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The United States and China have been conducting extensive operational-level 
engagement on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation issues for more than three 
decades. Many policy-makers and analysts are wondering whether such engagement has 
contributed in any way to more trust in the two countries’ nuclear relationship. The core 
question that this research seeks to address is: does operational-level engagement 
between the United States and China increase China’s trust towards the United States in 
their nuclear relationship? And if so, why is this the case and how does this take place? 
This research distinguishes strategic trust from moralistic trust. The former type of trust is 
based on recognition of common interests and the latter derives from recognition of 
shared moral principles. This research fills the gap in existing international relations 
research that does not answer the question of whether and how trust arises between states 
that do not imagine or understand there to be common interests or shared moral principles 
at the inception of engagement. Realist theories reject the issue of trust as a meaningful 
concept; neoliberals focus on redressing transaction costs to achieve common interests 
and they both see national interests as commonly understood and predetermined; 
constructivists, while acknowledging that identity affects perception of national interests, 
tend to focus on separate moments rather than analyzing what drives perception change 
during an extensive time period. This research traces an incremental process of 
convergence towards recognizing common interests between states that at first do not 
conceive of such common interests. It examines whether operational-level engagement is 
able to help states recognize and develop common interests and/or common moral 
principles. The research uses three cases in the U.S.-Chinese nuclear engagement to 
XV 
 
understand whether interaction at the operational-level can ultimately bring about 
convergence of perception at the top-level through building of epistemic community and 
bottom-up communication. 
The primary finding of this research is that U.S.-Chinese operational-level engagement 
did increase strategic trust at the top level but did not increase moralistic trust. For 
strategic trust, the case studies show that operational-level engagement played an 
important role in building and growing China’s nuclear community and helped them 
develop a common vocabulary with their American counterparts; such engagement 
wasnecessary for the Chinese nuclear community to learn, accept, internalize, and spread 
American nuclear arms control and nonproliferation concepts and theories; such 
engagement helped the Chinese nuclear community develop a much better inter-agency 
coordinating mechanism and helped them develop direct and indirect bottom-up 
communication channels that have been effective in promoting perception change at the 
top-level; such bottom-up driven perception change helped the Chinese to recognize 
more common interests with the United States and to become increasingly motivated to 
cooperate with the United States to achieve these newly-identified common interests; 
operational-level engagement also played an important role in building up the technical 
capacity of the Chinese nuclear community, making it easier for the two countries to 
achieve the newly-identified common interests. 
As for moralistic trust, the case studies show that operational-level engagement actually 
makes the Chinese nuclear community believe that the U.S. nuclear policy-making is 
guided by a few principles – none of which overlaps with China’s traditional nuclear 
moral/normative principles; operational-level engagement reveals and reinforces the 
XVI 
 
identity gap between China and the United States – the Chinese nuclear principles are 
based on their identification with the developing countries rather than the United States; 
operational-level engagement convinces the Chinese nuclear community that they should 
follow realpolitik principles in their nuclear policy-making and should give less 
consideration to moral/normative principles, thus undermining the basis for building 
“moralistic trust” between the two countries. 
The same findings hold true for both long-term operational-level engagement (the cases 
on U.S.-Chinese engagement on nuclear stability and arms control and U.S.-Chinese 
engagement on nuclear nonproliferation) and concentrated operational-level engagement 
(the case on CTBT). These case studies represent a comprehensive and systematic study 
of all the major operational-level engagement between the two countries on nuclear 




THE THEORY OF ENGAGEMENT AND TRUST-BUILDING 
 
Why Is Trust or Trust-building Relevant? 
The need for studying the issue of trust building is driven by important, real policy 
problems facing foreign policy decision-makers everywhere in the world. Many 
prominent policymakers and senior experts argue that trust is essential for fostering 
cooperation and avoiding conflict between nation-states and that lack of trust hampers 
progress on important foreign and security policy issues.1 In the U.S.-China nuclear 
relationship, the two countries have been able to carry out a number of successful 
cooperative actions on important nuclear arms control and nonproliferation issues (such 
as the drafting of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and joint action to counter regional 
proliferation).2But numerous senior U.S. and Chinese decision-makers and analysts still 
complain about lack of trust as the biggest obstacle to the two countries developing a 
1"Building U.S.-China Trust through Next Generation People, Platforms, and Programs," (U.S.-China Bi-
National Commission, USC Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism, Peking University 
School for International Studies, 2013); "Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula," (Seoul: Ministry 
of Unification, Republic of Korea, 2013); Jinping Xi, "New Asian Security Concept for New Progress in 
Security Cooperation: Remarks at the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence 
Building Measures in Asia,"(Shanghai Expo Center21 May 2014). 
2Lewis A. Dunn et al., "Building toward a Stable and Cooperative Long-Term U.S.-China Strategic 
Relationship (构建长期稳定、合作的中美战略关系),"(Science Applications International Corporation 
(科学应用国际公司), The Pacific Forum CSIS (战略与国际问题研究所太平洋论坛), and China Arms 
Control and Disarmament Association (中国军控与裁军协会), 2012); Nikita Perfilyev, "The Ctbt and 
Strategic Relations between Russia, China and the United States "(Program on Strategic Stability 
Evaluation, Georgia Institute of Technology, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2012); Jingping (李静平) 
Li, "A Preliminary Analysis on U.S.-China Strategic Stability: Contructing U.S.-China Strategic Stability 
Beyond Strategic Weapons (中美战略稳定初探——超越战略武器看中美战略稳定的构建)," in 13th 




                                                            
stable and constructive nuclear relationship.3 For instance, although the Chinese strongly 
believe and repeatedly claim that they would never need or intend to build a nuclear 
arsenal as large and powerful as that of the United States, the United States still very 
much skeptical that China might choose to “sprint to parity” and massively build up its 
nuclear forces.4 Such concerns have reduced U.S. interests in pursuing further nuclear 
reductions or engaging with China on nuclear arms control cooperation. Similarly, China 
has always been skeptical about the real intentions behind the U.S. development and 
deployment of missile defense systems globally and in the Asia Pacific region in 
particular.5 Such skepticism has prevented the two countries from reaching agreement on 
how to improve nuclear stability between them and in the region more broadly.6 Because 
of such suspicions and mistrust, both countries base their nuclear policymaking on worst-
case scenarios, which reinforces threat perceptions and leads to persistent high-level 
expenditures on nuclear-related defense projects that do not seem to fit with the overall 
bilateral and global environment in the twenty-first century. 
In spite of the need for better understanding about trust and trust building, the concept of 
trust is understudied in the field of international relations (IR). Questions such as what it 
means for states to trust, what the relationship between trust and cooperation is, how is 
3 See, for example, Elbridge A. Colby and Abraham M. Denmark, "Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China 
Relations: A Way Forward - a Report of the Poni Working Group on U.S.-China Nuclear 
Dynamics,"(Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013); Kenneth Lieberthal and 
Wang Jisi, "Addressing Us-China Strategic Distrust,"(John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings, 2012). 
4Gregory Kulacki, "China’s Nuclear Arsenal: Status and Evolution,"(Boston, MA: Union of Concerned 
Scientists, 2011); James M Acton, "Bombs Away? Being Realistic About Deep Nuclear Reductions," The 
Washington Quarterly 35, no. 2 (2012); Brad Roberts, "Asia's Major Powers and the Emerging Challenges 
to Nuclear Stability among Them,"(DTIC Document, 2009). 
5Keir A Lieber and Daryl G Press, "The Rise of Us Nuclear Primacy," Foreign Affairs (2006); Wu Riqiang, 
"China's Anxiety About Us Missile Defence: A Solution," Survival 55, no. 5 (2013). 




                                                            
trust detected and measured in interstate relations, how trust might emerge in an anarchic 
environment in the first place, and how it might grow, still do not have satisfactory 
answers. 
Moreover, analysts have argued that mutual trust can be built through bilateral 
engagement.7 The strategic engagement theory, for example, argues for using 
engagement to change and manipulate perception and behavior.8 Political leaders also 
call for bilateral dialogues and exchanges as a means to “increase mutual trust” and 
“remove prejudices, and differences” because “these exchanges give folks a chance to be 
able to have a deeper understanding of each other… and eventually that understanding 
can grow into trust.”9 In particular, some analysts claim that extensive bilateral 
engagement at operational levels between people who know and work on the issues on a 
day-to-day basis can help build interstate trust.10 According to this argument, growth of 
trust at the operational level can influence thinking at higher levels (e.g., the level of 
national decision-makers) and can lead to increase of trust at high levels.11 However, 
there has been no empirical research to support this argument. In the case of the U.S.-
China nuclear relationship, despite decades of operational-level bilateral mutual 
engagement, people still very often complain about the so-called “trust deficit” and argue 
7Yongjin Zhang, China in International Society since 1949: Alienation and Beyond(Macmillan Basingstoke, 
1998); David Shambaugh, "China's Military Views the World: Ambivalent Security," (2006). 
8Marc Lynch, "Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement," European Journal of 
International Relations 8, no. 2 (2002); Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, China Joins the World: 
Progress and Prospects(Council on Foreign Relations, 1999). 
9John Kerry, "Remarks at the Closing Session of the 2013 U.S.-China High-Level Consultation on People-to-
People Exchange,"(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, November 21, 2013). 
10Bin Li, "Promoting Effective China-U.S. Strategic Nuclear Dialogue,"(Washington DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, October 18, 2011). 
11Zhe Sun, "Building a Security Community in the Asia-Pacific Region: Dilemmas and Prospects,"(Tokyo: 
The Tokyo Foundation, 2012); Nicholas J. Wheeler, "The Challenges to Trust-Building in Nuclear Worlds 
Project Practitioners Meeting Report,"(The House of Commons, Members' Dining Room: David Davies 
Memorial Institute of International Studies, February 2010). 
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that “trust deficit” is causing serious problems.12 Many people have put their hope for a 
better U.S.-China nuclear relationship in the assumption that operational-level 
engagement will gradually remove mistrust and increase trust at both the operational and 
decision-making levels. The problem is, it does not appear that the so-called bottom-up 
engagement actually repairs the “trust deficit” or leads to more trust. Especially for 
people who argue that trust results from enhanced communication, engagement, 
transparency, and information sharing,13 it is really puzzling that although U.S. nuclear 
policies and the policy-making process have been relatively transparent, decades of 
bilateral interaction with China still have not persuaded Beijing to have more faith in 
Washington’s benign intentions. It is, therefore, necessary to ask the questions, what is 
the real impact of operational-level engagement on trust building? And are we wrong in 
expecting growth in trust as a result of bottom-up engagement? 
For the purpose of shedding light on these issues, this dissertation seeks to address this 
specific question: does operational-level engagement between the United States and 
China increase China’s trust toward the United States in their nuclear relationship? And if 
so, why is this the case and how does this take place? This research seeks to first clarify 
the meaning of trust in the context of the U.S.-China nuclear relationship and to then 
12Lynch, "Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement."; Ralph Cossa, Brad 
Glosserman, and David Santoro, "Progress Continues, but Disagreements Remain: The Seventh China-Us 
Strategic Dialogue on Strategic Nuclear Dynamics & the Inaugural China-Us Dialogue on Space Security," 
in Issues & Insights(Beijing, People's Republic of China: China Foundation for International and Strategic 
Studies (CFISS), Pacific Forum CSIS, January 2013). 
13Dunn et al., "Building toward a Stable and Cooperative Long-Term U.S.-China Strategic Relationship (构
建长期稳定、合作的中美战略关系)."; "Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space 
Activities,"  in Study Series 34(New York: United Nations, 2013); Des Browne et al., "Building Mutual 
Security in the Euro-Atlantic Region,"(Washington DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2013); "Building U.S.-
China Trust through Next Generation People, Platforms, and Programs." 
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examine the connection between operational-level engagement and high-level trust 
building in this relationship. 
Definitions of Trust in Existing Literature 
Trust is defined in numerous ways in the existing literature.14 In general, they can be 
grouped into three broad categories: trust as encapsulated interests, trust as risk-taking, 
and trust as bond. 
Trust as Encapsulated Interests 
In the prisoner’s dilemma, mutual defection is the default choice for both actors, and it is 
the only Nash equilibrium in the game in the sense that both actors prefer defection to 
cooperation with each other. In the assurance game, however, if one actor thinks the other 
will cooperate, it prefers to cooperate as well. That is, there is a Nash equilibrium in 
which both sides cooperate.15 This confirms the rationalist argument about trust—shared 
interests are the foundation. As Thomas C. Schelling states, “[W]hether polite or impolite, 
constructive or aggressive, respectful or vicious, whether it occurs among friends or 
antagonists and whether or not there is a basis for trust and goodwill, there must be some 
common interest, if only in the avoidance of mutual damage, and an awareness of the 
14 For discussions of the concept of trust in international relations, see, for example, Aaron M Hoffman, "A 
Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations," European Journal of International Relations 8, no. 3 
(2002).Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002).Elinor Ostrom 
and James Walker, Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons for Experimental Research, vol. 
6(Russell Sage Foundation, 2005); Margaret Levi and Valerie Braithwaite, Trust and Governance(Russell 
Sage Foundation, 1998); Niklas Luhmann et al., Trust; and, Power: Two Works by Niklas Luhmann(Wiley 
Chichester, 1979); Gregory A Bigley and Jone L Pearce, "Straining for Shared Meaning in Organization 
Science: Problems of Trust and Distrust," Academy of Management Review 23, no. 3 (1998). 
15Andrew H Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations(Princeton University Press, 2005). 
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need to make the other party prefer an outcome acceptable to oneself.”16According to 
rationalists’ understanding of the concept, actors trust on the basis of beliefs about others’ 
interests.17 Actors trust others when they believe that others’ interests “encapsulate” their 
own. Trust is a belief that potential partners have self-interest in cooperation.18 This 
concept of trust is based on a cold, sober evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages 
of trust—or, according to Hardin, it is a “matter of prudential assessment, not moral 
choice.”19 
Wheeler and Booth see this type of trust as “functional cooperation.”20 Rationalists such 
as Keohane, Olson, Uslaner, and Stein claim that trust is limited and situational.21 
“Actors trust specific others in particular contexts in which they have enough relevant 
information about interests. Trust is confined to particular situations but not generalized 
beyond.”22 In these situations, actors do not make judgments about others’ inherent 
trustworthiness; instead they explain and predict behavior according to situational 
circumstances.23 Accordingly, actors might have an incentive to cooperate in one area but 
to defect in another. 
16Thomas C Schelling, "The Diplomacy of Violence," Essential Readings in World Politics 2(1966). 
17Brian C Rathbun, Trust in International Cooperation: International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics 
and American Multilateralism(Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
18Russell Hardin, "Trust (Key Concepts)," Polity (2006). 
19"Conceptions and Explanations of Trust," Trust in society 2(2001); "Trust (Key Concepts)." 
20Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World 
Politics(Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
21Robert O Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy(Princeton 
University Press, 2005); Mancur Olson, "The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups, Second Printing with New Preface and Appendix (Harvard Economic Studies)," (1971); Eric M 
Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust(Cambridge University Press, 2002); Arthur A Stein, "Coordination 
and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World," International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982). 
22Rathbun, Trust in International Cooperation: International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics and 




                                                            
Trust as Risk-taking 
A number of scholars point out that trusting others involves making predictions about 
their future actions.24 Despite the existence of “encapsulated interests,” it is always 
difficult for the trustor to completely rule out the possibility that the trustee might still 
choose to act against the “encapsulated interests.” Actors that entrust their interests to 
others always run the risk of betrayal.25 As a result, some scholars claim that trust and 
uncertainty/risk are interconnected. According to them, trust always develops under 
conditions of uncertainty and never completely escapes it.26 If actors had100 percent 
certainty in a relationship, they would not need trust; trust would become an irrelevant 
concept.27 In this sense, Jonathan Mercer claims that what defines trust is “certainty 
beyond observable evidence.”28 In essence, trust involves the willingness to take risks.29 
Trust as Bond 
Rationalist accounts of trust in IR are attacked for overlooking some of its key social 
properties.30 Social psychologists point out that the key to building trust lies in 
individuals developing common identifications and ties, leading to a strong sense of 
24Luhmann et al., Trust; and, Power: Two Works by Niklas Luhmann; Adam B Seligman, The Problem of 
Trust(Princeton University Press, 2000); Diego Gambetta, "Can We Trust Trust," Trust: Making and 
breaking cooperative relations (2000). 
25Seligman, The Problem of Trust; James S Coleman and James Samuel Coleman, Foundations of Social 
Theory(Harvard University Press, 1994). 
26Barbara Misztal, Trust in Modern Societies: The Search for the Bases of Social Order(John Wiley & Sons, 
2013); Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World Politics; Emanuel 
Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities(Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
27Martin Hollis, Trust within Reason(Cambridge University Press, 1998); J David Lewis and Andrew Weigert, 
"Trust as a Social Reality," Social forces 63, no. 4 (1985). 
28Jonathan Mercer, "Rationality and Psychology in International Politics," International Organization 59, 
no. 1 (2005). 
29Hoffman, "A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations." 




                                                            
group identity.31 Their arguments suggest that trusting interstate relationships develop 
when leaders perceive that they and their counterparts in potential trustee states are 
members of the same social group or groups.  
In existing literature, shared identity is one of the most frequently cited causes of close 
relationships.32 According to the social identity theory, the more individuals “see 
themselves in terms of their shared similarities with other members of particular social 
categories, the more likely they are to engage in in-group favoritism and out-group 
discrimination.”33 Common group membership creates a sense of obligation among 
members that “develops out of identification with the group and group values.”34 The 
obligations group members feel toward one another as a result of their commitment to 
group values inhibit their willingness to take advantage of gains that come at each other’s 
expense. 
Trust and International Relations Theories 
Scholars have used various ways to define trust in the existing literature, but not many of 
them have systematically explored the concept of trust and especially its relationship with 
mainstream IR theories. This section provides a review about how trust is understood 
31The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World Politics; Marilynn B Brewer, "The Social 
Psychology of Intergroup Relations: Can Research Inform Practice?," Journal of Social Issues 53, no. 1 
(1997); Paul Seabright, The Company of Strangers: A Natural History of Economic Life (Revised 
Edition)(Princeton University Press, 2010). 
32Adler and Barnett, Security Communities; Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the 
International State," American political science review 88, no. 2 (1994). 
33Aaron Michael Hoffman, "In States We Trust: The Evolution and Decline of Trusting Relationships in the 
United States, 1776--1860, and the European Community, 1950--1986" (Ph.D., University of Pittsburgh, 
2001); Russell Spears, Bertjan Doosje, and Naomi Ellemers, "Commitment and the Context of Social 
Perception," (1999). 




                                                            
from the perspective of respective mainstream IR theories, how these perspectives relate 
to each other, and most importantly their limitations. 
Research on trust-related issues started in the early 1900s and was first conducted by 
economists. In his famous book The Philosophy of Money, published in 1907, German 
scholar Georg Simmel claims that trust is one of the most important powers of integration 
of a society. He states, “Without the general trust that people have in each other, society 
itself would disintegrate.”35 Since then, the concept of trust has been discussed by a large 
number of economists who have sought to understand how trust is necessary for any 
monetary system to work and the role that trust plays in business or trade relationships.36 
It was only in the 1970s that the concept of trust was initially examined by a number of 
sociologists, political scientists, and psychologists, among others.37 Before that, IR 
scholars did not pay much attention to the issue of trust, even though some early realist 
philosophers did reveal how they thought about issues related to trust in their works. 
Thomas Hobbes, for instance, pointed out that anarchy was the fundamental nature of the 
international system and implied that mistrust dominates interstate relations. For Hobbes, 
the state of nature is the state of war.38 Because of the anarchical nature of the 
international system, there is no place for trust and every state seeks to destroy of the 
35Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money(Psychology Press, 2004). 
36Lynne G Zucker, "Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic Structure, 1840–1920," 
Research in organizational behavior (1986); Roger C Mayer, James H Davis, and F David Schoorman, "An 
Integrative Model of Organizational Trust," Academy of management review 20, no. 3 (1995); Deepak 
Sirdeshmukh, Jagdip Singh, and Barry Sabol, "Consumer Trust, Value, and Loyalty in Relational 
Exchanges," Journal of marketing 66, no. 1 (2002). 
37Lewis and Weigert, "Trust as a Social Reality."; Alan Fox, Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust 
Relations(Faber & Faber London, 1974); Allan Silver, "Trust in Social and Political Theory," The Challenge 
of Social Control (1985); Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt and Luis Roniger, Patrons, Clients and Friends: 
Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society(Cambridge University Press, 1984). 
38Terry Nardin and David Mapel, Traditions of International Ethics(Cambridge Univ Press, 1992). 
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power of anyone else who might pose a threat. “During the time men live without a 
common power to keep them in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and 
such a war as is of every man against every man.”39 
The belief of realists is that not everyone is a security seeker and states may be 
aggressively motivated. As a result, even security seekers have to attack preventively and 
preemptively to destroy the power of others before they ever become a real threat.40 Such 
a belief is mostly embraced by IR scholars who later came to be known as offensive 
realists. For offensive realists such as John Mearsheimer, survival is the primary goal of 
states in an anarchic system. Because there is always uncertainty about the real intentions 
of other states, mistrust is unavoidable and a permanent background feature of IR. 
According to Mearsheimer, “states in the international system fear each other. They 
regard each other with suspicion, and they worry that war might be in the offing. They 
anticipate danger. There is little room for trust among states. Although the level of fear 
varies across time and space, it can never be reduced to a trivial level.”41 Instead of trust, 
fear is the key concept in offensive realism. The basis of this fear is that “in a world 
where states have the capability to offend against each other, and might have the motive 
to do so, any state bent on survival must be at least suspicious of other states and 
reluctant to trust them.”42 
39Thomas Hobbes, "Leviathan. Edited by Cb Macpherson 1968. Reprinted 1987,"(Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books); Gregory S Kavka, "Hobbes's War of All against All," Ethics (1983). 
40David P Gauthier, "The Logic of Leviathan: The Moral and Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes," (1969); 
Gregory S Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory(Princeton University Press, 1986). 




                                                            
The reason that offensive realists dismiss the concept of trust is that they believe that 
even if states have different motivations—security seeking or expansion—they would 
behave similarly in an anarchic system. Because “states seek to survive under anarchy by 
maximizing their power relative to other states, in order to maintain the means for self-
defense,” even security seekers “seek opportunities to weaken potential adversaries and 
improve their relative power position. They sometimes see aggression as the best way to 
accumulate more power at the expense of rivals.”43 Kenneth Waltz shares this view: “[I]n 
an anarchic domain, a state of war exists if all parties lust for power. But so too will a 
state of war exist if all states seek only to ensure their own safety.”44 
The underlining premise is that every state pursues “relative gains” rather than “absolute 
gains” when it comes to security issues. As Waltz puts it, “In an anarchic domain, the 
source of one’s own comfort is the source of another’s worry.”45 This, however, does not 
seem to always be the case in the U.S.-Chinese nuclear relationship. China has for 
decades kept a very modest nuclear stockpile, even when the U.S. stockpile grew to more 
than 30,000 nuclear weapons at the height of the Cold War.46 The “relative gains” against 
the United States, or any other country, do not appear to be a major concern for China’s 
decision makers. In many cases, both the United States and China showed significant 
interests in cooperating with each other to achieve common objectives such as the 
indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1995 and joint efforts to 
strengthen regional and international nonproliferation regimes. They even managed to 
43"Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International security (1990). 
44Kenneth N Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," Journal of Interdisciplinary History (1988). 
45Ibid. 
46Stephen I Schwartz, Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of Us Nuclear Weapons since 
1940(Brookings Institution Press, 2011). 
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work together and reached an agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. All these 
examples demonstrate that offensive realism’s obsession with relative gains and its 
categorical rejection of trust in IR have serious problems. 
Defensive realism differs from offensive realism in the sense that defensive realists reject 
the categorical dismissal of trust in IR. Although they share the basic realist assumption 
that states are rational, unitary actors in an anarchic system, they tend to highlight that 
states are motivated by the desire for security and are therefore mostly security seekers.47 
They believe that a certain level of trust can be established and states can form a 
relatively stable relationship. They can manage to coexist peacefully and to cooperate on 
common interests.48 
Moreover, defensive realists believe that the way to build trust is to manage to send 
accurate signals about one’s benign and security-seeking intentions that can be 
distinguished from aggressive intentions.49 Some of their research focuses on the 
conditions that may make it easier or more difficult to send distinguishable signals. The 
offense-defense balance literature, for example, argues that in a defense-dominant 
environment, if defensive weapons and offensive weapons are clearly distinguishable, 
security-seeking countries can choose to invest in defensive weapons to signal their 
benign intentions to each other and therefore avoid an arms race.50 
47Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," Security 
Studies 7, no. 1 (1997); Jeffrey W Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism 
Revisited," (2006); Charles L Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International 
Security (1994). 
48Michael Spirtas, "A House Divided: Tragedy and Evil in Realist Theory," Security Studies 5, no. 3 (1996). 
49Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help." 
50Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World politics 30, no. 02 (1978); Charles L 
Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," ibid.50, no. 01 (1997). 
12 
 
                                                            
Trust is not a central concept for liberalism either. But liberal scholars attach more 
importance to common interests. Neoliberals believe that the building of interdependence 
can lead to a web of shared interests that promotes cooperation.51 Robert Keohane’s 
neoliberal institutionalism highlights the possibility of contingent cooperation even in an 
anarchic system.52 For neoliberal institutionalists, trust is possible but is specific to 
particular situations and is based on information.53 They recognize that fear drives states’ 
policy-making in anarchy but believe that fear results from lack of information. “Through 
the provision of information, trust of particular others becomes possible. As shadows of 
future are lengthened, linkages are created, and reputations put at a premium, the level of 
trust between egoists increases as their interests come to encapsulate one another. All of 
these mechanisms focus almost exclusively on creating incentives for trustworthy 
behavior through adjustments to the strategic environment.”54 
One of the liberal theories that relates to the issue of trust is the theory that argues that it 
is less likely for democratic countries to fight democratic countries.55 There are various 
explanations about why this might be the case, but the general idea is that democratic 
countries are more likely to be security seekers. For instance, Jack Snyder points out that 
centralized political systems are more likely to embrace expansionist interests whereas 
51David Allen Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate(Columbia University 
Press, 1993). 
52O Keohanc Robert, "After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy," 
Princeton: Princeton University Press 12(1984). 
53Brian C Rathbun, "It Takes All Types: Social Psychology, Trust, and the International Relations Paradigm 
in Our Minds," International Theory 1, no. 03 (2009); Robert M. Axelrod, The Evolution of 
Cooperation(New York: Basic Books, 1984); Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: 
Hypotheses and Strategies," World Politics 38, no. 01 (1985). 
54Rathbun, "It Takes All Types: Social Psychology, Trust, and the International Relations Paradigm in Our 
Minds."P. 350. 
55James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace 
Proposition(University of South Carolina Press Columbia, 1995); Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic 
Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World(Princeton University Press, 1994). 
13 
 
                                                            
democratic systems undermine the ability of political elites to promote expansionist 
interests.56 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James Morrow, and others argue that authoritarian 
states are more likely to be expansionists because the ruling few are the ones who 
disproportionately benefit from any military invasion or conquest and therefore have a 
particular interest in expansionist policies.57 Others make the argument that ordinary 
citizens have a bigger voice in influencing policy-making in democracies. Because 
ordinary citizens often bear the highest cost and suffering from wars, they are usually less 
inclined to launch wars with other countries. This makes democracies less likely to be 
expansionists.58 
For these reasons, liberal theory suggests that regime types affect interstate trust building 
and that democracies are more likely to trust each other. This, however, is not very 
helpful for understanding trust building between a democracy and a nondemocracy, such 
as between the United States and China. On the one hand, the United States and China 
have different domestic political systems; on the other hand, there could be significant 
common interests between the two. As mentioned before, neoliberal institutionalists 
recognize that common interests are the foundation for building trust and that provision 
of information will help reduce mistrust.59 Thus, what would happen when these 
contradictory conditions come together? What is the specific impact of regime type on 
56Jack Snyder, "Myths of Empire," Domestic Politics and International Ambition, Ithaca, NY (1991). 
57Bruce Bueno De Mesquita et al., "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," American 
Political Science Review (1999). 
58John M Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," International security (1994); Bruce Bueno 
De Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives(Cambridge Univ 
Press, 1992). 
59Robert O Keohane and Lisa L Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," International Security 20, 
no. 1 (1995). 
14 
 
                                                            
trust building in a democracy-nondemocracy dyad? These issues need to be further 
explored. 
Neoliberal institutionalism’s reliance on transparency and provision of information for 
reducing uncertainty and building trust has its limitations. Interstate communication and 
share of information is rarely thorough, complete, and symmetric.60 Even if there is 
sufficient information available, verification of the authenticity of the shared information 
beforehand is always difficult. Especially for highly sensitive national security issues, 
neoliberal institutionalists do not explain how states can be convinced to exercise self-
restraint and goodwill and commit themselves to building institutions in the first place. 
In general, rationalist theories assume that states have clearly defined and predetermined 
interests. Their analysis “relies on a strategic conception of rationality, in which actors 
seek the best strategy for realizing predetermined preferences.”61 For many realists, states’ 
interests are predetermined by the structure of the international system. One’s relative 
material capability determines one’s position in the system, which then determines one’s 
interests. Knowledge of capabilities is viewed as far more reliable than knowledge of 
intentions.62 From the realist perspective, intentions can and will change; states are better 
off focusing on power rather than intentions.63 As a result, structural realists pay little 
60Miao (耿淼) Geng, "Theoretical Research on Inter-State Trust Issue in the Modern States' System: The 
Concept of Inter-State Trust and Its Compatibility with the Prevailing International Relation Theories (现代
国家体系中国家间信任问题的理论初探——国家间信任的概念及其与主流国际关系理论的兼容性)" 
(Renmin University of China (中国人民大学), 2005). 
61Lynch, "Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement." 
62Barry Buzan, Charles A Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural 
Realism(Columbia University Press, 1993); Kenneth N Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," 
International security 25, no. 1 (2000). 
63Stefano Guzzini, "Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis," International Organization 
47, no. 03 (1993). 
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attention to issues of understanding intentions through interstate communication and 
signaling.64 
Neoliberal institutionalists are more concerned with effective communication and 
conveying reliable information about states’ preferences. Their research focuses on how 
to send credible signals to convey preferences and intentions. The “costly signal” 
argument, for example, points out that a costly signal is more credible and can help 
distinguish real intentions from “cheap talks.”65 Some experts use the “costly signal” 
theory to understand the dynamics of “hand-tying” and “sunk-cost” signals in 
international politics and to evaluate whether forward deployment of tactical nuclear 
weapons by the United States in allied countries would help send “costly signal” about 
U.S. commitment in extended nuclear deterrence and therefore improve the credibility of 
U.S. reassurance to its allies.66 
However, from the trust-building perspective, “costly signal” can only serve to reveal 
true intentions at a time; it does not speak to how confidence about a state’s long-term 
intentions can be established. More importantly, such theories tend to dismiss the 
usefulness of long-term bilateral engagement for improving mutual understanding about 
each other’s intentions. From this perspective, communication is a form of “cheap talk,” 
64Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help."; Daryl Grayson Press, Calculating Credibility: 
How Leaders Assess Military Threats(Cornell University Press, 2005). 
65Andrew Kydd, "Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation," American Journal of Political 
Science 47, no. 4 (2003); James D Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests Tying Hands Versus Sinking 
Costs," Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 1 (1997); Daniel T Blumstein et al., "The Peacock’s Tale: 
Lessons from Evolution for Effective Signaling in International Politics," Cliodynamics: The Journal of 
Theoretical and Mathematical History 3, no. 1 (2012). 
66See, for example, Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S Sechser, "Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand‐
Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence," American Journal of Political Science (2014); 
Philipp C Bleek and Eric Lorber, "Friends Don’t Let Friends Proliferate: Credibility, Security Assurances, 
and Allied Nuclear Proliferation,"(Paper Prepared for the Project On Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE) 
and the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, 2013). 
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which is not costly and thus cannot increase credibility.67 In practice, however, such 
“cheap talk”—when it takes place on a sustained, long-term basis—can indeed help 
reveal true intentions and promote mutual understanding. This research’s in-depth study 
on U.S.-Chinese engagement on a range of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation 
issues speaks to that effect. In other words, “cheap talk” can be as useful a tool for 
revealing true intentions as “costly signals.” 
In general, rationalists perceive a state’s interests and preferences as predetermined and 
fixed. For traditional realists, as mentioned above, a state’s interests are derived from the 
structure of the international system and its relative position within this system.68 For 
liberal institutionalists, a state also has clearly defined and fixed interests. What liberal 
institutionalists focus on is how to reduce transaction costs and help states achieve their 
predetermined interests through the development of institutions.69 This is why rationalist 
theories have serious problems for understanding how trust gets built. In the case of U.S.-
Chinese nuclear engagement, there is clear evidence that Chinese understanding of their 
national interests changed, partly as a result of bilateral engagement. During the late 
1980s and early 1990s, China’s relative position in the international system did not 
change significantly, but China’s attitudes toward a range of important nuclear arms 
control and nonproliferation issues changed dramatically. By tracing the evolution of 
China’s domestic discussion on these issues, this research finds that such change of 
attitudes was primarily due to a perception change on fundamental assumptions about 
67Charles L Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and 
Deterrence Models," World politics 44, no. 04 (1992). 
68Guzzini, "Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis." 
69Robert O Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches(Springer, 1989); Andrew Moravcsik, 




                                                            
what are China’s interests, and this perception change was very much attributable to the 
influence of U.S.-Chinese nuclear engagement. In other words, a state’s interests and 
preferences are not predetermined or fixed, even when the structure of the international 
system remains the same. Rationalist theories cannot account for the change of a state’s 
perception of its interests. Since rationalists believe that common interests are the 
foundation for trust, their view about predetermined national interests undermines their 
ability to explain trust building in IR. 
Contrary to the rationalist argument, this research points out that common interests do not 
automatically become incentives for cooperation because states do not always 
automatically recognize the existence of common interests. In many cases, as this 
research will show, a state’s perception of its interests and of other states’ interests 
changes, even when external material variables remain the same. It is not a 
straightforward process for two states to come to agree on whether they share common 
interests or what their common interests are. In this regard, this research recognizes that 
trust-building is less about any static perception of common interests and more about the 
process by which two states come to recognize that they share more common interests 
than they previously thought. This incremental process of perceived convergence toward 
common interests is an important part of trust building that has not been fully addressed 
by the existing literature. 
In addition, rationalist theories tend to ignore the influence of morality or ethics. For 
realist scholars, morality or norms do not play an important role. Morgenthau, for 
example, warns against a moralistic foreign policy, and believes that there are no 
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universal moral principles that apply to state actions.70 Moral considerations must be 
subordinate to “reason of state.” “Other criteria, sadder, more limited, more practical 
must be allowed to prevail.”71 Realism’s rejection of moral considerations does not seem 
to fit with the empirical record, even in highly sensitive national security issue areas. In 
the case of China’s nuclear policy-making, China’s persistent embrace of the 
unconditional No First Use policy is an example of moral consideration. Mao Zedong and 
Deng Xiaoping pointed to moral considerations as the primary reason for their adoption 
of the No First Use policy,72 despite the fact that No First Use actually reduced China’s 
capability to deter large-scale conventional attacks and was not the best choice for China 
from a pure security perspective.73 
Morality does not receive priority attention in liberal theories either. Liberal 
institutionalists focus on how to derive an accurate understanding about a state’s intention 
through communication and signaling. Based on understanding of intentions, they 
distinguish security seekers (status quo countries) from aggressors (expansionist 
countries).74 Some point out that democratic states are more likely to be security seekers 
because they usually find wars to be costly and of little intrinsic benefit, whereas 
authoritarian states are more likely to be aggressive and volatile because of fewer 
70Hans Morgenthau, "Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Peace and Power,"(New York: Knopf, 1973). 
71George Frost Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Policy(Norton, 1966). 
72Jin (邹谨) Zou, "Deng Xiaoping's Nuclear Strategy Thinking (邓小平的核战略思想)," Journal of the Party 
School of CPC Yunan Province Committee (中共云南省委党校学报), no. 04 (2006); Lijuan (蔡丽娟) Cai, 
"An Analysis of Deng Xiaoping's Nuclear Strategic Thinking (论邓小平的核战略思想)," Theory Guide (理
论导刊), no. 04 (2006); Li (王莉) Wang, "Factors Behind the Evolution of China' Nuclear Strategy During 
the Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Era (毛泽东与邓小平时代的中国核战略演进动因分析)" (Foreign 
Affairs University, 2011). 
73Brad Roberts, Robert A Manning, and Ronald N Montaperto, "China: The Forgotten Nuclear Power," 
Foreign Affairs (2000). 
74Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," International 
Security 24, no. 1 (1999). 
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citizenry constraints.75 It is also argued that democratic states are more likely to be seen 
as security seekers because of their transparency.76 In any case, liberalists argue that 
some countries are more likely to be trusted as security seekers for reasons of their 
domestic political systems rather than moral considerations. Trust is not linked to 
morality in these theories. 
Morality plays a much more prominent role in constructivism. The moral principles that a 
state embraces are regarded as part of a state’s identity,77 and states’ identity is at the core 
of constructivists’ understanding of trust. For constructivists, international politics is 
socially constructed and collective identity is the precondition for trust.78 They argue that 
perceptions about each other’s identity determine whether they see each other as friends 
or enemies.79 If two states believe that they have a shared identity, they are more likely to 
see each other as friends and they are more likely to trust each other. This collective 
identity helps construct a friendly relationship and makes self-help behavior less likely to 
take place, which is conducive to the formation of a “security community.”80 In contrast, 
if two states believe that they do not share a collective identity, they are more likely to 
75Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations. 
76De Mesquita and Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives. 
77Amy Gutmann, Identity in Democracy(Princeton University Press, 2009); Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral 
Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International 
Relations(Princeton University Press, 1999). 
78Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics(Cambridge University Press, 1999); Rathbun, "It 
Takes All Types: Social Psychology, Trust, and the International Relations Paradigm in Our Minds." 
79Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics; Yaqing (秦亚青) Qin, "Anarchy in International System: A 
Review of Wendt's Social Theory of International Politics (国际体系的无政府性——读温特<国际政治的
社会理论)," International Politics (国际政治), no. 10 (2001). 
80Geng, "Theoretical Research on Inter-State Trust Issue in the Modern States' System: The Concept of 




                                                            
see each other as enemies and much less likely to trust each other.81 A number of studies 
have shown that threat perception is not only based on material capability but is also 
affected by ideational factors. Different political ideologies make states feel threatened 
and compel them to react to the perceived ideational threats.82 Some scholars have used 
empirical evidence to show that perception of each other’s identity does influence one 
state’s threat perception of the other. Democracies, for examples, are less likely to 
construct other democracies as threats but are more likely to construct external 
nondemocracies as threats.83 
One problem is that mainstream constructivist theories cannot account for significant 
cooperation between states that do not share common identities.84 They argue that shared 
identity allows for the initiation of the cooperative process. This contradicts empirical 
evidence in the U.S.-Chinese nuclear relationship. As this research will show, there was 
little common identity between the United States and China, but they still managed to 
cooperate on a range of important nuclear arms control and nonproliferation issues 
including the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the indefinite extension 
of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, among others. 
However, constructivism does not reject the possibility of building trust between states. 
Wendt, for example, points out that fear and conflict are not inevitable. States are not 
81Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics; John Gerard Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang 
Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," International organization 52, no. 
04 (1998); Geng, "Theoretical Research on Inter-State Trust Issue in the Modern States' System: The 
Concept of Inter-State Trust and Its Compatibility with the Prevailing International Relation Theories (现代
国家体系中国家间信任问题的理论初探——国家间信任的概念及其与主流国际关系理论的兼容性)." 
82Lawrence Rubin, Islam in the Balance: Ideational Threats in Arab Politics(Stanford University Press, 2014). 
83Jarrod Hayes, Constructing National Security: Us Relations with China and India(Cambridge University 
Press, 2013). 




                                                            
doomed to live forever in a highly competitive, self-help Hobbesian anarchy; they can 
actually change the dynamics of their interaction and live in a more cooperative 
environment if they choose.85 For constructivists, the key to start this transformative 
process is to build trust through interaction: “Trust-building might begin through a 
rationalist process of signaling and conveying information, but the process is more 
transformative, allowing for a redefinition of self and other from adversary to partner to 
friend.”86 
The limitation of this argument is that it has not been proven by empirical evidence. 
Constructivists believe that engagement is not only about communication: engagement 
can help understand preferences, but more importantly it can help change preferences.87 
Research on engagement and foreign policy change indicates that engagement may be 
able to bring about four graduated levels of a country’s foreign policy change: adjustment 
change, program change, problem/goal change, and international orientation change.88 
Among them, the international orientation change is the most extreme form of foreign 
policy change that involves “the redirection of the actor's entire orientation toward world 
affairs” and “a basic shift in the actor's international role and activities.”89 The problem is 
there has been little empirical research that actually shows that such a fundamental 
change of self-identification and one’s “international role” indeed take place as a result of 
communication and engagement. Does engagement help states embark on a more 
85Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 
International organization 46, no. 02 (1992). 
86Rathbun, "It Takes All Types: Social Psychology, Trust, and the International Relations Paradigm in Our 
Minds." 
87Lynch, "Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement." 
88Charles F Hermann, "Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy," 




                                                            
cooperative path by bringing about identity change? This is the question that 




A Better Framework for Understanding Trust 
The rationalist understanding of trust, especially the trust-as-encapsulated-interests 
school of thought rightly emphasizes encapsulated interests as the material foundation of 
a trusting relationship. From their perspective, trust means full predictability resulting 
from removing as much uncertainty/risk as possible from calculations of benefits and 
costs. However, defining trust in such a fully deterministic setting runs the risk of 
begging the question of the relevance of trust in IR: when there is no threat of betrayal, 
there is no “problem of trust” in the first place. 
This is where the trust-as-risk-taking school of thought comes into play. The trust-as-risk-
taking school, however, is also problematic. It equates trust with willingness to take risks 
but fails to distinguish different types of risk taking in IR. There is one type of risk taking 
in which the trustor expects the trustee to cooperate because the trustor believes that the 
trustee will do “what is right” even if this means sacrificing some of the trustee’s own 
benefits.90 There is also another type of risk taking in which one simply makes a series of 
90Charles W Kegley and Gregory A Raymond, When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World 
Politics(University of South Carolina Press, 1990); Bernhardt Lieberman, "I-Trust: A Notion of Trust in 
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calculations that include the chances of the other choosing to cooperate against the 
chances of the other choosing to cheat, as well as the benefits and costs associated with 
each possible choice that the other might make. Based on such calculations or 
assessments, one then makes a decision whether to take the risk or not. The second type 
of risk taking is closer to risk taking in gambling than to risk taking in a trusting 
relationship as people normally understand it. 
Therefore, trust sometimes implies a willingness to take risks related to the behavior of 
others based on the belief that potential trustees will “do what is right.” This distinguishes 
trusting from nontrusting relationships. Thus, researchers cannot simply look at decision-
making records to find and measure trust. They have to look into the domestic policy-
making process to detect a trusting relationship by connecting the decision-making record 
to the policy choices and deliberation process. 
In general, the existing literature agrees that trust is closely related to predictability. What 
the experts disagree about is where this predictability comes from. The trust-as-
encapsulated-interests school believes that predictability derives from the recognition of 
common interests. In comparison, the trust-as-risk-taking school and the trust-as-bond 
school do not reject encapsulated interests as one source for generating predictability, but 
their arguments imply that predictability can also be generated by something other than 
material calculations (i.e., faith in shared moral values and principles). Some experts 
describe such trust as “generalized trust,” as opposed to “situational” trust or trust that is 
Three-Person Games and International Affairs," Journal of Conflict Resolution (1964); Bernard Barber, The 
Logic and Limits of Trust, vol. 96(Rutgers University Press New Brunswick, NJ, 1983). 
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“tailored to individual circumstances.”91 When people say Actor A is more trustworthy 
than Actor B, their trust toward Actor A is not completely contingent upon specific 
situations but is a reflection of their confidence that they can better predict the behavior 
of Actor A than that of Actor B because they have faith in their shared moral values with 
A. In this research, I use the term “moralistic trust” to refer to the second type of trust, 
which is based on predictability derived from shared moral values and principles, and I 
use the term “strategic trust” to name the first type of trust, which is based on 
predictability derived from encapsulated interests.  
The problem with the traditional approach for measuring trust is already recognized by 
some scholars.92 For instance, one approach assumes that presence of trust is necessary 
for cooperation to take place.93 Under this assumption, there is no need to develop a 
separate method for measuring trust. Since the existence of cooperation indicates the 
presence of trust, cases of cooperation are treated as cases of trust. The problem is that 
cooperation may be motivated by a range of factors that have nothing to do with trust. 
States could be coerced into cooperation, for instance. This research seeks to avoid using 
cooperation to measure trust. Instead, it uses the following indicators to measure the 
existence of different types of trust (as shown in Table 1). 
  
91Rathbun, Trust in International Cooperation: International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics and 
American Multilateralism. 
92Hoffman, "In States We Trust: The Evolution and Decline of Trusting Relationships in the United States, 
1776--1860, and the European Community, 1950--1986." 
93Deborah Welch Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust: Us-Soviet Relations During the Cold War(Cornell University 
Press, 2000); Morton Deutsch, "Trust and Suspicion," Journal of conflict resolution 2, no. 4 (1958); 
Coleman and Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory. 
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• No recognition of common 
interests 
• No recognition of shared 
moral principles 
• No expression of common 
interests 




• Recognition of common 
interests;  
• No recognition of shared 
moral principles 
• Expression of common 
interests 
• No emphasis on importance 
of moral principles in policy-
making 
o Expression of 
principles of self-
help, power politics, 
and coercion 
• Expression of conflicting 
moral principles with the 
partner 
• Risk aversion 
o High demand for 
verification 
o Use enforcement to 
address uncertainty 
o Hedging strategy 
Moralistic 
Trust 
• Recognition of shared 
moral principles 
• Emphasis on importance of 
moral principles in policy-
making 
• Expression of shared moral 
principles 
• Internalization of shared 
norms 
• Expression of strong group 
identity with the partner 
• Cooperative risk-acceptance 
o Low demand for 
verification 
o Allow for delayed 
“compensatory” 
reciprocation 





In this research, “no trust” refers to a relationship where there are no recognized common 
interests or shared moral principles. In such a zero-sum game, actors use deceptions to 
deliberately increase unpredictability. One example of “no trust” would be the U.S.-
China nuclear relationship before China set up its small rudimentary nuclear force. 
Before that, China had no experience of operating a nuclear force and had no 
appreciation of the potential risks and consequences of unintentional nuclear conflict and 
inadvertent escalation. China therefore adopted deceptive policies to create the greatest 
amount of confusion possible in the mind of American policy makers out of the belief 
that the more the Americans were confused/deceived, the better Chinese interests were 
protected.  
“Strategic trust” refers to the relationship in which the recognition of common interests 
motivates actors to cooperate but there is no recognition of shared moral principles. In 
this relationship, Actor A sees Actor B as either having low regard for moral principles in 
policy-making or having conflicting moral principles with Actor A. In the first case, 
Actor A may believe Actor B has a worldview of hard-nosed realpolitik (i.e., embracing 
realpolitik doctrines of self-help and power politics and rejecting moral principles as 
guidance for policy). In the second case, Actor A may perceive Actor B as a follower of 
some moral principles, but their moral principles are different or even conflicting. In 
either case, without any ethical bond or moral connections, Actor A would choose to 
cooperate with B completely out of “strategic” calculations. However, the existence of 
common interests does not always guarantee the complete avoidance of cheating taking 
place, especially if Actor B could get more benefit from exploiting A’s preference for 
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cooperation. So if A faces any significant uncertainty/risk, it will not cooperate, despite 
the existence of common interests. In other words, A is risk averse.  
Because Actor A is not open to taking any uncertainty/risk in granting Actor B discretion 
over A’s own interests, it either demands perfect information about B’s intention, 
capability, etc., or needs institutional mechanisms to help remove any uncertainty that B 
might cheat during their interaction. One example of “strategic trust” can be found in 
U.S.-China negotiation over the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in which both 
countries had shared interests in prohibiting further nuclear testing. But they only 
managed to cooperate on this matter after spending years setting up a comprehensive 
verification system, as well as a set of complicated rules to prevent inspection abuses and 
gaining strong confidence about the reliability of the systems and institutions. If the 
verification technology at that time did not manage to satisfy their demand for almost 
zero uncertainty, the CTBT negotiation would have probably failed. 
It is necessary to emphasize that the “recognition” of common interests is key for 
“strategic trust.” In other words, both actors need to “recognize” that they share common 
interests for any “strategic trust” to exist. Many rationalist studies talk about common 
interests as if they were an objective reality that is apparent to everyone.94 This research 
will show that this is not necessarily the case. It took the United States and China much 
time and effort to recognize that they do share common interests on important nuclear 
issues, and the scope and scale of these perceived common interests has increased over 
time. This, by itself, constitutes an important part of U.S.-Chinese trust building. 
94Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches; Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal 
Theory of International Politics." 
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“Moralistic trust” is the existence of a sense of moral obligation that develops out of 
identification with the trustor and its moral principles. As opposed to strategic trust—the 
belief that a potential trustee will do what is beneficial for itself—moralistic trust is based 
on the belief that a potential trustee will “do what is right.” The trustee’s commitment to 
the moral values of the trustor or the values of the group in which they are both members 
inhibits the trustee from taking advantage of gains at the expense of the trustor.  
For moralistic trust to work, the trustee needs to show that it respects moral principles as 
an important guide in its policy deliberation and that it shares the same set of moral 
principles with the trustor. It needs to internalize those international norms that the trustor 
embraces and share a strong sense of group identity and in-group favoritism with the 
trustor. The most important indicator for moralistic trust—which distinguishes it from 
strategic trust—is the trustor’s cooperative, risk-accepting behavior toward the trustee. 
Risk-averse realpolitik thinking is thus transcended and replaced by some sort of 
idealpolitik thinking that can only take place under a strong sense of shared moral 
principles. When it comes to nuclear arms control and nonproliferation, it usually means 
less demand on verification regimes and higher tolerance for delayed reciprocation from 
the partner in bilateral interactions.95 
Another indicator for “moralistic trust” is the embrace of security dilemma sensibility. 
Security dilemma sensibility refers to a state’s awareness about the existence of a security 
dilemma and about the possibility that one’s own defensive action can create fear in the 
mind of the other and can drive the other to take countermeasures. Ken Booth and 
95Roderick M. Kramer, Marilynn B. Brewer, and Benjamin A. Hanna, Collective Trust and Collective Action: 
The Decision to Trust as a Social Decision. Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research. Sage 
Publications, Inc(Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 1996). 
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Nicholas Wheeler define security dilemma as “an actor’s intention and capacity to 
perceive the motives behind, and to show responsiveness towards, the potential 
complexity of the military intentions of others. In particular, it refers to the ability to 
understand the role that fear might play in their attitudes and behaviour, including, 
crucially, the role that one’s own actions may play in provoking that fear.”96 The 
realpolitik assumption is that states have malignant intentions or must be treated as if 
they do.97 But if a state is sensible about the existence and impact of a security dilemma, 
it understands that the other’s seemingly threatening behavior might not necessarily be a 
sign of aggression and it could very well be a response to one’s own seemingly defensive 
action. As a result, security dilemma sensibility helps a state avoid overexaggeration of 
threat and avoid worst-case analysis of the other’s intentions. This helps lay the ground 
for states to build “moralistic trust.” 
Bottom-Up Engagement and Trust-building 
Although trust is an important concept in IR theory, there has not been much work 
devoted to explaining how interstate trust emerges in the first place and how it develops. 
Much of the conceptual framework on trust used in IR literature is adopted from social 
psychology studies.98 As a result, studies of trust in IR usually assume that interpersonal 
notions of trust can be used, without modification, to understand interstate relations. This 
9696Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World Politics; Nicholas J 
Wheeler, "To Put Oneself into the Other Fellow's Place': John Herz, the Security Dilemma and the Nuclear 
Age," International Relations 22, no. 4 (2008); Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, "Rethinking the Security 
Dilemma," Security Studies. 
97Rathbun, "It Takes All Types: Social Psychology, Trust, and the International Relations Paradigm in Our 
Minds." 
98Brewer, "The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations: Can Research Inform Practice?."; Coleman and 
Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory; Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness; Lewis and Weigert, "Trust as a 
Social Reality."; Tyler, "Why Do People Rely on Others? Social Identity and Social Aspects of Trust." 
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assumption, however, is problematic. It obscures important differences between 
interpersonal and interstate behavior, and more importantly, it avoids the critical question 
of the relationship between trust at the interpersonal level, or trust between groups of 
individuals, and trust at interstate level (between national states).  
In the existing literature, there are generally two approaches to applying interpersonal 
trust to the realm of interstate relations. The unitary rational actor approach reduces a 
national state into a fictional decision maker and treats interstate trust as trust between the 
fictional decision makers.99 In contrast, the societal approach implies that states trust each 
other when their citizens and citizen-associations trust each other.100 
Both approaches present serious problems for understanding interstate trust. In the reality 
of national decision making, there are a variety of different domestic players who 
participate or have influence in the process: citizens or citizen groups, officials at 
different bureaucratic levels, and the national leadership, among others. Reducing the 
complex decision-making body into one fictional decision maker makes it impossible to 
understand how trust really gets built during interstate interaction. The societal approach 
also fails to describe how states act upon the trust that citizens or citizen groups feel for 
each other. It also does not take into account the very likely scenario that different citizen 
groups have different perceptions when it comes to trusting their counterparts in another 
state. In this case, the regime type or the type of domestic political institution of a state is 
going to affect the extent to which it can mediate conflicting domestic perceptions. This, 
99Zeev Maoz and Dan S Felsenthal, "Self-Binding Commitments, the Inducement of Trust, Social Choice, 
and the Theory of International Cooperation," International Studies Quarterly (1987); Andrew Kydd, "Trust, 
Reassurance, and Cooperation," International Organization 54, no. 2 (2000). 
100Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity(Free Press New York, 1995). 
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however, has not been elaborated by the societal approach, although there is limited 
discussion about the relationship between regime type, audience cost, and foreign policy 
signaling.101 
For individuals or individual groups to influence the overall thinking of a state, they need 
to overcome resistance in political and administrative structures and processes. 
Bureaucratic inertia and standard operating procedures pose significant obstacles.102 It is 
usually assumed that in authoritarian countries individuals or individual groups encounter 
much greater problems in influencing policy-making. But this research will show that this 
is not necessarily the case, especially in the nuclear area. In the Chinese case, there were 
actually plenty of bottom-up communication channels and ways for operational-level 
players to influence state thinking and policy-making. In general, the existing literature 
on trust has not fully explained the connection between individuals or individual groups 
and state decision making and has not shown how the microprocesses take place. 
For most scholars, the individuals of interest are the members of the “foreign policy 
executive…[d]efined as the high-ranking bureaucrats and elected executive officials 
charged with the overall conduct of defense and foreign affairs.”103 When it comes to 
interstate trust-building, Chinese policy makers and scholars also point to the important 
role played by high-level decision makers and argue that trust can only be built between 
top decision makers first before it is possible to talk about trust between policy 
101Jessica L Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," International 
Organization (2008); Michael Tomz, "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental 
Approach," ibid.61, no. 4 (2007). 
102Hermann, "Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy." 
103Hoffman, "In States We Trust: The Evolution and Decline of Trusting Relationships in the United States, 
1776--1860, and the European Community, 1950--1986."; G John Ikenberry, David A Lake, and Michael 
Mastanduno, The State and American Foreign Economic Policy(Cornell University Press, 1988). 
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practitioners at operational levels. They emphasize the importance of political 
commitment at the very top level for starting the trust-building process.104 This is usually 
called the “top-down” approach of building trust. 
In contrast, many Western policy makers and analysts have more faith in the so-called 
“bottom-up” approach of building trust.105 The argument is that trust can be built from 
engagement and cooperation at operational levels and then spreads upward to facilitate 
the growth of trust at top decision-maker levels. The epistemic community theory seems 
to lend support to this argument, although this theory focuses on explaining interstate 
cooperation rather than interstate trust. 
The concept of epistemic community is used to describe a “network of professionals with 
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to 
policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.”106 Scholars who study 
international cooperation are interested in epistemic communities because they believe 
that epistemic communities can use their recognized expertise to influence policy makers 
104Hui Xu, "Why Is It Difficult to Build U.S.-China Military Mutual Trust? (中美军事互信为何难以建立？)," 
Foreign Affairs Review (外交评论) no. 2 (2010); Dawei Xiao, "Chinese Traditional Strategic Culture and the 
Cross-Straits Military Security Mutual Trust Mechanism Construction (中国传统战略文化与两岸军事安
全互信机制的构建之道)," Journal of Binzhou University (滨州学院学报) 28, no. 1 (2012); Lin Sun, 
"Repeated Games and Mechanism Construction: A Research on Cross-Strait Confidence-Builing of Military 
Security (重复博弈与机制构建：两岸军事安全互信探析)," Taiwan Research Journal (台湾研究集刊), 
no. 2 (2012); Dawei Xiao, "Choosing the Right Research Approach to Study the Construction of Cross-Strait 
Military Security Mutual Trust-Building Mechanism (两岸军事安全互信机制构建问题的研究视角选择)," 
Taiwan Research and Cross-Strait Relations (台湾研究-两岸关系）, no. 1 (2012); Rusong Wu, A New 
Reading of the Art of the War (孙子兵法新说), 1 ed.(Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press (解放军出版
社), 2008). 
105Wheeler, "The Challenges to Trust-Building in Nuclear Worlds Project Practitioners Meeting Report." 
106Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," 
International Organization 46, no. 01 (1992). 
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and promote those policies that lead to international cooperation.107 They argue that 
“international issues are increasingly characterized by their technical aspects, complexity, 
uncertainty, and interdependence” and “once the expectations and values injected by 
epistemic communities into the policy process are internationally shared, they help 
coordinate or structure international relations.”108 Scholars such as Emanuel Adler claim 
that epistemic communities “played a key role in creating the international shared 
understanding and practice of nuclear arms control, which gave meaning to and helped 
coordinate expectations of superpower cooperation during the Cold War.”109Although 
epistemic community theory looks at the issue of interstate cooperation rather than at 
interstate trust, it does provide a useful perspective for studying the connection between 
individuals or individual groups and state decision making.  
When it comes to China’s nuclear decision making, the main domestic players include 
academics, relevant government agencies, and the political leadership. The academics 
refer to both independent scholars in universities and researchers and analysts in 
government-sponsored research institutes and think tanks. The three relevant government 
agencies include: the defense industry (the nuclear weapons labs), the military (the 
Second Artillery Corps), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Among the main players, 
academics and technocrats in the government agencies work at the operational level and 
107James K Sebenius, "Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation: Negotiation 
Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities," ibid., no. 1; Emanuel Adler, "The Emergence of 
Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms 
Control," International organization 46, no. 01 (1992); Peter M Haas, "Epistemic Communities and the 
Dynamics of International Environmental Cooperation," Regime Theory and International Relations, 
Oxford (1993); Clair Gough and Simon Shackley, "The Respectable Politics of Climate Change: The 
Epistemic Communities and Ngos," International Affairs 77, no. 2 (2001). 
108Emanuel Adler and Peter M Haas, "Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation 
of a Reflective Research Program," International organization 46, no. 1 (1992). 
109Emanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International 
Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control," ibid., no. 01. 
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comprise the so-called “nuclear community”; they are the ones who follow the 
development of events on the ground and are mostly exposed to bilateral engagement 
with their U.S. counterparts. In comparison, high-level officials in the three government 
agencies and the political leadership at the national level are generally considered top-
level players in the system. 
Chinese and U.S. policy makers and analysts have had a long debate about what is the 
most effective approach to conduct mutual engagement for the purpose of building trust. 
The Chinese top-down approach focuses on interaction between the two countries’ top 
decision makers, whereas the American bottom-up approach emphasizes the importance 
of engagement between the technocrats and academics at operational levels. This 
disagreement has been an obstacle for the two countries to cooperate on important 
security issues including nuclear issues.  
The disagreement essentially boils down to the question of how interstate socialization 
takes place and what its impact is on security policy-making. The bottom-up approach 
believes that ideational change usually first takes place at operational levels—as a result 
of learning, persuasion, and other socialization mechanisms—and then spreads upward to 
change perceptions at top levels. The top-down approach, by contrast, assumes that 
ideational change is primarily a top-down process whereby top decision makers initiate a 
change, which is then followed and implemented by lower levels. Existing literature on 
interstate socialization does not quite address the issue of at what level the process takes 
place and what the direction of the causal mechanism is.110 The exact causal mechanism 
110Injoo Sohn, "Learning to Co-Operate: China's Multilateral Approach to Asian Financial Co-Operation," 
The China Quarterly 194(2008); Chen Dingding, "China's Participation in the International Human Rights 
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may be dependent on domestic political structures, as it is usually assumed that top-down 
change is more likely to take place in authoritarian states, whereas bottom-up change is 
more often seen in democratic states.111 This is why it is important to focus on a specific 
case (the U.S.-China interaction in this research) and use empirical research to examine 
the validity of different claims. 
Top-down engagement and bottom-up engagement certainly do not exclude or contradict 
each other. In practice, the United States and China have been conducting both top-level 
and operational-level engagement. Ideally, it would be helpful to examine the impact of 
both approaches on trust building. But it is extremely difficult to conduct empirical 
research on top-down engagement due to the enormous secrecy surrounding top-level 
communications. Nicholas Wheeler’s research on India-Pakistan nuclear trust building, 
for example, is a rare attempt at examining top-level engagement and the research results 
demonstrate the limit of such efforts.112 Wheeler’s research shows that it is difficult to 
establish trust through the so-called “leaps of trust” type of top-leadership interaction 
because such a once-through effort is highly risky and can be easily interrupted by 
numerous variables beyond the control of the top leadership. Once the first attempt of 
radically improving the bilateral relationship fails, it becomes very difficult for the policy 
initiator to gather enough political resources again for another try. In his study, because 
of the scarcity of available authoritative sources, the research has to focus on one single 
event—the Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s meeting with the Pakistani 
Regime: A State Identity Perspective," The Chinese Journal of International Politics 2, no. 3 (2009); Lynch, 
"Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement." 
111Charles Tilly, "Survey Article: Power—Top Down and Bottom Up," Journal of Political Philosophy 7, no. 3 
(1999). 
112Nicholas J Wheeler, "“I Had Gone to Lahore with a Message of Goodwill but in Return We Got Kargil” 1: 
The Promise and Perils of “Leaps of Trust” in India-Pakistan Relations," India Review 9, no. 3 (2010). 
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leader Nawaz Sharif at Lahore in 1999. In the U.S.-Chinese case, the two countries only 
started to conduct high-level official dialogues that touched upon nuclear issues in the 
mid-2000s, and most of the official discussions were in fact devoted to economic and 
nonnuclear-related strategic security issues. Nuclear arms control and nonproliferation 
have not become a major part of official U.S.-Chinese high-level dialogues. In contrast, 
bilateral engagement between the United States and China at the operational level has 
been taking place regularly for more than three decades, and its process and content are 
much more open and transparent, which provides the opportunity to study the impact of 
bottom-up engagement on trust-building in the U.S.-China nuclear relationship. 
In this bilateral nuclear relationship, it is necessary to distinguish China’s trust toward the 
United States from U.S. trust toward China. This research focuses on the former and 
seeks to understand whether and how operational-level engagement between the United 
States and China increases China’s trust toward the United States at the top level. It will 
certainly be helpful to also explore whether a similar impact is observable regarding U.S. 
trust toward China. However, in the U.S.-Chinese nuclear relationship, China is the one 
that is traditionally less transparent, less proactive, and less appreciative of cooperative 
nuclear arms control and nonproliferation efforts. It would be more interesting to 
understand the impact of operational-level engagement on Chinese perception and policy-
making. My follow-up research project in the future will seek to address the other 




Because of the distinction between the two types of trust, this research seeks to 
understand the impact of operational-level engagement on each of the two types of trust, 
respectively. There are, therefore, two hypotheses to be tested. 
Hypothesis 1: Operational-level engagement between the United States and China on 
nuclear issues increases China’s strategic trust in the United States. 
Hypothesis 2: Operational-level engagement between the United States and China on 
nuclear issues increases China’s moralistic trust in the United States. 
For Hypothesis 1 to be accepted, we should be able to observe at least three dynamics at 
work. Firstly, operational-level engagement should help create and develop the epistemic 
community in China (China’s nuclear community), including the incorporation of more 
people from more agencies into this community, helping establish a common vocabulary 
and common background knowledge within the community and helping reach consensus 
on important policy issues among the community members. Secondly, as a result of 
operational-level engagement, the Chinese nuclear community should be able to find new 
areas of common interests with their American counterparts, reversing its original view 
that China has few common interests with the United States or has opposite/conflicting 
interests with the United States. And thirdly, the Chinese nuclear community’s 
recognition of increased common interests and its new motivation to pursue such 
common interests with the United States should be able to affect policy thinking at the 
top government level and therefore increase China’s strategic trust toward the United 
States at the top level. 
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These causal dynamics represent three specific hypotheses that need to be tested. 
Hypothesis 1A: Operational-level engagement promotes the growth and expansion of a 
Chinese nuclear community that shares a common vocabulary with the U.S. nuclear 
community and understands important concepts that are used by the U.S. nuclear 
community. 
For this hypothesis to be accepted (to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship 
between operational-level engagement and expansion of the Chinese nuclear community), 
we need to be able to identify a causal connection between operational-level engagement 
and the occurrence of the following events: 
Operational-level engagement creates institutional interests that attract more people from 
an increasing number of institutions/agencies (academics, the military, the defense 
industry, the foreign ministry, and other relevant government agencies) to study and 
discuss nuclear-related issues. 
This growing group of people develops sophisticated understanding about U.S. nuclear 
policy and policy-making over time and begins to understand and share a common 
vocabulary on important technical and policy matters with the U.S. nuclear community. 
This growing group of people is able to reach consensus on important policy issues 
within themselves. This is not to say there is no internal debate within the community. 
But at the end of a policy debate, they are able to speak with more or less one voice and 
to promote the same policy. 
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Hypothesis 1B: Operational-level engagement helps the Chinese nuclear community to 
recognize new areas of common interests with the United States and to become more 
motivated in pursuing cooperation with the United States to achieve these newly 
recognized common interests. 
This can take place in several ways. For instance, operational-level engagement may help 
the Chinese nuclear community develop sophisticated understanding about the U.S. 
nuclear policy, which helps clarify positions and recognize common interests; 
engagement may help introduce American concepts and ideas into the Chinese nuclear 
community, which if accepted by the Chinese would help change the basis of their cost-
benefit calculations, and engagement may help build the technical capacity of the 
Chinese nuclear community, which can help them recognize dangers that they previously 
ignored because of inexperience and help them recognize new areas of interest as they 
become more technically capable of pursuing such interests. In any case, to accept 
Hypothesis 1B, empirical data needs to show that at least one or several of these 
dynamics are at work. 
Hypothesis 1C: The Chinese nuclear community is able to convince the top leadership 
that these new areas of common interests are real and worth pursuing in cooperation with 
the United States. 
The Chinese nuclear community needs to demonstrate effective communication channels 
to influence the thinking of China’s top leadership on nuclear issues. The empirical 
evidence needs to show that their thinking is indeed gradually embraced by the top 
leadership and reflected in China’s official nuclear policy. 
40 
 
A competing hypothesis (according to the top-down trust-building theory) depicts the 
influence between the Chinese epistemic community and top decision makers in the 
reverse order(i.e., change takes place firstly among the top decision makers in the form of 
shifting strategic visions and strategic calculation; that change is then embraced and 
implemented by the Chinese nuclear community). The sequence of change that takes 
place at these two levels would be the key evidence to either accept or reject this 
hypothesis. 
Similarly, for Hypothesis 2 to be accepted, we also need to test the correctness of three 
sub-hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2A: Operational-level engagement promotes the growth and expansion of a 
Chinese nuclear community that shares a common vocabulary with the U.S. nuclear 
community and understands important concepts that are used by the U.S. nuclear 
community. 
This is essentially the same causal mechanism that is already reflected in Hypothesis 1A. 
In other words, it is a necessary condition for either type of trust to be built. Hypothesis 
1A and 2A are the same. 
Hypothesis 2B: Operational-level engagement helps the Chinese nuclear community to 
recognize and/or accept more common moral/normative principles with the United States 
on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation issues. 
follows a set of moral principles in its nuclear policy-making that China also agrees and 
follows. It would be rejected if engagement actually makes the Chinese believe that the 
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United States is playing realpolitik games and following no moral principles in its 
nuclear policy-making, or the Chinese nuclear community perceives the United States as 
following a set of moral principles that conflict with Chinese nuclear ethics. 
Hypothesis 2C: The Chinese nuclear community is able to convince the top leadership 
that the United States and China share important moral/normative principles in their 
respective nuclear policy thinking. 
Case Studies and Main Argument 
This research examines three cases: U.S.-Chinese operational-level engagement before 
and during CTBT negotiations, U.S.-Chinese operational-level engagement over nuclear 
stability and arms control, and U.S.-Chinese operational-level engagement over nuclear 
nonproliferation.  
These three case studies represent inclusive research of all the major operational-level 
engagements between the two countries on nuclear issues. There are two types of 
operational-level engagement between the United States and China. One is concentrated 
engagement, which takes place in an intensive manner prior to official negotiations to 
solve policy disagreements. The second type of operational-level engagement is gradual 
engagement, which takes place in the form of long-term, regular bilateral exchanges. The 
case on CTBT is a case of concentrated engagement during which the United States and 
China conducted intensive operational-level dialogues and exchanges for a relatively 
short period of time that were focused on a specific issue (CTBT). The cases of U.S.-
Chinese engagement on nuclear stability and arms control and U.S.-Chinese engagement 
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in nuclear nonproliferation are cases of long-term engagement during which the two 
countries conducted regular operational-level engagement for more than three decades. 
These three cases provide a hard test of the bottom-up trust-building theory.113 Nuclear 
test ban and nuclear arms control present major consequences for China’s nuclear 
second-strike capability that are foundational for credible nuclear deterrence. China’s 
accession and integration into the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime also 
reshaped China’s global and regional security policy in a significant manner. If the 
empirical evidence supports the bottom-up trust-building theory in these highly sensitive 
national security issue areas, it will lend important credibility to the theory. 
This research benefits greatly from the author’s personal involvement in operational-level 
U.S.-Chinese nuclear engagement and the connections that the author has developed with 
both senior American and Chinese participants in these engagement programs. Before 
and during his stay in the United States, the author had the opportunity to study and work 
with some of the most established Chinese nuclear experts and arms control scholars for 
over ten years. The author had the opportunity to attend nuclear policy meetings and 
workshops and build connections with China’s most senior nuclear scientists and arms 
control policy makers. Under the sponsorship of the Young Leaders Program of the 
Pacific Forum CSIS, Union of Concerned Scientists, the Program on Strategic Stability 
Evaluation (POSSE), the Project on Nuclear Issues of the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the 
113Andrew Bennett, "Case Study Methods: Design, Use, and Comparative Advantages," Models, numbers, 
and cases: Methods for studying international relations (2004); Norrin M Ripsman and Jean-Marc F 
Blanchard, "A Guide to Conducting Case Studies of Economic Interdependence and Conflict,"(Economic 
Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate, ed. by Edward D. 
Mansfield and Brian M. Pollins. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003). 
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Italian International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts (ISODARCO), 
among others, the author has personally attended a number of important operational-level 
nuclear dialogues, exchanges, and other training programs including the Conference on 
U.S.-China Strategic Nuclear Dynamics, U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, CSCAP Study 
Group meetings on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
CSCAP Export Controls Experts Group meetings, Summer Symposia on Science and 
World Affairs, and various U.S.-Chinese nuclear policy-related workshops and seminars. 
The author also helped organize and attended the Tsinghua University Summer 
Symposium on Arms Control. All these events and activities provided the author with 
unique opportunities to get access to senior nuclear experts, scientists, policy makers, and 
policy practitioners from both China and the United States and to keep close and frequent 
communication with them. Much of the author’s understanding of the historical 
development and impact of various U.S.-Chinese engagement programs is from personal 
correspondence with the senior participants of these programs. 
The author was also able to obtain a large number of documents of the major dialogues, 
meetings, and exchange programs including meeting summaries, proceedings, and reports 
from the organizers of these dialogues. These documents provide a detailed accounting of 
views exchanged at these meetings and a thorough description of the discussions, which 
is very helpful for developing deep understanding about the content and background of 
the discussions and for detecting the change and evolution of attitudes and views on 
specific issues from both the Chinese and American participants. 
This research also relies on primary Chinese sources collected from visiting special 
Chinese libraries and information centers. For instance, documents obtained from the 
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Information Center of Science and Technology in National Defense at Beijing provide 
important insight on the involvement of China’s nuclear defense industry in China’s 
nuclear arms control and nonproliferation domestic policy discussions and policy-making. 
The author’s visit to China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA) 
helped the author obtain insight about the participation of China’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs–affiliated organizations and nongovernmental organizations in nuclear policy 
discussions. 
Another important way to understand the evolution of the views of the Chinese nuclear 
community is to conduct summative content analysis of their writings and publications 
between the 1950s and present. Many of the so-called “internal circulation” publications 
that were previously not available to the public have recently become available. These 
writings by Chinese nuclear weapons scientists, military personnel, arms control experts, 
government officials, think tank analysts, and academics make it possible to monitor 
domestic debates and compare their thinking on specific nuclear policy issues over time. 
Significant changes in frequency and intensity of writings on specific issues also reflect 
the shift of interests on these issues within the community. These are analyzed by using 
conceptual analysis tools.114 More importantly, this research not only analyzes the macro 
data and general trends of these writings but also conducts in-depth summative content 
analysis of these writings.115 Hundreds of these writings and publications were read and 
analyzed in order to grasp the Chinese nuclear community’s evolving understanding and 
114 See, for example, Charles P Smith, "Content Analysis and Narrative Analysis," Handbook of research 
methods in social and personality psychology (2000); Marta Indulska, Dirk S Hovorka, and Jan Recker, 
"Quantitative Approaches to Content Analysis: Identifying Conceptual Drift across Publication Outlets," 
European Journal of Information Systems 21, no. 1 (2012). 
115Hsiu-Fang Hsieh and Sarah E Shannon, "Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis," Qualitative 
health research 15, no. 9 (2005). 
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internalization of important nuclear terms and concepts used by their American 
counterparts. Many of these writings and publications are made available through various 
databases set up by the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI), which was 
initiated by Tsinghua University. The CNKI databases include almost all major Chinese 
publications that were written over the last several decades—some dating back to as early 
as the 1940s—and include not only academic journals but also conference papers, 
conference proceedings, newspapers, yearbooks, theses, etc. 
These primary Chinese sources are used to trace the development of the Chinese nuclear 
community. Their change of perception and thinking on major nuclear arms control and 
nonproliferation issues is documented by systematically examining all the operational-
level engagement programs and by conducting in-depth content analysis of the writings 
and publications of the Chinese nuclear community. The author also collected all 
available historical Chinese official documents that relate to nuclear policy, including 
foreign and security policy guidelines reports, foreign policy review reports, proceedings 
of Central Meetings on Foreign Affairs Work, speeches and remarks made by national 
leaders, official statements, announcements, position papers, statements submitted to 
international governmental organizations, and speeches delivered by senior government 
officials on nuclear-related topics. Additional government-sponsored newspapers such as 
the People’s Daily were also used to help identify change of perception and thinking at 
the official level. In the case of the People’s Daily, content analysis was conducted for all 
its editorials and political and international news articles since 1946.116 
116This analysis is conducted by making use of the People’s Daily Full-Text and Graphic Database (1946-
2014) (人民日报图文数据库（1946-2014）). People’s Daily was created and has been supervised by the 
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The primary finding of this research is that U.S.-Chinese operational-level engagement 
increased strategic trust at the top level but did not increase moralistic trust. For strategic 
trust, the case studies show that operational-level engagement played an important role in 
building and growing China’s nuclear community and helped them develop a common 
vocabulary with their American counterparts; such engagement was necessary for the 
Chinese nuclear community to learn, accept, internalize, and spread American nuclear 
arms control and nonproliferation concepts and theories. Such engagement helped the 
Chinese nuclear community develop a much better interagency coordinating mechanism 
and helped them develop direct and indirect bottom-up communication channels that 
have been effective in promoting perception change at the top level. Such bottom-up 
perception change helped the Chinese to recognize more common interests with the 
United States and to become increasingly motivated to cooperate with the United States 
to achieve these newly identified common interests. Operational-level engagement also 
played an important role in building up the technical capacity of the Chinese nuclear 
community, making it easier for the two countries to achieve the newly identified 
common interests. 
As for moralistic trust, the case studies show that operational-level engagement actually 
makes the Chinese nuclear community believe that U.S. nuclear policy-making is guided 
by a few principles—none of which overlap with China’s traditional nuclear 
moral/normative principles. Operational-level engagement reveals and reinforces the 
identity gap between China and the United States. The Chinese nuclear principles are 
based on their identification with the developing countries rather than the United States. 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. It is widely viewed as the most authoritative source 
of direct information on the policies and viewpoints of the Party and the government. 
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Operational-level engagement convinces the Chinese nuclear community that they should 
follow realpolitik principles in their nuclear policy-making and should give less 
consideration to moral/normative principles, thus undermining the basis for building 
“moralistic trust” between the two countries. 
The same findings were observed for both long-term operational-level engagement (the 
cases on U.S.-Chinese engagement on nuclear stability and arms control and U.S.-
Chinese engagement on nuclear nonproliferation) and concentrated operational-level 
engagement (the case on CTBT). These case studies represent a comprehensive and 
systematic study of all the major operational-level engagements between the two 
countries on nuclear issues and have important theoretical and policy implications. 
Plan of the Dissertation 
The rest of the dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter two provides a detailed study 
of U.S.-Chinese operational-level engagement on the issue of CTBT. This is a case of 
concentrated engagement during which the United States and China conducted intensive 
operational-level dialogues and exchanges on CTBT related issues for a relatively short 
period of time. Before such engagement, there was essentially no specialist community in 
China that had a sophisticated understanding about nuclear arms control issues. Chinese 
official policy had been very much opposed to nuclear test ban for decades. Such 
engagement introduced Chinese nuclear scientists, foreign ministry officials, military 
personnel, and security experts to U.S. domestic debates around CTBT and raised their 
interests and technical capacity in conducting policy research on CTBT and other nuclear 
arms control issues. These engagement programs played a big role in forming and 
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growing the Chinese nuclear community and changed their perceptions about the 
potential benefits and costs for China to sign the test ban treaty. Such change of 
perception at the operational level initiated domestic discussions that ultimately 
influenced Chinese official thinking at the top level.  
Chapter three analyzes one of the long-term engagement cases: U.S.-Chinese engagement 
on nuclear stability and arms control. This chapter reviews all the major engagement 
programs over the past three decades and analyzes their influence on the expansion and 
professionalization of the Chinese nuclear community. It looks into the process of how 
such engagement helped to build a common vocabulary between the Chinese nuclear 
community and their American counterparts and shifted Chinese thinking on a number of 
important concepts on nuclear arms control. China’s gradual development of its nuclear 
strategy was also greatly influenced by this process. These engagement programs also 
provided insight for the Chinese nuclear community to understand how the United States 
deliberated on nuclear stability and arms control issues, which significantly influenced 
how the Chinese view the role of moral and normative principles in their nuclear policy-
making. 
Chapter four studies the other case of long-term engagement: U.S.-Chinese engagement 
on nuclear nonproliferation. Since the early 1980s, a number of American organizations 
have carried out a range of operational-level engagement programs with China. These 
programs focused not only on policy discussions that influenced Chinese perceptions 
about the dangers of proliferation but also on technical trainings that helped to 
significantly build up the technical capacity of the Chinese nuclear community to draft 
nonproliferation regulations and carry out nonproliferation policies through enhanced 
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interagency coordination and strengthened export control. The top leadership’s 
endorsement of China’s membership in NPT and their support for a legally based export 
control regulation system were greatly influenced by the change of perception at the 
operational level. Operational-level engagement, however, shaped the perception of the 
Chinese nuclear community in a way that undermined moralistic trust between the two 
sides. 
Chapter five draws conclusions from the case studies and summarizes why and how 
operational-level engagement has been helpful for increasing Chinese strategic trust 
toward the United States but was not successful in building moralistic trust. It explores 
the implications for IR theories, especially the Track II dialogue and trust-building 
literature. It also offers policy implications on how to better manage existing and future 
U.S.-Chinese engagement programs on nuclear issues and how to deal with existing 





CONCENTRATED OPERATIONAL-LEVEL ENGAGEMENT: THE 
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY NEGOTIATIONS 
 
The signing of the CTBT is a case that represents a milestone in the evolution of China’s 
nuclear policy for at least two reasons. First, CTBT is the first international nuclear arms 
control negotiation that China took part in. CTBT requires state parties to ban all kinds of 
nuclear explosions and has significant implications for China’s very limited nuclear 
capability. 
Second, China’s decision to actively participate in the CTBT negotiations and ultimately 
sign the treaty marked a dramatic shift from its previous policy toward the nuclear test 
ban. China vehemently opposed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) of 1963 and the 
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of 1974. In the early to mid-1980s, China did not 
allow the Conference on Disarmament to even set up an ad hoc committee to discuss the 
issue of a comprehensive nuclear test treaty by vetoing the proposal for five consecutive 
years. However, China ultimately participated in the CTBT negotiations and became one 
of the first countries to sign the treaty in September 1996. Why did China completely 
change its attitudes and position about the nuclear test ban in this time period? What role 
did China’s nuclear community play in this process, as compared with the role played by 
China’s top political leaders, in bringing about this policy change? And to what extent 
was the bottom-up type of engagement between China and the United States helpful in 
generating this policy change in China? 
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In addition, the CTBT case is an example of concentrated engagement in the sense that a 
large number of operational-level engagement programs took place on high frequency 
during a short period of time prior to and during official negotiations. In comparison, the 
other two case studies in this research—U.S.-China nuclear strategic stability dialogue 
and U.S.-China nuclear nonproliferation interaction—are cases of gradual engagement 
that took place in the form of long-term regular bilateral exchanges, as well as in the form 
of unilateral observing and learning. This chapter on CTBT, therefore, seeks to examine 
the impact of concentrated operational-level engagement in trust building between the 
United States and China. 
This chapter reviews the process of U.S.-China operational-level engagement over CTBT. 
It delineates how operational-level engagement was able to help build and grow China’s 
nuclear arms control community. It analyzes the impact of this engagement on China’s 
internal interagency policy-making mechanism and examines whether operational-level 
engagement was able to promote bottom-up communication and influence top-level 
decision making. It then identifies major issues that operational-level engagement was 
able to help the United States and China reach consensus on in formal CTBT negotiations. 
In the end, it examines the impact of operational-level engagement on strategic trust and 
moralistic trust between the United States and China, respectively. The main finding is 
that operational-level engagement considerably increased Chinese strategic trust toward 
the United States because it convinced the Chinese that it shared more common interests 
with the United States than it originally recognized. There is no evidence of increased 
moralistic trust because engagement did not lead to the convergence of moral/normative 
principles between the two sides. 
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Previous Chinese Attitudes toward the Nuclear Test Ban 
China opposed all forms of a nuclear test ban throughout the 1960s–1980s. This was 
consistent with Mao’s view that superpowers tend to use their nuclear superiority to 
coerce and bully less advanced countries.117 On August 23, 1962, the Chinese 
government received a notification from the Soviet government that the Soviet Union 
was going to accept the proposal made by U.S. secretary of state Dean Rusk about 
negotiating a treaty for preventing nuclear proliferation. China strongly opposed this idea 
and expressed repeatedly to the Soviets that Rusk’s proposal was aimed at imposing the 
obligation of nuclear nonproliferation on those socialist countries that did not yet have 
nuclear weapons and that its primary target country was China. The Soviet Union 
repudiated China’s claim in a memo sent to the Chinese government on April 20, 1963, 
and insisted that it would negotiate and sign an agreement on nuclear nonproliferation 
with the United States.118 The Soviet Union then went ahead and signed the Treaty 
Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water 
(also known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty [PTBT]) on July 25 with the United States and 
the United Kingdom.119 One of the primary purposes of the PTBT was to prevent further 
proliferation of nuclear weapons beyond existing nuclear weapons states at that time. It 
prohibited nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water but did not ban 
117Wei Wang and Jiefeng Zhang, "A Brief Analysis of the Art of War Control by Mao Zedong in the Korean 
War (略论抗美援朝战争中毛泽东的战争控制艺术)," in Symposium in Commemoration of the 50th 
Anniversary of the Korean War (纪念抗美援朝战争胜利 50 周年学术讨论会)(Nanjing2003); Guoyin 
Cheng, "Mao's Nuclear Strategy and Implementation," Sichuan Party History (1997). 
118Taiping (王泰平) Wang, Diplomacy of the People's Republic of China, 1957-1969 (中华人民共和国外交
史, 1957-1969)(World Knowledge Publishing House (世界知识出版社), 1998). 




                                                            
underground nuclear tests. This kept the option open for the three countries to continue 
conducting nuclear tests and improving nuclear weapon designs.  
China immediately published a statement that accused the three nuclear powers of using 
the PTBT to reinforce their monopoly on nuclear weapons and undermine the objective 
of nuclear disarmament.120 Two days later, Premier Zhou Enlai wrote a letter to a few 
heads of states to once again express China’s opposition to the treaty. On August 15, 
China made another statement restating China’s discontent and condemning the Soviet 
Union for making an utterly wrong policy choice.121 One year later, China tested its first 
nuclear device. 
After the PTBT, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom continued 
trilateral discussions on an additional test ban throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. In 
1974 the United States and the Soviet Union concluded the bilateral Threshold Test Ban 
Treaty (TTBT), limiting underground nuclear weapons tests to yields below the 
equivalent of 150 kilotons (150 kt) of the explosive TNT.122 Two years later, the United 
States and the Soviet Union signed another bilateral treaty to restrain so-called “peaceful 
nuclear explosions.”123 In this treaty between the United States and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, both 
countries agreed not to carry out any individual nuclear explosions having a yield 
120Longbiao ( 钟龙彪) Zhong, "Analyses of the Evolution of China's Policy Concerning International Arms 
Control (中国国际军备控制政策演变论析)," Contemporary China History Studies (当代中国史研究) 16, 
no. 5 (2009). 
121Wang, Diplomacy of the People's Republic of China, 1957-1969 (中华人民共和国外交史, 1957-1969). 
122Ola Dahlman, Svein Mykkeltveit, and Hein Haak, Nuclear Test Ban, vol. 1(Springer, 2009). 
123"Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 




                                                            
exceeding 150 kilotons and not to carry out any group explosion (consisting of a number 
of individual explosions) having an aggregate yield exceeding 1,500 kilotons.124 
For China, all of these efforts by nuclear superpowers to ban or limit nuclear testing were 
condemned as “a big fraud to fool the people of the world” and to “tie the hands of all 
peace-loving countries.”125 China argued that banning nuclear tests would not stop 
superpowers from manufacturing or using nuclear weapons but would hinder other 
countries from strengthening their defense. Chinese arms control statements and analyses 
have always focused on the importance of No First Use (NFU) commitment and on steps 
aimed at complete elimination of nuclear weapons.126 
China’s Arms Control Community before CTBT 
China’s experience with arms control and nonproliferation had been extremely limited by 
the 1980s, particularly when compared with that of other nuclear weapons states—the 
United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France. China went into a de facto self-
isolation after Chinese-Soviet separation in the late 1950s and early 1960s. China was by 
and large absent from important international institutions and had minimal, if any, 
interactions with other countries in nuclear arms control talks or negotiations, such as the 
Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963), the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (1968), the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972), the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974), and the Treaty on 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (1976).  
124 The treaty was signed in April 1976 and entered into force on December 11, 1990. 
125"Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国政府声明)," The 
People's Daily, October 17 1964. 
126William SW Chang, "China and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Negotiations," Stanford Journal of 
East Asian Affairs 1(2001). 
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China only joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1983 and signed 
the NPT in 1992. The CTBT (signed in 1996) is the first nuclear arms control treaty that 
China actively negotiated. Before the CTBT negotiations officially started in 1993, China 
was seen as the wild card in the negotiations as other countries understood very little 
about the Chinese position.127 
Before the 1990s, Chinese top political leaders paid little attention to issues of arms 
control. They were generally very much skeptical about the utility of arms control. The 
term “arms control” had a negative connotation in the mind of Chinese decision makers. 
It was seen as what the superpowers used to consolidate their own quantitative and 
qualitative advantages in military technology and capability and to avoid comprehensive 
and complete disarmament.128 The dominant view was that arms control was a “political 
smokescreen for the U.S.-Soviet ‘nuclear deadlock’ since the 1960s and for the 
unprecedented arms competition that seeks to obtain overwhelming nuclear superiority.” 
They believed the nuclear superpowers used this “to implement nuclear blackmail 
diplomacy and aim to achieve the goal of coercion without having to resort to ‘suicidal’ 
nuclear war.”129 
There had been very limited official interaction between officials of China’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and their colleagues from other countries. For example, Qian Jiadong, 
China’s first Special Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs (裁军大使), had no arms 
127Alastair Iain Johnston and MM May, The Cox Committee Report: An Assessment(Center for International 
Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, 1999). 
128Huaqiu (刘华秋) Liu, Handbook on Arms Control and Disarmament (军备控制与裁军手册)(National 
Defense Industry Press (国防工业出版社), 2000). 
129Fang (张放) Zhang, "An in-Depth Analysis of the U.S. Imperialist' "Arms Control" Theory (美帝国主义
“军备控制”论的透视))," World Affairs (世界知识) 24(1963). 
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control experience when he took this position in Geneva in June 1983. In Chinese 
rhetoric, the term mostly used is “arms control struggle” (军控斗争). The view was that 
arms control was a new form of war in which countries fought for their survival and 
benefits.130 According to the Chinese perspective, Western countries dominated the 
international struggle over arms control and used it against socialist and developing 
countries and forced them into arms control. As a result, China must “counter this policy 
of power politics and hegemonism” and fight Western countries to “protect socialist 
countries’ security interests and to preserve world peace.”131 
U.S.–China Operational-Level Engagement 
There was no high-level official communication on the issue of CTBT before the early 
1990s. The U.S. government had only focused on China’s arms control policies 
sporadically and often in a politically charged environment. The primary focus of the U.S. 
government had been on Soviet nuclear capability.132 The rapid improvement of the U.S.-
Chinese relationship since the late 1970s further reduced the U.S. government’s concern 
about China.133 Conversely, American NGOs and universities maintained continuous and 
close relationships with the emerging Chinese arms control community, including low- 
130Qiang (石强) Shi, "Nuclear Arms Control between the United States and Russia (论美俄之间的核军备
控制)" (Northwestern Normal University (西北师范大学), 2007). 
131Qing (刘卿) Liu, "On the Characters of the Struggle of International Arms Control (论国际军控斗争的
性质)" (Renmin University of China (中国人民大学), 2004). 
132Steve Weber, Cooperation and Discord in Us-Soviet Arms Control(Princeton University Press Princeton, 
1991). 
133Chenghu (朱成虎) Zhu, Evolution of Sino-U.S. Relationship and Future Trend (中美关系的发展变化及
其趋势)(Jiangsu People's Publishing House (江苏人民出版社), 1998). 
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and mid-level officials from the Foreign Ministry and experts and analysts from think 
tanks and universities.134 
Starting in the late 1980s, in anticipation of the upcoming CTBT negotiations, the 
scientific communities of the United States felt the need to meet with their Chinese 
counterparts and discuss potential technical issues before the formal negotiations started. 
Toward the end of the Cold War, American nuclear scientists had developed a good 
working relationship with their Soviet colleagues, and such U.S.-Soviet engagement 
contributed to cooperation between the two governments on nuclear arms control 
issues.135 Encouraged by the successful U.S.-Soviet scientific engagement, American 
scientists were eager to develop a similar relationship with their Chinese colleagues. On 
the Chinese side, Chinese nuclear scientists also saw it necessary to start some type of 
dialogue with the United States to prepare for the anticipated CTBT negotiations. Such 
U.S.-Chinese exchanges began in the late 1980s and continued in the early 1990s and 
during the official negotiations in 1995 and 1996. Table 2provides a summary of the 
major bilateral visits between the U.S. and Chinese nuclear scientific communities during 
1993–1996. 
Table 2 Summary of Major Bilateral Visits between U.S. and Chinese Nuclear Scientific 
Communities before and during the CTBT Negotiations, 1993–1996 
  
134Wendy Frieman, China, Arms Control, and Nonproliferation(Psychology Press, 2004). 
135Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International 
Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control." 
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136Zou, Yunhua (邹云华). 1994. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Is an Inevitable Historical Development 
(全面禁止核试验是形势发展的必然：写在《全面禁止核试验条约》谈判前夕). International Studies 
(国际问题研究) (1):5-12. 
137Zhao, Hong (赵宏). 2006. Track Two Dialogue between the U.S. and China on CTBT Negotiations (二轨
外交与中美全面禁止核试验条约谈判), Institute of International Studies (国际问题研究所), Tsinghua 
University (清华大学), Beijing. 
138 Ibid. 




                                                            
Dialogue between Chinese Scientists Group on Arms Control and U.S. National 
Academy of Sciences 
The Chinese Scientists Group on Arms Control (CSGAC) of the Chinese People’s 
Association for Peace and Disarmament (CPAPD, 中国人民和平与裁军协会), and the 
Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) of the U.S. National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS) have been meeting since 1989 to discuss nuclear arms 
control, nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear energy, and regional security issues, with the 
goal of reducing the possibility of nuclear weapons use and reducing nuclear proliferation 
in the world at large.140 
The NAS first began conducting dialogues with Russian scientists starting in 1981. This 
U.S.-Russian Track II dialogue, built on a foundation of scientist-to-scientist interaction, 
allowed the CISAC to discuss technical and potentially sensitive issues in international 
security, arms control and disarmament with their Russian colleagues. Even when official 
relations were strained, the CISAC was able to sustain links to Russian senior weapon 
scientists, politicians, and military officers.141 This successful experience encouraged the 
U.S. National Academy of Sciences to initiate a similar dialogue with Chinese nuclear 
scientists.142 
140"English - Chinese Chinese - English Nuclear Security Glossary," Chinese People's Association for Peace 
and Disarmament and the Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) of the U.S. 
National Academy of Sciences, http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/cisac/PGA_050966. 
141"Committee on International Security and Arms Control ,” U.S. National Academy of Sciences 
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/cisac/PGA_048467. 
142Zuoyue Wang, "Us-China Scientific Exchange: A Case Study of State-Sponsored Scientific 




                                                            
The first dialogue took place in 1989. The Chinese People’s Association for Peace and 
Disarmament was the Chinese co-organizer. The main U.S. participants were prominent 
NAS scientists and experts working on arms control and international security issues. The 
Chinese participants were mainly scientists and experts from the military nuclear 
establishment and the PLA. They called themselves the Scientists Group on Arms 
Control of CPAPD.143 Some of the Chinese participants were not only prominent nuclear 
scientists but also senior government officials within the defense industry bureaucracy. 
Among them were Zhu Guangya (朱光亚), a leading nuclear weapons scientist and the 
head of the Science and Technology Committee of the Commission of Science, 
Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND),144 and Qian Jiadong, 
China’s first ambassador for disarmament affairs. This group of Chinese scientists and 
experts later became the core members of the COSTIND’s Arms Control Experts Group. 
This group held internal preparatory meetings before the dialogue with U.S. National 
Academy of Sciences. These internal meetings later became a platform for broader 
discussions among China’s arms control community. 
The annual dialogue usually takes place in the form of a three-day seminar during which 
both Chinese and U.S. experts present papers and have discussions. The meetings raised 
considerable Chinese interests in more discussions, and the number of Chinese 
participants grew quickly. In the first dialogue in 1989, a total of eight Chinese experts 
143Banning N Garrett and Bonnie S Glaser, "Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control," International 
Security (1995). 
144 COSTIND was responsible for managing China’s defense industry. Many of its officials and staffs wore 
PLA uniforms. In 1998, COSTIND was separated into two organizations: one military organization —the 
General Armament Department of the PLA, and one civilian organization —the State Administration for 
Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) which is a complete civilian agency 
under the administration of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. 
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attended, and by the third dialogue in 1992, 28 Chinese experts attended the meeting.145 
Since 1995, based on a Chinese proposal, occasional special, small-scale seminars were 
organized in addition to the regular annual meeting in order to have in-depth discussions 
on specific issues.146 
During 1995–96, discussions between American and Chinese nuclear scientists focused 
heavily on CTBT related issues. On February 7–8, 1996, CISAC and CSGAC experts 
held a two-day seminar on CTBT in Beijing at the Institute of Applied Physics and 
Computational Mathematics. Senior American and Chinese scientists had an extensive 
exchange on the CTBT verification system, peaceful nuclear explosion, and other 
important technical issues that the U.S. and Chinese negotiators at the CD had not been 
able to reach agreement on. 
In this meeting, Wolfgang Panofsky, a professor at the Stanford Linear Accelerator 
Center of Stanford University, had a discussion with his Chinese colleagues on the 
monitoring and verification of CTBT. He mentioned that in August 1995, President 
Clinton had made a decision to pursue a complete zero-yield test ban treaty. France had 
also determined that CTBT should prohibit any nuclear explosion that produced nuclear 
energy. It would be more difficult to verify a zero-yield CTBT than a CTBT that allowed 
a low-yield nuclear test such as 1 kilogram or 1kiloton nuclear tests, Panofsky argued. 
But he also pointed out that the military significance of conducting low-yield nuclear 
tests (e.g., 1 kilogram or 1 kiloton) was so small that it was negligible. The more 
145Evan S Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China's Nonproliferation Policies and Practices, 
1980-2004(Stanford University Press, 2007). 
146Hong (赵宏) Zhao, "Track Two Dialogue between the U.S. And China on Ctbt Negotiations (二轨外交与
中美全面禁止核试验条约谈判)" (Tsinghua University (清华大学), 2006). 
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important thing was to add some article into the treaty to allow the adoption of new and 
less expensive verification technologies in order to ensure that the verification regime 
under the treaty would be effective, as well as sustainable, over the long term. He also 
discussed the importance of increasing transparency for verification purposes.147 
American scientist Richard Garwin gave the Chinese scientists an introduction to the U.S. 
nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship program. The draft CTBT under discussion at that 
time prohibited any country from conducting any type of nuclear explosion experiment. 
Under this stipulation, as Garwin argued, the United States would not make any new 
weapon designs, except making necessary improvements to its existing nuclear weapons 
in order to maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the existing stockpile. 
According to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I and START II), the United 
States was going to reduce the number of its nuclear weapons designs from twenty-five to 
seven.148 The focus of its nuclear weapons management was going to be on maintaining 
the credibility of the weapons’ safety, security, and reliability. Taking into consideration 
the fact that China’s nuclear weapons development program was different from that of 
the United States, Garwin suggested that it would be helpful for China to have a good 
understanding of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship program in order to 
safely and effectively maintain China’s own nuclear stockpile after the nuclear test ban. 
Garwin also pointed out a few potential problems faced by the U.S. stockpile stewardship 
program including standardization, remanufacture, infrastructure, etc. The solution was to 
develop a technical capability to examine the parts and materials inside the weapons 
147Ibid. 
148Lisbeth Gronlund et al., "Making Smart Security Choices: The Future of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons 
Complex,"(Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists, 2013). 
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without testing. For that purpose, the United States was making efforts to retain the 
scientific knowledge and technical skills by maintaining the science and engineering 
institutions of the nuclear weapons complex. The introduction of the U.S. stockpile 
stewardship program to the Chinese enhanced their confidence that China could also 
maintain its nuclear stockpile without testing.149 This recognition was essential for 
Chinese scientists’ support of the CTBT.150 
One of the major concerns of China was the issue of peaceful nuclear explosion. With 
much less testing experience with peaceful nuclear explosion, Chinese scientists believed 
that peaceful nuclear explosions were useful for large-scale infrastructure construction, 
mining, and dealing with sudden natural disasters. Their view was that peaceful nuclear 
explosions would not facilitate the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, would not 
be helpful for advancing nuclear weapons technology, and would be distinguishable from 
military nuclear weapons explosion experiments under an effective international 
monitoring and verification system.151 Chinese scientists Hu Side and He Zuoxiu led the 
discussion on peaceful nuclear explosion with the American delegation. 
U.S.-China Arms Control Technical Exchange Program 
The U.S.-China Arms Control Technical Exchange Program (ACE), also known as the 
U.S.-China Lab-to-Lab Technical Exchange Program (CLL), was in nature an unofficial 
149Yulong (张玉龙) Zhang and Debing (唐德兵) Tang, "Scientitific Experiment Programs of the U.S. Nuclear 
Warhead Stockpile Management (美国核弹头库存管理中的科学实验项目)," Modern Military (现代军
事) 1(2008). 
150Yunhua (邹云华) Zou, "China and the Ctbt Negotiations," Center for International Security and 
Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University, CISAC Working Papers (1998). 
151Dongfeng (田东风) Tian and Side (胡思得) Hu, "Peaceful Nuclear Explosion and Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test Ban (和平核爆炸与全面禁止核试验)," Modern Military (现代军事) 6(1996). 
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exchange. It did not include government officials in the exchanges but derived its 
authority from government officials’ oversight on each side. 
This program started as some scientists at the Los Alamos National Laboratory used their 
previous connections with their Chinese colleagues to invite them for a visit. In February 
1994, Qian Shaojun and Hu Side, both prominent nuclear weapons scientists, led a six-
member delegation of China’s nuclear complex and visited the Sandia National 
Laboratories (SNL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and Los Alamos 
National Laboratory (LANL). At the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, their 
visit focused on environmental restoration; links of LLNL with industry; and activities on 
nonproliferation, arms control, and international security. 
This visit convinced the United States that there was potential for the United States and 
China to cooperate on CTBT and other nuclear arms control and nonproliferation issues. 
Following this, in July 1994, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Einhorn 
requested that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) establish scientific interactions with 
its Chinese counterpart.152 This set in motion the policy process that ultimately developed 
the framework for interactions between American and Chinese nuclear weapons 
laboratories. In October 1994, the director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory paid 
for a follow-up visit to China that helped move the process forward. 
In January 1995, the directors of the U.S. national laboratories proposed to CAEP an 
exchange program that would focus on technical issues in the areas of nonproliferation, 
arms control, and nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting. CAEP was also 




                                                            
happy to be treated as an equal partner of the U.S. national laboratories and accepted this 
proposal. The ACE program was born. 
The primary U.S. motivation for establishing the ACE program was the recognition that 
professional relationships between American and Chinese nuclear scientists that 
developed out of these exchanges could serve as a means for increasing trust and 
developing common approaches for addressing issues of concern to national and 
international security. The main objectives were 
1. To provide technical contributions to arms control and nonproliferation efforts in 
the United States and China through joint development and deployment of 
integrated systems of modern technologies. 
2. To explore new technical means for building mutual trust based on information 
shared about the operations and management of nuclear facilities, while at the 
same time protecting the national security interests of both the United States and 
China. 
3. To establish long-lasting professional relationships as a basis for understanding 
between U.S. and Chinese scientists concerned with arms control, 
nonproliferation, and regional stability in Asia.153 
U.S. participants in the ACE program were scientists from Sandia National Laboratories 
(SNL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LANL). Their Chinese counterparts were nuclear scientists from the China 




                                                            
Technology (NINT). NINT was included in this exchange because it was in charge of 
conducting and analyzing China’s nuclear tests. As for the CTBT negotiations, NINT 
played a key role in regard to the verification of the treaty. Under CTBT, NINT has the 
responsibility of implementing verification technologies for CTBT’s International 
Monitoring System. 
The ACE program continued until 1999. According to U.S. analysts, under this exchange 
program, the United States developed a technical understanding of the status and key 
players of China’s nuclear weapons program. Such exchanges were very important for 
the United States because the United States used to have connections with China’s first-
generation nuclear scientists, most of whom were educated between 1930 and 1950 in the 
United States, Britain, Germany, and France. But as China’s first-generation nuclear 
scientists turned over the leadership of their program to a second generation of scientists 
who were mostly trained in China and the Soviet Union, the United States lost its 
connection with the key players of China’s program.154 The ACE program provided an 
opportunity for the United States to get to know this new generation of Chinese nuclear 
scientists and to rebuild some of the connection. This channel of communication between 
American and Chinese nuclear scientists opened a window for the United States to obtain 
up-to-date information about China’s nuclear program and policy. Such information was 
very important for the United States as it was trying to influence China’s policy over 
CTBT, nonproliferation, and nuclear security. 
By 1997, the Lab-to-Lab Exchange Program had sponsored five major workshops and 
several smaller meetings: 
154Johnston and May, The Cox Committee Report: An Assessment. 
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• Comprehensive Test Ban Monitoring Technologies Workshop (January 1996) 
• Workshop on Material Protection Control and Accounting Technologies (January 
1996) 
• Cooperative Monitoring Workshop (March 1996) 
• Atmospheric Sciences and Nonproliferation Workshop (June 1997) 
• Workshop on the Technical Expertise Applied to the Control of Nuclear 
Technologies for the Prevention of Nuclear Proliferation (August 1997)155 
To support official CTBT negotiations in Geneva, American and Chinese scientists 
focused on CTBT verification technology and sought to reach agreement on the CTBT 
verification mechanism. Their exchanges during this period were focused on the 
following issues: 
1. Establishing a common understanding about the methodology to be used in the 
CTBT verification system for collection and analyzing data 
2. Improving their capability and increasing their experience for data processing 
3. Encouraging joint participation in the early phase of the implementation and 
testing of the CTBT verification system and building mutual confidence through 
enhancing transparency to the extent that national security information would not 
be compromised 
4. Building mutual confidence in on-site inspection without compromising national 
security information. 
155Wen L Hsu, "The Impact of Government Restructuring on Chinese Nuclear Arms Control and 
Nonproliferation Policymaking," The Nonproliferation Review 6, no. 4 (1999). 
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Table 3 is a summary of the cooperative research projects that focused on CTBT-related 
issues.156 
Table 3 CTBT-Related Cooperative Research Projects under ACE 
Area of Cooperation Objectives Chinese Partners 
Data Handling (i.e. 
authentication and 
visualization) 
Increase experience and 
confidence in methods to 
analyze and present data; 
Develop common technical 
approaches 
CAEP 




















Enhance systems for 
application in China 
CAEP 
Atmospheric Modeling Develop regional 




During March 23 to April 5, 1996, a delegation from the Chinese Academy of 
Engineering Physics was invited to visit a number of U.S. national labs and research 
institutes. The discussion was focused on CTBT monitoring and verification technologies, 
CTBT on-site inspection, data analysis under CTBT, role of U.S. national laboratories in 
promoting arms control, and peaceful nuclear explosion. The Chinese delegation included 
156Nancy Prindle, "U.S.-China Lab-to-Lab Technical Exchange Program," ibid., no. Spring-Summer (1998). 
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Li Youping, Chen Xueyin, Wang Deli, Li Bin, and other Chinese nuclear scientists. They 
visited the Cooperative Monitoring Center of Sandia National Laboratory, Los Alamos 
National Laboratory, Natural Resources Defense Council, Federation of American 
Scientists, State University of New York at Stony Brook, and Energy and the 
Environment Research Center at Princeton University.157 
American scientists explained their views about CTBT on-site inspection—how to build 
confidence through inspection, deter treaty violations, and enhance information-
collection capability. They introduced to Chinese scientists the DOE’s Seven Years’ Plan 
of Technology Research and Development for the Monitoring and Verification of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The main purpose of the plan was to improve U.S. 
technical capability to detect the yield of a potential nuclear test, to increase the 
credibility of its assessment, and to reduce the false alarm rate. Chinese scientists were 
informed that China (and Northwestern China in particular), the Middle East, and North 
Africa were going to be the main regions that the United States would like to prioritize 
for CTBT monitoring and inspection. 
American and Chinese scientists had an exchange on the challenges of processing data 
under CTBT. Potentially useful data would include both data collected through national 
technical means (NTM) and sharable data (i.e., data collected by the International 
Monitoring System and during on-site inspections). There was already some data 
processing technology available at that time, but whether all such data should be 
157Xueyin (陈学印) Chen and Deli (王德礼) Wang, "U.S. Visit Report: Technical Information Regarding 
Nuclear Arms Control, Monitoring, and Verification, March 23- April 5, 1996 (访美专题汇报----核军控、




                                                            
submitted to the International Data Center and be shared with all states’ parties still 
needed to be considered. There were different views among the expert community 
regarding the data processing capability of the International Data Center and regarding 
whether there was available data-processing software to be shared. Much of the 
discussion between the U.S. and Chinese scientists was devoted to reaching consensus on 
this issue. 
Another major issue discussed during this visit was peaceful nuclear explosion. Chinese 
nuclear scientists believed that peaceful nuclear explosion could have important values 
for civilian construction and for natural disaster prevention. This was probably due to the 
Chinese nuclear scientists’ lack of testing experience with peaceful nuclear explosions. 
By contrast, both the United States and Soviet Union had conducted many more tests on 
peaceful nuclear explosion and found that peaceful nuclear explosion was less useful than 
they previously thought.158 However, the Chinese view had greatly influenced Chinese 
official position during the CTBT. During this visit, American scientists held an 
extensive discussion with their Chinese colleagues on potential benefits and problems for 
allowing peaceful nuclear explosion under CTBT. On a workshop organized jointly by 
the Natural Resources Defense Council, State University of New York at Stony Brook, 
and Princeton University, nuclear physicist Frank von Hippel explained the lessons that 
the United States learned during its history of conducting peaceful nuclear explosions and 
provided his analysis on the feasibility of distinguishing peaceful nuclear explosions from 
military nuclear tests. Chinese scientists also had a discussion with experts from the 
Natural Resources Defense Council on the potential impact of not banning peaceful 
158Trevor Findlay, Nuclear Dynamite: The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Fiasco(Rushcutter's Bay, N.S.W.: 
Brassey's Australia, 1990). 
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nuclear explosion on major nuclear powers’ capability for continuing the advancement of 
their nuclear weapons development.159 
Dialogue Organized by the Natural Resources Defense Council 
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) is a nongovernmental U.S. 
environmental organization with its headquarters in New York. During the 1990s, nuclear 
arms control experts at NRDC were very active in promoting U.S.-Chinese scientific 
exchange on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation issues. NRDC experts not only 
served on some of the U.S. delegations to U.S.-Chinese Track II dialogues, but they also 
initiated and organized their own exchange programs with Chinese nuclear scientists. 
On September 23, 1992, the United States conducted its 1,030th and last nuclear weapon 
test at the Nevada test site. One day later, the U.S. Congress passed the Exon-Hatfield-
Mitchell nine-month test moratorium legislation that limited the number and purpose of 
any additional testing and set the date for ending U.S. testing on September 30, 1996.160 
This signaled an important shift in U.S. policy on nuclear test bans. After the United 
States completed its nuclear test plan, it was eager to push forward a global test ban treaty 
and wanted to get other major nuclear weapons states onboard. Senior research associates 
Thomas Cochran and Christopher Paine believed it was the right time to engage with 
their Chinese counterparts to discuss issues related to the global nuclear test ban. 
159Chen and Wang, "U.S. Visit Report: Technical Information Regarding Nuclear Arms Control, Monitoring, 
and Verification, March 23- April 5, 1996 (访美专题汇报----核军控、检测、核查技术方面信息（1996
年 3 月 23 日-4 月 5 日）)." 
160"Arms Control Association,” "No Going Back: 20 Years since the Last U.S. Nuclear Test " Arms Control 
Today 3, no. 14 (2012). 
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On March 29, 1993, Cochran and Paine coauthored a letter to be delivered to Hu Side and 
Wang Deli at the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics. They 
explained in this letter that the U.S. Congress had asked the president to start a test ban 
treaty negotiation. The United States would not conduct any more nuclear tests after 
September 30, 1996, unless other countries tested. In response to the congressional 
mandate, the new administration was preparing a comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear 
test policy and was at that moment making a new plan for U.S. nuclear tests in the future. 
Cochran and Paine believed that this was a critically important moment to have a 
discussion with Chinese nuclear scientists and nuclear policy makers because the 
prospects of a successful nuclear test ban treaty relied on full cooperation from China. 
They mentioned that the discussion did not need to be at the official level but would be 
very helpful if views could be exchanged informally at the unofficial level. If possible, 
they wanted to know the Chinese perspective on the U.S. nuclear test moratorium, the 
impact of a test ban treaty on China’s nuclear weapon development plan, and the 
implications for China’s nuclear policy if the United States, Russian, and France 
extended their nuclear moratoria.161 
Wanting to have a better understanding of U.S. thinking on CTBT, Hu Side and Wang 
Deli responded positively to Cochran and Paine’s proposal and decided to host a visit by 
the Natural Resources Defense Council to the Institute of Applied Physics and 
Computational Mathematics. On June 1, a six-member U.S. delegation arrived in Beijing 
and began a four-day exchange with Chinese nuclear experts. Besides Thomas Cochran 
and Christopher Paine, Robert Norris from NRDC, George Bunn from Standard 




                                                            
University, and Ray Kidder from LLNL (retired) all participated in this exchange. On the 
Chinese side, there were a total of 25 participants, most of whom were from CAEP and 
IAPCM, such as Hu Side, Du Xiangwan, Liu Gongliang, TianDongfeng, and Wang Deli. 
Experts from the China Defense, Science, and Technology Information Center, China 
Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, Chinese People’s Association for 
Peace and Disarmament, and Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics also 
took part in the meeting. 
American and Chinese experts exchanged views about the status of nuclear weapons 
programs of the major nuclear weapons states. They agreed that there was no strong 
demand for new nuclear weapon designs in the United States and Russia, and both 
countries had no new research and development plans. Britain’s nuclear weapon 
development was also restricted because it did not have its own nuclear test site and had 
been using the American test site at Nevada. France, too, had cancelled or postponed 
most of its nuclear development plans and had joined the United States, Britain, and 
Russia in nuclear test moratoria. China’s decision, as a result, would be critical for what 
would happen in the near future. If China continued to test, this would give other nuclear 
weapons states an excuse for resuming their nuclear tests, too. Hu Side and other Chinese 
experts explained that it was China’s policy to pursue the ultimate goal of comprehensive 
prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. They argued that China would 
be supportive of nuclear arms control efforts including the nuclear test ban, as those were 
in line with China’s nuclear policy and strategic objectives. 
American experts also briefed Chinese experts about domestic debates in the United 
States about nuclear test bans. That debate was centered on the safety, security, and 
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reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons and would significantly affect U.S. decisions on a 
comprehensive test ban. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, some in the United States 
argued that the priority of the U.S. nuclear program should shift from “modernizing” 
existing stockpiles to increasing its “safety” and “security.” As a result, they asserted that 
the United States needed to spend money on developing a new generation of nuclear 
warheads, as well as new aircrafts and other delivery systems that were safer and less 
prone to accidents. The U.S. Congress, on the other hand, was opposed to this new plan 
and believed it was unnecessary to develop “safer” and “more secure” nuclear warheads 
because there had never been an accidental nuclear explosion. Chinese scientists such as 
Liu Gongliang held the view that it was understandable for the United States to conduct a 
limited number of tests for the purpose of addressing safety and security issues. But 
China would be concerned about the ability of technologically advanced countries to 
circumvent CTBT detection systems. In the process of negotiating the CTBT, the more 
important issue was going to be the establishment of an effective verification regime 
through sufficient information exchange and technology sharing. 
Among potential issues that might prevent countries from reaching agreement on CTBT, 
the definition of “nuclear test” received a lot of discussion. American scientists were very 
candid in saying that it was going to be difficult for nuclear weapons states and 
nonnuclear weapons states to reach agreement on the definition of nuclear explosion. On 
the one side, the nuclear weapons states wanted to keep a certain ambiguity regarding the 
definition of nuclear explosion so that they could continue making necessary experiments 
that would make it easier to effectively maintain their existing nuclear stockpiles. On the 
other side, all the nonnuclear weapons states would demand prohibiting any type of 
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nuclear explosion. As a result, American scientists suggested that it would be really 
helpful for the five nuclear weapons states defined by the NPT to reach an informal 
agreement among themselves in advance. That would make negotiations with the 
nonnuclear weapons states easier. 
Aware of the significant problem of verification if countries all proposed their own 
desired thresholds for nuclear explosion, the Chinese scientists suggested that a strict 
definition of nuclear explosion be adopted (i.e., any nuclear explosion with a yield larger 
than zero should be prohibited). This zero-yield standard should be applied also to 
experiments that are intended to help maintain the efficacy and reliability of existing 
stockpiles.162 
In terms of CTBT verification, there was still debate about whether it was possible to 
reliably detect clandestine nuclear explosions with yields of less than 1 kiloton. Chinese 
scientists suggested that more joint research be conducted to better understand available 
verification technology and its policy implication. This position clearly reflected China’s 
concern that its relative lack of verification experience and technology might land it in an 
unfavorable position during official negotiations. They therefore argued that relevant 
countries should also share their verification technology with each other in order to avoid 
a limited number of technologically advanced countries dominating the negotiations over 
the CTBT verification regime.163 
162Zou, "China and the Ctbt Negotiations." 
163Zhongliang (吴忠良) Wu, "Nuclear Tests Monitoring Technology and Physics (核试验监测的技术和物
理)," Physics (物理) 36, no. 07 (2007). 
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Indirect Communication 
In addition to dialogues and exchanges, American scientists also provided their Chinese 
colleagues with in-depth research (unclassified research) conducted by the United States 
or U.S. experts to help the Chinese better understand the policy debates and development 
in the United States in the belief that if well informed, China would be more capable of 
making rational decisions over CTBT that were going to serve both countries’ common 
interests. 
In 1994, per the request of the U.S. government, an independent group of scientists—the 
Jason Committee—conducted research on the necessity for the United States to continue 
nuclear tests.164 The chair of the Jason Committee, Sidney Drell, provided their report to 
Hu Side of the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics. The Science 
and Technology Information Center of Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics then 
translated this report into Chinese. 
The Jason report concludes that after more than 1,000 nuclear tests over more than fifty 
years—particularly after the most recent 150 tests of new nuclear weapon designs over 
the last twenty years—the United States could be highly confident that the safety, 
security, and reliability of its existing stockpile could be maintained over the next several 
decades.165 
When it comes to CTBT, the Jason report states that nuclear tests at a yield of about 500 
kiloton are helpful for understanding the functioning of boost gas ignition and initial burn, 





                                                            
which is a critical step in achieving full primary design yield. However, such tests must 
be conducted regularly and be conducted each and every time after old parts are replaced 
with remanufactured parts. However, this would turn the CTBT essentially into another 
TTBT. Although such tests can add to confidence about long-term stockpile reliability, its 
importance is not going to be as high as the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship 
program (SBSS).166 Therefore, the overall benefit for conducting such tests is not 
significant. 
The Jason report also finds that lower-yield nuclear tests were not necessary. Nuclear 
tests with nominal yields up to a 100-ton limit permit “examination of aspects of the pre-
boost fission process.” However, “this is at best a partial and possibly misleading 
performance indicator.” As for the so-called hydro nuclear tests (tests with a nuclear yield 
of less than 4 lbs. TNT equivalent), the Jason report concludes that there is no persuasive 
case for the utility of hydro nuclear tests for detecting small changes in the performance 
margins for current U.S. weapons. At best, “such tests could confirm the safety of a 
device against producing detectable nuclear yield if its high explosive is detonated 
accidentally at one point.” However, “the U.S. arsenal has neither a present nor 
anticipated need for such re-confirmation.”167 
In case serious technical problems emerged that would significantly reduce the reliability 
of the U.S. nuclear stockpile and that could not be addressed by the SBSS, the United 
States might need to test the primary at full yield and to test the ignition of the secondary. 
The yield of such tests might exceed 10,000 kilotons. In this case, as suggested by the 
166C Callan et al., "Science Based Stockpile Stewardship,"(Mitre Corp Mclean Va Jason Program Office, 
1994). 
167Drell et al., "Nuclear Testing: Summary and Conclusions, Jason Report Jsr-95-320." 
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Jason Committee, the United States could choose to withdraw from the CTBT according 
to the “supreme national interests” withdrawal clause of the treaty. 
In general, the Jason report concludes that because of the SBSS, there is no need for the 
United States to continue conducting low-yield nuclear tests, as they are not going to be 
particularly helpful. Partly because of the conclusion that the Jason report presented, 
President Clinton in August 1995 decided to support the zero-yield test ban proposal in 
the CTBT negotiation and expressed support for relying on the SBSS for maintaining the 
safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile after CTBT enters into 
force.168 
During the series of Track II exchanges shortly before and during the CTBT negotiations, 
Chinese nuclear scientists received several important unclassified research reports 
produced by their American colleagues or the U.S. government, including the Jason 
Committee report, the DOE’s Seven Years’ Plan of Technology Research and 
Development for the Monitoring and Verification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 
the NRDC’s Arsenals of the Nuclear Weapons Power: An Overview,169 among others. 
These reports received much attention and many of them were translated into Chinese 
and widely distributed within the nuclear laboratories.170 By the time CTBT negotiations 
started, China’s nuclear maintenance capability was much less advanced than the United 
States, and China faced serious uncertainty about its capability to maintain its nuclear 
stockpile after nuclear tests were prohibited. Chinese scientists carefully studied these 
168"Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Chronology ,” Federation of American Scientists, 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/chron.htm. 
169"The Arsenals of the Nuclear Weapons Power: An Overview," (Natural Resources Defense Council, 
January 4, 1996). 




                                                            
reports provided by the U.S. scientists and found them very helpful in drawing lessons 
from the U.S. SBSS program and the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI). 
This has helped reduce Chinese scientists’ concerns and build their confidence in 
maintaining China’s stockpile under CTBT.171 
Operational-Level Engagement and the Emergence of China’s Nuclear 
Arms Control Community 
The Defense Industry 
Chinese nuclear scientists in the defense industry did not begin conducting arms control 
research until the late 1980s and early 1990s, when they became active participants in 
U.S.-Chinese operational-level engagement. During these exchanges, they came to the 
recognition that developing technical expertise in nuclear arms control treaty 
implementation is an important function of a country’s nuclear weapon labs. They 
observed how the U.S. national labs devoted substantial resources to arms control and 
nonproliferation research and began to accept the notion that nuclear weapons scientists 
have a role to play in supporting their country’s nuclear arms control and nonproliferation 
policy-making. As a result, many of the Chinese participants quickly set up research 
groups on arms control in their home institutes. China’s nuclear scientists participated 
intensively in China’s domestic discussion around CTBT and played an important role in 
official CTBT negotiations. Their influence grew quickly as a result. 




                                                            
Hu Side was among the first group of Chinese nuclear scientists to participate in U.S.-
Chinese technical engagement. In his historical visit to the three major DOE nuclear labs 
(LANL, LLNL, and SNL) in February 1994, he and five other Chinese nuclear scientists 
had extensive discussions with American nuclear scientists on technical dimensions of 
important international security issues, including nuclear arms control and 
nonproliferation. After coming back from this trip, he created the Program for 
Verification Technologies Studies in 1995 to investigate technical solutions to support 
nuclear arms control verification.172 
Chen Xueyin, one of Chinese leading nuclear weapons scientists, attended an 
international conference organized by the Italian Union of Scientists for Disarmament 
(USPID)173 on a nuclear winter in 1985. Chen met other nuclear arms control scientists 
from the United States and Soviet Union during this meeting and was greatly inspired by 
the feeling that there was a common language with other scientists. After returning from 
this meeting, Chen recommended setting up a working group within CAEP/IAPCM for 
nuclear scientists to discuss and work on nuclear arms control. This working group later 
became the Program on Science and National Security Studies (PSNSS, 科学与国家安
全研究项目) at the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics 
(IAPCM) in 1989. 
Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics 
172Hsu, "The Impact of Government Restructuring on Chinese Nuclear Arms Control and Nonproliferation 
Policymaking." 
173USPID (UnioneScienziati per ilDisarmo in Italian) is the Italian Union of Scientists for Disarmament, an 
association established in 1982 with the purpose of providing information about and analysis of arms 
control and disarmament. For more information, see http://www.uspid.org/ 
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In1989, the Program for Science and National Security Studies was established within the 
Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics (IAPCM, 北京应用物理与
计算数学研究所)174 as an arms control research unit. The main research focus was on 
science and technology issues related to national and international security and arms 
control. This research unit carried out two types of research: One was to study the impact 
of nuclear weapons and conduct research on nuclear policy in general. The other was to 
conduct technical research on nuclear disarmament.175 For example, PSNSS studied 
China’s nuclear strategy and challenges faced by China’s arms control policy.176 It also 
conducted technical research on detection of nuclear warheads and verification of nuclear 
materials.177 PSNSS quickly became a very successful and important part of IAPCM’s 
technical and policy research arm. Its personnel and research activities increased speedily 
over time. IAPCM scientists produced a range of studies on important arms control issues, 
many of which became textbooks for training China’s emerging arms control expert 
174 Both CAEP and IAPCM were part of CONSIND until 1998. With a government organizational 
restructuring in 1998, CAEP and IAPCM becomes subordinate organizations under the newly established 
General Armament Department of the PLA. 
175Xiangli (孙向丽) Sun and Deli (王德礼) Wang, "Current Status and Future Trend of Nuclear Arms 
Control Research (核军备控制研究的现状与前景)," Trends in Nuclear Physics (核物理动态) 12, no. 4 
(1995). 
176Xiangli (孙向丽) Sun, "Features and Characteristics of China's Nuclear Strategy (中国核战略性质与特
点分析)," World Economics and Politics (世界经济与政治), no. 9 (2006); "New Challenges and New 
Agenda for China's Arms Control (中国军控的新挑战与新议程)," Foreign Affairs Review (外交评论), no. 
3 (2010). 
177Bo (陈波) Chen and Fanhua (郝樊华) Hao, "Γ Detection of Nuclear Warhead Model (核弹头模型的Γ
射线探测)," Nuclear Electronics & Detection Technology (核电子学与探测技术) 16, no. 6 (1996); Jian (龚




                                                            
community.178 Several years later, IAPCM set up an Arms Control Physics Division with 
a research staff of eight in January 1997.179 
The China Defense, Science, and Technology Information Center (CDSTIC) 
Liu Huaqiu, a senior research fellow at the China Defense, Science, and Technology 
Information Center, was assigned to China’s delegation to the Conference on 
Disarmament in the 1980s where he observed discussions at the CD on arms control 
issues and began to devote his research interests to arms control and disarmament.180 In 
1986, he established the first arms control and disarmament program within CDSTIC.181 
This program later developed into the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament at 
CDSTIC.182 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
After China re-obtained its membership in the United Nations in the 1970s and began to 
adjust itself to the post-Mao policy of opening up to the outside, it began to send 
delegations to important international organizations in an effort to participate more 
actively in international institutions. China sent its first observer team to the Conference 
on Disarmament in 1979 and joined the CD one year later. As soon as the Chinese 
delegates began to expose themselves to the CD discussions, they quickly recognized that 
178Deli (王德礼) Wang and Xiangli (孙向丽) Sun, "A Collection of Arms Control Research Papers (军备控制
论文集),"(Beijing: Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics  (应用物理与计算数学研
究所), 1995). 
179Hsu, "The Impact of Government Restructuring on Chinese Nuclear Arms Control and Nonproliferation 
Policymaking." 
180Lora Saalman, "How Chinese Analysts View Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nuclear Deterrence after 
the Cold War," Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament. Monterey Institute of International 
Studies: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (2009). 
181Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China's Nonproliferation Policies and Practices, 1980-
2004. 
182"The China Defense, Science, and Technology Information Center (Cdstic),"  http://www.cdstic.cn/. 
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their lack of expertise was creating difficulties for them to effectively engage in 
discussions.183 To address this, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up a new division 
within the Department of International Organizations to focus on arms control-related 
issues. This new division was designated as the Fourth Division and quickly became an 
effective training ground of China’s first generation of arms control experts within the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As members of China’s delegation to the CD rotate from 
year to year, the number of Chinese Foreign Ministry officers who have worked at the 
CD and have obtained a substantial level of expertise on arms control has grown 
dramatically. By 1996, the year when the CTBT negotiations concluded at the CD, more 
than ninety Chinese foreign affairs officers had worked at the CD, compared to only a 
dozen in the early 1980s.184 
The PLA 
Within the PLA, arms control-related issues have been primarily dealt with by the Second 
Department of the General Staff Depart (总参二部). The Second Department is in charge 
of military intelligence. As the most important source of defense intelligence, national 
security, and military-related strategic analysis for China’s senior leadership, the Second 
Department has superior resources and authority over other civilian and military 
intelligence agencies. Although the Second Department was established as early as the 
1950s, it did not pay much attention to arms control issues except simply monitoring 





                                                            
arms control policies of the major powers.185 Until the mid-1990s, the majority view 
within the PLA was that arms control was a game between superpowers and had little to 
do with China’s security policy and paid minimal attention to arms control research as a 
result.186 This was changed after some leading researchers within the PLA began to 
interact with the international arms control community starting from the late 1980s. 
Pan Zhenqiang, who later became a major general, served in the General Staff 
Department of the PLA until 1986. In 1986, he began to work at the Institute of Strategic 
Studies (ISS) of the National Defense University (NDU) until his retirement in August 
2001. At the ISS, he started as a research fellow and rose all the way to serve as the 
director of the institute. Soon after he became a research fellow at ISS, he was accepted 
into U.S. National Defense University in 1987 and later spent one year as a research 
fellow at the Center for International Security and Arms Control (later renamed the 
Center for International Security and Cooperation) at Stanford University during 1988–89. 
In the early to mid-1980s, he also served on China’s delegation to the Conference on 
Disarmament for one year. Drawing on these experiences, his research interests began to 
shift to arms control and disarmament issues. As he assumed leadership positions within 
ISS, arms control and disarmament gradually became an important part of ISS’s research 
portfolio. General Pan and his colleagues wrote and published one of the first books on 
arms control in China: International Disarmament and Arms Control (国际裁军与军备
185Michael D Swaine, The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Policymaking, vol. 781(Rand 
Corporation, 1998). 
186Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China's Nonproliferation Policies and Practices, 1980-
2004; Liu, "On the Characters of the Struggle of International Arms Control (论国际军控斗争的性质)." 
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控制),187 in which he argues that arms control research is of high importance to the PLA 
and China’s national security interests in general. Against the traditional view that arms 
control has nothing to do with China, General Pan and his team were the first within the 
system to challenge that view and point out that international arms control affects China’s 
security interests and China should pay more attention to arms control issues. As more 
PLA researchers began to take up arms control issues, they ultimately played an 
important role in changing the traditional view within the military.188 The Institute of 
Strategic Studies of the National Defense University also became the leading arms 
control policy research institute with the PLA. 
Research Institutes 
Fudan University 
The establishment of China’s first non-government-based arms control research 
program—the Program on Arms Control and Regional Security at the Center for 
American Studies of Fudan University—was also greatly influenced by U.S.-Chinese 
operational-level engagement. The founder of this program is Dr. Shen Dingli, who 
received his PhD in physics in 1988 and was then accepted into the arms control program 
at Princeton University. His interaction with arms control experts and scientists at 
Princeton during 1989–1991 shifted his research from physics to the interdisciplinary 
area of science and international security. His initial research focused on China’s nuclear 
187Zhenqiang (潘振强) Pan, Liping (夏立平) Xia, and Zhongchun (王仲春) Wang, eds., International 
Disarmament and Arms Control (国际裁军与军备控制)(Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1996). 
188Bo (许博) Xu, "Arms Control and Sino-U.S. Relations after the Cold War (冷战后军备控制与中美关
系))" (The PLA University of Foreign Languages (中国人民解放军外国语学院), 2004). 
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test policy and nuclear forces modernization.189 Soon after returning from Princeton to 
Fudan University in 1991, Dr. Shen established the Program on Arms Control and 
Regional Security at the Center for American Studies.190 
Dr. Shen was also invited in 1991 to participate in an annual International Summer 
Symposium on Science and World Affairs organized by the Union of Concerned 
Scientists (UCS). UCS is a nongovernmental organization based in Boston that conducts 
scientific and technical research on important policy issues. The main goal of the annual 
International Summer Symposiums on Science and World Affairs is to encourage and 
support the development of young scientists working on policy-oriented research on 
international security and arms control issues. According to UCS, the Summer 
Symposium is to encourage the development of “independent, technically-trained arms 
control and international security analysts” in “countries where there is not a strong 
tradition of public interest science and to integrate them into the international community 
of researchers with similar interests and backgrounds.”191 Although the Summer 
Symposium was primarily intended at the beginning to enhance discussions between U.S. 
and Soviet junior scientists, the UCS also invited a small number of Chinese young 
scientists to participate. Dr. Shen therefore was invited to attend the third Summer 
Symposium in August 1991. 
189Dingli (沈丁立) Shen, "The Current Status of Chinese Nuclear Forces and Nuclear Policies," in CEES 
Report No. 247(Center for Energy and Environmental Studies); "Likely Impact of the Policy of Clinton 
Administration on China's Nuclear Test (克林顿政府对中国核试验可能产生的影响)," Fudan 
Journal(Social Sciences Edition) (复旦学报(社会科学版)), no. 04 (1993). 
190"Shen Dingli," Center for American Studies, Fudan University, 
http://www.cas.fudan.edu.cn/viewprofile.en.php?id=66. 




                                                            
His experience apparently greatly inspired his interest in arms control-related research 
and was convinced about the importance of conducting international scientific dialogues. 
He offered to host the next Summer Symposium at his home university—Fudan 
University—in 1992. The 1992 Shanghai Summer Symposium became the first Summer 
Symposium ever held in China. It turned out to be very successful in bringing together an 
emerging generation of Chinese public interest scientists and in introducing them to the 
new field of arms control research and to their international colleagues. The Program on 
Arms Control and Regional Security also developed into a leading Chinese research 
institute on arms control and nonproliferation.192 
Operational-Level Engagement and the Growth of China’s Nuclear 
Arms Control Community 
Operational-level engagement not only helped China’s nuclear arms control community 
to emerge but also played a significant role in facilitating its growth. As China’s first 
generation of arms control specialists began to concentrate their own work on arms 
control, their appreciation of the importance of international engagement encouraged 
them to start promoting more dialogues and exchanges between their home institutes and 
the international arms control communities. The emergence and increase of dialogues and 
exchanges provided unprecedented opportunities to expose a growing number of Chinese 




                                                            
Dialogues, Exchanges, and Growth of the Chinese Community 
Hu Side, a frequent participant of U.S.-Chinese nuclear scientific dialogues, founded the 
ISODARCO-Beijing Seminar on Arms Control in 1988. This ISODARCO-Beijing 
Seminar takes place on a biennial basis and is organized by the IAPCM and CICIR. It 
was initiated by the Chinese military nuclear establishment to serve as a communication 
channel between Chinese and the international scientific community. The Italian 
International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts (ISODARCO) serves as 
the main foreign partner of this dialogue,193 but American arms control experts have been 
the most important foreign participants. After the ISODARCO-Beijing Seminar was 
established, CTBT-related issues quickly became a major focus. This seminar offers a 
timely opportunity for Chinese arms control and international security experts to present 
their research on CTBT and have discussion with their colleagues from the United States 
and other countries.194 
193 For more information about ISODARCO and a chronicle of the seminars organized by ISODARCO, see 
http://www.isodarco.it/index.html 
194Xueze (胡学泽) Hu, "The Second Beijing Arms Control Seminar: Introduction and Paper Titles (北京第二




                                                            
 
Figure 1 Participants in ISODARCO-Beijing Seminar on Arms Control, 1988–2012195 
195 Data collected from the official participant lists for each ISODARCO-Beijing Seminar. Date for 2008 and 
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196 Data collected from the official participant lists for each ISODARCO-Beijing Seminar. 
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As shown in Figure 1 and Table 4, a large number of Chinese participants attended each 
of the ISODARCO-Beijing Seminars on Arms Control since 1988. Taking into 
consideration the fact that China’s arms control community was still very young and 
small in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the gathering and presence of a large number of 
Chinese experts in this arms control seminar is by itself a strong indicator of a rapid 
growth of interest. The number of foreign participants also increased dramatically from 
eight in 1988 to 65 in 2012. American arms control experts have been most active in 
these meetings. More than half of the foreign participants are from the United States. A 
breakdown study of the official participant lists shows more details: 
1. The seminar not only invited senior Chinese experts but was also open to young 
and next-generation Chinese analysts. In each seminar since 1988 till 2012, there 
were about twenty to thirty new Chinese participants who had never attended this 
seminar before. On an accumulative base, therefore, a total of several hundreds of 
Chinese experts have participated in one or more seminars; 
2. An increasing number of Chinese government agencies and non-government 
research institutes are represented on these seminars. At the beginning Chinese 
participants were primarily from the military nuclear complex – the CAEP, 
IAPCM, and CDSTIC. Increasingly, officials from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Ministry of Defense began to attend the meetings. Experts from 
major research institutes such as CICIR and CIIS and major universities such as 
Fudan University, Tsinghua University, and Beijing University were also 
involved. Since the late 1990s through the 2000s, Chinese participants came from 
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an increasingly diversified background and institutes. Even government agencies 
that are partially involved in arms control policy-making sent experts to these 
seminars. Experts from a large number of research institutes became interested in 
arms control issues and got involved in this dialogue. Figure 2 is the list of 
Chinese institutes and organizations that sent representatives to the 2012 
ISODARCO-Beijing Seminar. They include all the major government agencies, 
PLA organizations, defense industry entities, research institutes, think tanks, 
universities, and non-governmental organizations. The ISODARCO-Beijing 







Figure 2Expansion and Pluralization of China’s Arms Control Community as 
Represented in ISODARCO-Beijing Seminars on Arms Control (2012) 
 
Training Programs and the Growth of the Chinese Community 
After setting up the Program on Science and National Security Studies in 1989, CAEP 
and IAPCM started graduate programs in the multidisciplinary area of science and arms 
control including both MA and PhD programs in 1990.197 Du Xiangwan (杜祥琬), a 
leading Chinese nuclear weapons scientist and a frequent participant of U.S.-China 
exchange programs, wrote and published the book The Scientific and Technological 
Foundation of Nuclear Arms Control (核军备控制的科学技术基础), which later 
became a popular textbook that was widely used in arms control education programs 
across the country. The graduate programs at CAEP and IAPCM have been very effective 
in cultivating China’s new generation of arms control specialists. 
Li Bin, one of China’s leading nuclear arms control experts since the 1990s, is one of the 
graduates of the CAEP/IAPCM program. After receiving his bachelor’s and master’s 
degrees in physics in 1988, Li entered the Graduate School of CAEP to study arms 
control. During that time, his research focus was on the technical aspects of controlling 
laser weapons for missile defense. He received his PhD in 1993 and continued to work 
for IAPCM as a research fellow. He began to focus his research on the CTBT. He also 
joined the COSTIND technical group that supported the Chinese CTBT Negotiating 
Team in Geneva. One year later, in 1994, Dr. Li received the two-year postdoctoral 
Fellowship on Peace and Security in a Changing Word awarded by the Social Science 
197Xiangwan ( 杜祥琬) Du, The Scientific and Technological Foundation of Nuclear Arms Control (核军备控
制的科学技术基础)(Beijing: Defense Industry Press (国防工业出版社), 1996). 
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Research Council and MacArthur Foundation. Under the support of this fellowship, he 
spent his first year at the Defense and Arms Control Studies Program (now the Security 
Studies Program) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) to undergo training 
in the field of arms control and international security. He spent his second year at the 
Center for Energy and Environmental Studies at Princeton University, where he 
continued his research on CTBT, missile proliferation, and missile defense.  
After Dr. Li went back to IAPCM in the summer of 1996, he was appointed senior 
research fellow. In late July 1996, when the last round of CTBT negotiations began, he 
was sent to CD in Geneva to serve as a technical adviser to the Chinese CTBT 
Negotiating Team. After the conclusion of the CTBT, Dr. Li went back to IAPCM and 
set up a division in IAPCM to study the technical aspects of arms control. He was 
appointed director of this division, as well as executive deputy director of the Program 
for Science and National Security Studies. 198 
After leaving IAPCM, Dr. Li set up a research center—the Institute of Science and Public 
Affairs at China Youth College for Political Science in 1999—and another research 
center—the Arms Control Program at the Institute of International Studies (now the 
Department of International Relations) of Tsinghua University in 2000. Since then, the 
Arms Control Program at Tsinghua University has served as one of the most important 
and influential training programs for China’s young arms control specialists. 
Like Dr. Shen Dingli, Dr. Li Bin was also an early participant of UCS’s International 
Summer Symposium on Science and World Affairs. After the first summer symposium 




                                                            
was held in China in 1993, Chinese participants in this program grew more supportive of 
it and soon organized another summer symposium in China. The 1996 summer 
symposium was therefore held in Beijing and hosted by the Beijing University of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics (also known as Bei Hang University). This meeting again 
played the important function of helping to create a community of Chinese researchers, 
“most of whom were unaware of others working on similar issues” at that time.199 
Under the leadership of Dr. Shen Dingli, the Program on Arms Control and Regional 
Security at the Center for American Studies of Fudan University also became China’s 
first university-based arms control training program and began to offer classes on nuclear 
arms control and nonproliferation as part of their master’s and PhD curriculum since the 
early 1990s. 
In summary, Figure 3 illustrates the dramatic increase of Chinese organizations that 
became part of China’s nuclear arms control community, due to a large part to the 
intensive operational-level engagement between the United States and China before and 
during the CTBT negotiations. In Figure 2, boxes with blue borders are civilian 
organizations under the administration of the State Council; boxes with red borders are 
organizations within the defense industry; and boxes with green borders are military 
organizations. The Central Military Commission was in charge of both the military and 
the defense industry at that time. In this figure, only organizations that are filled with 
white color were involved – to a very limited extent – in China’s arms control policy-
making and policy discussion before intensive operational-level engagement took place 
199Personal correspondence with experts at Union of Concerned Scientists, 2008."25th International 
Summer Symposium on Science and World Affairs .” 
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between the United States and China around CTBT. Those organizations that are filled 
with grey color are new organizations that became part of China’s nuclear arms control 





Figure 3China’s Nuclear Arms Control Organization Chart, by the end of CTBT negotiation
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Inter-Agency Coordination and Communication Channels 
Before the bilateral engagement around CTBT, there was clearly a lack of a formal 
decision-making mechanism for specific arms control issues. The overall arms control 
community was disjointed and lacking cohesiveness. The historical development of the 
compartmentalized nuclear establishment contributed to the stovepipe nature of Chinese 
organizations.200 There were only very limited interactions between China’s nuclear 
weapons scientists and members of China’s nascent arms control policy community.201 
China’s defense industry organizations, for example, were tightly vertically integrated but 
highly autonomous from other organizations outside the defense industry. The scope and 
frequency of interagency exchange, communication, and coordination increased 
significantly during and after the CTBT engagement and negotiations. 
Coordination Mechanism within and among the Defense Industry, the Foreign 
Ministry, and Academics 
Starting in 1992, COSTIND’s Science and Technology Committee (科技委) held an 
annual meeting on international arms control developments. The Science and Technology 
Committee was in a very senior and powerful position within the defense industry. It is 
described as “the leading technical and intellectual brain trust for supporting the planning 
and development of defense S&T.”202 Due to the seniority of its members, the Science 
200Hsu, "The Impact of Government Restructuring on Chinese Nuclear Arms Control and Nonproliferation 
Policymaking." 
201Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China's Nonproliferation Policies and Practices, 1980-
2004. 
202Eric Hagt, "China's Defense High-Tech Leadership: Implications for S&T Innovation," in Policy Brief No. 
22(San Diego: The Study of Innovation and Technology in China (SITC), University of California Institute on 
Global Conflict and Cooperation, 2011). 
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and Technology Committee and its annual conference on arms control had important 
influence within China’s internal arms control policy debates. 
COSTIND established the Senior Arms Control Leading Group in early 1990s, which 
was supervised by COSTIND’s Arms Control Office. General Qian Shaojun, a former 
commander of the Lop Nur nuclear test site, was the director of the Arms Control 
Office.203 The main responsibility of the Senior Arms Control Leading Group was to 
coordinate arms control and nonproliferation research and policy analysis within the 
entire Chinese defense industry. The group was in charge of allocating money and 
organizing research, aligning the activities of the defense industry with China’s 
international arms control and nonproliferation commitment, and providing policy advice 
to relevant government agencies.204 
In order to coordinate broader interaction among the larger arms control community in 
China, COSTIND established the Arms Control Experts Group (军控专业组), which 
pulled together and conducted regular interaction (every month or every other month) 
among China’s top researchers on arms control from all the major research institutes 
including CDSTIC, CAEP, IAPCM, CIIS, CIISS, IAS, etc.205The PSNSS program at 
CAEP/IAPCM also organized a seminar series that brought together experts from a range 
of agencies including the PLA General Staff Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and the technical community to discuss policy and technical issues related to nuclear 
arms control. This had greatly facilitated the interagency community among China’s 
203Hsu, "The Impact of Government Restructuring on Chinese Nuclear Arms Control and Nonproliferation 
Policymaking." 





                                                            
burgeoning arms control community.206In response to increasing CTBT and other nuclear 
arms control discussions in the 1990s, MFA began to hold monthly preliminary meetings 
(务虚会) to review and discuss new developments in international arms control. Usually 
thirty to forty participants from across China’s arms control community came to such 
meetings and contributed thoughts on how China should adjust its arms control policy.207 
Soon after the onset of CTBT negotiations, MFA was finally given permission to upgrade 
the Fourth Division within the International Organizations Department into the new and 
separate Department of Arms Control and Disarmament. There was probably a sense that 
one agency had to be able to consistently take the lead within the entire government 
bureaucracy in coordination. The creation of the new department meant the MFA 
acquired more authority in the interagency process. ShaZukang, MFA’s chief arms 
control official, used to be the head of the Fourth Division and a deputy director of the 
International Organization Department. After the creation of the new department, he was 
elevated to first director. This put him on roughly the same level, in terms of bureaucratic 
ranking, with QiaoShaojun who was the director of COSTIND’s Arms Control Office 
and in charge of arms control issues within the entire Chinese defense industry. This 
bureaucratic elevation raised Sha’s relative position in the interagency coordination 
process. 
206Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000. 
207Alastair Iain Johnston, "Learning Versus Adaptation: Explaining Change in Chinese Arms Control Policy 
in the 1980s and 1990s," The China Journal (1996). 
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Chinese Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament 
A number of government agencies rotated members to serve on the Chinese delegation to 
the CD. Particularly during the CD negotiations on CTBT, all China’s relevant 
government agencies sent representatives to the Chinese delegation to support China’s 
CTBT negotiations. This became an important interagency communication and 
coordination mechanism for China’s still young and growing arms control community. 
These government agencies are summarized in Table 5.  
Table 5 Government Agencies Represented at the Chinese Delegation to the CD 
Specific Unit Unit Functions Government Agency 





Arms control and 
disarmament policy 






Information collection and 
research on foreign weapon 
systems, military 
technology, arms control, 
and other defense policy 
Commission of Science, 
Technology, and Industry for 
National Defense (COSTIND) 
CAEP/IAPCM Nuclear weapons design, 
manufacture, and 
maintenance; nuclear arms 
control and nonproliferation 
policy research 
COSTIND 
Second Department Intelligence collection and 
analysis 
General Staff Department, the 
PLA 
 




                                                            
More importantly, before each CD meeting, there were usually internal preparatory 
meetings held in China for participants from the MFA, the military, and COSTIND to 
come together and communicate with each other on policy issues that were going to be 
discussed in Geneva.209 
Nationwide Cross-Agency Meetings 
For the purpose of promoting intellectual exchange, some large-scale meetings were 
occasionally held to bring together a large number of experts from various agencies. In 
October 1986, for example, CICIR, MFA, and BIISS (Beijing Institute of International 
Strategic Studies) together organized a large-scale conference on arms control policy. 
More than fifty experts and analysts from almost all the major institutions, including CIIS, 
CASS, NDU, CICIR, CDSTIC, MFA, and BIISS, participated in the meeting.210 Papers 
presented at the meeting were later published in the form of an internally circulated book 
under the title A Collection of Research Papers on International Disarmament Struggle 
and China.211 There was a general consensus in this meeting that China’s arms control 
policy had been too simplistic, abstract, and inflexible and that there should be more 
horizontal connection and coordination within the entire community.212 
Table 6 summarizes China’s internal interagency policy coordination channels that had 
been established by the end of the CTBT negotiations. 
209Ibid. 
210Bonnie S Glaser and Banning N Garrett, "Chinese Perspectives on the Strategic Defense Initiative," 
Problems of Communism 35, no. 2 (1986). 
211"A Collection of Research Papers on International Disarmament Struggle and China (国际裁军斗争与中
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Bottom-Up Channel of Communication and Influence 
Initiation of Internal Policy Discussion by China’s Nuclear Scientists 
China’s original official position was strong objection to CTBT. China’s position was 
that banning nuclear testing by itself was useless unless it was accompanied by a general 
program for disarmament. After China began to participate in the CD in 1980, it blocked 
efforts even to set up an ad hoc working group to discuss the nuclear test ban for five 
consecutive years. In August 1981, China submitted a working paper to the CD to explain 
its position about the nuclear test ban. It stated, “Prohibiting nuclear tests can not bring 
about nuclear disarmament by itself. Nuclear threats can only be reduced when a range of 
measures for nuclear disarmament are taken.”214 
Chinese nuclear scientists, who had been following the progress of U.S. and Soviet 
nuclear weapons development, came to the conclusion that the United States would soon 
come to the point where it had mastered all the important technologies and additional 
tests would bring about reduced marginal benefits. Deng Jiaxian, Yumin, and Hu Side—
all prominent nuclear weapons scientists—wrote a report to the Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party proposing that China prepare for a possible global nuclear test 
ban in the near future. They recommended that China accelerate its nuclear testing 
program and finish the tests of its miniaturized warhead design in advance of a test 
214"Views on Disarmament and Related Issues, Working Paper,"  in Conference on Disarmament(Geneva: 
CD/206, August 6 1981). 
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ban.215 Their proposal received considerable high-level attention and the Central 
Committee approved their report on April 2, 1986.216 
At the same time, China’s official position on CTBT began to soften. China had stopped 
nuclear testing in the atmosphere as early as October 1980, but in 1986 China for the first 
time officially announced that it would conduct no more atmospheric nuclear tests.217 
Also in 1986, the Chinese delegation at the CD for the first time expressed its willingness 
to participate in an ad hoc committee on CTBT if such a committee were convened.218 
Arms Control Community and Their Bureaucratic Connections 
Some of the major Chinese research institutes that conducted research on the nuclear test 
ban and contributed to government policy deliberation included the China Institute of 
Contemporary International Relations (CICIR, 现代国际关系研究所), China Institute of 
International Studies (CIIS, 中国国际问题研究所), Foreign Affairs College (外交学院), 
and Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS, 中国社会科学院). Within CASS, the 
Institute of American Studies (IAS, 美国研究所) and the Institute of World Economic 
and Politics (世界经济政治研究所) played the important role in conducting arms control 
research. 
215Jian (宋健) Song and Nengquan (葛能全) Ge, Biography of the Founding Fathers of China's Atomic 
Bomb, Ballistic Missile, and Satellite Project (" 两弹一星" 元勋传), vol. 1(Beijing: Tsinghua University Press 
(清华大学出版社), 2001). 
216Ibid. 
217Guangya (朱光亚) Zhu, "A Few Reflective Thoughts on China's Nuclear Tests (对我国核试验的几点回
顾与思考),"(Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics (中国工程物理研究院), 2010). 
218Jiadong Qian, "Statement at the Conference on Disarmament," in Final Record of the 339th Plenary 




                                                            
Different from independent research institutes in the United States and other countries, 
most major Chinese research institutes were (and most still are) affiliated with certain 
government agencies and funded by the state. The above research institutes in particular 
had (and still have) direct communication channels to their “supervising” government 
agencies. This made it possible to submit reports and memos and provide policy advice to 
their “supervising” agencies. The following table illustrates their connection with specific 
Chinese government agencies. Such formal connections with supervising government 
agencies make it possible for researchers in these institutes to submit internal reports to 
relevant government agencies. They are also frequently consulted by relevant 
government agencies on technical and policy issues.219 
  
219Pascal Abb, "China's Foreign Policy Think Tanks: Changing Roles and Structural Conditions,"(GIGA 
Working Papers, 2013); Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, "Chinese Military-Related Think Tanks and 
Research Institutions," The China Quarterly 171(2002). 
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Table 7 Arms Control Research Institutes and Their Bureaucratic Connections 
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Publications by the Chinese nuclear arms control community were another channel of 
communication to promote their policy agenda and draw high-level attention to nuclear 
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arms control issues. This was done through two means: “internal circulation” and “open 
publication.” 
“Internal circulation” was a type of semi-classified internal publication that was primarily 
circulated within certain government bureaucracies and was used to inform and advise 
policy makers. The emergence of “internal circulations” since the 1980s established 
channels for the dissemination of information and analysis across the bureaucracy.220 
Some of the “internal circulations” were specifically focused on nuclear issues and were 
mostly prepared by the nuclear defense industry. The following is a list of such “internal 
circulations”: 
• Nuclear Weapons and High Technology (核武器与高技术), originally named 
Foreign Science and Technology Information (国外科技资料), was published 
firstly in 1992 by the Science and Technology Information Center of CAEP. 
• CDSTIC’s internal circulation publications: 
• Arms Control Information Bulletin (军控信息简报), published by CDSTIC’s 
Arms Control and Disarmament Research Department.221 
• Arms Control Research Newsletter (军备控制研究通讯), published by 
CDSTIC’s Arms Control and Disarmament Research Department.222 
220Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China's Nonproliferation Policies and Practices, 1980-
2004. 
221Shuang (颜爽) Yan, "A Study on the Evolution of U.S. Nuclear Arms Control Policy after the Cold War (冷
战后美国核军控政策的演变研究)" (National University of Defense Technology, 2009). 
222"China Missile and Aerospace Digest (中国导弹与航天文摘)," (Beijing: China Aerospace Science and 
Technology Corporation Information Research Institute (中国航天科技集团公司信息研究所), 1994). 
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• Selected Readings on Arms Control and Disarmament (军控与裁军选读), 
published by CDSTIC’s Arms Control and Disarmament Research 
Department.223 
Besides “internal circulations,” the nuclear arms control community also produced an 
increasing amount of “open publications” to promulgate their research and analysis. The 
growth of open publications reflected the broadening scope of China’s arms control 
research.224Figure 4 illustrates the number of research and policy analysis papers on the 
issue of CTBT that were openly published in Chinese journals. Such publications started 
to appear in the late 1980s and increased quickly before and during CTBT negotiations. 
Both scientists and policy analysts contributed to the rapid increase of open publications 
on CTBT, making their voices heard throughout the academic and policy circles.  
223Baochang (吴保昌) Wu, "Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and India's Nuclear Policy (全面核禁试条约
与印度核政策)," Nuclear Weapons and High Technology (核武器与高技术), no. 1 (1998). 




                                                            
 
Figure 4 Chinese Open Publications on CTBT 
Increasing Attention and Changed Perception at the Top Level 
As one Chinese nuclear scientist noted, during the Cold War years, Chinese leaders rarely 
consider arms control a relevant issue because of “the sharp gap between its nuclear 
arsenal and those of the principal nuclear powers” and “its deeply rooted mistrust of the 
superpowers.”225 But as China’s nuclear arms control community was making a louder 
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and louder voice for rethinking China’s policies, the top leadership developed a “gradual 
toleration and willingness” to consider arm control and nonproliferation.226 
MFA tried several times during the 1980s and into the 1990s to upgrade the Fourth 
Division to the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament (which is one level higher 
within the government bureaucracy) but failed. The request was believed to be denied for 
at least two reasons. One was that other bureaucratic players like the defense industry and 
the PLA had concerns that the MFA would dominate the interagency policy-making and 
coordinating process. Secondly, and more importantly, Chinese top leaders did not 
believe that arms control was an important enough issue to deserve a department in the 
MFA. As late as the early 1990s, Chinese leaders still saw arms control as primarily a 
U.S.-Soviet issue and a reflection of super power rivalry. China, in their views, was a 
developing country with a “peaceful foreign policy” and “defensive military policy” and 
therefore had little to do with arms control. Chinese arms control experts 
disagreed.227The Department of Arms Control and Disarmament was finally created in 
1997. 
Operational-level engagement was also quite effective in bringing about perception 
change at the very top level about some of the most basic but highly important concepts 
in the field of international arms control. Prior to international engagement, 
“disarmament” (裁军) was the only politically correct term in the Chinese lexicon. 
“Disarmament” was what the developing countries demanded and what China 
226Hsu, "The Impact of Government Restructuring on Chinese Nuclear Arms Control and Nonproliferation 
Policymaking." 
227Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000; ibid. 
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supported.228 In comparison, “arms control” was a negative term—it was what the 
superpowers used to consolidate their quantitative and qualitative advantage in military 
technology and capability and to avoid comprehensive and complete disarmament. Even 
in the Global Military Yearbook published in 1991 by the PLA Press, “arms control” was 
still defined as “an important element of the American and Soviet nuclear strategic 
thoughts.”229 
The change of perception really took place at the operational level. During the Track II 
exchanges, Chinese participants developed a deeper and much more sophisticated 
understanding of arms control. They began to accept the utility of arms control and 
started to argue that China should embrace arms control issues and develop its own arms 
control policy. For example, Du Xiangwan at the Chinese Academy of Engineering 
Physics wrote a textbook in the early 1990s to train China’s arms control specialists: The 
Scientific and Technological Foundation of Nuclear Arms Control (核军备控制的科学
技术基础). The book noted that arms control can help reduce dangers of military 
conflicts, reduce the likelihood of wars, and prevent the escalation of conflicts after they 
break out.230 Such views about the utility and objectives of arms control fall well in line 
with Western thinking on arms control.231 
228Liu, Handbook on Arms Control and Disarmament (军备控制与裁军手册). 
229"On Nuclear Arms Control Theoretical Research and Nuclear Disarmament (关于核军备控制理论研完
和核裁军)," in Global Military Yearbook (世界军事年鉴)(Beijing: The PLA Press (解放军出版社), 1991). 
230Du, The Scientific and Technological Foundation of Nuclear Arms Control (核军备控制的科学技术基础). 
231See, for example, Graham T Allison and Frederic A Morris, "Armaments and Arms Control: Exploring the 
Determinants of Military Weapons," Daedalus (1975); Bernard Brodie, "On the Objectives of Arms 
Control," International Security 1, no. 1 (1976). 
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Chinese experts began to invite their American colleagues to visit and discuss arms 
control issues.232 During this period, Chinese experts also started to publish articles in 
Chinese journals to introduce arms control policy research institutes in the United States 
(e.g., the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University) to 
their research.233 Arms control research as an academic subfield was also embraced and 
promulgated in China by China’s first generation of arms control experts.234Because 
CTBT is an arms control rather than disarmament agreement, China’s shift of perception 
at the beginning of the 1990s and the ultimate acceptance of “arms control” as a relevant 
concept paved the way for China’s participation in the CTBT negotiations.235China’s 
perception toward verification was also significantly changed as a result of Track II 
dialogues. This change of perception made it possible for China to reach an important 
agreement with other countries during the CTBT negotiations.  
In the early 1980s, China’s proposals submitted to the CD always contained very vague 
ideas about technical details such as verification. They tended to present normative 
appeals for compliance with arms control agreements, and they tended to aim at 
achieving rather ambitious arms control objectives without paying attention to whether it 
was technically possible to verify compliance. For the Chinese, compliance was more of 
232Cuncheng (冯存诚) Feng, "American Arms Control Experts Visited China (美国军备控制专家来华交
流)," Social Sciences Abroad (国外社会科学), no. 6 (1993). 
233Guangrong (游光荣) You, "Introduction of the U.S. Center for International Security and Arms Control 
(美画国降安奎与军备牲刹中心简介)," Soft Sciences in China (中国软科学), no. 1 (1996). 
234Min (于敏) Yu et al., "Study on Nuclear Physics,Nuclear Technology and Related Disciplines at Caep (中
国工程物理研究院的核物理、核技术及相关学科的研究)," Nuclear Physics Review (核物理动态) 12, no. 
4 (1995). 
235Liu, "On the Characters of the Struggle of International Arms Control (论国际军控斗争的性质)."; 
Kaibing (朱凯兵) Zhu and Yanan (刘亚南) Liu, "China's Achievement in International Arms Control in Spite 
of Difficulties and Challenges (论中国在国际军控困境和挑战中的作为)," Journal of PLA Nanjing Institute 
of Politics (南京政治学院学报) 21, no. 6 (2006); Sun and Wang, "Current Status and Future Trend of 
Nuclear Arms Control Research (核军备控制研究的现状与前景)." 
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a normative obligation than something that had to be strictly verified. Chinese proposals 
usually contained little discussion about incentive structures, credibility, or compliance 
issues. The term “verification” was not accepted or used by the Chinese.236 
During interaction with American scientists and arms control experts, Chinese arms 
control specialists apparently developed a much more open view toward “verification” as 
usually understood in the Western literature and policy circles. In their publications, they 
acknowledged that verification is a necessary part of arms control and that this could be 
done through unilateral means, bilateral means, and/or multilateral means. Even on the 
issue of on-site inspection—which China had been greatly concerned about237—they 
began to appreciate the necessity of on-site inspections for arms control verification 
purposes.238 
As Chinese arms control specialists became increasingly familiar with the technical 
issues related to arms control verification, they also became capable of and confident 
about arguing about technical details of verification regimes. Chinese seismologists’ 
substantial involvement in CTBT negotiation is one good example.239 
236"Chinese Delegation Proposals on the Main Contents of a Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons,"  in Conference on Disarmament(Geneva: CD/102, June 3 1980). 
237Jin (徐进) Xu, "Exposing the U.S.' Nuclear Blackmail (揭穿美国的核讹诈)," World Affairs (世界知识), no. 
17 (1962). 
238Liping (夏立平) Xia, "China Making Progress on Adopting Confidence-Building Measures with Other 
Countres (中国与其它国家建立信任措施的进展)," Contemporary Asia-pacific Studies (当代亚太), no. 6 
(1996). 
239Shaoxie (许绍燮) Xu, "Seismic Verification and Seismic Research (地震核查与地震研究)," in Collection 




                                                            
 
Figure 5 Number of Chinese Publications on Arms Control Verification, 1949–2013240 
The concept of effective verification has been gradually embraced in Chinese official 
rhetoric since the 1990s. The Chinese white paper on arms control and nonproliferation in 
1995 took a positive view toward arms control verification.241 In recognition “of the 
complexity of the problems relating to the verification mechanism,” Chinese official 
statements have begun to support the establishment of “effective and feasible verification 
measures” and emphasize the importance of preventing the abuse of verification.242 
CTBT Issues Discussed during Operational-Level Engagement 
To better understand the extent of influence of operational-level engagement on the 
CTBT negotiations outcome, this section examines the specific issues discussed during 
U.S.-China operational-level exchanges. This will be compared with the results of official 
240 To save space and make the chart more illustrative, the years between 1945 and 1969 are not shown. 
There was zero publication during this period. 
241"China: Arms Control and Disarmament," (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council Of the 
People's Republic of China, 1995). 
242"China's National Defense in 2010 (2010 年中国的国防)," (Beijing: Information Office of the State 














                                                            
CTBT negotiations in the next section. As mentioned above, during 1990 and 1996, the 
United States and China carried out a series of intensive exchanges at the operational 
level. Such exchange programs offered opportunities for nuclear scientists and experts 
from both countries to discuss theoretical and technical issues related to CTBT. They also 
functioned as an unofficial channel of communication through which the two countries 
could test out each other’s positions and receive feedback with regard to the other’s new 
positions. Five major issues were discussed during these exchanges. 
Definition and Scope of the Treaty 
The definition of nuclear explosion and scope of the treaty were one of the major 
disagreements among negotiating parties. There was a major gap between nonnuclear 
weapons states and nuclear weapons states regarding their preferred definition of nuclear 
explosion. Most nonnuclear weapons states wanted the treaty to prohibit all kinds of 
nuclear explosions. In contrast, nuclear weapons states hoped to continue certain types of 
non-explosive emulation tests in order to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of 
their existing stockpiles. In addition, there was no agreement among the nuclear weapons 
states themselves. The United States, for example, considered a yield limit of up to 1 
kiloton and later proposed to allow nuclear explosions with yield of no more than 1.8 
kilogram.243 
On the definition and scope of CTBT, Chinese scientists advocated for “zero yield” from 
the very beginning. They believed that allowing low-yield tests would contradict the 
spirit of CTBT. In the U.S. domestic debate, however, there were a lot of different 




                                                            
voices.244 During the exchanges, American scientists were cognizant of China’s resolve 
to stick to “zero yield,” and Chinese scientists came to understand the intense debates 
within the U.S. on this issue. In 1994, the Jason Committee conducted a review of the 
necessity of continuing nuclear tests and concluded that the United States did not need to 
conduct low-yield tests in the future. Their conclusions were generally accepted by the 
U.S. scientific community. As a result, although the official negotiating teams from the 
two countries had different positions, scientists from the two countries had largely 
reached a consensus on “zero yield.” Such a consensus provided much needed confidence 
for their governments, encouraged them to accept “zero yield,” and therefore paved the 
way for moving the negotiation forward.245 
Activities Not Prohibited under the Treaty 
For the CTBT negotiations to succeed, one important prerequisite was that the treaty 
must allow the nuclear weapons states to be able to continue ensuring the safety, security, 
and reliability of their nuclear stockpiles including conducting subcritical tests and other 
non-violating experimental activities. Therefore, the nuclear scientists from the five 
nuclear weapons states got together and cooperated on creating a list of activities not 
prohibited by the treaty on the basis of their common understanding of science and 
technology. This list of permitted activities helped strike a balance among the five 
nuclear weapons states on preserving their core national security interests without overly 
agitating nonnuclear weapons states. Because the scientists successfully reached 
244Paine, Christopher E. 1993. The U.S. debate over a CTB Washington DC: Natural Resources Defense 
Council  




                                                            
consensus on this list in advance, the negotiating teams from the nuclear weapons states 
maintained an implicit agreement with each other in Geneva.246 Even when different 
voices were heard on the media, they managed to downplay the differences and to keep a 
relatively unitary position.247 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosion 
During CTBT negotiations, Chinese experts for a long time held the view that peaceful 
nuclear explosions (PNE) should not be prohibited because they might have potential 
nonmilitary values. They believed that through international monitoring and verification, 
peaceful nuclear explosions could be distinguished from nuclear weapons tests. 
Some analysts argued that the issue of peaceful nuclear explosion was purely an excuse 
used by China to delay the negotiations in Geneva. This cannot be completely accurate 
based on the empirical evidence. General Qian Shaojun, the top nuclear scientist on the 
Chinese delegation to the CTBT negotiation, delivered a statement to the NTB ad hoc 
committee on January 26 1996, stating, “It is true that PNE have so far only been 
conducted by the United States and former Soviet Union. It is also true that the experts of 
these two countries had different assessments on the economic and environmental impact 
of PNE. But different experts of each country had differences of opinion on PNE even 
among themselves and these differences are not sufficient to negate the potential 
246Ibid. 
247Rebecca Johnson, Unfinished Business: The Negotiation of the Ctbt and the End of Nuclear Testing, vol. 
9(Scott Allen, 2009). 
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technological benefits of PNE or to provide a good ground to ban PNE as a 
technology.”248 
Russia’s position on PNE, for example, was equivocal. The Russian delegation spoke 
neither for nor against PNE and maintained that it would not obstruct consensus on 
banning PNE. Behind the scenes, however, during communication between Russian and 
Chinese scientists, Russian scientists and officials from the Russian Ministry of Atomic 
Energy provided data to their Chinese colleagues, and the data turned to show that PNE 
could be safe and economically viable for a developing country.249 
According to one Chinese expert who participated in the negotiations, China’s nuclear 
weapons program started later than other nuclear weapons states. As a result, China 
conducted a limited number (45) of nuclear weapons tests but had not have time to start 
PNE studies. In the early 1980s, the Ministry of Petroleum Industry actually requested 
that Chinese nuclear experts study the application of PNE to oil extraction in order to 
increase the oil output of the Daqing Oil Field, which faced a technical challenge for 
maintaining a high oil output at that time.250 China also considered using nuclear 
explosions in its historic South-to-North Water Diversion Project. There are a number of 
publications written by Chinese scientists and engineers for studying the utility of PNE in 
civilian construction projects.251 In1996, China held a nationwide conference in Beijing 
248Shaojun (钱绍钧) Qian, "General Qian Shaojun's Statement at the Ntb Ad Hoc Committee," in 
Conference on Disarmament(GenevaJanuary 26, 1996). 
249Rebecca Johnson, A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Signed but Not Sealed(Disarmament Intelligence 
Review, 1997). 
250Zou, "China and the Ctbt Negotiations." 




                                                            
to further explore the issue of PNE and its civilian value.252 Thus, for economic 
considerations, China did not want PNE to be stopped.253 
Because of the gap in their views, scientists from China and the United States conducted 
a series of dialogues and exchanges on the issue of peaceful nuclear explosion, 
particularly during the visit of the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics to the 
United States in 1996. They analyzed the history of U.S. and Russian peaceful nuclear 
explosion plans, China’s technical capacity, the potential cost versus benefit of 
conducting peaceful nuclear explosion, and its impact on CTBT verification. On the basis 
of this, American experts suggested their Chinese colleagues give up the option of 
peaceful nuclear explosion. The two sides ultimately decided to agree to disagree and 
concluded that it would be necessary to further study the theoretical feasibility of making 
use of peaceful nuclear explosions. 
Effectiveness of CTBT Verification Regime 
The CTBT’s verification regime consists of several elements: the International 
Monitoring System that has 321 monitoring stations and 16 laboratories built around the 
globe, the International Data Center located in Vienna, a global communications 
infrastructure that transmits data collected by the International Monitoring System back 
to the International Data Center, a procedure for consultation and clarification, a set of 
252Xianjue (彭先觉) Peng, "Exploiting the Other Side of "Nuclear Explosion" (开发“核爆炸”的另一面)," 
Scientific Chinese (科学中国人), no. 6 (2005). 




                                                            
confidence-building measures, and on-site inspections that are used when an issue cannot 
be addressed satisfactorily through other means.254 
The development of a verification regime is one of the factors that played an important 
role in ensuring the successful conclusion of CTBT negotiation. Verification technology 
had been a major concern for both Chinese and American scientists and has been an 
important topic in their exchange programs since 1993. Scientists from the two countries 
also engaged in cooperative research programs in verification technology development in 
order to develop shared technologies and to increase experience and build confidence in 
verification technologies. The United States was far ahead of China in terms of arms 
control verification technology development, and Chinese scientists got to know more 
about some of the concepts and unclassified technologies during these exchanges. After 
obtaining a better understanding of the role of verification technology, Chinese scientists 
also began to set up their own verification technology research and verification system.255 
Many Chinese scientists’ proposals on CTBT verification were not incorporated into the 
final treaty draft, however. For instance, China proposed an international network of 
satellites and EMP sensors to ensure coverage of upper atmospheric and space nuclear 
explosions. Chinese experts saw satellite monitoring as the most effective, timely, and 
reliable means of detecting atmospheric and space nuclear explosions.256 This was 
254"The Ctbt Verification Regime: Monitoring the Earth for Nuclear Explosions ,” (Vienna: Preparatory 
Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization). 
255Xu, "Seismic Verification and Seismic Research (地震核查与地震研究)."; Chen and Wang, "U.S. Visit 
Report: Technical Information Regarding Nuclear Arms Control, Monitoring, and Verification, March 23- 
April 5, 1996 (访美专题汇报----核军控、检测、核查技术方面信息（1996 年 3 月 23 日-4 月 5 日）)." 
256"Statement at Working Group I, Ntb Ad Hoc Committee," (August. 17, 1994). 
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supported by previous monitoring of South African and Indian nuclear experiments.257 
The EMP monitoring system was also seen as a useful verification technique because of 
its high sensitivity, precise location, and prompt response. Chinese scientists argued that 
only an EMP sensor network would be able to detect low-yield nuclear testing at a high 
altitude because EMP sensors have unique advantages: high sensitivity, easy operation, 
reliable performance, and relatively low cost.258 
Chinese experts believed that none of the four technologies included in an IMS system 
could effectively monitor nuclear explosions in the upper atmosphere or space. The IMS 
would be incomplete if it depended only on these monitoring techniques, and it would be 
unable to fully accomplish CTBT’s mission to monitor nuclear explosions in all 
environments.259 However, the view of the Chinese scientists was not very influential in 
Geneva. Many technologically advanced countries dismissed China’s proposal and 
argued that satellites and EMP sensors would be too expensive to employ.260 The final 
treaty draft only includes four types of monitoring technologies—seismic, hydroacoustic, 
infrasound, and radionuclide and noble gas. Satellites and EMP sensors were excluded 
from the International Monitoring System. 
257Jincheng (张金城) Zhang, Qixiong (范启雄) Fan, and Jiadan (周家丹) Zhou, "Some Discussion on the 
Fuction of Satellite Remote Sensing on Ctbt (卫星遥感在全面禁止核试验条约验证中的作用)," Global 
Nuclear Geological Science (世界核地质科学), no. 3 (2003). 
258Frieman, China, Arms Control, and Nonproliferation. 
259"Working Paper: Establishment of a Global Electromagnetic Pulse Monitoring System," 
(CD/NTB/WP.217, February 20, 1995). 
260Johnson, Unfinished Business: The Negotiation of the Ctbt and the End of Nuclear Testing, 9; Zou, "China 
and the Ctbt Negotiations." 
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Maintaining the Safety, Security, and Reliability of Nuclear Arsenals under CTBT 
American nuclear scientists played an important role in setting up the nuclear stockpile 
stewardship programs in the United States for the purpose of ensuring the safety, security, 
and reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Compared with American scientists, Chinese 
scientists were more concerned about how to maintain their nuclear stockpile after CTBT 
enters into force. This was because the number of Chinese nuclear tests was only a tiny 
fraction of the U.S. nuclear tests, and China had much less data than the United States on 
which they could rely to maintain their nuclear arsenal. As a result, maintaining the safety, 
security, and reliability of nuclear stockpiles without nuclear testing became a key topic 
in U.S.-China scientific exchanges. China paid serious attention to U.S. domestic studies 
(unclassified) about the American SBSS program. Chinese scientists also learned in 
Track II dialogues about how the United States conducted its nuclear stockpile 
stewardship programs, and they seemed to become more confident about this issue after 
they came out of the discussions with their U.S. colleagues.261 
Major Issues in Official CTBT Negotiations between the United States 
and China 
The Chinese negotiation team at the CD was headed by Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
officials. Senior experts from CAEP and IAPCM also served on the team for technical 
261Zhao, Hong (赵宏). 2006. Track Two Dialogue between the U.S. and China on CTBT Negotiations (二轨
外交与中美全面禁止核试验条约谈判), Institute of International Studies (国际问题研究所), Tsinghua 
University (清华大学), Beijing. 
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advice.262 During the negotiations, the United States and China disagreed on four major 
issues. 
NFU and NSA 
One of the major disagreements between China and the United States was that China 
wanted to link the CTBT to a prohibition of first use of nuclear weapons and to a 
commitment to negative security assurances for nonnuclear weapons states. China 
submitted several working papers on the issue of NFU and NSA.263 The Chinese 
reasoning was that since the CTBT would essentially freeze the nuclear gap between 
nuclear weapons states and nonnuclear weapons states, it was the responsibility of 
nuclear weapons states to adopt the No First Use policy and negative security assurances 
to guarantee nonnuclear weapons states that they would not face the threat of nuclear 
attack.264 
China wanted all nuclear weapons states to commit to the NFU policy as a precondition 
for the CTBT negotiation and proposed that NFU and NSA be included in the preamble 
rolling text of the CTBT. China’s insistence on NFU and NSA was not surprising. China 
has always stood for an unconditional commitment by all nuclear weapons states not to 
use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any nonnuclear weapons states or nuclear-
free zones and not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against others. China believes 
that all nuclear weapons states should provide security assurances to nonnuclear weapons 
states in the form of legally binding international instruments in order to compensate for 
262Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000. 
263"Proposed Wording for the Ctbt Article on "Security Assurances for States Parties,”"  in Conference on 
Disarmament(Geneva: CD/NTB/WP.122, June 20 1994); "Proposed Wording for the Preamble to the Ctbt,"  
in Conference on Disarmament(Geneva: CD/NTB/WP.124, June 20 1994). 
264"Disarmament," Newsletter of the UN Centre for Disarmament Affairs 12, no. 3 (1994). 
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the inherent imbalance of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.265 According to 
Ambassador HouZhitong, such provisions would greatly reduce the danger of nuclear 
conflict, enhance security for all countries, and create favorable conditions for 
accelerating the nuclear disarmament process.266 
The United States was a strong opponent against the Chinese proposals regarding NFU 
and NSA. From the U.S. perspective, a military doctrine could still be defensive even if it 
does not adopt an explicit NFU policy. More importantly, the United States had security 
commitments to allies and therefore had much broader interests to protect than China did. 
NFU could be perceived as a decrease of U.S. commitment to its NATO allies, Japan, 
and South Korea, and might therefore reduce regional stability.267 Facing strong 
opposition from the United States and others, China later agreed to withdraw from the 
rolling text its proposed text on negative security assurances to nonnuclear-weapon states 
and mutual no first use of nuclear weapons among the nuclear weapon states.268 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosion 
There was one issue over which American and Chinese scientists did not manage to 
resolve their disagreement and that was the issue of peaceful nuclear explosion. After 
several discussions with their American counterparts, Chinese nuclear scientists were still 
not convinced that peaceful nuclear explosion was of little practical use. Chinese 
scientists’ insistence seems to be related to their relative lack of empirical experience 
265Zukang Sha, "Statement at the Fourth Preparatory Committee for the 1995 Review and Extension 
Conference for the Npt,"(January 23 1995). 
266Zhitong Hou, "Ambassador Hou Zhitong's Statement at the U.N. Disarmament Commission,"(April 19, 
1994). 
267Harold A Feiveson and Ernst Jan Hogendoorn, "No First Use of Nuclear Weapons," The Nonproliferation 
Review 10, no. 2 (2003). 
268Zou, "China and the Ctbt Negotiations." 
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with conducting peaceful nuclear explosion experiments.269 They therefore wanted their 
government to support their view that peaceful nuclear explosion should not be 
prohibited under the treaty.270 This was the only disagreement between Chinese and 
American nuclear scientists among all the major issues debated in the negotiations. 
This view of the Chinese scientists was reflected in China’s official CTBT negotiations 
positions. Since March 1994, China has repeatedly raised the issue of peaceful nuclear 
explosion in its working papers to the CD and has stated that no international legal 
instrument on nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation “should obstruct or 
restrain the development and peaceful uses of science and technology, nor impair the 
legitimate right of States Parties, the mass of developing countries in particular, to make 
peaceful use of nuclear energy.”271 In accordance with the view of Chinese scientists, the 
Chinese delegation at the CD pointed out that the exploration of PNE was far from 
finished and that PNE had great potential to be used for peaceful purposes that would 
benefit human beings as a whole.272 
China’s proposed treaty language on PNE, however, proved very much controversial. A 
limited number of countries, such as Algeria and Iran, expressed interest in further 
consideration of the issue, but an increasing number of countries came to the conclusion 
that it was too difficult to distinguish peaceful nuclear explosions from military nuclear 
tests. After advocating for the right of conducting peaceful nuclear explosions in the 
269Findlay, Nuclear Dynamite: The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Fiasco. 
270Xiangwan ( 杜祥琬) Du and Side ( 胡思得) Hu, "Nuclear Arms Control and Physics (核军备控制与物理
学)," Physics (物理), no. 11 (1995). 
271"Ctbt Article on "Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion,”"  in Conference on 
Disarmament(Geneva: CD/NTB/WP.167, August 23, 1994). 
272"Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion - Statement of the Chinese Delegation 




                                                            
initial negotiations, Chinese security policy makers later decided to compromise. They 
agreed on Canadian-proposed language that essential says that PNE would be banned 
under the CTBT but the issue could be rediscussed later at a review conference; if the 
review conference decides by consensus that PNE may be permitted, an appropriate 
amendment to the treaty should then be made. This later became the final draft of Article 
VIII of the CTBT.273 
National Technical Means 
The role and status of national technical means became another issue of major 
disagreement, primarily between the United States and China. The controversy over 
national technical means involved two aspects: First, should national technical means be 
allowed in the CTBT verification system? Second, could countries use information 
obtained through national technical means to request on-site inspections? In the Cold War 
context, NTM refers to the technical means that belong to and are operated by a state, and 
usually includes imaging satellites, signal intelligence, communication intercepts, and 
human intelligence.274 The United States, Britain, France, and a few other countries 
wanted to have quick access to any suspect site and demanded that information provided 
by NTM should be treated as equal to data collected by the International Monitoring 
System. 
China, India, and Pakistan, among others, insisted that taking into consideration the fact 
that there were significant asymmetries in national technical means, NTM should not be 
273"Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Text," Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), http://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/treaty-text/. 
274Patricia M. Lewis, "China and the Nuclear Test Ban," China Review, no. Autumn/Winter (1996). 
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used to trigger on-site inspections.275 China was particularly unhappy with the U.S. 
position on NTM. Ambassador Sha’s 1995 speech at the CD plenary session emphasized 
the danger of NTM, and he implicitly indicated that this danger mainly came from the 
United States: 
“One country … should take advantage of their exclusive NTM and monopolize 
international verification in disregard of the IMS with a self-assumed mandate of ‘world 
Police.’ … The institutionalization of NTM in the CTBT would be tantamount to 
legalizing the ability of one State party or a small group of States parties with superior 
technical means to police the world, conduct all kinds of activities, including espionage, 
against other State parties and keep watch over the majority of States parties that do not 
have such means.”276 
China, however, possessed no real leverage over the issue of NTM and finally agreed on 
a compromise that NTM would only be used as a supplement to IMS data, and IMS data 
would serve as the primary basis for triggering an on-site inspection. As a result, the final 
language in the treaty (Article IV, Paragraph 5) states, “[F]or the purposes of this Treaty, 
no State Party shall be precluded from using information obtained by national technical 
means of verification in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of 
international law, including that of respect for the sovereignty of States.”277 
275"Statement by Ambassador Sha to the Conference on Disarmament,"  in Conference on 
Disarmament(Geneva: CD/PV.717, September 5 1995). 
276Ibid. 
277"Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (Ctbt)," The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive 




                                                            
On-Site Inspection Approval Procedure 
A major disagreement between the U.S. delegation to the CTBT negotiation and the 
Chinese delegation was over the procedure of approving on-site inspections. The United 
States was a strong supporter of the “3/4 red light approach,” which means after a state 
submits a request to conduct an on-site inspection, the on-site inspection (OSI) request is 
automatically approved unless more than three-fourths of the member states reject the 
OSI within 24 hours. The objective of the United States and many other countries was to 
create a fairly easy approval procedure for conducting OSI. They wanted to make sure 
that the bar was set low enough so that on-site inspections would not be obstructed by a 
small number of countries. The concern of Chinese security policy makers, however, was 
that such a low bar for conducting OSI would encourage some countries to abuse OSI by 
requesting and conducting many more OSIs than necessary and therefore threaten the 
national security of the inspected party. In contrast, China proposed the “2/3 green light 
approach,” which meant that an on-site inspection request would not be automatically 
approved unless two-thirds of the member states agreed for it to go ahead. This would set 
a much higher bar to approving an on-site inspection.278 
The Chinese lead negotiator, Ambassador ShaZukang, was so concerned about OSI being 
abused by technically advanced states, he was vehemently opposed to the “3/4 red light 
approach.” The U.S. lead negotiator, Ambassador Stephen J. Ledogar, was a strong 
proponent of the “3/4 red light approach.” Neither of them would make compromises, 
278Wu, Zhan (吴展). 1998. Issues Related to Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (关于全面禁止核试验的问
题). American Studies (美国研究) (3):7-27. 
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and the dispute between the Chinese and U.S. ambassadors led the entire negotiations 
into a stalemate.279 
Both China and the United States were under tremendous and increasing international 
pressure. Ambassador Ledogar later withdrew from his original position and offered a 
step-by-step compromise by proposing a “2/3 red light approach,” a “1/2 red light 
approach,” and a “1/2 green light approach” at different stages of the negotiation. But 
Chinese concern about OSI abuse was so strong that they would not take yes for an 
answer.280 As Chinese ambassador ShaZukang pointed out, OSI was a crucial factor in 
the “success or failure of the talks on the treaty.”281 As a result, they chose to up the ante 
by raising the tension to the top leadership level. 
Chinese president Jiang Zemin personally wrote to President Clinton stressing the 
importance of addressing China’s concern about the “1/2 green light approach” for 
approving on-site inspection requests. China’s vice prime minister Qian Qichen, who was 
also the foreign minister, met with U.S. secretary of state Warren Christopher to convey 
the view that the treaty could not be passed without revision of the 1/2 green light 
approach.282 
The fight ended only after the United States and China finally agreed to settle on a “30/51 
green light approach,” largely because of U.S. preference to get a treaty before the U.N. 
279Zong, Daoyi  (宗道一). 2000. "General Sha" in Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Negotiations (全
面禁止核试验条约谈判中的沙大将军). Extensive Reading About CCP History (党史博览) (10):28-35. 
280Zong, Daoyi  (宗道一). 2000. U.S. and China Crossing Swords in Geneva: Ambassador ShaZukang in the 
Negotiations of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (中美在日内瓦的一次交锋: 记全面禁止核
试验条约谈判中的沙祖康大使). Culture and History (文史精华) 4 (119):4-12. 
281"Prc: Representative on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," (FBIS-CHI-96-117, June 17, 1996). 
282Zong, Daoyi  (宗道一). 2000. "General Sha" in Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Negotiations (全
面禁止核试验条约谈判中的沙大将军). Extensive Reading About CCP History (党史博览) (10):28-35. 
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General Assembly opened in September 1996. The United States also made a 
commitment to China regarding possible abuse of CTBT verification. In a letter sent from 
U.S. secretary of state Warren Christopher to China’s vice premier and minister of 
foreign affairs Qian Qichen on September 20, 1996, Christopher reassured Qian that the 
United States understood China’s concern on NTM and was committed to compliance by 
all parties to the CTBT with these CTBT provisions against possible abuse.283 
Comparing the discussions during the U.S.-China operational-level engagement and the 
process of official negotiation at the CD, operational-level engagement seems to have had 
a very positive influence on the official negotiation outcomes. Over the eight major issues, 
five were covered by the operational-level engagement before or during the negotiations. 
American and Chinese scientists were able to reach agreement on four of the five issues, 
which laid a very positive foundation for the official negotiations. These issues caused 
major debates and high-level tensions during the official negotiations among other 
negotiating countries, but U.S. and Chinese negotiators successfully avoided major 
clashes over these issues due, to a large extent, to the cooperative efforts of their nuclear 
scientists. Table 8 summarizes the impact of operational-level engagement on official 
negotiations over these major issues. 
  
283Zou, "China and the Ctbt Negotiations." 
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Definition and Scope of the Treaty Yes Yes Strong 
Activities Not Prohibited under the 
Treaty 
Yes Yes Strong 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Yes No Medium 
Effectiveness of CTBT 
Verification Regime 
Yes Yes Strong 
Maintaining the Safety, Security, 
and Reliability of Nuclear Arsenals 
under CTBT 
Yes Yes Strong 






NFU and NSA No   
On-Site Inspection Approval 
Procedure 
No   
 
Strategic Trust and U.S.-China CTBT Engagement 
Strategic trust refers to the relationship in which the recognition of common interests 
motivates actors to cooperate but there is no recognition of shared moral principles or 
norms. In the CTBT case, whether operational-level engagement increased China’s 
strategic trust in the United States depends on whether operational-level engagement 
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helped China identify new common interests with the United States and made China 
capable of finding ways to achieve these common interests. The answer to this question is 
yes, and this is accomplished through the following means. 
First, operational-level engagement apparently played a critical role in the emergence of 
China’s nuclear arms control community. Following successful U.S.-Soviet scientific 
engagement, American nuclear scientists initiated a similar engagement program with 
their Chinese colleagues. Chinese participants in these exchanges quickly benefited from 
these exchanges and became adamant advocates for more exchanges and developed a 
strong interest in policy research on issues related to nuclear arms control. The 
emergence of China’s nuclear arms control community, therefore, benefited significantly 
from such operational-level engagement. 
Second, operational-level engagement greatly promoted the growth of China’s nuclear 
arms control community. Dialogues and exchange programs brought in new Chinese 
participants from new organizations and agencies and from increasingly diversified 
backgrounds. Such engagement was directly related to the quick expansion, pluralization, 
and professionalization of China’s nuclear arms control community. 
Third, operational-level engagement facilitated a stronger and more coherent internal 
interagency coordination mechanism in China on arms control issues. Chinese 
participants grew increasingly familiar with the American interagency policy-making 
process. As more and more Chinese organizations throughout the bureaucracy began to 
address arms control issues, they quickly established various interagency communication 
and coordination channels to facilitate policy discussions. As a result, the traditional 
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bureaucratic boundaries between different government agencies were essentially 
overcome. 
Fourth, operational-level engagement facilitated bottom-up communication and influence 
within the Chinese bureaucracy. Because of operational-level engagement, Chinese 
nuclear scientists initiated the domestic discussion to reassess China’s policies regarding 
the nuclear test ban. Chinese participants of the engagement programs gradually accepted 
and embraced some of the most important arms control concepts of their American 
colleagues. They also managed to reach agreements with their U.S. colleagues on many 
of the major issues about CTBT, which built the foundation for successful official 
negotiations. This perception change started at the bottom and managed to gradually 
influence thinking at the top level through bureaucratic connections and various internal 
and open publications. 
Chinese top leaders began to recognize the importance of arms control policy and became 
more willing to involve themselves in arms control policy-making. Their perception 
about arms control and its relationship to China’s security interests shifted significantly. 
This allowed them to recognize the existence of substantial common interests between 
China and the United States. President Jiang and Vice Premier Qian personally interfered 
during the CTBT negotiations and reached out to their American counterparts to seek 
common ground. Such recognition of new common interests and strong willingness to 
achievement the common interests is a strong indicator of increased strategic trust 
between the two countries. 
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Moralistic Trust and U.S.-China CTBT Engagement 
Risk Taking and China’s CTBT Decision 
As mentioned in chapter one, moralistic trust is the existence of a sense of moral 
obligation that develops out of identification with the trustor and its moral/normative 
principles. The indicators of moralistic trust include the recognition of shared norms, the 
rejection of realpolitik thinking, and the willingness to accept risks in cooperation. In the 
CTBT case, one important but rarely discussed point is that China’s decision to sign 
CTBT was not completely based on calculations of material interests. By agreeing to sign 
the CTBT, China actually assumed a great deal of the risk regarding its national security 
interests. 
Risk for Nuclear Modernization 
For China’s nuclear complex, there was indeed a need to continue testing. As a latecomer 
to the P-5, China only began to experiment with miniaturizing its warhead designs in the 
mid-1980s. ZouYunhua mentioned that CTBT negotiations “caught China in the middle 
of its nuclear weapons program, whereas the United States, Russia, and Britain had 
completed several development cycles.”284 The September 1993 test was the first test of 
an aspherical primary design—a feature that allows the warhead to have a much smaller 
diameter and therefore makes it easier to fit into the top of a missile.285 By the time that 
China conducted its last test in 1996, China had only conducted several tests to validate 
284Ibid. 




                                                            
its miniaturized warhead design.286 By comparison, the United States and Soviet Union 
had conducted far more tests to give them much higher confidence about the reliability of 
their warhead designs.287 
With far less testing experience and far less data collected from nuclear tests, China’s 
empirical nuclear design capability was certainly less advanced than the United States 
and Russia and possibly Britain and France. There has been evidence showing that China 
still has serious problems with warhead miniaturization and still does not possess 
sophisticated miniaturized warheads.288 This implies a number of significant risks for 
national security. First, signing the CTBT means China might have to give up important 
options for its nuclear modernization program and abandon more ambitious nuclear 
strategies than the minimum nuclear deterrence strategy. Strategies such as limited 
nuclear deterrence, flexible response, escalation dominance/control, and counterforce 
striking would be out of the question for China for the foreseeable future.  
One Chinese author mentioned in an internal publication that if China would like to catch 
up and reach a rough parity with the nuclear stockpiles of other major nuclear powers, 
China would need to continue testing.289 Under CTBT, China certainly would not be able 
to develop any new nuclear warhead other than the very small number of warhead 
designs that it possessed by 1996. This means if the future security situation demands that 
286Robert Johnston, "Database of Nuclear Tests, China-Prc,"  
http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/tests/PRC-ntests1.html; Jeffrey G Lewis, The Minimum Means 
of Reprisal: China's Search for Security in the Nuclear Age(MIT Press Cambridge, MA, 2007). 
287"United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992," (Washington, DC: Federation of 
American Scientists). 
288Debalina Chatterjee, "China’s Nuclear Warhead Miniaturization and Its Impact on Its Ballistic Missiles," 
Sri Lanka Guardian, March 22, 2013. 
289Zheng (吴铮) Wu, "Updates on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Negotiation (全面禁止核试验跳跃谈判
进展情况)," Trends in Foreign Nuclear Weapons (国外核武器动态), no. 3 (1996). 
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China develop more advanced, capable, and reliable warheads, or some type of special 
nuclear weapons, China will not be able to do it.  
By comparison, even though the United States has many more available warhead designs 
(a total of eighty-five types of nuclear warheads for more than 100 types of weapon 
systems)—most of which are much more advanced and reliable than Chinese 
designs290—many in the U.S. government maintained that it would be too risky for the 
United States to give up the option of developing new nuclear warheads.291 As a matter 
of fact, by 1996, China was still in the process of developing its first generation of solid 
fueled intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)—including the DF-31 and JL-2. 
Ending nuclear tests in 1996 might have significantly increased the uncertainty and 
difficulty of such development. Without DF-31 and a reliable submarine-launched 
ballistic missile, China’s strategic nuclear force had been very much vulnerable. 
Because of the lack of sophisticated warhead miniaturization capability, China was 
believed to have problems with developing and adopting Multiple Independently-
Targeting Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) technology. Currently, all Chinese ballistic missiles 
carry only one warhead. For China, giving up MIRV capability means that China gives 
up the option of obtaining massive nuclear strike capability that all the other four of the 
P-5 countries possess.292 Moreover, the lack of MIRV capability also has significant 
290Thomas B Cochran et al., "Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume Ii: Us Nuclear Warhead Production-
Natural Ressources Defense Council, Inc,"(Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 
1987). 
291Xiaosi (贺孝思) He, "Banning Nuclear Testing Would Paralyze the Trident Program (禁止核试验将使三
叉戟等计划陷于瘫痪)," Foreign Missile and Aerospace (国外导弹与航天), no. 01 (1986). 
292Phillip C Saunders and Jing-dong Yuan, "China’s Strategic Force Modernization: Issues and Implications 
for the United States," Proliferation Challenges and Non-proliferation Opportunities for New 
Administration,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 
Occasional Paper, no. 4 (2000). 
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implications for the credibility of China’s nuclear second-strike capability. MIRVing 
could substantially increase a country’s nuclear retaliatory capability because MIRVing is 
a very useful way for penetrating mid-course and end-course missile defense systems.293 
Without MIRVing, China has seriously limited its options for reinforcing the 
survivability of its limited nuclear weapons, particularly if the United States continues to 
build up its missile defense capability. 
China’s signing of the CTBT in 1996 also takes away its ability to develop sophisticated 
tactical nuclear weapons in the future. China at present is suspected of only possessing a 
very limit amount (about twenty) nuclear gravity bombs that can be dropped by the H-6 
bomber. Some analysts suggested that China might have a small number of nuclear-
capable cruise missiles (about twenty), but other analysts such as Hans Kristensen and 
Robert Norris noted that the “evidence for Chinese nuclear cruise missiles is sketchy and 
should be viewed with caution.”294 Even if China does have a limited number of nuclear 
gravity bombs and cruise missiles, its tactical nuclear capability is still far behind that of 
the United States and Russia, and the gap will not be filled, because China needs nuclear 
tests to develop new tactical nuclear weapons. That means China completely gives up the 
option of obtaining meaningful tactical nuclear capability and the option of pursuing 
battlefield nuclear war-fighting capability.  
Risk for Nuclear Safety and Security 
Maintaining the safety and security of nuclear weapons is a high priority for all nuclear 
weapons states. Take the case of the United States for example. Out of the more than 
293Sun, Implications of a Comprehensive Test Ban for China's Security Policy. 
294Hans M Kristensen and Robert S Norris, "Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2013," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 
69, no. 6 (2013). 
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1,000 nuclear tests carried out by the United States, a total of about 140 low-yield nuclear 
tests were for safety evaluation purposes.295 All U.S. weapons have been designed to be 
intrinsically one-point safe in the event of accidental detonation of the high explosives.296 
They also employ multiple modern safety measures, such as Enhanced Nuclear 
Detonation Safety (ENDS), Insensitive High Explosive (IHE), and a Fire-Resistant Pit 
(FRP), which help prevent inadvertent or accidental explosions.297Table 9 shows the 
safety features of the nuclear weapons in the existing U.S. nuclear stockpile.298 
Table 9 Safety Features of Nuclear Weapons in the Existing U.S. Stockpile 
Warhead Weapon System Stockpile Entry 
Date 
Safety Features 
B61 Gravity bombs 1980-present ENDS, IHE 
W88 Trident II 1990 ENDS 
W87 Minuteman III 1986 ENDS, IHE, FRP 
W80 ALCM, SLCM 1982, 1984 ENDS, IHE 
B83 Gravity bomb 1983 ENDS, IHE, FRP 
W78 Minuteman III 1980 ENDS 
W76 Trident II 1979 ENDS 
 
By comparison, given the very small number of nuclear tests that China had carried out in 
total (45), it is obvious that China had a long way to go to ensure the safety and security 
295Thomas B Cochran and Christopher E Paine, The Role of Hydronuclear Tests and Other Low-Yield 
Nuclear Explosions and Their Status under a Comprehensive Test Ban(Natural Resources Defence Council, 
1995). 
296A nuclear weapon is one-point safe if, when the high explosive is initiated and detonated at any single 
point, the probability of producing a nuclear yield exceeding 4 pounds of TNT equivalent is less than one 
in 106. See, for example: "Dod Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program Manual, Number 3150.02," 
(Washington DC: Department of Defense, January 31, 2014). 
297Ray E Kidder, "Assessment of the Safety of Us Nuclear Weapons and Related Nuclear Test 
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of its nuclear weapons. Although China paid attention to the issue of safety and security 
of nuclear weapons and had conducted research to test warhead safety under harsh 
circumstances such as fire, falling, or collision,299 there is no indication that China had 
possessed modern safety measures.300 Chinese nuclear weapons scientists once 
informally proposed the idea that a nuclear ban treaty should consider allowing a limited 
annual quota of tests that could be used to ensure the improve the safety, security, and 
reliability of existing weapon designs but could not be used for experimenting with new 
weapons designs.301 
Without nuclear tests, China faced technical difficulty to improve the safety and security 
of the warheads. China probably did not have the financial and technical capability to 
launch a nuclear stockpile stewardship program similarly to the Stockpile Stewardship 
and Management Program (SSMP) in the United States or the PALEN (Préparation à la 
limitation des essaisnucléaires; Preparation for the Limitation of Nuclear Testing) 
program in France.302 Such programs were extremely expensive. The National Ignition 
Facility alone, for instance, was a multi-billion-dollar project.303 Given China’s rapid 
decrease in national defense spending in the 1980s and early 1990s, China most likely 
was able to only retain a relatively small technical competency base.304 
299Guang (谢光) Xie and Danhuai (陈丹淮) Chen, China's Science and Technology in National Defense (当
代中囯的囯防科技事业), vol. 1(Contemporary China Publishing House (当代中囯出版社), 1992). 
300Shen, "Likely Impact of the Policy of Clinton Administration on China's Nuclear Test (克林顿政府对中国
核试验可能产生的影响)." 
301Zhan (吴展) Wu, "Some Thoughts on Nuclear Arms Control," in Conference on South Asia Arms 
Control(ShanghaiMarch 1994). 
302Catherine Kelleher and Judith Reppy, Getting to Zero: The Path to Nuclear Disarmament(Stanford 
University Press, 2011); Robert S Norris, "French and Chinese Nuclear Weapon Testing," Security Dialogue 
27, no. 1 (1996). 
303David Kramer, "National Ignition Facility Faces an Uncertain Future," Physics Today 66, no. 6 (2013). 
304Sun, Implications of a Comprehensive Test Ban for China's Security Policy. 
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It is not only much more expensive but also much more technically challenging to 
maintain the safety and security of nuclear weapons only in labs without actual testing.305 
The United States already possessed much more advanced computer simulation 
technology by the 1990s than China did.306 After signing the CTBT, the Chinese military 
continued to float suggestions that the United States provide some help with simulation 
technology because, among the P-5, China was the only one that did not have such 
technology. Some U.S. weapons designers also doubted that China could develop 
sophisticated warhead designs using simulation technology alone.307 In addition, China 
did not have enough testing data to support computer simulation, which was also very 
much problematic for China.308 Just as one Chinese nuclear weapon scientist put it, 
“[W]ithout an extensive SSMP-like program, China would be at more of a disadvantage 
in a post-CTBT era. A CTBT would seem to not only freeze the gap between China and 
other nuclear states, but very likely enlarge this gap also.”309 
Other Uncertainties and Risks 
China faced other uncertainties and risks that were beyond its control. Even though the 
Clinton administration was supportive of a nuclear test ban, China was not sure that 
future U.S. administrations would follow this policy. Liu Huaqiu, one Chinese delegate at 
the CTBT negotiations, raised the concern that “as a token, the CTB will bring nuclear 
testing to a halt, but one cannot take for granted that a CTB will automatically bring 
305Du and Hu, "Nuclear Arms Control and Physics (核军备控制与物理学)." 
306Zhan (吴展) Wu, "The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (关于全面禁止核试验的问题)," American 
Studies (美国研究), no. 03 (1998). 
307Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000. 
308Ling (王玲) Wang, "Why Was the United States Actively Promoting Nuclear Test Ban (美国为何积极推
动核禁试)," World Knowledge (世界知识) 15(1993). 
309Sun, Implications of a Comprehensive Test Ban for China's Security Policy. 
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efforts to develop and modernize nuclear weapons to a stop. The CTB in itself does not 
address this issue. Halting development and modernization is a much different—and 
more difficult—matter. … Within the context of a test ban, what is important is the 
political intention of complying with the treaty.”310 
The “political intention” of the United States, for instance, was difficult for China to 
predict. In the 1994 midterm elections, a large number of anti-CTBT conservatives were 
elected into the U.S. Congress.311 With the gradual change in the U.S. domestic political 
landscape, domestic support in the United States for CTBT began to decline. In 1996, the 
three major national labs—LANL, LLNL, and SNL—all supported President Clinton’s 
decision to sign the CTBT. In 1999, just three years later, the directors of these three 
national labs modified their views and voiced concerns about the sustainability of U.S. 
nuclear stockpile without testing. As CTBT was put forward to the Senate for ratification, 
the director of the Sandia National Laboratory, C. Paul Robinson, testified to the Senate’s 
Armed Services Committee, saying, “confidence in the reliability and safety” of the 
nuclear deterrent would “eventually decline without nuclear testing.”312 The Panel to 
Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United States Nuclear Stockpile—
established according to the Defense Authorization Act in 1999—also reported that there 
was “a disturbing gap between the nation’s declaratory policy that maintenance of a safe 
and reliable nuclear stockpile is a supreme national interest and the actions taken to 
310Liu Huaqiu, "No-First Use and China’s Security," Henry L. Stimson Center Electronic Essay. 
311Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000. 
312"Statement of C. Paul Robinson, Director, Sandia National Laboratories," (United States Senate 
Committee on Armed Services, October 7, 1999). 
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support this policy.”313 As for the issue of nuclear test readiness, the panel stated that “a 
policy of sustaining low levels of readiness could, in the future, tie the hands of a 
President faced with stockpile problems” and recommended the reduction of test 
readiness “to well below the Congressionally mandated one year.”314 
Moralistic Trust? 
Despite China’s willingness to accept significant national security risks, Chinese experts’ 
interpretation of U.S. motivation for promoting CTBT was very much in line with 
realpolitik thinking and did not recognize moral/normative consideration as part of U.S. 
motivation. Chinese experts believed that one of the main U.S. motivations behind CTBT 
was the relative decline of the importance of nuclear weapons in overall U.S. national 
defense as a result of U.S. “military strategic adjustment.” After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, regional military threats surpassed global military threats to become the main 
national security threats for the United States. U.S. nuclear weapons had little role to play 
in dealing with such regional threats and U.S. conventional military capability would be 
more useful under this new security environment. This, coupled with the fact that 
additional nuclear tests would generate rapidly decreasing marginal benefits, gave the 
United States little interest in continuing nuclear tests.315 
From the Chinese perspective, another main U.S. motivation was also the changed 
security threats faced by the United States. By the early 1990s, nuclear proliferation 
became a top security concern for the United States. Nonproliferation received 
313Harold M. Agnew et al., "Fy 2000 Report to Congress of the Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and 
Security of the United States Nuclear Stockpile,"(2001). 
314Ibid. 
315Ling (王玲) Wang, "The United States Promotes Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (美国推动全面禁止
核试验)," Contemporary International Relations (现代国际关系) 8(1993). 
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unprecedented priority in the U.S. government, and the United States was determined to 
prevent the emergence of any new nuclear-armed state. The CTBT was primarily used by 
the United States as a means to achieve nonproliferation goals. In order to win the 
support of nonnuclear weapons states on the issue of nonproliferation, the United States 
had to compromise on the issue of nuclear disarmament and to end its own nuclear 
tests.316 
In addition, the U.S. promotion of CTBT was generally interpreted by Chinese experts as 
aimed at reinforcing U.S. nuclear superiority and freezing the gap between the United 
States and other countries in terms of nuclear technology and capability—China in 
particular. The United States had a superior nuclear striking capability and a much bigger 
and much more advanced nuclear stockpile than most countries. The United States had 
accumulated enough technical experience and capability to carry on maintaining its 
nuclear stockpile without resorting to nuclear tests, whereas for China and other nuclear 
weapons states, CTBT would significantly tie their hands and make it extremely difficult 
for them to catch up with the United States.317 
In addition, the lessons that China drew from the outcome of the CTBT negotiations were 
also very much in line with realpolitik thinking: the embrace of principles of self-help 
and power politics was very visible. During the CTBT negotiations, China failed to 
316Hui (窦晖） Dou and Rongrong (刘蓉蓉) Liu, "Commentary on U.S.' Nuclear Policy (评美国的核政策)," 
Peace and Development (和平与发展) 3(1996); Wang, "Why Was the United States Actively Promoting 
Nuclear Test Ban (美国为何积极推动核禁试)." 
317Peizhi (谢培智) Xie, "In Order to Maintain Nuclear Deterrence Capability under Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty, the United States Is Planning to Build a Series of Nuclear Explosion Simulation Facilities (为在
全面禁止核试验条件下保持核威慑力量——美国拟新建若干核爆炸仿真试验设施)," Modern Military 
(现代军事) 9(1995); Wang, "The United States Promotes Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (美国推动全
面禁止核试验)."; "The Situation before the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Opens for Signature (全面禁
止核试验条约签署前的形势)," ibid., no. 06 (1996). 
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secure a number of proposals—such as to link CTBT with NFU and negative security 
assurance commitment, to exclude national technical means from the verification 
mechanism, and to include certain verification technologies. In most cases, the United 
States was one of the strongest opponents to such proposals and dominated the debates at 
the CD. The general perception was that China did not have the leverage to push these 
proposals through on its own.318They attributed the lack of such leverage to their inferior 
capability and technology. 
On the issue of national technical means, all the countries that already possessed 
advanced national technical means—such as the United States and Russia—supported 
incorporating NTM into CTBT verification. China, Pakistan, and India, among others 
who did not have the capacity, opposed that.319 In the end, national technical means was 
basically accepted into the treaty. This also reinforced Chinese appreciation of material 
capability and technology as a source of political leverage.320 
The Chinese perception of why they failed to include satellite and electromagnetic 
sensors into CTBT verification basically revealed the same issue. Chinese scientists 
believed that satellite monitoring and electromagnetic sensors would be very helpful for 
detecting nuclear tests and have conducted research on these issues.321 But these 
technologies were not included in the CTBT verification mechanism in the end. One 
Chinese expert who served on the Chinese negotiation team late stated that “as early as 
318Hsu, "The Impact of Government Restructuring on Chinese Nuclear Arms Control and Nonproliferation 
Policymaking." 
319Frieman, China, Arms Control, and Nonproliferation. 
320Zhu and Liu, "China's Achievement in International Arms Control in Spite of Difficulties and Challenges 
(论中国在国际军控困境和挑战中的作为)." 




                                                            
1995, the Americans, believing that four techniques were enough, had decided to exclude 
EMP and other techniques even if they were useful.” “For the United States, the sooner 
this treaty was signed, the better.” Because discussing additional verification technologies 
would take time, whereas the United States wanted to conclude the negotiation as soon as 
possible, “this was the main reason the IMS failed to include the EMP technologies and 
satellites.” From the perspective of Chinese experts, the United States was able to 
dominate discussions on this issue during the negotiations because of its advanced status 
on the subject of satellite technology. China, on the contrary, did not possess advanced 
satellite technologies and did not have the experience of running an extensive satellite 
network, which caused the Chinese proposal to fall on deaf ears.322 
By comparison, China had a very positive experience during the CTBT negotiations in 
issue areas where it was technologically competent. China had many well-trained 
geologists who were familiar with seismology through research on earthquake prediction. 
Thus, Chinese scientists participated in the CTBT Group of Scientific Experts Technical 
Test (GSETT) as early as 1994. This might have contributed to China’s confidence in 
support of seismic monitoring systems. 
Norms and China’s CTBT Decision 
Looking into the details of China’s domestic discussions and foreign policy behavior 
before and during the CTBT negotiations, I found no indication that China felt it had 
shared norms with the United States. To the contrary, China was primarily responding to 
normative demands of the developing countries. During the 1980s and early 1990s, China 
322Hong (王洪) Wang, "Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Its Verification Technology (全面禁核试条约
及其核查技术)," New Era National Defense (新时代国防), no. 10 (2010). 
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tended to define international norms as the demands of the developing countries rather 
than those of the United States or other Western countries. Throughout the CTBT 
negotiations, China had always sought to identify itself with and respond to the demands 
of the developing countries—represented by the nonaligned countries (G-21 countries) 
and nonnuclear weapons states—even though China itself is a nuclear weapons state 
officially recognized by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. 
China did have a need to continue nuclear tests in the early 1990s in order to protect its 
important national security interests. But as China’s nuclear testing program continued 
during the CTBT negotiations, many of the developing countries began to show 
increasing disappointment with China’s tests and began to call Chinese behavior an 
affront to the moral norms of the international community. Delegations from these 
countries accused China of being irresponsible, violating the “moral conscience of the 
international community”323 and offending the feelings of people in the developing 
world.324 Such normative accusations raised great concern for the Chinese. Even though 
they were still in the process of developing the second-generation nuclear warheads 
(miniaturized designs) and they would not be able to tell whether the warhead design was 
successful until the end of the last scheduled test in July 1996, they decided in 1994 to 
accept the CD’s mandate to negotiate a treaty and decided in 1995 to sign the treaty when 
there was still a lot of uncertainty about the treaty’s impact on China’s future nuclear 
deterrence capability.325 
323"Remarks by the Chilean and Argentinean Delegations,"  in Conference on Disarmament, CD/1227, 
CD/1314(Geneva October 13, 1993). 




                                                            
China’s negotiation behavior at the CD revealed the same point. During the negotiations, 
many nonaligned countries initially showed interest in negative security assurances and a 
no first use treaty.326 With the support of nonaligned countries, China attempted to link 
the CTBT to a prohibition on the first use of nuclear weapons and to a commitment to 
negative security assurances for all nonnuclear weapon states by seeking to include 
language in the treaty related to “no first use,” the “complete prohibition and thorough 
destruction of nuclear weapons,” and universal security assurances to nonnuclear weapon 
states. India, for instance, wanted a general reference to the relationship between the end 
of nuclear tests and nuclear disarmament and made three proposals for the total 
elimination of nuclear weapons within a “time-bound framework,” “agreed time frame,” 
and “time-bound process.” Most nonaligned countries supported this “time-bound” 
nuclear disarmament initiative, whereas all the nuclear weapons states rejected it, except 
China.  
China in fact stood by its commitment to NFU, NSA, and “time-bound” disarmament for 
quite a long time during the negotiations. However, as the negotiations dragged on at the 
CD, the nonaligned countries and nonnuclear weapons states began to be more concerned 
about the timely conclusion of the negotiations and there was a desire not to link the 
CTBT to other issues and instead to focus entirely on the prohibition of nuclear 
tests.327Because of this new development, China later withdrew its proposed text on 




                                                            
negative security assurances to nonnuclear weapon states and no first use of nuclear 
weapons by the nuclear weapons states.328 
On the issue of peaceful nuclear explosion, India, Algeria, Iran, and other nonaligned 
countries at the beginning did not oppose China’s PNE requirement. But as debates at the 
CD over PNE intensified, most G-21 countries had dropped their tacit support by 1996 
and began to demand that all types of nuclear explosions be banned without exceptions. 
The Chinese delegation therefore agreed in June 1996 to temporarily ban PNEs unless 
international consensus changes following review conferences.329 
On the issues of national technical means and on-site inspection approval procedure, 
China’s position was completely in line with that of the nonaligned countries. With their 
support, China insisted on its position in spite of the extremely strong opposition from the 
United States and other nuclear weapons states. The United States ultimately made 
significant compromises on these issues. 
Some scholars argued that China decided to sign the CTBT primarily because it faced 
significant international political pressure after the Tiananmen incident and desperately 
wanted to reduce its diplomatic tensions with the international community.330 This may 
not be an accurate assessment of Chinese thinking, however. In the aftermath of the 
Tiananmen incident, most of the international pressure that China faced was on human 
328"Sha Zukang' Statement at the Cd Plenary Meeting," (Geneva: CD/PV.737, June 6, 1996). 
329"Arms Control Reporter," (Section 608: CTBT, June 6, 1996). 




                                                            
rights issues, and most of the pressure was from the United States.331 If China wanted so 
desperately to improve its image, China should have made concessions on human rights 
issues and made such concessions directly with the United States. But that did not happen. 
China did not carry out any significant “human rights diplomacy.” During the CTBT 
negotiations, there is little evidence that China was particularly concerned about U.S. 
opposition. To the contrary, China insisted on its positions on a number of the most 
important issues despite vehement U.S. opposition. 
China’s official statements at the CD also reflect the considerable attention that it paid to 
the demands of the developing countries and its willingness to reshape its policy 
accordingly. When explaining Chinese attitudes toward CTBT, the Chinese negotiators at 
the CD always used language such as “great international trend,” “responsible world 
power,” and “global atmosphere” to point to the normative responsibility for China to 
join the CTBT.332 When China pledged in 1990 to participate in an ad hoc committee on 
CTBT if such a committee were created at the CD, China stated, “China sympathizes 
with, and understands, the ardent desire of the vast number of Third World countries and 
other nonnuclear weapon states (NNWS) for the early realization of a complete 
prohibition of nuclear tests…China will take an active part in the work of the ad 
hoccommittee and together with all other delegations work for the early materialization 
of a nuclear test ban and effective nuclear disarmament.”333 
331Shixin (焦世新) Jiao, "The Impact of American China Policy in the Course of China's Intergration into 
Two International Human Rights Convenants (中国融入国际人权两公约的进程与美国的对华政策)," 
Fudan Journal (Social Sciences Edition) (复旦学报：社会科学版), no. 4 (2007). 
332Lewis, The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China's Search for Security in the Nuclear Age. 
333"Chinese Plenary Statement to the Conference on Disarmament,"  in Conference on 
Disarmament(GenevaJuly 17 1990). 
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When China declared on July 8, 1996, a moratorium on nuclear tests, President Jiang 
Zemin mentioned this moratorium on nuclear tests as “a response to the legitimate 
demand of the vast number of non-nuclear-weapon states.”334  This is fully in line with 
China’s self-identification at that time as a “permanent member of the developing 
countries.” Deng Xiaoping, China’s paramount leader during the late 1970s and 1990, 
emphasized throughout those years that “China always belongs to the Third World” and 
“China at present and in the future will always be (a part of) the Third World.”335 During 
this period, the reports of the twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth National 
Congress of China’s Communist Party all placed “solidarity and cooperation with 
developing countries as the foundation and starting point of China’s foreign policy.”336 
On this point, Chinese leaders and China’s arms control experts were on the same page. 
As one Chinese arms control expert who participated in the CTBT negotiations noted, 
“[I]n international disarmament negotiations, China has always supported rational 
disarmament proposals initiated by Third World countries.” As for CTBT, she 
observed,“[F]or decades it has been a goal of the Third World countries to sign a CTBT,” 
and China needed to “maintain its image in the Third World countries.” After China 
decided to sign the treaty, “China’s image as a responsible major power is reportedly 
increasing.”337 
334"Prc: Jiang Zemin on Early Conclusion of Nuclear Treaty," (FBIS-CHI-131, p. 1, July 8 1996). 
335Zicheng (叶自成) Ye, "Deng Xiaoping's Third World Perspective: Inherited Principles and Idealistic 
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no. 02 (1999). 
336Qingmin (张清敏) Zhang, "Development of China's Foreign Policy in Sixty Years: A Text Analysis of the 
Reports of the Party's National Congress (六十年来新中国外交布局的发展——对党代会政治报告的文
本分析)," Foreign Affairs Review (外交评论(外交学院学报)), no. 04 (2009). 
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Therefore, although China demonstrated a willingness to take significant risks during the 
CTBT negotiations, there was no indication of increased moralistic trust between China 
and the United States. Chinese interpretation of U.S. motivations still followed realpolitik 
thinking. The lessons China drew from the negotiation experience actually reinforced its 
appreciation of self-help and power politics principles. Mostly important, China defined 
international norms as the demands of the “developing countries,” which from the 
Chinese perspective conflicted with those of the United States. As a result, there was no 
recognition of shared norms between China and the United States coming out of their 





LONG-TERM OPERATIONAL-LEVEL ENGAGEMENT: NUCLEAR 
STABILITY AND ARMS CONTROL 
 
U.S.-Chinese engagement on CTBT took place at the early stage of systemic U.S.-
Chinese operational-level engagement. Such engagement has continued from the signing 
of the CTBT until today. The issues discussed during these decades-long engagement 
programs include every dimension and aspect of nuclear arms control and strategic 
stability. The forms of engagement also went beyond regular dialogues and exchanges 
and began to include training programs and extensive visits. 
Such long-term engagement helped to continue to grow the Chinese nuclear community, 
which came to the recognition that it needed to build a common vocabulary with its U.S. 
counterparts. Introduction of U.S. arms control theories, concepts, and analytical 
frameworks laid the foundation for narrowing the gap between U.S. and Chinese 
understanding of their national interests. Perception change from the bottom-up 
influenced Chinese interpretation of U.S. interests, as well as helped identify new 
common interests with the United States. Strategic trust increased as a result. 
Engagement helped the Chinese nuclear community to develop a deeper and more 
sophisticated understanding of U.S. nuclear policy-making. However, the lessons drawn 
by the Chinese nuclear community were very much along the lines of realpolitik thinking. 
They became more convinced that the United States pursued realpolitik principles of 
power politics and “absolute security.” This made them less likely to recognize common 
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moral/normative principles with the United States. The basis for moralistic trust was 
undermined. 
This chapter starts with a review of official U.S.-Chinese high-level dialogues on nuclear 
arms control and stability issues. The politically charged environment and the rarity of 
such high-level dialogues made it difficult to generate significant influence on the 
bilateral nuclear relationship. The next section provides a comprehensive discussion on 
U.S.-Chinese operational-level engagement programs. It analyzes the impact of such 
engagement on the growth of Chinese nuclear community, on the perception change 
within the community, and on the perception change at the top leadership level. It finds 
that strategic trust was increased during this process as Americans and Chinese found 
more and more common interests as a result of operational-level engagement. However, 
engagement reinforces Chinese perception of the realpolitik principles behind U.S. 
nuclear policy-making. Moralistic trust was not built. 
Official High-Level Dialogue 
U.S.-Chinese high-level official dialogues on arms control and nonproliferation were 
very limited in number and only started in 2003. Most of the discussions took placed in 
politically charged environments and were in most cases iterations of general talking 
points rather than substance. In the two years following 2003, the two governments held 
three rounds of U.S.-China Strategic Security, Multilateral Arms Control, and 
Nonproliferation Dialogue at the undersecretary level. Issues including regional stability, 
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international arms control, counterterrorism, nonproliferation, the South Asia situation, 
North Korea, and the Iraqi situation were discussed.338 
The United States and China also held a total of five rounds of the U.S.-China Strategic 
Dialogue between 2005 and 2008 at the undersecretary level. This dialogue was initiated 
by President George W. Bush and President Hu Jintao in November 2004 to encourage 
high-level talks on strategic issues, such as trade and economics, counterterrorism, and 
the North Korea issue.339 
In 2009, President Barack Obama and President Hu Jintao agreed to establish the U.S.-
China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) to replace both the U.S.-China Strategic 
Dialogue and the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue. The U.S.-China Strategic 
Economic Dialogue was a high-level economic dialogue that held several meetings 
between 2006 and 2008.340 This new forum had both a “strategic track” and an 
“economic track.” The strategic track was typically led by the U.S. secretary of state and 
a Chinese state councilor and the economic track was led by the U.S. secretary of 
treasury and a Chinese vice premier. In 2011, a new Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD) 
was created under the strategic and economic dialogue that was headed and co-chaired by 
the U.S. deputy secretary of state and the Chinese executive vice foreign minister and 
338"The United States and China Held Strategic Security, Multilateral Arms Control, and Nonproliferation 
Dialogue (中美举行战略安全、多边军控和防扩散磋商)," Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/zyxw_602251/t66630.shtml. 
339"Background Information: U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue (背景资料：中美战略对话)," Xinhua News 
Agency, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2007-06/21/content_6270059.htm. 




                                                            
included the undersecretary of defense for policy and a deputy chief of the People’s 
Liberation Army general staff.341 
All these high-level official dialogues were created relatively recently, starting from the 
early to mid-2000s, and many of the discussions were focused predominantly on 
economic and trade issues that were primary concerns for both countries’ top leaders 
during the period. Foreign policy and security discussions were mostly devoted to 
regional security problems, such as South Asia and the Korean Peninsula, and counter-
terrorism cooperation. Nuclear arms control and nonproliferation were not featured 
prominently in these high-level dialogues.342 In contrast, U.S.-Chinese operational-level 
engagement on nuclear arms control issues had a much longer history and is much 
broader in scope and deeper in substance. 
Operational-Level Engagement on Nuclear Stability and Arms Control 
Issues 
U.S.-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation 
The U.S.-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation was 
organized by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of 
International Studies and its Chinese organizing partner was the China Institute of 
International Studies. The China Arms Control and Disarmament Association later took 
over as the Chinese co-organizer of the dialogue. This dialogue took place between 1998 
341Susan V Lawrence, "Us-China Relations: An Overview of Policy Issues," (2013). 
342Xiao (卢潇) Lu, "U.S.-China Arms Control Interaction and Its Theoretical Analysis (中美在军控领域的交
流及其理论分析)," The probe (求索), no. 3 (2012); "The United States and China Held Strategic Security, 
Multilateral Arms Control, and Nonproliferation Dialogue (中美举行战略安全、多边军控和防扩散磋
商)"; "Background Information: U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue (背景资料：中美战略对话).” 
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and 2009 and was attended by low- to mid-level American and Chinese officials, as well 
as experts from think tanks and academia. The primary purpose was to deepen 
discussions and develop a more complete understanding of the conceptual and technical 
issues dividing the two countries on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation.343 
The Chinese participants were typically from the foreign ministry, military, defense 
industry, universities, and research institutes. On the American side, the participants were 
usually from the State Department, the Defense Department, the Department of Energy, 
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the U.S. national labs, and several 
nongovernment organizations. 
This two-day dialogue was usually attended by more than fifty participants from both 
countries. Over the course of twelve years, a total of seven conferences were held. The 
dialogue clearly helped to get more Chinese government organizations and 
nongovernment institutes involved in discussions of nuclear arms control and 
nonproliferation policies. The number of Chinese organizations that sent representatives 
to this dialogue increased over the years, and they represented an increasingly broader 
spectrum of Chinese government organizations and nongovernment institutes. 
  
343"Us-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation," Center for 
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344 Data collected from the participants list of the U.S.-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament 
and Nonproliferation in 1998. 
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Figure 6Participating Chinese Government Organizations and Nongovernment Institutes 
by 2009345 
 
345 Data collected from the participants lists of the U.S.-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament 
and Nonproliferation from 1998 and 2009. 
161 
 
                                                            
As Table 10 and Figure 6 show, in 1998, within China’s entire civilian government 
bureaucracy, only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the CWC 
Implementation sent representatives to the dialogue. By 2009, however, representatives 
from the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of 
Commerce, the National Energy Administration, the National Development and Reform 
Commission, the General Administration of Customs, the China Atomic Energy 
Authority, and the Office of the CWC Implementation became frequent participants of 
this dialogue. 
There is a similar trend as well for organizations as part of the PLA, the defense industry, 
universities, and research institutes. In addition, a couple of nongovernmental 
organizations became frequently involved in China’s nuclear arms control and 
nonproliferation policy discussions at the meetings. Discussions at these meetings also 
became increasingly deeper and more substantive. At the beginning, the discussions 
usually centered on general understandings about the overall international disarmament 
situation, the role of nuclear weapons, views about NPT, etc.346In later meetings, 
participants began to conduct more in-depth exchanges on a much broader array of topics. 
At the 2002 meeting, for example, participants discussed in detail not only the concept of 
strategic stability but also its policy implications.347 Both American and Chinese experts 
made presentations on defining and contrasting U.S. and Chinese views on the conceptual 
basis of strategic stability. They also examined the impact of September 11, missile 
346"Summary of Conference Proceedings: Us-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and 
Nonproliferation," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the Monterey Institute of International Studies 
http://cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/eanp/research/beijing/setting.htm. 
347Evan S. Medeiros and Phillip C. Saunders, "Fourth U.S.-China Conference on Arms Control, 
Disarmament and Nonproliferation: "Building a Global Strategic Framework for the 21st 
Century,”"(Washington, D.C.: East Asia Nonproliferation Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 
Monterey Institute of International Studies March 4-5, 2002). 
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defense, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty on strategic stability. In 2006, participants 
held an extensive discussion about the Six-Party Talks and future security mechanisms on 
the Korean Peninsula. They also discussed how to more effectively build mutual 
confidence through strategic dialogues in the future.348 In 2009, discussions began to 
cover technical issues such as the benefits and problems with peaceful use of nuclear 
energy and specific nuclear nonproliferation issues prior to the 2010 NPT Review 
Conference.349 For example, the multilateral approach to containing the proliferation 
risks inherent in the spread of nuclear energy received heated discussion by participants. 
They also addressed issues related to possible Chinese admission into the Missile 
Technology Control Regime. 
Conference on U.S.-China Strategic Nuclear Dynamics 
The Conference on U.S.-China Strategic Nuclear Dynamics has been jointly organized by 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Institute for Defense 
Analyses (IDA), the RAND Corporation, and the China Foundation for International and 
Strategic Studies (CFISS) since 2000. A total of seven meetings had been organized by 
2013. This series of meetings and conferences has been funded by the U.S. Defense 
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the Department of State and aims at serving as an 
348Stephanie C. Lieggi, "Sixth U.S.-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation: 
"U.S.-China Nonproliferation Cooperation,”"(Washington, D.C.: East Asia Nonproliferation Program, 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies 5-6 June 2006). 
349"Seventh U.S.-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation,"(Beijing: East 
Asia Nonproliferation Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International 
Studies December 16-17, 2009). 
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unofficial but authoritative channel for discussing sensitive issues related to nuclear 
weapons and strategic stability in U.S.-China relations.350 
The U.S. participants usually include former and current government officials and 
American experts who have a deep background in U.S. and Chinese nuclear strategy. 
They usually come from the State Department, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Pacific 
Command, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the Department of Energy, 
National Defense University, University of California, the Institute for Defense Analyses, 
the RAND Corporation, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The 
Chinese delegation usually includes government officials, military officers, and 
independent experts from the National Defense University, the Academy of Military 
Sciences, the General Staff Department, the Second Artillery, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics, the Institute for Applied Physics 
and Computational Mathematics, China Institutes of Contemporary International 
Relations, China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, and Tsinghua 
University.351 
As one of the recently established U.S.-Chinese operational-level engagement programs, 
this dialogue is able to build on the basis of previous dialogues and exchanges and 
conduct discussions on specific issues related to nuclear arms control and 
nonproliferation. Issues such as factors motivating nuclear modernization, challenges of 
nuclear terrorism, nuclear reassurance between the United States and China, 
350"Conference on U.S.-China Strategic Nuclear Dynamics," (Beijing, China: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS), the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), the RAND Corporation, and the China 
Foundation for International & Strategic Studies (CFISS), June 20-21, 2006). 
351"Conference Report on 'U.S.-China Strategic Nuclear Dynamics'," (Beijing, China: Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS), the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), the RAND Corporation, and the 
China Foundation for International & Strategic Studies (CFISS), June 9-10, 2008). 
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preconditions for no first use commitment, cross-domain deterrence, nuclear weapons 
and crisis management, and the future of P-5 nuclear arms control received a lot of 
attention and extensive discussions during these exchanges.352 Both American and 
Chinese participants perceived these discussions as very useful for fleshing out each 
other’s concerns and narrowing the gap between their considerations. They were able to 
reach agreement on issues such as crisis management coordination, the P-5 framework on 
nuclear arms control, and improving each other’s understanding on nuclear signaling.353 
New concepts such as mutual strategic restraint were proposed and explored at these 
meetings. Occasionally, special workshops were held that were devoted to specific topics 
to facilitate more in-depth discussions. In 2013, for instance, a working session on “US-
China Mutual Strategic Reassurance” was organized immediately before the plenary 
meeting.354 
U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue 
The U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue was funded by the Advanced Systems and Concepts 
Office of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and organized by the Center for 
Contemporary Conflict, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, and the Pacific Forum of the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies. The Chinese co-host is the China Arms 
Control and Disarmament Association. The dialogue is held on an annual or biennial 
basis in Hawaii.  
352Ibid.; Cossa, Glosserman, and Santoro, "Progress Continues, but Disagreements Remain: The Seventh 
China-Us Strategic Dialogue on Strategic Nuclear Dynamics & the Inaugural China-Us Dialogue on Space 
Security."; "Conference on U.S.-China Strategic Nuclear Dynamics." 
353"Progress Continues, but Disagreements Remain: The Seventh China-Us Strategic Dialogue on Strategic 
Nuclear Dynamics & the Inaugural China-Us Dialogue on Space Security." 
354 Such special workshops were usually held separate from the plenary meetings and were attended by a 
portion of the plenary meeting participants. 
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This dialogue brings together Chinese and U.S. strategic experts in their personal 
capacities to discuss the role of nuclear weapons in U.S.-China relations. The aim of the 
discussions is to minimize mutual misunderstanding and identify practical steps for 
promoting bilateral cooperation. The American participants comprise scholars, experts, 
former government officials, and military officers. The Chinese participants usually 
include a mix of active-duty military officers, retired officers, think tank researchers, and 
academic scholars.355 
This dialogue is able to take advantage of the growing Chinese nuclear community that 
previous dialogues and exchanges had helped to build and to conduct deep and 
substantive discussions on nuclear-related security issues. Many of participants are 
seasoned Chinese nuclear experts who have participated in previous dialogues. Since its 
first meeting, the dialogue facilitated a series of discussions that focused on Chinese and 
American threat perception, U.S. alliance and extended deterrence in East Asia, military 
operational concepts for nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons safety and security, crisis 
escalation in theory and history, etc.356 In recent meetings, nuclear transparency and 
reassurance, nuclear doctrine, and regional strategic stability, among other topics, were 
discussed. As a result of such discussion, Chinese participants recognized the intrinsic 
355Michael Glosny, Christopher Twomey, and Ryan Jacobs, "U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase Vii 
Report,"(Hawaii: U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC), Project on 
Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC), May 2013); Eben Lindsey, Michael Glosny, 
and Christopher Twomey, "U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase Vi Report,"(Honolulu, Hawaii: U.S. Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS), Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC), Project on Advanced Systems and 
Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC), June 2011); Christopher Twomey, Peter R. Lavoy, and Elizabeth L. 
Stone, "U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase I Report,"(Honolulu, Hawaii: U.S. Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS), Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC), Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering 
WMD (PASCC), August 1-3, 2005). 
356Christopher Twomey and Kali Shelor, "U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase Ii Report,"(Honolulu, Hawaii: 
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC), Project on Advanced 
Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC), November 5-7, 2006); Twomey, Lavoy, and Stone, 
"U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase I Report." 
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linkage between space, cyber, and the nuclear domains. They displayed an emerging 
awareness that attacks on space or cyber assets could be very escalatory. They developed 
a positive view about separate transparency and confidence-building measures and 
expressed support for negotiated structured verification measures.357 
The U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue is also the first dialogue that devotes significant time 
to jointly defining and discussing specific nuclear-related terms and concepts. During a 
number of meetings, American and Chinese participants were divided into a few breakout 
groups, each of which was responsible for clarifying the specific meanings of a few 
nuclear-related terms and concepts in American and Chinese linguistic, cultural, and 
military backgrounds. Much of the effort was focused on terms and concepts that are 
used in American and/or Chinese nuclear doctrines and policies, such as “nuclear 
threshold,” “counter-coercion,” “key point counterattack,” “inadvertent escalation,” 
“effective and reliable deterrence,” “lean and effective,” “cross domain deterrence,” “war 
control,” “air-sea battle,” etc.358 After the breakout sessions, each breakout group would 
report back to the entire group on the findings they reached on these terms and concepts. 
Such practice has helped the two sides close the gap between their understandings about 
each other’s nuclear thinking, strategy, doctrine, and practice. 
For instance, in the meeting in June 2012, American and Chinese participants had an 
extensive exchange on “nuclear signaling.” The traditional Chinese view was that only 
formal and official statements by the government constitute nuclear signals. During this 
357Glosny, Twomey, and Jacobs, "U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase Vii Report." 
358Michael Glosny and Christopher Twomey, "U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase V Report,"(Honolulu, 
Hawaii: U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC), Project on 
Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC), MAY 2010); Lindsey, Glosny, and Twomey, 
"U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase Vi Report."; Glosny, Twomey, and Jacobs, "U.S.-China Strategic 
Dialogue, Phase Vii Report." 
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discussion, Chinese participants recognized that in practice there might be other forms of 
nuclear signals such as nuclear tests and raising of alert levels. This has brought Chinese 
understanding more in line with American thinking on nuclear signaling. Chinese 
participants also acknowledged that China used to engaging in “passive and reactive 
nuclear signaling.” These signals were meant to “demonstrate the reliable capability of 
counter strike” by “improving the survivability and strengthening of the nuclear arsenal 
and successful tests.” In other words, the Chinese tended to emphasize the negative and 
coercive connotation of nuclear signaling. By contrast, Americans explained that 
signaling is not inherently coercive and can act as a potential method of escalation 
deterrence. They raised the experience of U.S.-Soviet efforts to engender transparent 
nuclear signaling through dialogues and arms control and cited the example of U.S.-
Russian mutual ballistic missile launch notification. Toward the end of the discussion, 
Chinese experts acknowledged that they had not previously considered this more positive 
and constructive aspect of signaling. They noticed that the American view of signaling as 
an assurance mechanism is something that China can learn from and suggested that 
signaling can serve as a confidence and security-building mechanism to de-escalate 
during a crisis.359 
Training and Exchange Programs 
Besides regular short-term dialogues and meetings, a number of U.S. universities and 
nongovernmental organizations started in the 1990s to provide Chinese nuclear scientists 
and arms control experts with opportunities to stay for an extensive period in some of the 
most established research institutes to conduct scholarly exchanges and undertake policy-
359"U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase Vii Report." 
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oriented research. Stanford University, Princeton University, and MIT, among others, 
were the first to start engagement programs with Chinese experts. 
Stanford University 
Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Arms Control (known as the 
Center for International Security and Cooperation since 1998) has focused from the very 
beginning on the study of arms control, nonproliferation, and the technical aspects of 
international security issues, particularly in the context of U.S.-Soviet-China relationships. 
In 1983, CISAC received a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York to bring mid-
career scientists to Stanford University to work on international security issues. Since 
then, CISAC has hosted a large number of Chinese scientists and policy experts at the 
center to conduct research and academic exchanges on issues related to nuclear arms 
control. Many of China’s nuclear scientists and arms control experts spent extensive 
periods of time at CISAC. CISAC opened a door for Chinese nuclear experts to get in 
touch and have in-depth interaction with their American colleagues—an opportunity that 
was nonexistent before. Many of these experts became more devoted to nuclear arms 
control issues as a result of such extensive exchanges. The research conducted by these 
Chinese experts during their time at CISAC became some of the most cited works in the 
field.360 
360 For example, Zou, "China and the Ctbt Negotiations."; Sun, Implications of a Comprehensive Test Ban 
for China's Security Policy. 
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Princeton University 
The Program on Science and Global Security (SGS) was previously part of the Center for 
Energy and Environmental Studies (CEES) at Princeton University and later moved to 
Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. The SGS has 
been providing training opportunities to postdoctoral and senior scientists interested in 
science and international security and has trained technical nuclear arms control and 
nonproliferation specialists from China and other countries. Frank von Hippel, the co-
director of the program from 1974 to 2006 has played a very important role in getting 
Chinese nuclear scientists trained at Princeton and helping them set up similar programs 
after they return to their home institutes in China. Some of China’s most prominent 
nuclear arms control experts, such as Li Bin, Shen Dingli, and Zhang Hui, all started their 
career in this field by spending one or two years at the program and getting familiar with 
the field of science and arms control, which was very much new to Chinese experts at 
that time. Zhang Hui conducted research on using commercial observation satellites to 
verify uranium enrichment gaseous diffusion plants and the application of commercial 
observation satellite imagery for the verification of declared and undeclared plutonium 
production reactors when he was in Princeton.361 Similarly, Shen Dingli conducted 
research on the status of Chinese nuclear forces and nuclear policies.362 All of these were 
some of the earliest research conducted by Chinese specialists on nuclear arms control-
related topics. 
361Hui Zhang and Frank von Hippel, "The Application of Commercial Observation Satellite Imagery for the 
Verification of Declared and Undeclared Plutonium Production Reactors," in CEES Report No. 319(Center 
for Energy and Environmental Studies); "Using Commercial Observation Satellites to Verify That Uranium - 
Enrichment Gaseos Diffusion Plants Are Not Operating," in CEES Report No. 325(Center for Energy and 
Environmental Studies). 
362Shen, "The Current Status of Chinese Nuclear Forces and Nuclear Policies." 
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SGS also publishes the leading international journal on science and arms control—
Science & Global Security. It publishes not only in English but in Chinese and has 
therefore played a role in informing, educating, and raising interests among the Chinese 
arms control community and has opened up a valuable window of communication for the 
Chinese community to interact with colleagues around the world. The number of research 
articles written by Chinese arms control experts and published in Science & Global 
Security has increased considerably since the mid 1990s.363 
Other Programs 
There are parallel programs at other U.S. universities and think tanks. MIT’s Defense and 
Arms Control Studies Program (now the Security Studies Program) provided similar 
training opportunities for Chinese scientists and security policy analysts. MIT professor 
Theodore Postol has brought in a number of Chinese scientists to work with him on 
missile defense and nuclear arms control issues. This provided Chinese analysts with 
deeper understanding of the U.S. debates around missile defense and helped them to 
conduct independent analysis on the impact of missile defense on global and regional 
stability. Li Bin, for example, conducted extensive research on issues related to ballistic 
missile defense, the impact of theater missile defense, and its implication on the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Missile Technology Control Regime.364 
363"Science & Global Security Archive," Taylor & Francis, http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/. 
364Li Bin, "Nuclear Missile Delivery Capabilities in Emerging Nuclear States," Science & Global Security 6, no. 
3 (1997); Bin Li, "Anti-Theater Missile Technology Transfer and Missile Technology Control Regime (反战
区导弹技术转让与《导弹技术控制体制》)" (paper presented at the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Workshop (核不扩散研讨会), Beijing, November 15 1997); "Ballistics Missile Defense and the Missile 
Technology Control Regime" (paper presented at the VIII International Castiglioncello Conference "New 




                                                            
The Stimson Center also played a very active role in training and facilitating the 
professionalization of the Chinese nuclear arms control community. As part of their 
Visiting Fellows Program, they invited midcareer Chinese analysts to visit and work on 
nuclear arms control and international security. Michael Krepon, cofounder of the 
Stimson Center has done a lot of work to connect Chinese scientists and experts with 
their American colleagues. Many of these Chinese visiting fellows were governmental 
officials, researchers, scholars, and military officers. They were provided with 
opportunities to visit U.S. government agencies, congressional committees, research 
institutes, and other nongovernmental organizations.  
Developing Common Vocabulary 
During these dialogues and exchange programs, it became clear to both the Americans 
and Chinese that “beyond the never-simple translation of one language into the other, 
there was also the difficulty of differing interpretations of terms.”365 They realized that as 
bilateral engagement on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation broadened and 
deepened, it was really important that dialogue participants whose native languages are 
not the same can agree to the meanings of relevant terms in Chinese and English. 
Before the endeavor to clarify terminologies, dialogue participants always found 
themselves in situations in which they misunderstood what the other side meant and 
talked past each other because there was significant disagreement on the meaning of the 
terms they used. Such misunderstanding of terms was common, including even some of 
the most frequently used ones such as arms control, disarmament, deterrence, strategic 
365"English-Chinese, Chinese-English Nuclear Security Glossary," (Washington DC: Committee on the U.S.-
Chinese Glossary of Nuclear Security Terms, National Research Council, 2008). 
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stability, and strategic nuclear weapons.366 Recognizing the importance of building a 
common vocabulary for effective community and the reduction of misunderstandings, 
American and Chinese experts made tremendous efforts to get agreement on a glossary of 
nuclear terms. In 2002, experts from the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Monterey 
Institute on International Studies created an English-Chinese nuclear terms dictionary that 
includes more than 1,000 terms and has been updated in following years.367 
In 2006, as part of the Chinese Scientists Group on Arms Control and U.S. National 
Academy of Sciences Dialogue, the Committee on International Security and Arms 
Control of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Scientists Group on 
Arms Control of the Chinese People’s Association for Peace and Disarmament started a 
project to jointly develop an unclassified glossary of terms on nuclear arms control, 
nonproliferation, and security. After extensive exchanges and two joint meetings in 
Beijing over a couple of years between 2006 and 2007, a list of terms, definitions, and 
references was finalized and the English-Chinese, Chinese-English Nuclear Security 
Glossary was subsequently published by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences in 
2008.368 
This glossary, which has approximately 1,000 terms, is “intended to reduce the likelihood 
of misunderstanding, and to remove barriers to progress in exchanges and diplomatic, 
cooperative, or other activities where unambiguous understanding is essential.”369 During 
the joint development process, American and Chinese experts found a large number of 
366Personal correspondence with U.S. and Chinese dialogue participants, 2008, 2010. 
367"English-Chinese Glossary of Wmd Terms," Nuclear Threat Initiative, 
http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/english-chinese-glossary-wmd-terms/. 




                                                            
cases in which there was a single meaning for one term in one language, but several 
different meanings for the same term that are quite distinct in the other language. There 
are also many cases in which one term has many different meanings even within a single 
language. The process of developing this glossary became in and of itself a process of 
cooperative clarification of some of the important policy issues. 
For example, during this joint project, some American experts discovered that the term 
“limited deterrence” was used in some Chinese military publications. They believed that 
this suggests that China embraces the same meaning of this term as in the American 
literature, which refers to using preemptive or retaliatory nuclear strikes against enemy 
military targets to achieve victory on the battlefield through “counterforce” targeting. The 
Chinese experts disagreed and pointed out that the U.S. definition of the term does not 
accurately describe the Chinese nuclear strategy. Rather, the Chinese meaning of the term 
emphasizes the development of a very moderate and limited nuclear capability for 
deterrence purposes as opposed to referring to obtaining war-fight capabilities or winning 
nuclear wars on the battlefield.370 Similarly, the Americans and Chinese did not share the 
same definition of “strategic nuclear weapons.” The Americans refer to those nuclear 
weapons that are designed to engage targets in geographically remote regimes (over 
5,500 kilometers) to accomplish strategic missions.371 Whereas the Chinese regard all 
their nuclear weapons—regardless of the range or potential targets to engage—as 
370370Kulacki, "Chickens Talking with Ducks: The Us-Chinese Nuclear Dialogue."; "English-Chinese Glossary 
of Wmd Terms.” 
371"Nato English and Russian Nuclear Terms," (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2007). 
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strategic nuclear weapons.372 Such differences were identified and clearly delineated in 
this joint glossary. 
As a matter of fact, the creation of this bilingual nuclear glossary is not only a product of 
almost two years of discussions and back-and-forth between American and Chinese 
experts but is rather built upon the foundation of about twenty regular dialogues and 
exchanges during which substantive and detailed discussions on these nuclear issues took 
place.373 
Community Expansion and Capacity Building 
With funding and intellectual help from American organizations, China’s nuclear 
community quickly expanded. Dr. Li Bin, who spent two years working as a postdoctoral 
fellow at Princeton University and MIT on science and nuclear arms control, established 
Tsinghua University’s science and arms control program. With funding from the Ford 
Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the MacArthur Foundation, Dr. Li organized a 
series of Tsinghua Arms Control Summer Symposia from 2002 through 2008. This was 
China’s first comprehensive training program that was specifically devoted to arms 
control and nonproliferation issues. The East Asia Nonproliferation Project of the Center 
for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and the 
Union of Concerned Scientists were co-organizers of these training programs and had 
played a very important role in sending experts as instructors for the training. 
372"China's National Defense in 2002 (2002 年中国的国防)," The Information Office of the State Council 
of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室), 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2001/content_61220.htm. 
373"English-Chinese Glossary of Wmd Terms.” 
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The goals of the summer symposium were to provide training and education on arms 
control and nonproliferation issues to junior Chinese professionals, to promote interests 
in the study of arms control and nonproliferation issues in China, and to strengthen ties 
between individuals and organizations in China’s arms control community. These 
summer symposia were usually attended by thirty-five to fifty researchers, analysts, 
junior officials, military officers, and journalists. All the major government agencies and 
military organizations that dealt with arms control and nonproliferation issues had their 
representatives at one or multiple symposia. There were also a large number of young 
researchers from many think tanks, research institutes, and universities that had not 
conducted arms control or nonproliferation research by that time but began to set up such 
programs or projects or to offer new courses on arms control and nonproliferation at their 
home institutes after they returned from the summer symposia. In fact, the summer 
symposia had been so successful and had raised so much interest in both civilian and 
military colleges/universities that Tsinghua held a special program in the winter of 2008 
to train professors, lecturers, and researchers from a total of nearly thirty universities 
across the country on arms control and nonproliferation teaching and education.374 
Similar training and educational programs have also been developed, with substantial 
help from the United States in many cases. Fudan University, Tongji University, Beijing 
University, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, among many others, have 
opened research centers and training programs that focus on nuclear arms control issues. 
Many of China’s government agencies including the military and the nuclear defense 
374"The Sixth Tsinghua Arms Control Symposium - Subject: Arms Control Education (第六届清华大学军备
控制研讨会，主题：军备控制教学)," (Beijing, China: Arms Control Program, Institute of International 
Studies, Tsinghua University, December 13-15, 2008). 
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industry have a large number of their officials and staffs trained in these programs and 
have gradually established formal units or organizations that are devoted to nuclear arms 
control issues. Chinese think tanks and nongovernment organizations have also 
developed increasing interest in these issues and set up research centers. Table 11 
summarizes existing Chinese government and nongovernment programs/organizations 
that have a heavy focus on nuclear arms control issues. 
Table 11Existing Chinese Government and Nongovernment Programs/Organizations that 
Have A Heavy Focus on Nuclear Arms Control Issues  
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375Gill and Mulvenon, "Chinese Military-Related Think Tanks and Research Institutions." 
376Harlan W Jencks, "Costind Is Dead, Long Live Costind!: Restructuring China’s Defense Scientific 
Technical and Industrial Sector," The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age. The first quote is on 
(1999). 
377Ganxiang ( 伍赣湘) Wu, "Nuclear Arms Control (核军备控制)," Missiles And Space Vehicles (导弹与航
天运载技术), no. 02 (1995). 
Program/Organization Hosting/Managing Organization 
Program on Science and National Security 
Studies  
CAEP/IAPCM 
Arms Control Physics Division IAPCM 
Department of Arms Control and 
Disarmament 
CDSTIC,  PLA  General Armament 
Department375 
Department of Arms Control and 
Disarmament 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Science and Technology Committee PLA  General Armament Department 
“703” Arms Control Group376 PLA  General Staff Department 
International Cooperation Department State Administration for Science, 
Technology and Industry for National 
Defense 
Arms Control Research Group China Aerospace Science and Technology 
Corporation (CASC); China Aerospace 
Machinery and Electronics Corporation 
(CAMEC)377 
Arms Control Research Group Chinese Academy of Sciences 
Institute for International Strategic Studies Central Party School 
Academy of Military Sciences Central Military Commission 
China Institute of International Strategic 
Studies 
The PLA General Stuff Department 
China Arms Control and Disarmament 
Association 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
China Institute of International Studies Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Center for Peace and Development Studies China Association for International Friendly 
Contact 
China Foundation for International 
Strategic Studies 
The PLA General Stuff Department 
China Institutes of Contemporary 
International Relations 
Ministry of State Security 
Foreign Affairs College Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Arms Control and Nonproliferation 
Research Center 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
Institute of Strategic Studies National Defense University, Central 
Military Commission 
Chinese Scientists Group on Arms Control 
(CSGAC) 
Chinese People’s Association for Peace and 
Disarmament 
Second Artillery Command College The Second Artillery Corps 
Second Artillery Engineering College The Second Artillery Corps 
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Figure 7China’s Nuclear Arms Control Organization Chart, by 2013  
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Figure 7 shows the expansion of China’s nuclear arms control organizations within the 
entire Chinese bureaucracy. As discussed in Chapter 2, at the beginning of U.S.-Chinese 
nuclear engagement, there were only an extremely limited number of organizations that 
occasionally dealt with nuclear arms control policy including the Fourth Division of the 
International Organizations Department of the Foreign Ministry and the Second 
Department of the PLA General Stuff Department (see Figure 3). By 2013, however, 
Chinese nuclear arms control organizations have increased dramatically. In Figure 7, 
boxes with blue borders are civilian organizations under the administration of the State 
Council; boxes with green borders are military organizations; boxes with red borders are 
organizations of the defense industry; boxes with yellow borders are research centers in 
universities; and boxes with black borders are nongovernmental organizations. 
The growth of China’s nuclear community contributes to the breaking of traditional 
compartmentalization of the bureaucracy. As missile defense became the subject of 
discussion at some U.S.-Chinese nuclear dialogues, some Chinese scientists from the 
aerospace industry were brought into those discussions. There also emerged an internal 
debate on missile defense among Chinese scientists and experts since the 1980s. 
Scientists within the Ministry of Aerospace Industry began to be involved in arms control 
research. A scientists’ research group called the Arms Control Research Group was set up 
within the Ministry of Aerospace Industry. Nuclear arms control and deep reductions 
were part of their research work. They held an annual ten-day meeting to present research 
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papers and have discussions. They also served as informal consultants to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.378 
Some of the think tanks and nongovernmental organizations have been organizing 
nationwide policy workshops and seminars. The Arms Control and Nonproliferation 
Research Center of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, for example, has hosted a 
number of workshops on “Arms Control and Sino-U.S. Relations,” “Annual Arms 
Control Situation,” “Current Arms Control Situation,” “U.S. Arms Control and 
Nonproliferation Policy,” etc.379 The China Arms Control and Disarmament Association 
has also hosted a large number of conferences and meetings on arms control situation 
analysis and arms control policy coordination. They publish an annual report on 
international arms control and disarmament (年度国际军备控制与裁军), with 
contributors from senior officials and experts from the Foreign Ministry, the PLA, the 
nuclear defense industry, and think tanks. In addition, professional journals that are 
specifically devoted to arms control issues establish another channel for communication 
and coordination across the system. Examples include the Arms Control and Security (军
备控制与安全) and Research and Progress in Arms Control (军备控制研究与进展). 
The unprecedented, large number of government organizations that have formal subunits 
working on nuclear arms control issues has influenced China’s official nuclear policy-
making. Even those think tanks and nongovernmental organizations in Figure 7 have also 
378Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China's Nonproliferation Policies and Practices, 1980-
2004. 
379Jishe (樊吉社) Fan, "Summary of the Workshop on Arms Control and U.S.-China Relations (军控与中美
关系研讨会综述)," American Studies (美国研究), no. 02 (1999); "A Summary of the Symposium on the 
Present Situation of Arms Control (军控形势研讨会综述)," American Studies (美国研究), no. 01 (2000); 
"Summary of American Arms Control and Nonproliferation Policy Workshop (“美国军控与防扩散政策
研讨会”综述)," America Studies (美国研究), no. 2 (2010). 
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developed close ties with relevant government agencies and have various communication 
channels for their voices to be heard at the top level. For instance, the China Foundation 
for International Strategic Studies can submit reports to the Politburo Standing 
Committee, and the Academy of Military Science coordinates and channels the 
submission of reports from the General Staff Department, China Institute of International 
Strategic Studies, National Defense University, and the General Armament Department 
to the General Office of the Central Military Commission, which then evaluates and 
summarizes them for the top leaders of the Standing Committee of the Politburo.380 
These communication channels also serve to transfer the results of various operational 
U.S.-Chinese nuclear dialogues to the formal decision-making circle at higher levels. At 
one of the U.S.-China strategic dialogues, one Chinese participant from China Arms 
Control and Disarmament Association emphasized that these Track II and Track 1.5 
dialogues are valued in Beijing and feed into the official process in China through 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defense.381 
Operational-Level Engagement and China’s Development of Its Nuclear Strategy 
After China obtained a rudimentary military nuclear capability in the mid-1960s, China 
did not have a nuclear strategy for a long time. What China had during the following 
decades were what it called “nuclear policies.” The best-known example is the 
unconditional No First Use (NFU) policy which China committed itself to immediately 
after its first nuclear explosion in October 1964. This policy was directly imposed by 
China’s top leadership in an effort to distinguish China’s moral principle of never using 
380Ming Zhang, China's Changing Nuclear Posture: Reactions to the South Asian Nuclear Tests(Brookings 
Inst Press, 1999). 
381Glosny, Twomey, and Jacobs, "U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase Vii Report." 
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nuclear weapons to threaten any other countries as long as they did not conduct the first 
nuclear strike on China. There was not much military consideration behind the 
announcement of the NFU policy by China’s top leadership at that time and the adoption 
of this policy was primarily a result of political decisions.382 
The NFU policy, along with the policy to support the “complete prohibition and thorough 
destruction of nuclear weapons”—another key element of China’s “nuclear policies”—
was based on the Chinese top leaders’ understanding of nuclear weapons and nuclear 
wars.383 The adoption of these policies by the top leadership was mainly used to “reveal 
the nature of its nuclear strategy as defensive” and to demonstrate China’s political stand 
against nuclear wars.384 For a long time, these “nuclear policies” were the principles of 
China’s nuclear operation and practice. China’s first and second paramount leaders—
Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping—both took a very active role in imposing these 
political principles to China’s nuclear policy, making themselves the ultimate authority in 
guiding the development of China’s nuclear policy.385 
382Yi (刘毅) Liu and Zhenjiang (刘镇江) Liu, "Mao Zedong's Nuclear Ethical Thought and Its Epochal Value 
(论毛泽东核伦理思想及其时代价值)," Journal of University of South China(Social Science Edition) ( 南华
大学学报(社会科学版)) 10, no. 5 (2009); Jingguo (潘敬国) Pan, "Zhou Enlai and the Formation of China's 
Nuclear Diplomacy Strategy (周恩来与中国核外交战略的形成)," in Third National History Annual 
Convention of the Institute of Contemporary China Paper Collections (当代中国研究所第三届国史学术年
会论文集)(2003); Jiayu (张家裕) Zhang, "An Analysis of the Nuclear Strategic Thinking of Mao Zedong and 
Zhou Enlai (试论毛泽东、周恩来的核战略思想)," Military History Research (军事历史研究), no. 02 
(1989). 
383Sun Xiangli, "Analysis of China’s Nuclear Strategy," China Security 1, no. 1 (2005); "Statement by the 
Chinese Delegation on the Issue of Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of the Risks of Nuclear War at the 
Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," (New YorkMay 2009). 
384"Analysis of China’s Nuclear Strategy." 
385Zou, "Deng Xiaoping's Nuclear Strategy Thinking (邓小平的核战略思想)."; Cai, "An Analysis of Deng 
Xiaoping's Nuclear Strategic Thinking (论邓小平的核战略思想)."; Wang, "Factors Behind the Evolution of 




                                                            
In comparison, the operational-level players throughout China’s government 
bureaucracy—including the PLA, the military defense industry, the foreign ministry, and 
think tanks—did not contribute to China’s nuclear policy-making. There was no 
systematic thinking about the role of nuclear weapons, what could and should be 
achieved through the possession of a nuclear weapons capability, under which scenarios 
China’s nuclear weapons should be used (except not to be the first to use nuclear 
weapons), and what should be the ideal size and configuration of China’s nuclear 
stockpile for the purpose of maximizing China’s security interests. All the operational-
level players were essentially executors of China’s “nuclear policy,” which was limited to 
a few political principles and was dictated by the top leadership. China’s nuclear 
scientists from the nuclear defense industry, for example, were influential in the 
development of China’s nuclear forces in the sense that they made decisions on China’s 
nuclear and missile procurement plans by interpreting the requirements suggested by 
Mao’s and Deng’s ideas about nuclear weapons and their nuclear principles.386 But they 
did not contribute to the nuclear policymaking, which was considered the sole 
responsibility of the top leadership.387 
This was the same for the PLA. The PLA set up a special strategic rocket force—the 
Second Artillery Corps—on July 1, 1966, two years after China’s first atomic explosion. 
Since then, the Second Artillery became the backbone of China’s nuclear forces, 
386John Wilson Lewis and Litai Xue, China Builds the Bomb(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988); 
China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age(Stanford University 
Press, 1996). 
387M Taylor Fravel and Evan S Medeiros, "China's Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese 
Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure," International Security 35, no. 2 (2010). 
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operating all of China’s land-based ballistic missiles.388 The Second Artillery, however, 
did not contribute to China’s nuclear policy-making for a long time, either. Its task was to 
execute orders in the form of managing and operating China’s nuclear forces. It did not 
even have much of an influence in determining force requirements, which was decided by 
the nuclear scientists based on their interpretation of the top leaders’ nuclear 
principles.389 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the Second Artillery conducted limited research on civil 
defense and conventional operations under a nuclear scenario.390 Throughout the 1980s, 
when it came to the issue of China’s nuclear strategy, the Second Artillery’s role was 
limited to the development of operational regulations and guidance for the nuclear forces. 
In the early 1980s, for instance, the Second Artillery held a couple of operational 
application research meetings, during which they discussed the Second Artillery’s 
operational guiding principles, principles of operations and battlefield construction, 
etc.391 The Second Artillery’s publications focused on operational principles and 
regulations. Even the most well-known documents, such as “The Science of Second 
Artillery Campaigns” and “The Science of Military Strategy”392 were operational texts 
388Shilun (宋时轮) Song and Ke (萧克) Xiao, Chinese Encyclopedia of Military Affairs (中国军事百科全书), 
vol. 1(Beijing: Military Science Press (军事科学出版社), 1997). 
389Lewis and Xue, China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age; 
China Builds the Bomb. 
390Fravel and Medeiros, "China's Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy 
and Force Structure."; Jianying (叶剑英) Ye, Selected Military Writings of Ye Jianying (叶剑英军事文
选)(Beijing: The PLA Press (解放军出版社), 1997). 
391Selected Military Writings of Ye Jianying (叶剑英军事文选). 




                                                            
that were based on interpretations of Mao’s and Deng’s views about the utility and 
purpose of nuclear weapons.393 
Beginning in the 1990s, however, as Chinese researchers and experts began to 
communicate and interact with their American and other foreign colleagues, they 
gradually came to the recognition that China did not have a nuclear strategy. Western 
analysts, particularly American analysts, began to study China’s nuclear strategy in the 
1970s. The study conducted by Alice Langley Hsieh on Communist China’s strategy in 
the nuclear era was one of the early studies.394 John Lewis and LitaiXue’s book China 
Builds the Bomb was one of the most widely cited works on China’s nuclear weapons 
development and policy. At the same time, Chinese American scholar Chong-Pin Lin 
wrote the book China’s Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition within Evolution.395 All 
these works were read and followed by Chinese experts and analysts. Some were 
translated and published in Chinese and instigated a lot of discussion in China.396 Chinese 
experts in most cases found these foreign studies informative as a detailed chronicle of 
China’s nuclear weapons program, although they also disagreed with many of the 
conclusions regarding Chinese nuclear thinking behind the weapon program.397 Most 
393Fravel and Medeiros, "China's Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy 
and Force Structure." 
394Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era(Greenwood Press, 1976). There 
were a few other studies, for instance, Leo Yueh-yun Liu, China as a Nuclear Power in World 
Politics(Macmillan, 1972). 
395Chong-Pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition within Evolution(Lexington Books Lexington, 
Mass, 1988). 
396Jifeng (刘戟锋) Liu, "Nuclear Strategy in Traditional Culture: A Review of China's Nuclear Weapons 
Strategy: Tradition within Evolution (传统文化中诞生的核战略─—评《龙威：中国的核力量与核战
略》)," Studies In Dialectics Of Nature (自然辩证法研究) 10, no. 08 (1994). 
397Wenting (聂文婷) Nie, "Research Review of China's Development of Its First Atomic Bomb (中国第一颗
原子弹研制的研究述评)," Military History Research (军事历史研究) 2(2013); Liu, "Nuclear Strategy in 
Traditional Culture: A Review of China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition within Evolution (传统文化
中诞生的核战略─—评《龙威：中国的核力量与核战略》)."; Donghai (段东海) Duan and Qian (张倩) 
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importantly, Chinese analysts realized that “compared to studies about China’s nuclear 
weapons development, there has been little study about China’s nuclear strategy.”398 
In 1989, He Zuoxiu, a prominent Chinese nuclear scientist and a frequent participant of 
U.S.-China operational-level engagements such as the Dialogue between Chinese 
Scientists Group on Arms Control and U.S. National Academy of Sciences, made the first 
open publication discussing China’s No First Use policy. He specifically mentioned the 
exchanges with American scientist Richard Garwin and acknowledged that China “faces 
the issue of how to describe its own ‘nuclear deterrence’ concept.”399 Since the 1990s, 
American analysts had an extensive debate on China’s nuclear strategy.400 During various 
operational-level dialogues, questions were raised by the American participants about 
China’s nuclear strategy.401 These American experts had different interpretations of 
China’s nuclear strategy. Some of the terms used by them to describe Chinese nuclear 
strategy include “minimum deterrence,” “credible minimum deterrence,” “assured 
retaliation,” “minimum means of reprisal,” and “limited nuclear retaliation,” among 
Zhang, "Breaking up Sino-Soviet Alliance: U.S. Strategic against China's Nuclear Development - an Analysis 
of Four Sino-U.S. Relationship Models During 1961-1964 (瓦解中苏同盟: 美国对中国核开发的战略——
关于 1961—1964 年四组中美关系模式的分析)," Cold War International History Studies (冷战国际史研
究) 2, no. 2. 
398Liu, "Nuclear Strategy in Traditional Culture: A Review of China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition 
within Evolution (传统文化中诞生的核战略─—评《龙威：中国的核力量与核战略》)." 
399Zuoxiu (何祚庥) He, "On China's Nuclear Policy of Not Using Nuclear Weapons First (论中国“不首先
使用核武器”的核战略)," Journal of Dialectics of Nature (自然辩证法通讯) 11, no. 1 (1989). 
400See, for instance, Alastair Lain Johnston, "Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited 
Deterrence Versus Multilateral Arms Control," The China Quarterly 146(1996); Xue Litai, "Evolution of 
China’s Nuclear Strategy," Strategic Views from the Second Tier: The Nuclear Weapons Policies of France, 
Britain, and China (1995); Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's New" Old Thinking": The Concept of Limited 
Deterrence," International Security 20, no. 3 (1995). 
401Elaine Bunn, "Nuclear Deterrence - Us and Chinese Perspectives," in US-China Conference on Arms 
Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation(Beijing, China: East Asia Nonproliferation Program, Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 24 to 25 September, 1998). 
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others.402 Some of the American understanding about China’s nuclear strategy was more 
aggressive and ambitious than a “minimum nuclear deterrence” and suggested that China 
was embracing a “limited nuclear deterrence” strategy.403 Faced by questions raised by 
their American colleagues, Chinese experts and strategists began to conduct their own 
research on China’s nuclear strategy. This was an unprecedented because China’s nuclear 
policy had always been imposed by the top leadership and had not been thoroughly 
examined by operational-level actors. 
The first Chinese description of its own nuclear strategy was in 1992.404 Starting in the 
mid-1990s, some of the Chinese experts who had been frequent participants in U.S.-
Chinese dialogues began conducting research on China’s own nuclear strategy and 
nuclear arms control policy.405 Some of the studies were clearly influenced by 
American/Western concepts such as the relationship between nuclear de-alerting and 
nuclear strategy.406 Originating from the perceived need to respond to American experts 
and policy analysts, this internal discussion in China quickly developed into a systemic 
bottom-up effort to reflect on and rethink Chinese nuclear strategy. Chinese experts from 
402Gill Bates et al., "The Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence," J., Mulvenon 
and AND, Yang (eds) The People’s Liberation Army as Organization (2002); Lewis, The Minimum Means of 
Reprisal: China's Search for Security in the Nuclear Age; John Wilson (约翰·刘易斯) Lewis and Litai (薛理
泰) Xue, "Evolution of China's Military Strategic Guidance and Nuclear Strategy (中国军事战略方针及核
战略之演变)," The Leadership (领导者), no. 2 (2011); Fravel and Medeiros, "China's Search for Assured 
Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure."; Michael Chase and Evan 
Medeiros, "China’s Evolving Nuclear Calculus: Modernization and the Doctrinal Debate" (paper presented 
at the RAND/CNAC PLA conference, Washington, DC, 2002). 
403Johnston, "China's New" Old Thinking": The Concept of Limited Deterrence."; Johnston, "Prospects for 
Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence Versus Multilateral Arms Control." 
404Cheng (姚成 ) Yao, "China's Nuclear Strategy and Its Features (中国的核战略及其特点)," World 
Military Yearbook ( 世界军事年鉴) (1992). 
405Huaqiu (刘华秋) Liu, "Analysis of China's Nuclear Arms Control Policy (中国核军控政策评析)," 
Contemporary Military (现代军事), no. 11 (1995). 
406Zhimin ( 李志民) Li, "The Relations between De-Alerting Nuclear Force and Nuclear Strategy (除核力量
警戒状态与核战略的关系)," China Nuclear Science and Technology Report (中国核科技报告) (2000). 
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the defense industry, the PLA, the foreign ministry, think tanks, and academia who had 
been involved in U.S.-Chinese dialogues were most active in leading and contributing to 
these discussions. Such internal operational-level discussions contributed greatly to the 
formation and clarification of China’s modern nuclear strategy by bringing attention to 
the importance of developing an explicit nuclear strategy, introducing and internalizing 
American/Western concepts into Chinese nuclear thinking, and helping rationalize and 
formalize Chinese nuclear strategy. The result of this was China’s gradual embrace of 
“deterrence.” 
Embracing Deterrence 
Chinese top leaders had a distinct understanding of the role of nuclear weapons from that 
of the United States. Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping all saw nuclear 
weapons as essentially unusable for the purpose of warfighting. Mao Zedong, who 
initiated China’s nuclear weapons program, spoke forthrightly about the role of nuclear 
weapons: “Some fools are still talking about (using) nuclear weapon, but it will never be 
used again. The nuclear explosion in Japan at the same time destroyed (the nuclear 
weapon) itself, because people all over the world are against its use.”407 His emphasis on 
“win by striking only after the enemy had struck” was in accordance with his “tit for tat is 
fair play” principle.408 Deng Xiaoping, the principal of China’s second-generation leaders, 
407Xiong (殷雄) Yin and Xuemei (黄雪梅) Huang, A Century's Review: A Global History of Atomic Weapons 
(世纪回眸: 世界原子弹风云录)(Beijing: Xinhua Press (新华出版社), 1999). 
408The literal translation of his original words is: We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are 
attacked,we will counterattack for sure. 
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stuck to the “win by striking only after the enemy had struck” principle and emphasized 
the importance of “effective revenge.”409 
The idea of “effective revenge,” therefore, became the most important concept in Chinese 
nuclear thinking. In contrast, the term “deterrence” was never part of China’s nuclear 
vocabulary until it was introduced by Chinese experts. As a matter of fact, the Chinese 
term of “deterrence” actually had quite a different meaning from the English term. This 
distinction did not come to the notice of the two countries’ nuclear decision makers until 
Chinese participants of some of the operational-level dialogues began to realize the 
significant difference. The English term “deterrence” has traditionally been translated 
into Chinese as weishe(威慑). However, weisheactually refers to using military 
intimidation to achieve objectives without fighting. It has a negative connotation in 
Chinese because it implies the use of coercive action.410 Therefore, the meaning of 
weishe is much closer to the meaning of the English terms of “coercion” or 
“compulsion.”411 Because of its negative connotation, China resisted the use of 
“deterrence” to define its nuclear strategy. For decades, China was heavily critical of the 
“superpowers’ nuclear deterrence.”412 In its official documents, China emphasizes that 
409Cai, "An Analysis of Deng Xiaoping's Nuclear Strategic Thinking (论邓小平的核战略思想)."; Zou, "Deng 
Xiaoping's Nuclear Strategy Thinking (邓小平的核战略思想)." 
410Riqiang (吴日强) Wu, "Issues in Sino-Us Nuclear Relations: Survivability, Coercion and Escalation," in 
UK-China Strategic Communication Initiative(London: Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2013). 
411William Burr, "Sino-American Relations, 1969: The Sino-Soviet Border War and Steps Toward 
Rapprochement," Cold War History 1, no. 3 (2001). 
412Zhan (吴展) Wu, "Nuclear Deterrence (核威慑)," American Studies (美国研究), no. 01 (1988). 
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“the Chinese government has always opposed to nuclear blackmail and nuclear 
deterrence,” and criticized the nuclear powers’ “nuclear deterrence” policy.413 
This anti-nuclear deterrence rhetoric began to change after China developed a better 
understanding of nuclear deterrence. Chinese nuclear scientists and analysts from 
government-affiliated think tanks were the first to be convinced about the neutrality of 
the term “nuclear deterrence” during their interaction with American scientists and 
experts. They were the first to use and highlight this term in their writings and analysis 
and introduce it to their colleagues in the foreign ministry and the military.414Since then, 
this term has been gradually accepted and embraced by China’s nuclear community. 
They are able to use and discuss nuclear deterrence through the same lens as it is used by 
American nuclear strategists.415 More importantly, China’s nuclear community had an 
extensive debate about whether the American term of nuclear deterrence appropriately 
delineates China’s nuclear strategy and strategic thinking and generally came to the 
conclusion that Chinese understanding about a limited means of reprisal is very much in 
line with the concept of minimum nuclear deterrence.416 
This apparently affected China’s official nuclear policy. Even though China’s 1995 arms 
control white paper continued its traditional policy of opposing the superpowers’ 
413"China's Arms Control and Disarmament (中国的军备控制与裁军)," (Beijing: State Council Information 
Office of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室), 1995). 
414Bin (李彬) Li, "China's Nuclear Strategy (中国核战略辨析)," World Economics and Politics (世界经济与
政治), no. 09 (2006). 
415Kuaiji (孙快吉) Sun, "Analyazing China's Self-Defensive Nuclear Strategy (解读我国自卫防御核战略)," 
Current Report (时事报告), no. 2 (2007). 
416Yu (荣予) Rong and Yuan (洪源) Hong, "The Evolution of China's Nuclear Strategy: From Anti-Nuclear 
Deterrence to Limited Deterrence (从反核威慑战略到最低核威慑战略:中国核战略演进之路)," Journal 
of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies (当代亚太), no. 3 (2009); Hongzhang (王鸿章) Wang, "The 
Development of Nuclear Deterrence Theory in China (中国核威慑思想的历史演进)," Military History (军
事历史), no. 5 (2012). 
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“nuclear deterrence,”417 the English version of its 2000 defense white paper began to use 
the term “deter” to describe its own nuclear strategy. Its Chinese version used the term 
ezhi(遏制), which is close to but slightly different from weishe (威慑).418 Since 2006, 
however, the term “deterrence” was officially accepted and used in its defense white 
papers in the nuclear capability sections.419 
Rationalization and Conceptualization of China’s Nuclear Strategy 
Chinese paramount leaders Mao and Deng personally erected a number of policy 
principles for China’s nuclear development and operation. But for decades, China did not 
have a coherent nuclear strategy. The growth and expansion of China’s nuclear 
community, and especially their close connection and interaction with their American 
colleagues, provided them the capability and opportunity to systematically examine 
China’s nuclear thinking and to help formulate a coherent nuclear strategy through 
rationalizing and formalizing the nuclear principles imposed by the top leaders. Such 
rationalization and formalization later was accepted by the top leadership and influenced 
China’s overall nuclear strategy development. 
During U.S.-Chinese operational-level engagement, the issue of no first use received a lot 
of attention and was heavily discussed.420 Since the Chinese NFU commitment was a 
417"China's Arms Control and Disarmament (中国的军备控制与裁军)." 
418"China's National Defense in 2010 (2010 年中国的国防)." 
419"China's National Defense in 2006 (2006 年中国的国防)," The Information Office of the State Council 
of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-12/29/content_5546076.htm. 
420"Conference Report on 'U.S.-China Strategic Nuclear Dynamics'."; Side (胡思得) Hu and Jun (伍钧) Wu, 
"Join Hands toward the Goal of a Nuclear Weapon Free Worlda World (携手向无核世界的目标前进)," in 
PIIC Beijing Seminar on International Security(BeijingNovermber 2012); Jianqun (滕建群) Teng, "Sino-
American Nuclear Dialogue: Retrospect and Prospect (中美核领域对话的回顾与展望)," International 
Studies (国际问题研究), no. 03 (2011); Medeiros and Saunders, "Fourth U.S.-China Conference on Arms 
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political principle imposed by top leaders, this commitment does not look completely 
rational from the realpolitik perspective. The credibility of China’s NFU policy, as a 
result, was often challenged by the United States and created significant 
misunderstanding between the two sides. During bilateral dialogues and exchanges, 
however, Chinese experts who became increasingly familiar with the American nuclear 
literature realized that the Chinese top leaders’ perception about the unusability of 
nuclear weapons was essentially similar to the concept of nuclear taboo in the U.S. 
literature.421 They used the concept of nuclear taboo to explain to their American 
colleagues the perception and thinking behind China’s NFU policy, which was effective 
in helping bridge the perceptional gap between the two sides.422 By revealing the 
different cultural and perceptional motivations behind China’s nuclear thinking, Chinese 
experts were also able to shed new light on issues of mutual concern such as strategic 
stability and help put abstract concepts into perspectives that facilitated the reduction of 
mutual misunderstanding. Li Bin, for instance, introduced Chinese thinking on strategic 
stability and adapted and broadened the original Western framework around strategic 
stability to include additional factors that reflect contemporary international security 
development.423 These exchanges also reinforced Chinese understanding and 
appreciation of the importance of maintaining NFU policy for a stable U.S.-Chinese 
Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation: "Building a Global Strategic Framework for the 21st 
Century.”" 
421Xin (李欣) Li, "Li Bin: Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Taboo (李彬：核武器与核禁忌)," Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences Journal (中国社会科学院院报) 2007; Bin (李彬) Li and Hongyi (聂宏毅) Nie, 
"A Study of Sino-U.S. Strategic Stability (中美战略稳定性的考察)," World Economics and Politics (世界经
济与政治), no. 02 (2008); Riqiang (吴日强) Wu, "Just War, Nuclear Taboo, and Nuclear Free World (正义
战争、核禁忌与无核武器世界)," ibid., no. 10 (2009). 
422Barry D. Watts, "Nuclear-Conventional Firebreaks and the Nuclear Taboo,"(Washington, DC: Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013); Li and Nie, "A Study of Sino-U.S. Strategic Stability (中美战
略稳定性的考察)." 
423"A Study of Sino-U.S. Strategic Stability (中美战略稳定性的考察)." 
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nuclear relationship. Chinese nuclear experts who have been involved in these exchanges 
have become the most vocal domestic supporters for China maintaining its NFU 
policy.424 
The credibility of China’s nuclear deterrence was another issue that was not 
systematically examined in China. Chinese top leaders intended to build a “lean and 
effective nuclear force” but did not explain what this meant in practice.425 This became 
clear only after the Chinese nuclear community adopted from the United States the 
concept of mutually assured retaliation and used it to understand qualitative and 
quantitative requirements for Chinese nuclear capability. Previously, Mao had a 
preliminary understanding that only a few nuclear weapons would be able to deter the 
United States from using nuclear weapons against China. But it was only after Chinese 
nuclear experts adopted the American analytical framework for understanding nuclear 
deterrence that they started to use concepts such as the threshold of unacceptable damage 
to help them understand the qualitative and quantitative requirement for Chinese nuclear 
force development.426 
Drawing on the American framework, Chinese participants also conceptualized the 
credibility rationale behind China’s nuclear development and force posture. They 
illustrated the role that “first-strike uncertainty” plays in China’s nuclear deterrence and 
pointed out potential areas for China to be more transparent in its nuclear development 
424Zhenqiang Pan, "China Insistence on No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons " China Security 1, no. 1 (2005); 
Sun, "Features and Characteristics of China's Nuclear Strategy (中国核战略性质与特点分析)." 
426Yiming (毕义明) Bi et al., "Research on the Quantitative Model for the Nuclear Deterrence Effectiveness 
(核威慑能力定量化模型研究)," Journal of Xi'an University of Engineering Science and Technology (西安
工程科技学院学报) 19, no. 2 (2005). 
426Yiming (毕义明) Bi et al., "Research on the Quantitative Model for the Nuclear Deterrence Effectiveness 
(核威慑能力定量化模型研究)," Journal of Xi'an University of Engineering Science and Technology (西安
工程科技学院学报) 19, no. 2 (2005). 
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and operation.427 It is argued, for instance, as China deploys more road-mobile missiles, 
it does not need to rely heavily on numerical ambiguity for obtaining a high level of 
survivability. Instead, China can rely more on geographical ambiguity. It is also 
suggested that China could be more transparent about midlevel nuclear doctrines that 
would give outsiders a deeper understanding of the guiding principles of Chinese nuclear 
posture without releasing sensitive details of its nuclear operation. Such a conceptual 
framework was gradually adopted by the broader Chinese nuclear community and was 
increasingly incorporated into China’s official nuclear policy deliberation and 
expression.428 
Bottom-Up Communication and Influence 
Initiation of Internal Debates and Policy Rethinking 
Operational-level engagement played a direct role in the initiation of China’s internal 
nuclear policy debate and rethinking. China’s internal discussion on missile defense and 
nuclear stability is one of the examples. China’s missile defense research project 
originally started in 1964 under the code name “640 Project” with the support from Mao 
Zedong. Between 1964 and 1977, when the project was terminated, the 640 Project had 
produced a number of missile interceptors such as Counter Strike I and Counter Strike II 
427Bin Li, "China and Nuclear Transparency," in Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials: The 
Political and Technical Dimensions, ed. Nicholas Zarimpas(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Wu 
Riqiang, "Certainty of Uncertainty: Nuclear Strategy with Chinese Characteristics," Journal of Strategic 
Studies 36, no. 4 (2013); Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, 
France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution(LIT Verlag Münster, 2000); Devin T Hagerty, 
The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia(MIT Press, 1998). 
428Xiangli (孙向丽) Sun, "Theories and Practice in Arms Control (军备控制的理论与实践)," Teaching and 
Research (教学与研究), no. 6 (2001); "China's Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-
Proliferation," (Beijing: The Information Office of China's State Council, 2005); "Nuclear Disarmament and 
Reduction of the Danger of Nuclear War: Working Paper Submitted by China,"  in 2010 Review Conference 
of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(New York6 May 2010). 
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and a series of antimissile cannons including the 640-2 and the Vanguard Cannon.429 But 
the project also encountered serious technical problems. In 1977, the project was 
terminated and three years later it was cancelled. 
After the United States started the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1983, however, 
Chinese nuclear and rocket scientists became concerned about the implications of such 
high-technology development for China’s nuclear capability and national security in 
general. This development of a missile defense system by the United States, however, did 
not trigger the concern of China’s top leaders due to the dramatically improved U.S.-
Chinese relationship at that time. In 1986, prominent Chinese scientists such as Wang 
Daheng (王大珩), Wang Ganchang (王淦昌), Yang Jiachi (杨嘉墀), and Chen Fangyun 
(陈芳允), with the support of other scientists such as Zhu Guangya (朱光亚), wrote a 
report to Deng Xiaoping arguing that China should respond to such development in the 
United States and other countries by starting its own research and development programs. 
Restarting missile defense research was one of the key recommendations submitted by 
the scientists. This report was approved by Deng and kick-started one of the most 
important high-technology research and development investment projects in China—the 
863 Project (National High Technology Research and Development Program of 
China).430 
429Jiadong (程加栋) Cheng and Jiaqi (张家齐) Zhang, "The Historical Development of China's Anti-Missile 
System (中国反导系统研发历程揭秘)," Friends of Party Members and Cadres (党员干部之友), no. 3 
(2010). 
430Song of the Spring: Deng Xiaoping and China's Science and Technology Development (春颂：邓小平同
志与中国科技事业), Book Series to Commemorate the 100th Anniversary of the Birth of Deng Xiaoping 




                                                            
China’s nuclear community started an internal debate about the impact of the Strategic 
Defense Initiative on China and how China should respond. Chinese scientists and policy 
analysts all participated in this debate.431 These studies formed the foundation of China’s 
official policy toward SDI. The research conducted by China Institute of International 
Studies researcher Zhang Qubing and later published in International Studies, for 
example, was used directly by China’s top leadership to inform their decision making.432 
The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences also published an edited volume on U.S. 
missile defense: Star Wars: An Analysis of the U.S.-Soviet Contention for Space.433 After 
the Chinese nuclear community voiced concerns about SDI’s impact on China’s nuclear 
retaliatory capability and overall security environment, Chinese government sources 
began to express open criticism about SDI. On September 30, 1985, foreign minister Wu 
Xueqian firstly called on the United States and Soviet Union to stop from weaponizing 
the space.434 Premier Zhao Ziyang also made a speech shortly after to reiterate the same 
point.435 
431See, for example, Da (司马达) Sima, "Realities and Illusions of Star Wars (星球大战的梦幻与现实)," 
World Affairs (世界知识), no. 12 (1983); Peiyao (陈佩尧) Chen, "The Reality and Future of the "Star Wars" 
(“星球大战”的现实与未来)," Material of International Issues (国际问题资料), no. 05 (1983); Jian (孙
俭) Sun, "The U.S. "Star Wars" Program (美国的“星球大战”计划)," foreign Missile and Aerospace (国
外导弹与航天), no. 04 (1985); Quanren (赵全仁) Zhao, "A Few Basic Comments on the "Star Wars" 
Program (试谈对“星球大战”计划的几点基本看法)," Foreign Missile and Astronautics (国外导弹与航
天), no. 01 (1986). 
432Qubing (庄去病) Zhuang, "An Analysis of the U.S. "Star Wars" Initiative (美国“星球大战”计划剖
析)," International Studies (国际问题研究), no. 04 (1984). 
433Star Wars: An Analysis of the U.S.-Soviet Contention for Space (星球大战：对美苏太空争夺的剖析), 
(Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Institute of World Economics and Politics (中国社会科学院
世界经济与政治研究所): PLA Publishing House (解放军出版社), 1986). 
434Xueqian Wu, "Statement by Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian at the Fortieth Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly,"(New YorkSeptember 29 1985). 
435Ziyang Zhao, "Statement by Zhao Ziyang at the Commemorating Meeting of the 40th Anniversay of the 
United Nations," (October 24 1985). 
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Perceptual Change 
U.S.-Chinese operational-level engagement played a direct role in pressuring the young 
Chinese nuclear community to reflect on, rethink, and redevelop its nuclear-related 
policies. For a decade after the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, China did 
not have a real nuclear policy (not just the lack of a clear military nuclear strategy as 
discussed earlier in this chapter). Chinese leaders were very comfortable with following 
the nuclear policy of the Soviet Union, which was then considered China’s “big brother.” 
For instance, in a 1959 standing committee meeting of the National People’s Congress, 
foreign minister Chen Yi (陈毅) stated, “We hold that the new initiatives suggested by 
the Soviet government on arms control are fully in accord with the fundamental interests 
of the Chinese people and people of all other states in the world.”436 Since 1949, China 
adopted the so-called “leaning to one side” diplomatic guidance, pledging to stand on the 
side of the Soviet Union in all “international struggles.”437 On nuclear-related issues, 
China’s official policy followed closely that of the Soviet Union, with very little 
exception.438 China supported the Soviet Union’s policy on the nuclear arms race and 
436Yixian (谢益显) Xie, China's Diplomatic History: The Period of the People's Republic of China, 1949-1979 
(中国外交史: 中华人民共和国时期, 1949-1979), vol. 3(Zhengzhou: Henan People's Press (河南人民出版
社), 1988). 
437Chengling (吴成玲) Wu, "The Establishment of the "Leaning on One Side" Diplomatic Policy from an 
International Perspective (国际化视阈下“一边倒”外交政策的确立)," Journal of University of 
International Relations (国际关系学院学报), no. 03 (2011); Caixin (万才新) Wan, "The Establishment of 
New China's "Leaning on One Side" Diplomatic Strategy and Its Policy Practice (新中国“一边倒”外交战
略的确立及其实践效应)," Socialism Studies (社会主义研究), no. 02 (2012). 
438Mingquan Zhu, "The Evolution of China's Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy," The Nonproliferation Review 
4, no. 2 (1997). 
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offered endorsement for almost all Soviet positions during the Korean War, Second 
Arab-Israeli War, and Berlin Crises.439 
After China split with the Soviet Union in the early 1960s, China went into de facto self-
isolation and had less engagement in nuclear arms control and nonproliferation issues 
with other countries. When the American scientists and experts began to engage with 
their Chinese counterparts, Chinese participants in these dialogues and exchanges were 
suddenly faced with the new challenge of developing independent views on nuclear 
issues. The operational-level engagement at the Conference of Disarmament, starting 
from 1980, often put Chinese diplomats into a similarly difficult position as well. The 
participation of Chinese experts and diplomats in various engagement programs in and of 
itself created a need for China to develop and refine its nuclear policies.440 This need has 
also motivated Chinese participants to actively observe and learn from their American 
and foreign colleagues, which greatly contributed to a socialization process that changed 
Chinese perception on some of the most important nuclear issues in a bottom-up manner. 
Accepting and Internalizing New Terms 
One indicator of this bottom-up perception change is the gradual acceptance and 
internalization of some of the most important American/Western terms on nuclear 
stability and arms control. Extensive discussions and exchanges on these terms took place 
in many of the U.S.-Chinese nuclear dialogues, which has played a significant role in 
changing the Chinese perception. 
439Shengfa (张盛发) Zhang, "Khrushchov and Berlin Crisis 1958-1961 (赫鲁晓夫与 1958~ 1961 年柏林危
机))," Shanghai Normal University Journal (Philosophy and Social Sciences) (上海师范大学学报 (哲学社会
科学版)) 4(1993). 
440Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000. 
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Strategic Stability 
Strategic stability was not a new term for the Chinese. The People’s Daily, for instance, 
has published commentaries and editorials that touched upon the issue of strategic 
stability for decades.441 However, the traditional Chinese understanding of strategic 
stability is not completely in line with the classic American/Western definition. The 
Chinese have traditionally taken a much broader view of strategic stability that 
encompasses not only nuclear relations but also political-military relations more 
generally.442 They have referred to strategic stability as a general state of balance—
including security, military, alliance, and economic stability, and many other 
dimensions.443 
The American understanding of strategic stability was introduced to the Chinese nuclear 
community through various U.S.-Chinese exchanges and the subsequent introduction of 
American arms control literature.444 The term “strategic stability” was extensively 
discussed during a number of dialogues such as the U.S.-China Conference on Arms 
Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation; the Conference on U.S.-China Strategic 
Nuclear Dynamics; the U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue; the ISODARCO-Beijing Seminar 
on Arms Control; and the CSCAP Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of 
441Xinhua News Agency, "Nato Foreign Affairs Ministers Conference Emphasized Defense Issues - Arguing 
for Capabilities That Can Deter Invasion and Resist Pressure (北约外长会议强调加强防务主张保持足以
遏制侵略和顶住压力的力量)," People's Daily, December 9 1977. 
442Brad Roberts, "China and Ballistic Missile Defense: 1955 to 2002 and Beyond,"(DTIC Document, 2003). 
443See, for example, Jin Wang and Wensheng Li, "The Contraversies over the Two Plus Two: The Missile 
Defense and Strategic Weapons of the Untied States and Russia (“2+2”的“是非题”美俄反导及战略
武器)," Ordnance Knowledge, no. 5 (2008); Nengwu (徐能武) Xu, "The Threats and Challenges to Outer 
Space Security Posed by the Adjustment of the U.S.Strategic Deterrent System (美国战略威慑体系调整
对外层空间安全的潜在威胁与挑战)," National Defense Science & Technology, no. 2 (2013). 




                                                            
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Study Group).445Chinese participants in these 
engagement programs were the first to learn and then use the American concept of 
strategic stability to study the U.S.-Chinese nuclear relationship. They wrote and 
published a relatively large number of papers to apply and promote the new analytical 
framework for understanding nuclear stability. These authors include experts from the 
nuclear defense industry,446 the military,447 the foreign ministry’s research institutes,448 
think tanks,449 and university research centers.450 
This new understanding and analytical framework of strategic stability—including both 
the arms control stability and crisis stability—was increasingly used to study the security 
implications of new military development in the United States and other places on 
Chinese nuclear deterrence and regional stability.451 As this concept has been accepted 
and embraced by a wider circle of policy and academic analysts, more Chinese experts 
445Evan S. Medeiros, "3rd Us-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation, Us-
China Arms Control and Nonproliferation Cooperation: Progress and Prospects,"(Beijing, China: East Asia 
Nonproliferation Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International 
Studies September 14-15, 2000); Medeiros and Saunders, "Fourth U.S.-China Conference on Arms Control, 
Disarmament and Nonproliferation: "Building a Global Strategic Framework for the 21st Century.”"; 
"Conference Report on 'U.S.-China Strategic Nuclear Dynamics'."; Carlo Schaerf,  in 8th ISODARCO Beijing 
Seminar on: "Arms Control"(Beijing, China14-18, October 2002); "Conference on U.S.-China Strategic 
Nuclear Dynamics."; Glosny and Twomey, "U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase V Report." 
446Sun, "Theories and Practice in Arms Control (军备控制的理论与实践)." 
447Li, "A Preliminary Analysis on U.S.-China Strategic Stability: Contructing U.S.-China Strategic Stability 
Beyond Strategic Weapons (中美战略稳定初探——超越战略武器看中美战略稳定的构建)." 
448Dunn et al., "Building toward a Stable and Cooperative Long-Term U.S.-China Strategic Relationship (构
建长期稳定、合作的中美战略关系)." 
449Xu, "The Threats and Challenges to Outer Space Security Posed by the Adjustment of the U.S.Strategic 
Deterrent System (美国战略威慑体系调整对外层空间安全的潜在威胁与挑战)." 
450Ting ( 吴挺) Wu, "Space Weaponization from the Perspective of U.S.-China Strategic Stability (从中美战
略稳定性看太空武器化问题)" (Fudan University (复旦大学), 2012); Deshun (李德顺) Li, "The Mutual 
Independence in Strategic Stability (战略稳定性中的相互依赖因素)" (Tsinghua University (清华大学 ), 
2012); Li and Nie, "A Study of Sino-U.S. Strategic Stability (中美战略稳定性的考察)." 
451Wu Riqiang, "Survivability of China's Sea-Based Nuclear Forces," Science & Global Security 19, no. 2 
(2011); Bin (李彬) Li and Riqiang (吴日强) Wu, "Impact of Euro-Missile Shield on Russia Security" (paper 
presented at the the 19th International Summer Symposium on Science and World Affairs, Oslo, Norway, 
July 21-30 2008); Lora Saalman, "China and the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review,"(Beijing: Carnegie-Tsinghua 
Center for Global Policy, February 28, 2011). 
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used it to understand the impact of missile defense on nuclear relationships.452 In the 
debates around deep nuclear reductions, they also used this concept to explore how 
strategic stability would change as global nuclear stockpiles continue to reduce and to 
derive policy recommendations.453 After this narrower concept of strategic stability was 
accepted by the Chinese nuclear community, it began to be embraced by the official 
Chinese rhetoric. Starting in the late 2000s, Chinese official statements and documents 
began to refer to strategic stability in the same manner.454 
The Chinese nuclear community not only played an important role in internalizing the 
American concept of strategic stability that was then accepted by government officials, it 
also managed to reach a common understanding with its American colleagues on the 
importance of maintaining strategic stability in the U.S.-Chinese nuclear relationship.455 
This common understanding has become the foundation of official U.S.-Chinese 
interaction on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation issues. China’s traditional 
position had always put the “complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear 
weapons” as the ultimate goal of its nuclear policy but was not able to connect this 
452Hongbo (李洪波) Li and Yan (周艳) Zhou, "Indian Missile Defense Plan and South Asia Regional Security 
(印度导弹防御计划与南亚地区安全)," South Asia Studies ( 南亚研究), no. 4 (2009); Huaqiu (刘华秋) Liu, 
"International Arms Control Aces New Challenges - "Arms Control and Disarmament Handbook" Editor 
Interviews (国际军备控制面临新的挑战——《军备控制与裁军手册》主编访谈录)," Modern Military 
(现代军事), no. 5 (2001). 
453Nengwu (徐能武) Xu and Saimei (金赛美) Jin, "The Practicality of the Construction of a Nuclear Free 
World (推进无核世界建设的现实性分析)," Contemporary World (当代世界), no. 1 (2010); Li, "The 
Mutual Independence in Strategic Stability (战略稳定性中的相互依赖因素)."; Bin (李彬) Li and Tiefeng 
(肖铁峰) Xiao, "Rethinking the Role of Nuclear Weapons (重审核武器的作用)," Foreign Affairs Review (外
交评论) 3(2010). 
454"Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of the Danger of Nuclear War: Working Paper Submitted by 
China."; "Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of the Danger of Nuclear War: Working Paper Submitted 
by China,"  in Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.40(Vienna27 April 2012). 
455Thomas Fingar and Fan Jishe, "Ties That Bind: Strategic Stability in the Us–China Relationship," The 
Washington Quarterly 36, no. 4 (2013). 
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idealistic goal with policy realities.456 It was concerned that participating in nuclear arms 
control talks would not only run counter to its ultimate objective but also undermine its 
own security interests in the process.457 For this reason, the Chinese government has been 
reluctant to officially commit itself to participating in nuclear arms control talks. At the 
operational-level, however, after years of discussions, the Chinese and American nuclear 
communities were able to reach a common understanding that bilateral strategic stability 
based on de facto mutually assured destruction (MAD) is a helpful starting point for 
building the bilateral nuclear relationship.458 For political reasons, the two governments 
could not openly support a bilateral nuclear relationship based on MAD and mutual 
vulnerability. The United States does not want to openly admit it is vulnerable to a 
Chinese second nuclear strike, and China does not like the Cold War–era term of 
mutually assured destruction, which implies a Cold War–type U.S.-Chinese rivalry. But 
the common understanding reached between the Chinese and American nuclear 
communities made it possible for the two governments to build on this tacit agreement 
and to initiate substantive talks on practical policy issues.459 
Escalation Control and Crisis Stability 
Crisis management or escalation control was not focused by China’s traditional security 
thinking. Ancient Chinese military thinking did not touch upon the issue of 
456"China's National Defense in 2000 (2000 年中国的国防)," The Information Office of the State Council 
of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国国务院新闻办公室), 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2001/content_61220.htm. 
457Xinyue ( 王欣月) Wang, "The Idea and Reality of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons (无核世界的构想与
现实)" (East China Normal University (华东师范大学), 2010). 
458Medeiros and Saunders, "Fourth U.S.-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and 
Nonproliferation: "Building a Global Strategic Framework for the 21st Century.”" 




                                                            
crisis/escalation management. During China’s revolutionary years under Mao, China’s 
security policy emphasized the importance of using tactics to confuse the enemy by 
creating the utmost uncertainty in the enemy’s mind. The purpose was to understand the 
enemy as much as possible but to keep the enemy from obtaining an accurate 
understanding of oneself.460 This was very close to the so-called brinksmanship strategy 
and was completely opposite the emphasis paid by the Western literature on reducing the 
fog of war. 
Chinese political and military leaders consistently expressed the view that military 
actions should only be taken when there is absolute certainty (or near-absolute certainty) 
of winning. Among the three principles for fighting enemies stressed by Mao, one was 
about when to employ military power: “The second is the winning principle. We either 
do not fight them; or if we do choose to go into a fight, we must win. We should never 
fight a war for which we are not very well prepared and which we do not have full 
confidence of winning.”461 Because of this principle of not fighting a war that China may 
not win, Chinese strategists devoted relatively little thinking to how to deal with 
scenarios other than complete victory or defeat. 
Under the leadership of Mao and Deng, there was a very clear line between the role of 
nuclear weapons and the role of conventional weapons in Chinese military doctrine and 
policy deliberation. Nuclear weapons were regarded only as a “strategic deterrent,” for 
deterring nuclear wars. Nuclear weapons were not intended and, as they believed, less 
460Zedong (毛泽东) Mao, Selected Military Works of Mao Zedong (毛泽东军事文选)(People's Liberation 
Army Soldiers Publishing House (中国人民解放军战士出版社), 1981). 
461Jisi (王缉思) Wang and Hui Xu (徐辉), "An Comparative Analysis of Sino-U.S. Crisis Behavior (中美危机
行为比较分析)," America Studies (美国研究), no. 2 (2005). 
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useful to deter other types of wars, including large-scale conventional wars and regional 
conflicts.462 They believed that mass mobilization (a people’s war) was more effective in 
deterring large-scale conventional invasion, and rapid-response conventional forces were 
more effective at deterring regional conflicts.463 
In addition, China did not traditionally focus on drawing lessons from past crises. Before 
the 1980s, Chinese discussion focused on how most crises stemmed from domestic 
struggles rather than international problems. Crises were regarded as opportunities to 
advance one’s own interests.464 After China obtained a nuclear capability in the mid-
1960s, China had little real experience of being directly involved in nuclear crises, with a 
brief exception in 1969 when the Soviets were reported to have made an implicit threat of 
conducting a surgical strike against China’s rudimentary nuclear capability.465 In contrast, 
the United States and the Soviet Union underwent a number of serious nuclear crises, not 
the least among which was the Cuban missile crisis. Such nuclear crises between the 
United States and the Soviet Union taught them firsthand lessons about the real dangers 
of inadvertent escalation, and China had very limited such experience in comparison. 
462Qiong (吴琼) Wu, "An Exploration of China's Military Deterrent Thinking in the New Era (我国新时期军
事威慑思想浅探)," Military History Research (军事历史研究), no. 2 (2002). 
463Zhengling (袁正领) Yuan, "The Thoughts and Practice of Conventional Deterrence after the Founding of 
Prc (论新中国建立后常规威慑思想与实践)," Military History (军事历史), no. 1 (2002). 
464Davis B Bobrow, Steve Chan, and John A Kringen, Understanding Foreign Policy Decisions: The Chinese 
Case(Free Press New York, 1979). 
465Yi (雨驿) Yu, "Sino-Soviet Nuclear Crisis Caused by Zhenbao Island (由珍宝岛引发的中苏核战危机)," 
Friends of Party Members and Cadres (党员干部之友), no. 12 (2009); Hao (陈昊) Chen, "Zhou Enlai before 
and after the Zhen Bao Islands Clashes (周恩来在珍宝岛事件前后)," Extensive Collection of the Party 
History (党史博采(纪实)), no. 1 (2010); Burr, "Sino-American Relations, 1969: The Sino-Soviet Border War 
and Steps Toward Rapprochement." 
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Moreover, the traditional Chinese view was that discussing the issue of crisis/escalation 
control in and of itself sends a signal of weakness.466 Never making compromise with the 
enemy was regarded as a sacred principle and a key quality of a decision maker. China’s 
appreciation of the dangers of inadvertent escalation of crisis was by and large 
established during long-term U.S.-Chinese interaction at the operational-level. Since the 
United States has been very much concerned about crisis stability in a potential U.S.-
Chinese confrontation, American participants devoted significant attention to include 
discussions of crisis stability and escalation management in various U.S.-Chinese 
dialogues and exchanges. In many of these meetings, there were extensive discussions on 
terms and issues related to “escalation control,” “inadvertent escalation,” “crisis stability,” 
and “nuclear threshold.”467 
Gradually, the gap between American and Chinese understanding about escalation 
control narrowed. Chinese participants began to see value in preventing escalation of war 
from the conventional to the nuclear level.468 Specific escalation scenarios across the 
Taiwan Strait were mostly discussed during these exchanges, but as the conversation 
went broader and deeper,469 more scenarios such as those on the Korean Peninsula, in the 
South China Sea, and in South Asia were also discussed.470 Chinese participants started 
to appreciate the risk of inadvertent escalation if signals were miscommunicated.471 They 
466Tuosheng ( 张沱生) Zhang, "Zhang Tuosheng Discusses the Establishment of the State Security 
Committee (张沱生谈设立国家安全委员会全球性大国要拼危机管控)," National Culture History (国家
人文历史), no. 24 (2013). 
467Glosny and Twomey, "U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase V Report." 
468Ibid. 
469Twomey and Shelor, "U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase Ii Report." 
470Ibid.; Glosny, Twomey, and Jacobs, "U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase Vii Report."; Cossa, 
Glosserman, and Santoro, "Progress Continues, but Disagreements Remain: The Seventh China-Us 
Strategic Dialogue on Strategic Nuclear Dynamics & the Inaugural China-Us Dialogue on Space Security." 
471Lindsey, Glosny, and Twomey, "U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase Vi Report." 
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even began to urge the United States and China to make crisis management a priority, 
seeking mutual understanding of each other’s key operational principles, and stress that 
both countries must establish bilateral crisis management mechanisms to improve 
communication both before and during a crisis.472 They started to argue for the 
importance of direct communication.473 
As the discussions continued, Chinese participants were increasingly open and willing to 
discuss more sophisticated issues related to crisis/escalation management. On several 
occasions, the issue of cross-domain escalation was discussed, and Chinese participants 
expressed the view that they actually believed such conversations were long overdue.474 
Escalation control discussions expanded from the nuclear-only scenarios to include 
additional domains such as space, air, and cyber. Taiwan no longer preoccupied Chinese 
participants’ attention and interests. They recognized the possibility that military tensions 
in other theaters might very well spillover and affect Taiwan.475 They also actively 
argued for the two countries to establish “rules of the road” to manage potential crises.476 
The same trend appeared in the publications of the Chinese nuclear community. They 
increasingly accepted American scholars’ concepts and used their works to draw lessons 
for China’s nuclear policy. They introduced and applied concepts, such as Thomas 
472Cossa, Glosserman, and Santoro, "Progress Continues, but Disagreements Remain: The Seventh China-
Us Strategic Dialogue on Strategic Nuclear Dynamics & the Inaugural China-Us Dialogue on Space 
Security." 
473Christopher Twomey and Kali Shelor, "U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase Iii: "The Role of National 
Perceptions of Security Environments in Shaping Sino-American Nuclear Affairs,”"(Honolulu, Hawaii: The 
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and Pacific Forum-Csis, November 4-6, 2007). 
474Cossa, Glosserman, and Santoro, "Progress Continues, but Disagreements Remain: The Seventh China-
Us Strategic Dialogue on Strategic Nuclear Dynamics & the Inaugural China-Us Dialogue on Space 
Security."; Glosny, Twomey, and Jacobs, "U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase Vii Report." 
475Cossa, Glosserman, and Santoro, "Progress Continues, but Disagreements Remain: The Seventh China-





                                                            
Schelling’s “threat that leaves something to chance,” Robert Jervis’s slippery slope from 
conventional to nuclear war, and Glen Snyder’s stability/instability paradox to Chinese 
scenarios.477 Experts such as Wang Jisi and Xu Hui proposed practical steps for China to 
take in order to better understand and manage crises.478Figure 8 also shows the increasing 
number of journal articles written by Chinese experts on the subject of crisis/escalation 
control/management. 
 
Figure 8 Number of Chinese Journal Publications on Crisis Management since 1990 
It is also interesting to note that within the Chinese nuclear community, Second Artillery 
officers and personnel were the latest to attend U.S.-Chinese nuclear dialogues. As a 
traditionally more isolated and sensitive organization, it took a longer time to agree to 
join the conversations. Some of the Second Artillery officers, such as Wu Tianfu, Sun 
Haiyang, and Major General Wang Xiaodon from the Second Artillery Command 
477Li, "China's Nuclear Strategy (中国核战略辨析)."; Yi (刘怡) Liu, "After Mad: Deliberating China's 
Nuclear Strategy and Missile Defense (中国“反导”背后的核战略思量——在 mad 之后)," World Atlas 
(世界博览), no. 3 (2010); Li and Xiao, "Rethinking the Role of Nuclear Weapons (重审核武器的作用)."; 
Rui (侯锐) Hou, "Research on U.S. Strategic Nuclear Missiles and the Cold War: 1945-1968 (美国战略核导
弹厉史与冷战进程研究：1945-1968)" (Northeast Normal University (东北师范大学)). 




























































                                                            
College, only began to participate in these dialogues starting from the early 2000s.479 In 
the case of U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Major General Yao Yunzhu from the 
Academy of Military Sciences could not make it to the first three meetings but was able 
to attend meetings since 2010.480 
Because of the relative lack of engagement between the PLA personnel and their U.S. 
counterparts, there appears to be more misunderstanding between the two sides. 
American analysis of the Second Artillery’s nuclear operation still relies heavily on 
publications of Chinese officers, which have generated a number of major 
misunderstandings. On the issue of crisis management, for example, the book published 
by the Second Artillery in 2004 titled Science of Second Artillery Campaigns discusses 
situations in which China might need to “lower the nuclear deterrence threshold.” This 
was interpreted by American experts as evidence that China prepares to use nuclear 
threats to deter conventional wars or in scenarios of conventional conflicts.481 But what 
the book really talks about by referring to “lowering the nuclear deterrence threshold” is 
actually raising the alert status during a crisis rather than using nuclear weapons in 
scenarios other than a retaliatory strike.482  Similar misunderstandings took place over the 
terms used by the Second Artillery such as “conventional war under nuclear deterrence” 
or “double deterrence.”483 Such episodes also suggest that long-term operational-level 
engagement is essential for building shared vocabulary and reaching common 
understandings.   
479 Data collected from various operation-level dialogues participants lists. 
480 Data collected from the official participants lists of the U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue. 
481Thomas J Christensen, "The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China's Strategic Modernization and Us-
China Security Relations," Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 4 (2012). 
482Wu, "Issues in Sino-Us Nuclear Relations: Survivability, Coercion and Escalation." 
483Christensen, "The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China's Strategic Modernization and Us-China 
Security Relations."; Wu, "Issues in Sino-Us Nuclear Relations: Survivability, Coercion and Escalation." 
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Strategic Trust 
Accepting American Arms Control Theories 
The Chinese nuclear community learned game theory and was the first to introduce 
American/Western nuclear deterrence and arms control theories into China.484 These 
theories were quickly internalized within the Chinese nuclear community and were 
widely spread to influence a much larger Chinese audience. These U.S.-originated 
theories gradually become the theoretical foundations of Chinese thinking on nuclear 
strategy and arms control policies, which makes it much easier for the two countries to 
reach a common understanding and find shared interests on important nuclear issues. 
Deeper Understanding of U.S. Interests and Decision Making 
Operational-level engagement has provided useful opportunities for the Chinese nuclear 
community to get a better understanding of different perspectives of U.S. domestic 
debates and the complicated motivation structure behind U.S. policy deliberation. The 
U.S. participants in many of the nuclear dialogues and exchanges came from various 
government institutions and nongovernmental organizations such as the Department of 
State, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, national labs, military 
colleges, think tanks, defense contractors, and academia. They presented different views 
within the U.S. policy and research circle and introduced the Chinese to their domestic 
policy debates and interagency coordination mechanisms. As a result, the Chinese were 
able to develop a much more sophisticated understanding of the U.S. definition of 
interests and policy incentives. As one Chinese analyst put it, “The U.S. national missile 
484Sun, "Theories and Practice in Arms Control (军备控制的理论与实践)." 
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defense plan is not purely a weapon development plan: it is subject to all kinds of 
influences and constraint. Besides the influence of objective security environment, 
technology development, and reaction of the international society, the U.S. domestic 
politics also has a significant, sometimes decisive impact on its national missile defense 
plan.”485 
The publications of the Chinese nuclear community also indicate a greater level of 
understanding about the historical, cultural, and political background and nuances of the 
U.S. domestic nuclear policy discussion.486 The Chinese mastery of U.S. terminology and 
analytical framework has also enabled them to participate directly in technical and policy 
discussions around U.S. ballistic missile defense with their American colleagues and to 
seek to influence U.S. debates on missile defense.487 During the late 1990s and early 
2000s, Chinese analysts conducted a large number of in-depth studies on U.S. domestic 
debates around missile defense, analyzing domestic political struggles and technical 
aspects of the proposed U.S. missile defense systems.488 They particularly applied the 
U.S. framework on offense-defense balance and strategic stability to highlight the 
negative impact of missile defense development on global security and stability in East 
485Tao (何涛） He, "Conservatism and U.S. National Missile Defense Plan after the Cold War (保守主义与
冷战后美国的国家导弹防御计划)" (The PLA University of Foreign Languages (中国人民解放军外国语学
院), 2007). 
486Hongxia (戴洪遐) Dai, "National Missile Defense Systems (Nmd): A Cultural Analysis (国家导弹防御系
统 (Nmd): 一种文化的分析)," Xinjiang Social Forum (新疆社科论坛), no. 4 (2001); Lineng (陈立能) Chen, 
"U.S. Domestic Debates around Missile Defense Strategy (美国国内围绕导弹防御战略的争论)," 
International Perspective (国际展望) 15(1996); Yongtao (刘永涛) Liu, "U.S. President, Congress, and the 
"Missile Defense Plan" (美国总统, 国会与“导弹防御计划”)," ibid.3(2001). 
487Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China's Nonproliferation Policies and Practices, 1980-
2004. 
488Liu, "U.S. President, Congress, and the "Missile Defense Plan" (美国总统, 国会与“导弹防御计划”)." 
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Asia and argued that missile defense “is going to put an end to traditional nuclear 
strategies.”489 
Finding Common Interests 
During U.S.-Chinese dialogues, Chinese participants were convinced that China’s 
decision to build a small nuclear arsenal was correct. After getting a better understanding 
of all the costs and problems that the United States had encountered with dismantling and 
destroying retired and excessive nuclear weapons, the Chinese began to further 
deemphasize the need to significantly build up their nuclear forces, realizing that they 
would have to go through the same painful process of destroying large numbers of retired 
nuclear weapons if they built too large an arsenal. This has helped the United States and 
China achieve a certain level of common understanding regarding future nuclear weapons 
development. It also helped the Chinese to recognize that it was in both countries’ 
interests not to test and obtain more advanced nuclear weapons, which contributed to 
their cooperation on CTBT negotiations.490 As discussed in details in the previous 
sections, operational-level engagement greatly facilitated the growth and expansion of 
China’s nuclear community and has helped China’s nuclear community to build up 
technical capacity to address nuclear policy issues. During this process, the perception of 
the Chinese nuclear community changed significantly. They took the lead in analyzing 
and drafting China’s nuclear strategy and have introduced and internalized important 
American nuclear terms into the Chinese policy and decision-making circle. This 
489Zhonghua (陶中华) Tao, "Impact of Missile Defense System on International Strategic Landscape (导弹
防御系统对国际战略格局的影响)," Defence Science and Technology (国防科技), no. 9 (2004); Zifeng (董
子峰) Dong, "U.S. Missile Defense System and the End of Traditional Nuclear Strategy (美国导弹防御系
统与传统核战略的终结)," Pacific Journal (太平洋学报), no. 4 (2004). 
490Zou, "China and the Ctbt Negotiations." 
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emergence of a common vocabulary and the convergence of perception between the 
United States and China have greatly helped the two sides to identify important common 
interests that were overlooked before. 
Moralistic Trust 
Chinese Perception of U.S. Principles and Rules of Behavior 
Over the course of decades of operational-level engagement, the Chinese nuclear 
community’s perception about the principles and rules of behavior to which the United 
States subscribes when it comes to the issue of nuclear arms control has not substantially 
changed. There also is little evidence suggesting a major gap between the perceptions of 
the Chinese nuclear community and those of China’s top leadership. In general, there are 
three major U.S. principles and rules of behavior from the Chinese perspective. 
Principle 1: Pursuit of “Absolute Security” 
The Chinese nuclear community’s reading of the U.S. strategic objective during the Cold 
War emphasized that the United States was not fully committed to a mutually assured 
destruction relationship with the Soviet Union. The U.S. efforts in developing “damage 
limitation” strategies convinced the Chinese that the United States was not at all 
comfortable with MAD. The United States only reluctantly accepted MAD with the 
Soviet Union after the Soviets obtained a strong enough nuclear capability.491As for 
China, the perception is that the United States did not accept a MAD relationship with 
491Jia (许嘉) Xu and Heng (张衡) Zhang, "The Trend of American Nuclear Policies' Adjustments and Its 
Influences after the Cold War (冷战后美国核政策的调整趋势及影响)," World Economics and Politics (世
界经济与政治), no. 03 (2011); Wu, "Nuclear Deterrence (核威慑)."; Jian (赵骞) Zhao, "The Shift of U.S. 




                                                            
China from the very beginning. The U.S. development and deployment of a limited 
missile defense system in the 1960s and 1970s was seen as primarily aimed at obtaining a 
capability to defend against possible Chinese missile strikes.492 The Reagan 
administration’s SDI was not seen as mainly targeted against China, but the Chinese 
nuclear community’s interpretation of the U.S. motivation behind SDI was an effort of 
the United States to regain strategic superiority over the Soviet Union.493 
This same perception continued as the United States refocused on the development of 
ballistic missile defense systems starting from the 1990s. Members of the Chinese 
nuclear community were very vocal in expressing their opposition toward the U.S. 
missile defense plan and the widely accepted view was that this was a renewed U.S. 
effort to obtain “absolute superiority” and “absolute security” in a unipolar world.494 
Although the Chinese have generally abandoned the more colorful Cold War term of 
“nuclear hegemony,” the perception of U.S. pursuit of “absolute security” beyond 
492Yang (张杨) Zhang, "U.S. Early Missile Defense Deployment Plan and China's Development of Strategic 
Nuclear Weapons (美国早期 abm 部署计划与中国战略核导弹发展)," in American National Security and 
Cold War Strategy (美国国家安全与冷战战略), ed. Qun (于群) Yu(Beijing: China Social Sciences Press (中
国社会科学出版社), 2006); Shuifu (汤水富) Tang, "Why the United States Is Particularly Interested in 
Nmd (美国为何对 nmd 情有独钟)," Outlook Newsweek (瞭望新闻周刊), no. 2 (2001). 
493Zhuang, "An Analysis of the U.S. "Star Wars" Initiative (美国“星球大战”计划剖析)."; Yang (张杨) 
Zhang, " China's Development of Strategic Nuclear Weapons and U.S. Initial Missile Defense Deployment 
Plan (中国战略核武器发展与美国早期 abm 部署计划)," Contemporary Chinese History (当代中国史研
究), no. 1 (2004); Glaser and Garrett, "Chinese Perspectives on the Strategic Defense Initiative." 
494Sun, "New Challenges and New Agenda for China's Arms Control (中国军控的新挑战与新议程)."; Lu, 
"U.S.-China Arms Control Interaction and Its Theoretical Analysis (中美在军控领域的交流及其理论分
析)."; Sun, "Theories and Practice in Arms Control (军备控制的理论与实践)."; Jie (赵杰) Zhao, "Analysis 
of U.S. Missile Defense Plan and China's National Security (美国导弹防御计划与中国国家安全分析)" 
(Tsingdao University (青岛大学), 2009); Hongyi (聂宏毅) Nie, "The Second Cold War Is Coming? A 
Strategic Analysis of the U.S. Deployment of Missile Defense System in East Europe (第二次“冷战”正在
降临?——对美国在东欧部署导弹防御系统的战略分析)," International Perspective (国际展望), no. 13; 
Qiong (王琼) Wang and Xuying (万绪英) Wan, "A New Evidence of Hegemony in the New Century: 
Analyzing the Impact of the Deployment of Missile Defense System by the United States (新世纪霸权的
又一例证——评美国部署弹道导弹防御系统的影响)," Modern Weaponry (现代兵器), no. 1 (2005). 
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mutually assured destruction or mutual vulnerability remains the same.495 This view was 
shared widely within the Chinese community and among experts from different sectors. 
Even the often-regarded “liberal” Chinese experts held this view, too.496 
Even after the Obama administration came into power in 2009—and President Obama’s 
personal endorsement of a “world free of nuclear weapons”—the general reaction from 
the Chinese nuclear community has so far still been skeptical. They often understand the 
motivation behind this new policy rhetoric as at least partially aimed at helping sell the 
U.S. nonproliferation and antinuclear terrorism agenda and maintaining American overall 
military superiority in a world without nuclear weapons.497 Most Chinese analysts believe 
that President Obama’s policy change was primarily a result of his different interpretation 
of the international security environment from President Bush rather than a genuine 
change of understanding about nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy. Obama openly 
declared that nuclear terrorism is “the single biggest threat” to U.S. security498 and 
therefore saw nuclear weapons as less useful for addressing American security concerns. 
From their interpretation, Obama’s call for a “world free of nuclear weapons” was “based 
495"Xinhua News Agency,” "Kennedy Pledgied to Strengthen the Dual Policy, Boasting That Last Year's 
Nuclear Blackmail During the Carribean Crisis Was Successful; Wanting to Build up Arms and Win Peace at 
the Same Time (肯尼迪叫嚷加強推行兩手策略吹噓去年加勒比危機時期的核訛詐政策成功；揚言今
後既要加緊擴軍又要“爭取和平”，既願意談判又不惜一戰)," People's Daily, October 22 1963; Chu 
(赵楚) ZHao, "Nuclear Blackmail: Three Simple Facts Behind Hegemonic Rhetoric (核讹诈:霸权话语背后
的三个简单事实)," International Perspective (国际展望), no. 7 (2002). 
496Yinhong (时殷弘) Shi, "U.S. National Missile Defense Plan and China's Response (美国国家导弹防御计
划与中国的对策)," The Pacific Journal (太平洋学报), no. 04 (2000). 
497Zunzun (朱尊尊) Zhu and Qin (安钦) An, "Russo- U. S. Relations from the Perspective of a Guided 
Missile Defense System (导弹防御系统问题视角下的俄美关系)," Siberian Studies (西伯利亚研究) 36, 
no. 3 (2009); Qingjun (王清军) Wang and Yizhi (郭懿芝) Guo, "China's Missile Defense Challenges U.S. 
"Nuclear Hegemony" (中国反导冲击美国“核霸权”)," World Journal (世界报), March 6, 2013 2013; 
Zhijun (王志军) Wang, "On the United States' Political Theology of "Absolute Security" and Obam's 
"Nuclear-Free World" (论美国“绝对安全”神学政治与奥巴马“无核世界思想”)," International 
Forum (国际论坛) 12, no. 1 (2010). 
498David Jackson, "Obama: Nuclear Terrorism Is ‘the Single Biggest Threat’to Us," USA Today 11(2010). 
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on considerations to pursue its own security interests,”499 and he never “intended to give 
up the goal of maintaining (the U.S.) nuclear superiority of the number one in the 
world.”500 
Principle 2: Technology Supremacy 
There is a consensus among the Chinese nuclear community about the U.S. obsession 
with technology supremacy. They believe the United States attaches particular 
significance to obtaining and relying on superior military technology for its national 
security. The perception that the United States prefers relying on technological 
supremacy to relying on a cooperative security framework for defending its national 
security interests is viewed by the Chinese nuclear community as a deeply buried 
preference for self-help over cooperative security or “common security.”501 
Superior military technology has helped the United States better defend its national 
security interests in international nuclear arms control talks over CTBT and the fissile 
material cutoff treaty.502 More importantly, the United States is perceived as always 
attempting to rely on technological breakthroughs, which can save it from the MAD 
relationship with other nuclear weapons states and which can provide it with more 
499Zikui (刘子奎) Liu, "Analysis of Obama's Nuclear Free World Strategy (奥巴马无核武器世界战略评
析)," American Studies (美国研究) 3(2009). 
500Jian (赵剑) Zhao, "The Changed and Unchanged of the U.S. Nuclear Strategy: Assessment of Obama 
Administration's Nuclear Posture Review Report (美国核战略的“变”与“不变”——对奥巴马政府
《核态势评估报告》的分析)," Peace and Development (和平与发展), no. 4 (2010). 
501Zhenfei (姜振飞) Jiang and Feitao (刘飞涛) Liu, "Geopolitics and American Missile Defense Plan in East 
Europe (地缘政治与美国东欧反导计划)," International Studies (国际问题研究), no. 6 (2007). 
502Xie, "In Order to Maintain Nuclear Deterrence Capability under Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the 
United States Is Planning to Build a Series of Nuclear Explosion Simulation Facilities (为在全面禁止核试验
条件下保持核威慑力量——美国拟新建若干核爆炸仿真试验设施)."; Wang, "The Situation before the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Opens for Signature (全面禁止核试验条约签署前的形势)."; "The United 
States Promotes Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (美国推动全面禁止核试验)," ibid.8(1993). 
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freedom to act with little constraint. According to the Chinese reading of the American 
history of missile defense development, the United States was more willing than other 
countries to pursue new military technologies even though there is uncertainty regarding 
the ultimate success of such technology and this unilateral pursuit of new technology will 
risk jeopardizing existing cooperative security frameworks and arms control agreements. 
The insistence on developing ballistic missile defense capability, particularly the national 
missile defense, was a classic example of this American penchant from the Chinese 
perspective.503 
The development of advanced conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) systems by the 
United States reinforces the Chinese perception. The CPGS capability opens the 
possibility for the United States to launch preemptive strikes over Russian and/or Chinese 
nuclear forces in a disarming or “damage limitation” operation. This could pose a serious 
threat to Russian and Chinese second-strike capability and add unprecedented new 
variable in the traditional nuclear balance based on MAD.504 The United States declared 
its motivation in developing this capability was to defeat time-sensitive targets such as 
high-value terrorists.505 However, the benefit of obtaining this capability is viewed as 
relatively small (striking a limited number of terrorists) by most Chinese experts, but the 
cost could be enormous because it threatens the existing nuclear stability between the 
503Dengxue (黄登学) Huang, "Can Russia and the United States Solve Their "East European Missile 
Defense" Dispute? (俄美能否化解“东欧导弹防御系统”争端?)," Issues of Contemporary World 
Socialism (当代世界社会主义问题), no. 3 (2008); Jiang and Liu, "Geopolitics and American Missile 
Defense Plan in East Europe (地缘政治与美国东欧反导计划)."; Haoqing (冯昊青) Feng, "Research of 
Unclear Ethics Based on Nuclear Security and Development (基于核安全发展的核伦理研究)" (Central 
South University (中南大学)). 
504Yong (方勇) Fang, "The United States Presses Forward the Prompt Global Strike Plan (美国推进快速全
球打击计划)," New Era National Defense (新时代国防), no. 2 (2010). 
505Amy F Woolf, "Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and 
Issues," in CRS Report for Congress(Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, May 5, 2014). 
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major nuclear powers.506 Therefore, the U.S. insistence on developing the CPGS 
technology is viewed as another example of its embrace of technology supremacy.507 
Principle 3: Peace through Strength 
The third commonly shared Chinese perception is that the United States believes in 
“peace through strength” in the nuclear field. One example highlighted by the Chinese 
nuclear community is the dissuasion strategy often discussed in the United States and 
officially embraced since the George W. Bush administration. The 2002 Nuclear Posture 
Review explicitly sought to maintain a nuclear capability that could dissuade nations 
from military competition with the United States and defeat those who attack.508 This 
same policy also appeared in other official documents such as the Department of 
Defense’s 2008 document National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st 
Century.509 There have also been a lot of U.S. domestic discussions about the dissuasion 
strategy.510 Such open advocate for a “dissuasion strategy” was seen as a reflection of 
U.S. propensity to use superior power and coercive means to contain the rise of other 
506Aicheng (逄爱成) Pang and Fengzhi (黄凤志) Huang, "Financial Crisis and Adjustment of U.S. 
Hegenomic Strategy (金融危机与美国霸权战略的调整)," Northeast Asia Forum (东北亚论坛) 1(2012). 
507Zikui (刘子奎) Liu, "An Analysis of the Nonproliferation Policy Shift under the Obama Administration (试
析奥巴马政府防扩散政策的调整)," Contemporary International Relations (现代国际关系), no. 4 (2011); 
Zhenfei (姜振飞) Jiang and Jinyu (程金玉) Cheng, "Analyzing the Obama Administration's Nuclaer 
Deterrence Policy (析奥巴马政府的核威慑政策)," Linyi University Journal 9 临沂大学学报）, no. 2 
(2012). 
508David Ruppe, "Experts Question a Core U.S. Arms Control Tenet,"(Washington DC: Global Security 
Newswire, Novermber 2004). 
509"National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century," (Washington DC: Department of Defense 
and Department of Energy, September 2008). 
510Us Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Getting It Right, (New Deterrent Working Group, 2009); Glen 
M. Segell, "Thoughts on Dissuasion," Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 10, no. 4 (Summer 2008); 
Jonathan D. Hagood, "Dissuasive Nuclear Strategies: The Strategic Concept of Dissuasion and the U.S. 
Nuclear Arsenal," in The Center for Strategic and International Studies Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) 
Conference(October 14, 2004); "Dissuasion in U.S. Defense Strategy," (Center for Contemporary Conflict, 
22 September 2004). 
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countries and therefore maintain peace.511 As one Chinese expert puts it, “The United 
States has two basic principles. One is not to allow an enemy to project military power 
onto the U.S. territory, i.e. not to allow Americans be under any direct military threat. 
The second is not to allow the emergence or existence of any country or group of 
countries that can compete with the United States at the global level.”512 
U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty despite strong international 
concern and criticism and the U.S. Senate’s rejection of the CTBT despite overwhelming 
international support for the treaty also were seen by the Chinese as examples of the 
United States using its unchallenged power to reverse or jeopardize international arms 
control progress for its own security interests. The U.S. willingness to use coercive power 
to achieve preferred objectives in its handling of Iraqi, Iranian, Libyan, and North Korean 
nuclear crises reinforces the Chinese perception.513 
As debate raged in the United States over a national missile defense system in the late 
1990s, the Chinese nuclear community made a great effort to express its opposition and 
to try to dissuade the United States from making a decision to develop a national missile 
defense system. These efforts were repeatedly made at various operational-level 
511Liping (夏立平) Xia and Chongwen (孙崇文) Sun, "Nato's Nuclear Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era (论
冷战后时期的北约核战略)," European Studies 9 欧洲研究), no. 6 (2012); Jianshu (崔建树) Cui, "The 
Evolution of American Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Policy from the Bush to Obama 
Administration (从小布什到奥巴马政府的美国核战略和核不扩散政策演变)," Peace and Development 
(和平与发展) 5(2009). 
512Wang and Wan, "A New Evidence of Hegemony in the New Century: Analyzing the Impact of the 
Deployment of Missile Defense System by the United States (新世纪霸权的又一例证——评美国部署弹
道导弹防御系统的影响)." 
513Fan, "Summary of the Workshop on Arms Control and U.S.-China Relations (军控与中美关系研讨会综
述)."; Xinning (郭新宁) Guo, "On China's Relationship with Developing Countries in International Arms 
Control and Disarmament (中国与发展中国家在国际军控与裁军进程中的关系)," Foreign Affairs 
Review (外交评论), no. 4 (2007). 
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dialogues and exchanges and through a large number of open publications.514 In the end, 
the United States went ahead with its plans, making the Chinese believe that their voice 
was not heard or paid attention to because they were weak in power and capability. As 
one Chinese analyst summarizes, “As history has spoken, the logic of ‘peace through 
strength’ is more appreciated by the United States.”515 
Security Dilemma Sensibility 
If the operational-level engagement has not been very successful in persuading the 
Chinese nuclear community from abandoning its realpolitik understanding of the U.S. 
principles, is there any evidence that at least such engagement has helped the Chinese 
nuclear community to develop a deeper appreciation of the possible existence of security 
dilemma between the United States and China on nuclear arms control issues? 
Presumably, an increased security dilemma sensibility would help the two countries 
conduct more objective assessment of each other’s strategic intentions, be more capable 
of carrying out self-introspection, reduce self-righteousness, and be more aware of the 
likely consequences of one’s own actions in provoking fear from the other.516 
However, the empirics offer little evidence to prove that this has been the case. There was 
indeed a debate among the Chinese right around the time when the George W. Bush 
514Medeiros, "3rd Us-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation, Us-China 
Arms Control and Nonproliferation Cooperation: Progress and Prospects."; Yan He, "The Latest 
Development of the U.S. Missile Defense Program and Its Influence on the World Security" (paper 
presented at the 8th ISODARCO Beijing Seminar on: "Arms Control,” Beijing, China, October 15, 2002); 
Jing‐dong Yuan, "Chinese Responses to Us Missile Defenses: Implications for Arms Control and Regional 
Security," The Nonproliferation Review 10, no. 1 (2003). 
515Zhao, "Analysis of U.S. Missile Defense Plan and China's National Security (美国导弹防御计划与中国
国家安全分析)." 
516Nicholas J Wheeler, "Nuclear Abolition: Trust-Building’s Greatest Challenge?,"(International 
Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, 2009). 
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administration withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and pressed full speed 
ahead with the development of ballistic missile defense systems. Some Chinese analysts 
such as Shi Yinhong (时殷弘) and Wu Zhengyu (吴征宇) raised attention to the issue of 
the security dilemma and argued that China should not seek to counter the U.S. 
development of ballistic missile defense through enhancing its nuclear capability because 
such Chinese reaction would be interpreted negatively by the United States and the two 
countries would fall into an action-reaction cycle that is common in a situation of a 
security dilemma.517 This was the first time that the issue of security dilemma was raised 
in a domestic debate. Both sides of this debate drew on the Western literature and had an 
extensive exchange on what security dilemma means, what are the causes, and what are 
the implications for China’s nuclear policy. 
This debate in and of itself served to raise awareness of the concept of security dilemma 
within the Chinese nuclear community. With that said, its impact on the thinking of the 
overall community was very limited. The two sides of this debate disagreed on the 
ultimate driving forces behind security dilemma, and more importantly, they disagreed 
about whether China’s self-restraint would help get the two countries out of a security 
dilemma situation.518 At the end of the debate, there was still a strong sense that China 
had to stick to its self-help rule.519 China’s response in the following years seems to have 
517Shi, "U.S. National Missile Defense Plan and China's Response (美国国家导弹防御计划与中国的对
策)."; Zhengyu (吴征宇) Wu, ""Calmly Respond"≠ "Self-Disarmament": U.S. National Missile Defense and 
China's Right Response (“沉着应对”≠“自废武功”——美国国家导弹防御计划与中国应有的对
策)," Contemporary International Relations (现代国际关系), no. 02 (2003). 
518Ruizhuang (张睿壮) Zhang, ""Calmly Respond" and "Self-Disarmament": A Response to Mr. Shi Yinhong 
on How to Deal with the U.S. National Missile Defense Plan (“沉着应对”与“自废武功”——就如何





                                                            
confirmed this generally dominant voice. China moderately increased the size of its 
nuclear forces and sought to obtain a capability to penetrate U.S. ballistic missile defense. 
In general, there was little evidence that the Chinese nuclear community has embraced a 
greater security dilemma sensibility as a result. 
Lessons Drawn by the Chinese Nuclear Community 
In according with their perception about U.S. principles and rules of behavior, the 
Chinese nuclear community has drawn a few lessons for defending its national security 
interests. These lessons suggest that the Chinese nuclear community is still very much 
preoccupied with realpolitik thinking, which long-term operational-level engagement 
does not seem to be capable of changing. 
Lesson 1: Security through Strength 
The Chinese nuclear community’s engagement with the United States on the issue of 
missile defense and nuclear stability showed a good example of the Chinese drawing a 
lesson of “security through strength” from their experience in the bilateral interaction. 
After failing to influence the U.S. thinking and decision over missile defense 
development, the Chinese nuclear community reaffirmed that “development is the last 
word” and adopted a two-step strategy.520 The first step is to quickly develop a capability 
to defeat missile defense and restore stability/balance, and the second step is to join the 
missile defense development competition itself.521 
520Zhongming (许忠明) Xu, "Understanding the U.S. Missile Defense System (美国导弹防御系统之我见)," 
Journal of Yanbian University ( Social Science) (延边大学学报: 社会科学版) 34, no. 3 (2005). 




                                                            
As the Chinese nuclear community was in communication with U.S. colleagues in the 
1990s when U.S. interests in ballistic missile defense mounted, Chinese experts were 
following the U.S. development but were not conducting much technical research on 
countering ballistic missile defense. This changed dramatically at the beginning of the 
2000s, when the Chinese nuclear community began to realize that its voice was not going 
to have any impact on the growing U.S. commitment to ballistic missile defense. They 
began to invest heavily in technical research on how to counter or penetrate ballistic 
missile defense, as reflected in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9 Number of Technical Research Articles on Ballistic Missile Defense Penetration 
Having conducted several years of research on approaches to counter ballistic missile 



























































focus on the so-called proactive countermeasures—for example, to carry out research and 
development of its own ballistic missile defense capability.522 This was completely in 
line with China’s first anti-satellite test in 2007 and midcourse interception tests in 2010 
and 2013.523 In fact, the anti-satellite test in 2007 demonstrated China’s capability to 
counter U.S. ballistic missile defense by destroying its early-warning satellites.524 More 
importantly, the anti-satellite test was also aimed at laying the technical foundation for 
developing China’s own ballistic missile defense capability.525 The 2007 test served as 
the transition point in China’s two-step response to the U.S. development of ballistic 
missile defense system. 
This same two-step response strategy also applies to China’s overall nuclear development. 
After China felt a threat from the U.S. nuclear weapons, the first response was to obtain 
very limited nuclear capability as a countermeasure for the purpose of restoring 
stability/balance.526 China regarded the purpose of its nuclear weapons as to counter what 
522See, for example, Enyu (高恩宇) Gao and Xiaokun (刘晓坤) Liu, "A Simplified Model for the 
Interception Rate of Ballistic Missile Defense Systems (弹道导弹防御系统拦截概率的简化模型)," 
Missiles and Space Vehicles (导弹与航天运载技术), no. 3 (2013); Zhihe (肖志河) Xiao et al., "Radar 
Identification Technology for Ballistic Missile Defense (弹道导弹防御的雷达目标识别技术)," Aerospace 
Electronic Warfare (航天电子对抗), no. 6 (2011); Qixing (吴启星) Wu and Weihua (张为华) Zhang, 
"Calculation of the Interception Window of Mid-Course Ballistic Missile Defense (弹道导弹中段防御的拦
截窗口分析)," Flight Mechanics (飞行力学) 23, no. 2 (2005). 
523Tong (钱彤) Qian, "China Conducted a Successful Land-Based Mid-Course Anti-Missile Interception Test 
within Its Border (中国在境内进行陆基中段反导拦截技术试验)," Xinhua News Agency, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/2013-01/27/c_124285256.htm; Heping (袁和平) Yuan, "China Building Land-
Based Anti-Missile Defensive Shield (中国构建陆基反导防御盾牌)," Science andTechnology Defense 
Industry (国防科技工业), no. 2 (2013). 
524Gang (洛刚） Hao, "A Research on U.S. Missile Defense Plan and China's Capability Development 
Countermeasures (美导弹防御计划与我装备发展对策研究)," Journal of the Academy of Equipment 
Command & Technology (装备指挥技术学院学报) 16, no. 2 (2005). 
525Xionghui (童雄辉) Tong et al., "The Development Trend of American and Russian Space Offense-
Defense Weaponry (美俄空间攻防武器装备的发展趋势)," Missiles and Space Vehicles (导弹与航天运载
技术) 6(2004). 
526Xuegong (赵学功) Zhao, "The Nuclear Blackmail Policy of the Eisenhowe Administration During the 
Korean War (论艾森豪威尔政府在朝鲜战争中的核讹诈政策)," Nankai Journal (南开学报) 4(1997). 
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they called “nuclear blackmail.” In their view, nuclear weapons are primarily a political 
weapon that would keep China from being intimidated by the super powers.527 For 
decades after China’s first nuclear explosion, China kept the size of its nuclear stockpile 
very limited and seemed to attach great importance to possessing nuclear weapon systems 
rather than building up its stockpile.528 After the successful full-range test of the DF-5 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and the introduction of the JL-1 submarine-
launched ballistic missile (SLBM), Deng declared in a 1986 meeting of the Political 
Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, “Since today, China has the capability to defend 
its motherland. We are able to launch a nuclear counterattack if we are struck by nuclear 
weapons from a foreign country.”529 Since then, China’s focus has been to catch up with 
the technology development in the United States and other nuclear powers and not be left 
behind in a technological competition. In recent decades, China has had one of the 
world’s most active nuclear modernization programs but still keeps the overall size of its 
nuclear stockpile at a very moderate level.530 
Lesson 2: Capability as Leverage 
As a response to the perceived U.S. principles of technological supremacy and peace 
through strength, the Chinese nuclear community is convinced that to be treated seriously 
and equally in negotiations with the United States, China needs to possess sufficient 
capability as a source of leverage. The Chinese attributed their inability to influence U.S. 
527Junting (李俊亭) Li, "The Strategic Choice That Made China Straighten Its Back (使中国挺直腰板的战
略性抉择)," Contemporary China History Studies (当代中国史研究) 2(2005). 
528Jeffrey Lewis, "China's Nuclear Idiosyncrasies and Their Challenges," in Proliferation Papers, No. 
47(2013). 
529Xiaoping (邓小平) Deng, "Selected Writings of Deng Xiaoping, Volume Iii (邓小平文选 (第三
卷)),"(Beijing, China, Central Literature Publishing House (中央文献出版社): Editorial Committee on Party 
Literature of the Central Committee (中共中央文献编委会), 1994). 
530Kristensen and Norris, "Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2013." 
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decision making on ballistic missile defense to their weak missile capability and their 
lack of technological prowess over missile defense.531 The ultimate lesson that they drew 
from this experience was that “reliable penetration tactics and countermeasure capability 
[are] the foundation of China’s diplomatic negotiations.”532 
This perception is shared widely across the Chinese nuclear community. Liu Huaqiu, a 
top Chinese arms control expert and a long-term participant of U.S.-Chinese nuclear 
dialogues, summarizes it as such: “I think it is true that China has been passive on arms 
control issues. This is because China’s nuclear capability is relatively underdeveloped 
(compared to other nuclear weapons states). The post–World War II history has made it 
clear that the countries that can seize the initiative of international arms control are 
always those that get ahead in the development of military capability.”533According to a 
similar logic, many Chinese experts argue that to catch up technologically with other 
countries and to develop advanced military technology are objectives in themselves 
because, according to them, “advanced technology is also an important strategic 
deterrence resource.”534 
Norms and China’s Nuclear Arms Control Policy 
Moral principles used to be a very important consideration behind China’s nuclear policy. 
China believed in the power of moral constraints over countries’ nuclear policies in 
general—not simply over its own nuclear policy. Chinese experts pointed out that 
531Wang and Guo, "China's Missile Defense Challenges U.S. "Nuclear Hegemony" (中国反导冲击美国“核
霸权”)." 
532Zhao, "Analysis of U.S. Missile Defense Plan and China's National Security (美国导弹防御计划与中国
国家安全分析)." 
533Liu, "Analysis of China's Nuclear Arms Control Policy (中国核军控政策评析)." 
534Tianfu (武天富) Wu, "Understanding China's Missile Defense Interception Test Technology (中国反导
拦截技术试验解读)," Outlook (瞭望), no. 03 (2010). 
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Chinese leaders very much appreciated the power of nuclear taboo in influencing a 
country’s nuclear policy-making. Mao Zedong, for instance, spoke forthrightly about the 
limited role of nuclear weapons: “Some fools are still talking about (using) nuclear 
weapon, but it will never be used again. The nuclear explosion in Japan at the same time 
destroyed (the nuclear weapon) itself, because people all over the world are against its 
use.”535 Mao believed that even the “imperialists” in the United States would not be able 
to bear the huge moral burdens of using nuclear weapons again because of the 
extraordinary destructive power of nuclear weapons that had been shown in Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. After a very long time since China’s first nuclear explosion, China seemed 
relatively comfortable with possessing a very weak and vulnerable nuclear force. This is 
also at least partly due to the Chinese faith in the influence of the so-called nuclear taboo 
that they believed would effectively deter the United States from launching a nuclear first 
strike against China.536 
The Chinese subscription to the moral constraints of nuclear weapons also greatly 
influenced Beijing’s nuclear policy-making. China’s unconditional No First Use policy 
was made at the very beginning of its possession of nuclear capability largely out of 
political and moral concerns rather than strategic calculations.537 China’s pledge that it 
would never use nuclear weapons against any nonnuclear weapons states was made at the 
535Yin and Huang, A Century's Review: A Global History of Atomic Weapons (世纪回眸: 世界原子弹风云
录). 
536Li and Xiao, "Rethinking the Role of Nuclear Weapons (重审核武器的作用)."; Riqiang (吴日强) Wu, 
"Just War, Nuclear Taboo and Nuclear-Weapon-Free World (正义战争、核禁忌与无核武器世界)," 
World Economics and Politics (世界经济与政治), no. 10 (2009). 
537Li and Nie, "A Study of Sino-U.S. Strategic Stability (中美战略稳定性的考察)." 
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same time and for similar reasons.538 These pledges were later proven not to be empty 
diplomatic rhetoric. It has actually trained its nuclear forces to act in full accordance with 
its assigned task —to conduct nuclear retaliatory strikes in environments and situations 
when it has been attacked with nuclear weapons first.539 There does not seem to have 
been serious debate in China over whether it should consider using nuclear weapons first. 
The Chinese nuclear community seems to have a firm understanding about nuclear taboo 
and to have raised moral concerns for their reason to reject a first-use policy.540 
Other examples of China’s response to moral or normative requirements include China’s 
sensitivity to the normative demands of developing countries in supporting nuclear 
weapon-free zones. For a very long time, China disliked its de facto membership in one 
of the nuclear “haves.” It employed policies (such as No First Use and negative security 
assurance) to separate itself from other nuclear weapons states and identified itself with 
most nonaligned-movement countries and developing countries.541 After the Chinese-
Soviet split in 1960, China essentially isolated itself from involvement in any 
international discussion on nuclear issues for almost two decades. But as many Latin 
American countries began to ask for the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in 
Latin America, China felt the need to respond. China was the first among the P-5 to sign 
Protocol Number 2 to the Treaty of Tlatelolco for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 
538Xiangli (孙向丽) Sun, "Features and Characteristics of China's Nuclear Strategy (中国核战略性质与特
点分析)," ibid., no. 9 (2006). 
539Fravel and Medeiros, "China's Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy 
and Force Structure." 
540He, "On China's Nuclear Policy of Not Using Nuclear Weapons First (论中国“不首先使用核武器”的
核战略)."; Yu (荣予) Rong, "An Discussion About Promoting an International Institution on No First Use of 
Nuclear Weapons (关于推动“不首先使用核武器”国际机制的探讨)," Peace and Development (和平
与发展), no. 6 (2009). 
541Jing-Dong Yuan, "Culture Matters: Chinese Approaches to Arms Control and Disarmament," in Culture 




                                                            
Latin America and the Caribbean on August 21, 1973. As nuclear weapon-free zones 
became increasingly popular among most developing countries, China has since then 
become very active in supporting the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones across 
the world and has been the most vocal supporter among the P-5, even during the times 
when it had no other interaction with the international community on nuclear issues.542 
The importance of normative consideration in China’s nuclear policy-making was also 
reflected in its attitudes toward the Partial Test Ban Treaty. The Partial Test Ban Treaty 
in 1963 prohibited the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space, and 
under water. China saw this treaty as highly discriminative and as an effort by the nuclear 
superpowers—i.e. the United States and the Soviet Union—to deprive the legitimate right 
of other countries to develop similar capabilities. China’s moral recrimination against this 
“unfair” treaty was so strong that it did not publicly declare it had already stopped 
atmospheric testing in 1981 and had been fulfilling the obligations under the treaty since. 
Only after China’s political attitudes toward the treaty began to change a few years later, 
in 1986, did China openly admit that it had already stopped atmospheric testing in 
1981.543 
However, whether the importance of normative consideration in China’s nuclear policy-
making has kept at the same level or has decreased, particularly in recent decades, is 
difficult to accurately evaluate. But there is some evidence suggesting that normative 
542Zhu, "The Evolution of China's Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy."; Hui (李慧) Li, "China's Participation in 
International Nuclear Nonproliferation Institutions: From the Perspective of National Identity (从国家身
份视角看中国参与国际核不扩散机制)," Theoretical Perspective (理论视野), no. 9 (2009). 
543Baogen (周宝根） Zhou, "China and Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: A Constructivist Analysis 




                                                            
consideration may have become slightly less important in recent decades. Since the late 
1980s and early 1990s, Chinese foreign policy experts, especially those with extensive 
overseas experience from Western countries, began to argue that China should abandon 
its traditional priority in defending the “overall benefits of all working people in all 
countries.”544 Between 1949 and the 1980s, promoting internationalism had always been 
a key element of China’s foreign policy, and it was viewed as shameful to prioritize 
China’s own national interests over the interests of other “brother countries.” It was only 
in the early 1990s that this ideology-driven view began to change and a new thinking was 
accepted that defending China’s own national interests should be the sole priority and the 
starting point of China’s foreign policy.545 
This adjustment of the definition of national interests, which is more in line with 
mainstream Western political thinking, has been gradually accepted by the Chinese 
nuclear community as well. The emphasis on moral or normative considerations in 
nuclear policy discussions seems to have decreased, and the nuclear community has 
become increasingly comfortable with the realist perspective of policy analysis that 
focuses on maximizing material interests through cost-benefit calculations. At the same 
time, the George W. Bush administration initiated new efforts to develop new low-yield 
tactical nuclear weapons such as the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator or the Reliable 
544Xuetong (阎学通) Yan, Analysis of China's National Interests (中国国家利益分析)(Tianjin People's 
Publishing House (天津人民出版社), 1997). 
545Ibid.; Shuyong (郭树永) Guo, "International Institution Integration and National Interests: A Historical 
Analysis of China's Foreign Policy (国际制度的融入与国家利益——中国外交的一种历史分析)," World 
Economics and Politics (世界经济与政治) 4(1999). 
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Replacement Warhead.546 The Chinese nuclear community conducted extensive research 
on these U.S. programs and concluded these were evidence of U.S. motivation to break 
the established nuclear taboo and to introduce small low-yield tactical nuclear weapons 
that would be suitable for warfighting on the battlefield.547 
Such new development took place right after the U.S. Senate rejection of the CTBT in 
1999, the U.S. decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 and 
the U.S. “militarization of space” by developing ballistic missile defense systems. All 
these developments contributed to China becoming disillusioned with international 
nuclear arms control norms.548 As a result, there is even less evidence for shared 
normative considerations between the United States and China on nuclear arms control 
issues. 
  
546Jonathan Medalia, "" Bunker Busters": Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Issues, Fy2005 and Fy2006" 
(2005); Robert W Nelson, "Nuclear Bunker Busters, Mini-Nukes, and the Us Nuclear Stockpile," Physics 
Today 56, no. 11 (2003). 
547Huaqiu (刘华秋) Liu, "The Evolution of U.S. Nuclear Bunk Buster Program (美国核钻地弹计划的来龙
去脉)," Modern Military (现代军事) 1(2006); Wensheng (李文盛) Li and Tao (梅涛) Mei, "An Overview of 
the U.S. Development of New Nuclear Bunk Busters (美国发展新型核钻地弹面面观)," ibid.8(2001). 
548lide (葛立德) Ge, "Withdrawal of the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the 
Prospect for the Development of Strategic Missile Defense System (美国退出《反导条约》及战略反导
系统的发展前景)," World Economics and Politics (世界经济与政治), no. 4 (2002); Qiangguo (朱强国) Zhu, 
"Reasons for the U.S. Withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and Its Hidden Strategic Intention 
(美国退出《反导条约》的动因及潜藏的战略意图)," Journal of Foreign Affairs College (外交学院学报), 
no. 1 (2005). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
LONG-TERM OPERATIONAL-LEVEL ENGAGEMENT: NUCLEAR 
NONPROLIFERATION 
 
The United States and China have conducted an extensive set of engagement programs at 
the operational level on nuclear nonproliferation issues since the 1980s. This constitutes 
another case of long-term operational-level engagement between the two countries as 
these programs took place on a regular basis over more than three decades. Various 
dialogues, exchanges, visits, and training programs were held to promote in-depth 
bilateral discussion on nuclear nonproliferation. 
Chinese thinking on nonproliferation issues was quite different from mainstream 
proliferation pessimists’ thinking. It was their long-held view that proliferation by 
“peace-loving countries” contributed to peace and stability. However, long-term 
engagement managed to promote a bottom-up change of perception, which started with 
the Chinese nuclear community and ultimately influenced the perception of the top 
leadership. China recognized the danger of nuclear proliferation and began to see its 
interests in line with those of the United States. Moreover, training programs provided by 
U.S. organizations greatly improved China’s technical capacity to implement 
nonproliferation and export control commitments. New common interests were identified 
during the process but perception of common moral/normative principles faded. 
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This chapter reviews the development of major engagement programs on issues related to 
nuclear nonproliferation. It traces the building of technical capacity and change of 
perception within the Chinese nuclear community as a result of such engagement. It 
analyzes whether and how this perception change at the operational level was able to 
influence top-leadership thinking and ultimately change China’s official policy regarding 
nonproliferation. On the issue of strategic trust, it finds that perception change and 
capacity building led the two countries to find new common interests with each other. 
However, engagement was not able to change Chinese perception about moral/normative 
principles behind U.S nonproliferation policy. To the contrary, China attaches less 
importance to moral/normative considerations in its nonproliferation policy thinking, 
believing this is what the United States has been doing. Moralistic trust was not built as a 
result. 
Operational-Level Engagement 
U.S.-China Arms Control Technical Exchange Program 
The U.S.-China Arms Control Technical Exchange Program (ACE) not only served as a 
very useful communication channel for American and Chinese nuclear scientists to 
discuss issues related to CTBT (as discussed in chapter two), but it also played a major 
role in promoting bilateral discussions on nonproliferation issues. Under the ACE 
program, a series of workshops was organized other with the Chinese Academy of 
Engineering Physics on subjects such as nuclear materials protection, control, and 
accounting; export controls; atmospheric modeling; and technical issues related to the 
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fissile material cutoff treaty.549 An important part of the ACE program was the U.S.-
China Integrated Demonstration of Nuclear Materials Protection, Control and Accounting 
(MPC&A), which was started in July 1998.550 This joint demonstration between the three 
U.S. national labs and the China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) took place at the 
CIAE’s Laboratory for Nuclear Safeguards in Beijing. It exhibited some of the most 
important and advanced nuclear materials safeguard systems, technologies, and 
equipment.551 Nuclear scientists from LANL, LLNL, SNL, and CAEP also worked 
together on a project that ultimately led to the publication of a bilingual primer on the 
technical issues related to nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting. 
One of the workshops jointly organized by LANL, SNL, and CAEP in 1997 was about 
the role of U.S. scientists in the control of nuclear technologies. The main purpose of this 
workshop was to introduce to the Chinese nuclear scientists how the American scientists 
at the national labs have been helping the U.S. government to design and implement 
nuclear nonproliferation institutions. Experts from LANL and SNL also explained to their 
Chinese colleagues what an important role they could play in helping the Chinese 
government to improve its nuclear nonproliferation policy and increase its capability to 
achieve nonproliferation objectives. According to Nancy Prindle, then project manager 
for the China Programs in SNL’s International Security Initiatives Department, 
discussion at the workshop included the following issues: the evolution of international 
committees and control lists, the role of U.S. nuclear scientists in international and 
549Marco Di Capua, "The Cox Report and the Us-China Arms Control Technical Exchange Program," 
September 1(1999). 
550Ibid. 




                                                            
domestic efforts to decide what to control and how, the role of scientists in reviewing 
export licenses and in training customs officials, the process for reaching internal 
technical consensus, and the control of international scientific interactions.552 
Bilateral Training Programs 
U.S.-China Arms Control Technical Exchange Program 
The U.S.-China Arms Control Technical Exchange Program (ACE) was primarily 
attended by senior American and Chinese nuclear scientists, but it paid special attention 
to cultivating the growth of next-generation Chinese scientists who would become 
interested in and familiar with nuclear nonproliferation issues. The need to encourage 
young scientists to work together with senior experts was very much recognized by both 
U.S. and Chinese organizers. As a result, a group of junior Chinese scientists was 
selected to participate in the ACE program.553 Li Bin and Zhang Hui were notable young 
participants in this program and later became leading experts on nuclear nonproliferation 
and arms control issues. 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies Exchange and Training Programs 
The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of 
International Studies is the largest nongovernmental organization in the United States 
devoted to research and training on nonproliferation issues. Since 1991, following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Newly Independent States, 
CNS started the Visiting Fellows Program to offer visiting fellows nonproliferation 
552Nancy Prindle, "U.S.-China Lab-to-Lab Technical Exchange Program," ibid., no. Spring-Summer (1998). 
553Capua, "The Cox Report and the Us-China Arms Control Technical Exchange Program." 
235 
 
                                                            
training at the grassroots level and to help raise awareness and promote a deeper 
understanding of the nonproliferation regime and nonproliferation values.554 In the first 
few years, this Visiting Fellows Program focused mostly on the Newly Independent 
States, but in 1996 CNS took a significant step in expanding the program beyond the 
Newly Independent States by establishing the Asia Export Control Fellows Program. The 
majority of this program’s participants actually came from China, including young and 
midcareer professionals from the Chinese foreign ministry, China customs, and a large 
number of research institutes and universities. 
As the goal of this program was to build and expand a community of policy makers, 
experts, and educators through education, training, and outreach activities, the program 
provided these visiting fellows with research, training, dialogue, capacity building, and 
networking opportunities during their three- to four-month fellowship at Monterey.555 
The lecture series of this training program included an introduction to nonproliferation 
threats, nonproliferation regimes, implementation of nonproliferation regulations, and 
discussion of regional nonproliferation issues. The participants usually took a six-week 
training course at CNS, a two-week training course at the Center for International Trade 
and Security at the University of Georgia, and a one-week roundtable with export control 
practitioners in Washington. Through this program, CNS developed a close working 
relationship with various Chinese governmental and nongovernmental organizations in 
554Margarita Sevcik, "Cns Visiting Fellows Program: Concept of Significant Learning Experience in 
Nonproliferation Training " (paper presented at the Isa's 49th Annual Convention, Bridging Multiple 
Divides, San Francisco, CA, 2008). 
555Robert Shaw, "The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies: Export Control Outreach 
Activities in the Asian Region" (paper presented at the 21st Asian Export Control Seminar, Tokyo, Japan, 
February 26-28, 2014). 
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the field of nuclear nonproliferation, especially the Department of Arms Control and 
Disarmament of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
In addition, the CNS organized special training programs geared toward specific groups 
of policy professionals. One example was the China-Washington Intensive 
Nonproliferation Seminar (WINS). This program brought Chinese officials, experts, and 
military officers to Washington, DC, to visit government agencies that contribute to 
nonproliferation policy-making such as the State, Energy, Defense, and Commerce 
Departments and to conduct informal discussions with their American counterparts on 
nonproliferation, arms control, and regional security issues.  
The Train the Trainer Initiative was another important program that the CNS organized to 
promote the growth of a nonproliferation expert community in China. This initiative 
provided training and course materials to Chinese university professors to help them train 
China’s nonproliferation and arms control specialists. Workshops were held in Chinese to 
help the participants develop introductory arms control and nonproliferation courses, to 
provide them with teaching materials (in Chinese and English) for new courses or to be 
incorporated in existing courses, and to train them to use the course materials.556 CNS 
was also instrumental in starting the Tsinghua University Summer Symposium on Arms 
Control by sending experts to give lectures at the symposium—the first seminar in China 
to have participants from a broad range of government and nongovernmental 
organizations and to focus exclusively on arms control and nonproliferation issues. 




                                                            
The CNS paid particular attention to training Chinese export control specialists. Its 
Export Control Fellows Program for Chinese Officials hosts four to six fellows every 
year from China’s export control system for an intensive summer program that focuses 
on strategic trade controls.557 The participants come from different agencies in China’s 
export control system and Chinese universities. Besides this program for Chinese export 
control officials, the CNS also has the relatively new Industry Fellows Program, which 
focuses on training export control practitioners in industry.558 
Center for International Trade and Security Exchange and Training Programs 
The Center for International Trade and Security (CITS) at the University of Georgia has a 
special focus on developing nonproliferation training programs in collaboration with 
Chinese nonproliferation and export control organizations. CITS hosts two annual 
training programs on China. One is an annual executive training in the United States for 
Chinese industry representatives on strategic trade control and business administration. 
The second is the Ministry of Commerce Fellowship program. Each year Chinese 
government representatives from licensing agencies come to CITS for specific trainings 
on export control. Participants from both training programs also have opportunities to 
have visits and meetings with U.S. policy makers and industry executives to exchange 
ideas and share best practices. 
The CITS also organized two industry outreach events in China every year in addition to 
a number of training programs for corporations. The Chinese co-organizers include the 
557"East Asia Nonproliferation Program," James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) 
http://www.nonproliferation.org/about-2/programs/east-asia/. 




                                                            
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the Chinese Academy of International Trade and 
Economic Cooperation (商务部国际贸易经济合作研究院), the State Nuclear Security 
Technology Center (国家核安保技术中心), and China Arms Control and Disarmament 
Association. The American instructors come from not only CITS but also from U.S. 
government agencies and corporations. The CITS has also been in cooperation with 
Chinese organizations such as the Central Finance and Economics University and China 
Reform Forum through the U.S. China New Relationship Colloquium to study economic 
and security issues and provide policy recommendations. Table 12 summarizes the 




Table 12 CITS’s China Exchanges and Training Programs and Its Chinese Partners 
Chinese Partners Areas of Exchanges and Trainings 
Ministry of 
Commerce 
Sponsored CITS workshops in China; every year sends 
Chinese government officials to study with CITS in Athens 
and Washingtonas MOFCOM Fellows 




Training programs for Chinese corporations 
China Arms Control 
and Disarmament 
Association 
US-China Working Group on Strategic Trade; collaboration 
on industry outreach 
China Foreign 
Affairs University 




Employee training on strategic trade control; co-development 









US-China Working Group on Strategic Trade; collaboration 
on industry outreach 
Tsinghua University Cooperation in CITS workshops and industry outreach 
Fudan University Hosts CITS’ visits; cooperation in lecture series 
 
The CITS’s training programs and outreach activities have greatly helped raise awareness 
of Chinese corporations about the importance of nonproliferation and export control 
issues. Many of the defense companies that have received training from CITS begin to set 
up dedicated programs on export oversight and reviews. For instance, the China North 
Industries Corporation (北方工业公司, English name: Norinco), one of China’s biggest 
defense manufacturing and trade companies, has become interested in recent years to 
240 
 
sponsor next-generation training and exchange programs to provide opportunities for 
next-generation scholars to study nonproliferation and export control issues and to 
network with international business leaders and officials on security policy 
discussions.559 
U.S.-Chinese Engagement at Multilateral Dialogues 
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Meetings 
The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) was established in 
1993 as a nongovernmental process that promotes and organizes Track II dialogues in the 
Asia Pacific region on security issues. The U.S. think tank Pacific Forum played a 
leading role in the formation of CSCAP and also manages the U.S. committee 
(USCSCAP). CSCAP has member committees in almost all the countries in the region 
including the United States, China, Japan, Australia, South Korea, North Korea, Canada, 
and all of the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries, among others. 
CSCAP has several study groups to address some of the most pressing security issues in 
the region. The CSCAP Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD Study Group) and CSCAP Export Controls Experts Group 
(XCXG) are two of the most active study groups.560 American participants of these 
meetings are mostly international security scholars, analysts, corporate executives, and 
current and former government officials with expertise in Asia-Pacific security 
559"Cits in China," Center for International Trade and Security (CITS), University of Georgia 
http://cits.uga.edu/programs/china. 




                                                            
issues.561The Chinese participants are analysts, scholars, and former government and 
military officials with expertise in nonproliferation and export control issues. All of the 
American and Chinese participants attended the meetings in a private capacity, but many 
of them have close connections with their governments through organizational affiliations 
and personal ties. For instance, frequent Chinese participants included retired admiral 
Yang Yi and experts such as Su Hao and Wang Haihan who work for the Foreign 
Ministry’s think tank. The CSCAP general conferences and study group meetings have 
provided opportunities for these experts to conduct extensive exchanges on WMD 
nonproliferation and export control issues not only in the Asia-Pacific region but also in 
the U.S.-Chinese bilateral context. Tables 13 and 14 summarize the WMD Study Group 
and XCXG meetings in the last decade. 
  
561"U.S. Member Committee (Uscscap), Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (Cscap)," 
(Honolulu: Pacific Forum, CSIS). 
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Table 13 Meetings of the CSCAP Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Study Group) since 2005 
 
Date of Study Group Meeting Place of Meeting 
27-28 May 2005 Singapore 
2-3 December 2005 Manila, Philippines 
26-27 March 2006 Singapore 
27-29 November 2006 Danang, Vietnam 
11-13 February 2007 San Francisco, USA 
9-10 December 2007 Jakarta, Indonesia 
26-27 May 2008 Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam 
23-24 January 2009 Bangkok, Thailand 
29-30 June 2009 Beijing, China 
7-8 December 2009 Hanoi, Vietnam 
2-3 July 2010 Singapore 
16-17 December 2010 Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam 
21-22 February 2011 Las Vegas, USA 
18-19 November 2011 Hanoi, Vietnam 
6-7 March 2012 Sydney, Australia 
6-8 November 2012 Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam 
2-3 June 2013 Manila, Philippines 
 
Table 14 Meetings of the CSCAP Export Controls Experts Group (XCXG) since 2005 
Date of Study Group Meeting Place of Meeting 
7-8 November 2005 Tokyo, Japan 
11-12 May 2006 Beijing, China 
9-10 February 2007 Tokyo, Japan 
25-26 August 2008 Manila, Philippines 
9-10 December 2009 Hanoi, Vietnam 
23-24 October 2012 Manila, Philippines 
 
The meetings have helped the participants to obtain better knowledge of one another’s 
thinking behind their respective policies and to build common understanding on specific 
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policy issues. On one of the recent meetings, for example, participants clarified their 
different understanding regarding UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which focuses 
on non-state actors. It does not impose penalties for noncompliance and other UN 
sanctions resolutions, which mostly focus on national states and contain articles for 
noncompliance penalties. The participants were also able to jointly draft a memorandum 
that establishes principles and recommends measures for better implementation of 
Resolution 1540.562 The issues discussed at the earlier meetings were very general and 
conceptual such as global nonproliferation order and nonproliferation norm.563 The 
participants were able to point out concerns such as the need to adapt nonproliferation 
norms to the unique characteristics of the Asia-Pacific region but usually could not agree 
on what specific steps to take.564 As the meetings continued, the issues discussed became 
increasingly in-depth and specific and participants were able to reach agreement on a 
wider range of substantive policy issues such as fissile material management and nuclear 
security, regulatory framework and control list in strategic good management, and 
transshipment points and foreign trade zones in export control.565 The common 
understandings reached at these study group meetings also feed into official-level 
562"17th Meeting of the Cscap Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (Wmd): Chairman's Report," (The Peninsula Manila, Manila, Philippines: Council for Security 
Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) ). 
563"Chairman's Report of the First Meeting of the Cscap Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction," (Singapore: Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific May 27-28 
2005); "Second Meeting of the Cscap Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction," (Manila, Philippines: Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific December 2-3 2005). 
564"Chairman's Report of the First Meeting of the Cscap Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction." 
565"17th Meeting of the Cscap Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (Wmd): Chairman's Report."; "Meeting of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-
Pacific (Cscap) on Managing Trade of Strategic Goods and Technologies: Chairman's Report," (New World 




                                                            
meetings such as the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament (ARF ISM/NPD)566 
Community Expansion and Capacity Building 
American organizations and institutes played a significant role in building and growing 
China’s nuclear nonproliferation specialists community. U.S. foundations and 
organizations provided funding for a large number of Chinese training programs on 
nuclear nonproliferation and provided important experts with support for these training 
programs. The Tsinghua University Summer Symposium on Arms Control, for example, 
was fully funded by the Ford Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the MacArthur 
Foundation. The CNS, CITS, and Union of Concerned Scientists sent many experts to 
give lectures and provide training at these symposia. The Summer Symposium was the 
first in China to have a heavy focus on nonproliferation issues. It provided a 
comprehensive introduction to nonproliferation issues to a large number of young 
Chinese experts and analysts from all the major government agencies, research institutes, 
and universities. There were also site visits to government agencies that are responsible 
for China’s nonproliferation policy-making or policy implementation, which provided 
opportunities for the participants to build connections and helped to break bureaucratic 
barriers among these relatively isolated agencies. 
U.S. government agencies, particularly the Department of Commerce, have also played 
an important role in developing and sponsoring operational-level training programs on 
nonproliferation in China. The U.S. Department of Commerce and MOFCOM co-
566"17th Meeting of the Cscap Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (Wmd): Chairman's Report." 
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organized bilateral conferences on export controls. They also held joint U.S.-China 
Customs seminars on WMD export controls. This was attended by Chinese customs 
officials who then went to the United States for training on WMD export control 
issues.567 
Such U.S.-initiated and sponsored training programs have proved very effective in raising 
interest and attention in Chinese government on improving their bureaucratic capacity to 
make and implement nonproliferation policies. Since the early 2000s, the Chinese 
government has been active in developing and sponsoring its own training programs. As 
the Ministry of Commerce takes the lead, a number of Chinese government agencies and 
nongovernmental organizations have sponsored and organized a variety of training 
programs. COSTIND, China Atomic Energy Agency (CAEA), and China General 
Administration of Customs have all played important roles in these training programs that 
are primarily aimed at educating Chinese local government officials and corporate 
officials on relevant laws and regulations over nuclear nonproliferation. In 2003, 
MOFCOM organized the first nationwide WMD export control seminar, which was 
attended by local officials from MOFCOM’s provincial departments. Additional 
provincial-level seminars have also been held. 
COSTIND, whose subordinate organizations have been heavily involved in various U.S.-
China nuclear dialogues, is also a very active actor in promoting nonproliferation 
education and training in China. It convenes seminars on China’s nonproliferation 
policies and regulations and invites officials from other government agencies to give 
567Evan S Medeiros, Chasing the Dragon: Assessing China's System of Export Controls for Wmd-Related 
Goods and Technologies(Rand Corporation, 2005). 
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lectures and presentations. Since COSTIND coordinates the operation of many Chinese 
defense industry companies, it is in a good strategic position to reach out to China’s 
defense industry on nonproliferation education. COSTIND also has a large number of 
offices and bureaus at various levels of the local government, which also play an 
important role in raising awareness on nonproliferation among local defense enterprises 
and provide them with nonproliferation training. 
The training programs raised attention in recent years in major state-owned enterprises, 
which began to dedicate specific offices and personnel to handle the issue of 
nonproliferation and export control. The China North Industries Corporation, for example, 
has established a small export-control research bureau within its Systems Research 
Institute.568 This bureau conducts research about the role of industry in the American 
export control system and provides recommendations for improving the company’s own 
export review and control procedures. The company also set up an Export Control 
Committee and an Export Control Office that has a veto power over export decisions. It 
incorporates an automatic screening mechanism into its export review procedure by 
establishing three internal review databases, including the sensitive countries database, 
the sensitive clients database, and the sensitive products database. The Export Control 
Office organizes various training programs for its employees at different levels and seeks 
regular consultation with relevant Chinese government agencies, nongovernmental 
organizations, and individual nonproliferation experts for information and advice.569 The 
existence of nonproliferation education, training, and implementation programs at the 
568Ibid. 
569Yulin (植玉林) Zhi, "Principles of Nonproliferation Export Control and Internal Export Self-Regulation 




                                                            
company level indicates a further deepening and broadening of China’s nonproliferation 
capacity building. It is now a common understanding within these companies that it is not 
only their obligation and responsibility under the law to strictly implement the 
government’s export control policies but also a crucial precondition for them to win 
international reputation and credibility and to sustain their global market.570 
U.S.-Chinese nuclear exchanges also helped China build its capacity on nuclear 
nonproliferation-related technology development. The China Institute of Atomic Energy 
(CIAE), for example, was among the first Chinese civilian nuclear energy research 
institutes to be involved in U.S.-Chinese nuclear exchanges. Since 1984, a number of 
nuclear scientists from CIAE were trained in Los Alamos National Laboratory to develop 
nuclear measurement instrumentation and safeguards systems technologies that would 
help support China’s implementation of its nonproliferation commitments. 
Such technical training and cooperation interaction was supported by the U.S. 
Department of Energy. Under this bilateral program, Chinese scientists and officials were 
invited to attend the DOE State Systems of Accounting and Control (SSAC) course. 
Chinese safeguard scientists were also invited for long-term visits (one to two years) at 
Los Alamos in the safeguards assay and the safeguards systems groups in the 
Nonproliferation and International Security Division. During their visits, Chinese 
scientists studied and worked on nondestructive assay (NDA) instrumentation and 
systems techniques that were used by IAEA inspectors. Some Chinese scientists also 
spent time at the Brookhaven National Laboratory. In addition, this program provided 
570 Personal correspondence with export control officers from Chinese defense manufacture and trade 
companies, 2012, 2013. 
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visiting Chinese scientists with opportunities to participate in technical conferences such 
as the annual meetings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM).571 
In reciprocity, U.S. nuclear safeguards experts paid visits to China and interacted with a 
large number of Chinese nuclear institutes. They gave lectures and presentations and held 
discussions on nuclear materials control and accountability, nondestructive assay 
safeguards instrumentation, and IAEA safeguards. Chinese scientists from CIAE, the 
Beijing Institute of Nuclear Engineering (BINE), and officials from the Government 
Safeguards Office participated in these extensive exchanges and discussions. Table 15 
provides a summary of the major visits and exchanges between Los Alamos and Chinese 
scientists during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
  
571George W. Eccleston, "Summary of Safeguards Interactions between Los Alamos and Chinese 
Scientists,"(Los Alamos National Laboratory Report, LA-UR 94-1395, April 20, 1994). 
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Table 15 Major Visits and Exchanges between Los Alamos and Chinese Scientists during 
the Late 1980s and Early 1990s572 
 
Time Highlight of Activities 
September 1984 G. R. Keepin visited China as a member of 
an INMM delegation. Chinese expressed 
interest in participating in a DOE-SSAC 
training course. 
June 1985 H. Zhuang and Jiang Jincai were the first 
Chinese attendees at the SSAC course held 
in Santa Fe, NM, and San Clement, CA 
September 1986 As a result of SSAC attendance, Arnie 
Hakkila presented an invited lecture on 
destructive analysis for safeguards at the 
International Conference on Nuclear 
Radiochemistry in Beijing, China 
Fall 1987 Professor Sun Zuxun, President of the 
Institute of Atomic Energy, visits Los 
Alamos. As part of the visit, Sun discussed 
technical exchanges on safeguards between 
Los Alamos and CIAE. (In 1983, Sun had 
previously spent a year in Los Alamos as a 
visiting scientist at Los Alamos Meson 
Physics Facility.) 
April 1987 Professor Zhu Rongbao, Z. Q. Luo, and W. 
Wang attended the DOE SSAC course in 
Santa Fe, Los Alamos, and Richland, WA. 
September 1987 Dr. T. K. Li and Mr. W. Kirk from Los 
Alamos participated in the 6th Pacific Basin 
Conference on Nuclear Energy in Beijing. 
During the visit Dr. Li presented lectures on 
safeguards NDA to CIAE scientists. He 
also visited the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences in Beijing to discuss application of 
nuclear detection techniques. 
September 1987 – March 1988 Professor Zhu spent 19 months in the 
United States, first visiting Brookhaven and 
then Los Alamos. At LANL, Zhu 
concentrated on NDA physics for 
safeguards. He established an NDA 





                                                            
Table 15continued: 
May 1989 Mr. L. Yang and Mr. D. Yang participated 
in the DOE SSAC course in Santa Fe, Los 
Alamos, and Richland, WA. 
May 1989 – June 1991 Professor Qiao visited Los Alamos for two 
years to learn safeguards NDA technology. 
He became the deputy group leader for 
safeguards NDA when he returned to 
CIAE. 
November 1989 – December 1989 Dr. Howard Menlove, Los Alamos Fellow, 
visited CIAE for six weeks as an IAEA 
Fellow to provide lectures and to assist the 
Chinese in safeguards NDA 
instrumentation development. 
November 1990 Dr. Hakkila lectured on safeguards systems 
design and safeguards for reprocessing 
plants. He visited Qinshan nuclear power 
plant and discussed the implications of 
IAEA safeguards on the power station. 
May 1991 Mr. Jiang Zhu, Q. Liu, and H. Wang 
participated in the DOE SSAC course in 
Santa Fe, Los Alamos, and Richland, WA. 
November 1991 Dr. R. Augustson visited China as an 
invited lecturer on the design and 
application of NDA instrumentation to 
safeguards. 
May 1991 – January 1992 Mr. Jiang Jincai visited Los Alamos to 
learn safeguards systems design 
methodology. The Los Alamos MAWST 
code for statistical evaluation of safeguards 
data was provided to the CIAE as part of 
this visit. Mr. Jiang returned to the United 
States in 1992 as a student at Texas A&M 
working toward a PhD in nuclear 
engineering. 
May 1992 Dr. Hsue from Los Alamos attended the 
Pacific Basin Conference on Nuclear 
Energy in Beijing. Following the 
conference he visited the CIAE and 
presented lectures on safeguards and NDA 
instrumentation. 
January 1993 - 1994 Mr. Yang visited Los Alamos studying 
NDA methods for safeguards applications. 
June 1994 Dr. Eccleston visited CIAE with John 
Rooney and provided a series of lectures on 




Such mutual interaction had a significant impact on building China’s nuclear safeguards 
expertise. Chinese scientists laid the foundation of the safeguards program at CIAE for 
China after returning from these extended visits and exchanges at U.S. national 
laboratories. They also became China’s dominant nuclear safeguards experts. Professor 
Zhu Rongbao, for example, after returning from an eighteen-month visit and study in the 
United States, headed CIAE’s first safeguards group in 1991. This CIAE safeguards 
group later expanded to a section that had been in charge of China’s NPT compliance and 
had played an important role in advising the Chinese government on nuclear 
nonproliferation policies and safeguard issues. In 1995, CIAE set up the Technical 
Research Laboratory for Nuclear Safeguards that has been used to conduct research on 
nuclear safeguards technology, provide training on materials accounting to operators of 
Chinese nuclear facilities, and support inspections for domestic nuclear material 
control.573 Based on the training received from the United States, Chinese scientists at 
CIAE also developed a number of nondestructive assay instruments and technologies 
including the Neutron Coincidence Counter, the Active Neutron Coincidence Collar, the 
Segmented Gamma Scanner, the Delayed Neutron Shuffler, and the Hybrid Densitometer, 
which greatly contributed to China’s nuclear safeguards research and implementation 
capability. 
As was the case for nuclear arms control, U.S.-Chinese nuclear dialogues and exchanges 
also raised interest among Chinese think tanks, research institutes, and universities to pay 




                                                            
attention to studying international nuclear nonproliferation issues and China’s nuclear 
nonproliferation policies. Since the late 1980s, these Chinese experts began to rethink 
China’s traditional attitudes toward nuclear nonproliferation. They raised the dangers of 
nuclear proliferation and analyzed the potential security, foreign policy, and economic 
problems that nuclear proliferation might pose to China.574 They were the first to 
systematically introduce the international nuclear nonproliferation regime to a broad 
Chinese domestic audience.575 Their research on the U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy 
and nuclear export control system offered practical policy recommendations for Chinese 
decision makers on how to improve its domestic control over sensitive nuclear 
technology.576 
These Chinese experts established China’s first research centers on nonproliferation 
issues. The Arms Control and Nonproliferation Research Center at the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences has organized a variety of nonproliferation workshops, seminars, and 
research meetings that effectively promoted interagency communication among different 
574Zhiyong (于智勇) Yu, "Rethinking Some of the Issues Related to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (关
于《核不扩散条约》若干问题的再认识)," World Economics and Politics (世界经济与政治) 6(1988); 
Yunhua (邹云华) Zou, "Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons - an Observation on the Eve of the Fourth 
Npt Reveiw Conference (不扩散核武器——写在《不扩散核武器条约》缔约国第四次审议会议之前)," 
International Studies (国际问题研究), no. 03 (1990); Zhijian (黄志坚） Huang, "Nuclear Proliferation: An 
Issue That Is Raising Increasing International Attention (核扩散——一个日益引起世人关注的问题)," 
World Economics and Politics (世界经济与政治) 7(1992); Liping (夏立平) Xia, "An Preliminary Analysis on 
Contemporary Nuclear Proliferation in the Asian-Pacific Region (浅析当前亚太地区的核扩散)," 
International Society and Economy (国际社会与经济) 6(1994). 
575Ling (王玲) Wang, "An Introduction of the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime (国际防止核
扩散体制简介)," International Data and Information (国际资料信息) 11(1994). 
576Mingquan (朱明权) Zhu, "Preventing Nuclear Nonproliferation: The U.S. Export Control Regime and Its 
Limites (防止核扩散: 美国的出口控制机制及其局限)," Fudan Journal (Social Sciences Edition) (复旦学报：
社会科学版) 4(1993); "Another Analysis of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy of the United States: 
Dilemma and Obstacle (再论美国的防止核扩散政策: 矛盾和困境)," ibid.2(1995). 
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Chinese government agencies, industry sectors, and research institutes.577 The China 
Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA), drawing expertise from a wide 
range of Chinese organizations, has a particular focus on nonproliferation policy research 
and training. CACDA has more than thirty corporate members who are engaged in 
research on issues of international security, arms control, and nonproliferation, including 
China’s Institute of International Studies, the Chinese People’s Association for Peace and 
Disarmament, the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, and the 
Foundation for International Strategic Studies, among others. Its more than 200 
individual members include scientists and experts working in the areas of weapons 
development and nonproliferation research. Additional expertise is provided by retired 
Chinese diplomats and former military officials. CACDA has formed a task force to 
study export control practices in Western countries and to draw lessons for improving 
China’s nonproliferation and strategic trade management system.578 It also sponsors a 
very large number of seminars and workshops in China to promulgate China’s 
nonproliferation policy, law, and regulations and reaches out to China’s defense 
enterprises and civilian companies to promote nonproliferation education and improve 
export control policy implementation.579 
577Fan, "Summary of American Arms Control and Nonproliferation Policy Workshop (“美国军控与防扩
散政策研讨会”综述)."; Hengyang (李恒阳) Li, "Summary of Nuclear Security and Regional 
Nonproliferation Situation Workshop (“核安全与地区防扩散形势”研讨会综述)," ibid.2(2012). 
578Medeiros, Chasing the Dragon: Assessing China's System of Export Controls for Wmd-Related Goods and 
Technologies. 
579"Industry Nonproliferation Self-Compliance and Self-Discipline Workshop Was Held in Dalian (企业防扩
散自律合规研讨班在大连举办)," (Dalian, Liaoning: China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (中
国军控与裁军协会), Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation (商务部国际贸
易经济合作研究院), Centre for Science and Security Studies, King's College London, November 29-30, 
2012); "Arms Control and Nonproliferation Training Symposium Was Held in Beijing (军控防扩散培训班
在京召开)," China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (中国军控与裁军协会), State 
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Operational-level engagement with the United States has greatly improved the Chinese 
government’s capability to effectively carry out its nuclear nonproliferation and export 
control policies. In the 1980s, China’s bureaucratic weakness in implementing nuclear 
export control regulations greatly undermined the effectiveness of its nonproliferation 
policy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for instance, lacked appropriate technical 
expertise in understanding and implementing nonproliferation policies and usually sought 
to respond to complicated nonproliferation compliance issues through general political 
and diplomatic principles. There was also a lack of effective coordination mechanisms 
among relevant government agencies, the military, and the defense industry.580 During 
1982 to 1987, China exported more than 100 tons of heavy water to unsafeguarded 
facilities in India, which was apparently a policy mistake because China would not have 
wanted to help India—China’s primary rival in South Asia—with its nuclear weapons 
program.581 In 1995, the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC, 中国原子
能工业公司), a subsidiary company of the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC, 
中国核工业集团公司) exported about 5,000 specially designed ring magnets to an 
unsafeguarded Pakistani nuclear laboratory that was allegedly involved in  nuclear 
weapons work. It turned out that the CNEIC had arranged the sale without the full 
awareness or consent of the Chinese central government.582 
Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (国家国防科技工业局), 
http://www.cacdacn.org/a/xiehuihuodong/20111223/1299.html. 
580Zhang, China's Changing Nuclear Posture: Reactions to the South Asian Nuclear Tests. 
581"China's Nuclear Exports and Assistance to South Asia," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey 
Institute of International Studies http://cns.miis.edu/archive/country_india/china/nsaspos.htm. 
582Jing-Dong Yuan, "The Evolution of China's Nonproliferation Policy since the 1990s: Progress, Problems, 
and Prospects," Journal of Contemporary China 11, no. 31 (2002). 
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During operational-level engagement with the United States, American experts and 
policy practitioners helped their Chinese colleagues to develop a few measures to address 
their bureaucratic weakness. They helped Chinese colleagues to change their focus from 
administrative actions to a law-based legal management approach of handling export 
control issues. The Chinese government has a well-known tradition of relying on 
administrative action to implement policy and rein in sub-state actors. This was also the 
case with its original approach toward nuclear export control.583 This tradition of using 
informal administrative action rather than clearly defined and published laws and 
regulations, however, began to change, as China began to understand the advantages of 
the U.S. model of relying on export control laws to regulate sub-state actors. Chinese 
experts and analysts conducted in-depth research about the U.S. model and promoted the 
change of approach by the government.584 In recent years, the Chinese government has 
shown increasing appreciation of the importance of export control laws in managing the 
export of domestic companies and has established a number of nuclear export control 
related laws and legal regulations.585Table 16 in the next section provides a summary of 
583Hsu, "The Impact of Government Restructuring on Chinese Nuclear Arms Control and Nonproliferation 
Policymaking." 
584Taichen (刘泰尘) Liu, "The U.S. High-Tech Export Control (美国的高技术出口管制)," Contemporary 
International Relations (现代国际关系) 3(1990); Lixin (许立新) Xu, "The Legal System of China's Foreign 
Trade Management and Export Control (我国对外贸易管理与出口管制法律制度)," China's Foreign 
Trade (中国对外贸易), no. 1 (2000); Jianjun (张建军) Zhang, "A Comparative Analysis of U.S. And Chinese 
Legal System Regarding Technology Export Management (中美技术出口管理法律制度的比较研究)" 
(Northwestern University (西北大学), 2004); Zhao (赵召) Zhao, "Lessons from the U.S. Export Control 
Legal Reform (美国出口管制法律改革的启示)," Economy (经济), no. 3 (2012). 
585"Regulations of the Prc on the Control of Nuclear Dual-Use Items and Related Technologies Export (中
华人民共和国核两用品及相关技术出口管制条例)," Gazette of the State Council of the People's 
Republic of China (中华人民共和国国务院公报), no. 09 (2007); "State Council Decision to Revise the 
Regulations of the Prc on the Control of Nuclear Export (国务院关于修改《中华人民共和国核出口管制
条例》的决定)," Gazette of the Commission of Science;Technology and Industry for National Defense of 
the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国国防科学技术工业委员会文告), no. 01 (2007); 
"Regulations of the Prc on the Control of Nuclear Export (中华人民共和国核出口管制条例)," Gazette of 
the State Council of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国国务院公报), no. 01 (1997). 
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the laws and regulations established by China on nuclear-related or dual-use export 
controls in recent years. 
Through bilateral engagement, the United States was also able to persuade the Chinese to 
embrace the “catch-all” principle for export control and to adopt end-use/end-user 
controls. MOFCOM and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) had little experience in 
investigating export control violations. They usually relied on the claims submitted by 
Chinese companies regarding the end-use and end-users of the intended sales and lacked 
a tradition of healthy skepticism when reviewing export applications.586 Increased 
interactions with American trainers and policy practitioners helped Chinese officials from 
export control enforcement agencies to address the insufficiency in their investigative 
culture. Chinese officials used to rely on the information submitted by export license 
applicants for judging the proliferation risks of the exporting items. American trainers 
have encouraged Chinese officials to set up cross-checking databases and to use 
relatively sophisticated investigative methods for identifying inconsistencies in export 
applications. Chinese export reviewers learned from the American catch-all controls, 
which increased government oversight over not only items on explicit control lists but 
also dual-use items not on existing control lists but may be suspected to be intended for 
nuclear weapon end-use or end-users.587 By the early 2000s, China set up specific 
regulations regarding the proof of end-use/end-users of the intended exports. Such 
regulations require exporters to provide different types of proofs of end-use/end-users 
586Medeiros, Chasing the Dragon: Assessing China's System of Export Controls for Wmd-Related Goods and 
Technologies. 
587Dennis Krepp, "Implementing Catch All Controls: A Risk Assessment-Based Approach toward 




                                                            
according to the sensitivity of the exported items. Besides these proofs, the end-users also 
need to explicitly pledge not to use China-imported items in any purposes other than the 
certified end-use or to transfer the items to any third party without permission from the 
Chinese government.588 
The growth of China’s nuclear nonproliferation specialists community also made it 
possible for the government to tap into a pool of expertise to support its nonproliferation 
and export control decision-making. The government created a group of about two 
hundred ad hoc technical experts from various government agencies and 
nongovernmental organizations. This independent panel of technical experts provided 
technical advice and recommendations in terms of risk assessment and export application 
reviews.589 All these developments have significantly contributed to the building of a 
more systemic, better coordinated, and more technically capable nuclear nonproliferation 
and export control system. Figure 10shows China’s nuclear export control system in 2013. 
All the major organizations in this system have been greatly benefited from U.S.-Chinese 
cooperative training programs. Note that the previous Commission of Science, 
Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) was transformed into the 
State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense 
(SASTIND) and put under the administration of the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology in 1998. The organizations in grey are those that play a consulting role in the 
system.
588"China's Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures (中国的防扩散政策和措施)," (Beijing: State Council 
Information Office (国务院新闻办公室), 2003). 
589Ibid.; Medeiros, Chasing the Dragon: Assessing China's System of Export Controls for Wmd-Related 
Goods and Technologies. 
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Figure 10China’s Nuclear-Related and Dual-Use Export Control Organization Chart, 2013590
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Bottom-Up Influence and Perception Change 
In one of the workshops co-organized by Sandia National Laboratory, Los Alamos 
National Laboratory, and the China Academy of Engineering Physics, a Chinese 
participant from CAEP stated, “We now have a clear picture of the function between the 
U.S. government, labs, and technical experts.” When it came to the role of Chinese 
scientists and experts in China’s nuclear policy-making, he offered this frank observation: 
“We are the nuclear weapons experts in China who know the critical technologies; the 
government has to listen to us.”591 
When it comes to the issue of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation, it seems indeed 
the case that the Chinese nuclear community has played a critical role in introducing 
American thinking, learning, and internalizing the American model of conducting nuclear 
nonproliferation and changing the understanding and attitudes toward nuclear 
nonproliferation at the top leadership level. During this process, the various American-
sponsored and organized dialogues, exchanges, and training programs greatly contributed 
to the growth and expansion of China’s nuclear nonproliferation specialists community 
that then started the change of perception in China in a largely bottom-up process. 
Chinese fellows and graduates from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ 
nonproliferation training programs, for example, were promoted to senior positions in 
government ministries. Many of them represented China at NPT Review Conferences, 
NPT Preparatory Committee meetings, various IAEA conferences, CD meetings, and 
other high-level nonproliferation functions. 
591Prindle, "U.S.-China Lab-to-Lab Technical Exchange Program." 
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Traditional Chinese Perception toward Nuclear Nonproliferation 
There are two schools of thinking in the West about nuclear nonproliferation. One school 
believes that nuclear proliferation has a negative impact on international security and 
stability. “Because of common biases, inflexible routines, and parochial interests,” 
deterrence might fail and nuclear conflicts could break out.592 Even if nuclear weapons 
are not used in international conflicts, more countries will obtain nuclear weapons and the 
more dangerous the world will become because nuclear weapons encourage aggressive 
behavior.593 Nuclear proliferation is seen as responsible for increasing international 
tension, making it more difficult to maintain peace and stability and making 
comprehensive and complete disarmament less likely to be achieved.594 The second 
school has a more optimistic view of the consequences of nuclear proliferation. Scholars 
such as Kenneth Waltz, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, John Mearsheimer, and Stephen Van 
Evera have stronger faith in the robustness of deterrence and see proliferation contribute 
to the maintenance of peace.595 With that said the policy community in the United States 
generally embraces a more pessimistic view about nuclear proliferation and has reached a 
general consensus that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is one of the top 
592Scott D Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of 
Nuclear Weapons," International Security (1994). 
593S Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia(NUS Press, 
2009). 
594George Bunn, "The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems," Arms Control 
Today 33, no. 10 (2003); Joseph S Nye, "Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime," International 
Organization 35, no. 1 (1981); Bradley A Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime," Security Studies 4, no. 3 (1995). 
595Scott Douglas Sagan and Kenneth Neal Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate(WW Norton 
New York, 1995); Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and William H Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of 
Selective Nuclear Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no. 2 (1982); Mearsheimer, "Back to the 
Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War."; Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the 
Cold War," ibid.; Barry R Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival 35, no. 1 (1993). 
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priorities of U.S. foreign policy.596 Over the past few decades, the United States has 
played a leading role in the world in preventing nuclear proliferation. This U.S. policy is, 
however, opposite the Chinese traditional understanding of nuclear proliferation. 
Mao Zedong, the ultimate decision maker for China’s nuclear policy, had the view that 
nuclear proliferation is good for maintaining international peace and stability. He 
believed that nuclear weapons are “paper tigers” in the sense that nuclear weapons could 
not be used because of their tremendous destructive power and the humanitarian 
consequences. Any country that used nuclear weapons would become politically 
isolated.597 From the military perspective, nuclear weapons only had a very limited role 
to play on the battlefield due to their highly indiscriminate destructive power and nuclear 
weapons would not be very useful against a “people’s war.”598 Zhou Enlai had the same 
view about nuclear weapons.599 In a 1961 statement, Zhou elaborated the same view with 
Mao: “If all countries have nuclear weapons, the possibility of nuclear wars would 
decrease.”600 
With this view of nuclear weapons, China’s top leaders believed that nuclear weapons 
could only be used for coercive political purposes, and this was exactly what the nuclear 
596Paul K Kerr, 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (Npt) Review Conference: Key Issues and Implications(DIANE 
Publishing, 2011); Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues(DIANE Publishing, 2010); 
Mary Beth Nikitin, Proliferation Security Initiative (Psi)(DIANE Publishing, 2008). 
597Zedong (毛泽东) Mao, Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Foreign Relations (毛泽东外交文选)(Beijing: 
Central Documentation Press (中央文献出版社), 1994). 
598"The Situation after Winning the Anti-Japanese War and Our Policy (抗日战争胜利后的时局和我们的
方针 (1945 年 8 月 13 日))," in Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume 4 (毛泽东选集, 第 4 卷)(Beijing: 
People's Publishing House (人民出版社), 1991). 
599Enlai (周恩来) Zhou, "Launch a National-Wide Counterattack and Take Down Jiang Jieshi (全国大反攻
打倒蒋介石)," in Selected Workds of Zhou Enlai, Volume One (周恩来选集 (上卷))(Beijing: People's 
Publishing House (人民出版社), 1980). 
600Enlai (周恩来） Zhou, Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on Foreign Affairs (周恩来外交文选)(Beijing: 
Central Archives Press (中央文献出版社), 1990). 
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superpowers did toward China—use nuclear blackmail to coerce and intimidate China.601 
Nuclear proliferation was therefore regarded as a way to counter the nuclear blackmail 
from the United States, Britain, and France and to force them ultimately give up their 
nuclear weapons and nuclear coercion policy.602 In his meeting with Bernard 
Montgomery on September 24, 1961, Mao explicitly mentioned, “I am not interested in 
nuclear weapons. These things are not going to be used; the more they are made, the less 
likely that nuclear wars are going to take place. The wars ultimately have to be fought 
with conventional weapons.”603 Mao told Montgomery that China was developing 
nuclear weapons and stated, “When will we get the weapon? I don’t know. The United 
States has so many of them. They have ten fingers. Even if we ultimately get the weapon, 
we would only have one finger. This thing can only be used to intimidate people; it costs 
a lot of money, but it is not useful.” He went on to explain the Chinese motivation for 
developing nuclear weapons: “It is like the poor people, the beggars who put on a nice-
looking dress and run around to let people see.”604 
Mao’s thinking on nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation greatly influenced China’s 
official nuclear policy. From the perspective of the Chinese government, the purpose of 
nuclear weapons development was to “break the nuclear power’s nuclear monopoly.” 
Therefore, China saw its development of nuclear weapons as support for the “oppressed 
601Zedong (毛泽东) Mao, Selected Works of Mao Zedong: Volume Four (毛泽东文集: 第四卷)(Beijing: 
Central Documentation Press (中央文献出版社), 1999). 
602Jing (陈静) Chen, "An Analysis of China's Policy toward the International Nuclear Nonproliferation: 
Historical Evolution and the Future (分析中国对国际核不扩散机制的政策: 演变与未来)" (Beijing 
Language and Culture University (北京语言大学), 2008). 




                                                            
people” in the world,605 and China was against the nuclear powers’ opposition to nuclear 
proliferation, believing that it was unfair to allow nuclear weapons states to retain and 
further develop nuclear weapons but not to allow nonnuclear weapons states to develop 
nuclear weapons.606 In China’s August 15, 1963, statement, the government claimed that 
when more than one country in the world obtained nuclear weapons, the danger was 
actually “smaller, rather than bigger,” because “whether nuclear weapons contribute to 
world peace depends on in whose hands they are.”607 It also stated that “the danger of 
nuclear war is bigger if nuclear monopoly by the American imperialists and their allies is 
maintained. As long as others who oppose them also have (nuclear weapons), they would 
not be that arrogant; their nuclear blackmail and nuclear threat policy would not be that 
effective; the chances for achieving comprehensive prohibition and complete elimination 
of nuclear weapons would be larger.”608 In another statement, China claimed, “The more 
countries develop their own nuclear weapons, the more possible it is to prohibit nuclear 
weapons, and the more possible it is to delay a world war.”609 
In fact, China held such a high profile as an open opponent against the “unjust” 
international nonproliferation system, it did not care to hide its intentions to develop its 
own nuclear weapons to break the perceived nuclear monopoly. Over the several years 
605Zhu, "The Evolution of China's Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy." 
606Zhan (吴展) Wu, "Fifty Years of Nuclear Weapons (核武器的五十年)," in War and Peace: 
Commemorating the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Victory of the Anti-Fascist War and the Establishemtn of 
the United Nations (战争与和平: 纪念反法西斯战争胜利暨联合国成立五十周年), ed. Guocheng (胡国
成) Hu and Mei (赵梅) Zhao(Beijing: China Social Sciences Press (中国社会科学出版社), 1996). 
607"Statement of the Spokesperson of the Government of the People's Republic of China: A Commentary 
on the August 3 Statement of the Soviet Union Government (中华人民共和国政府发言人声明——評苏
联政府八月三日的声明)," Gazette of the State Council of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和
国国务院公报), no. 14 (1963). 
608"Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国政府声明)." 
609"A Debate on the General Direction of the International Communist Movement (关于国际共产主义运
动总路线的辩论)," (Beijing: People's Publishing House (人民出版社), 1965). 
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before China conducted its first nuclear explosion on October 16, 1964, Mao Zedong 
openly talked about China’s development of nuclear weapons with visiting foreign 
statesmen. He not only admitted to Montgomery in 1961 that China was developing 
nuclear weapons but also mentioned China’s goal of obtaining nuclear weapons with 
French, Japanese, and American visitors.610 Mao’s rather open and relaxed attitudes 
toward China’s nuclear development program also reflected his belief that nuclear 
proliferation by China and other developing countries was a contribution to world peace 
and international stability. 
China’s opposition to the international nonproliferation regime that was dominated by the 
United States and Soviet Union was also a direct result of its opposition to the two 
nuclear superpowers.611 During the Cold War, all the direct and indirect security threats 
facing China were perceived as coming from the two superpowers. Under China’s “anti-
imperialism” and “anti-hegemonism” policy, the United States and Soviet Union were 
seen as China’s primary enemies and sources of security concerns. China’s strong 
ideological opposition to these two countries added to its resistance against the 
nonproliferation initiatives and regimes backed by the United States and Soviet Union. At 
the same time, China’s self-identification with the developing countries contributed to its 
view that imperialism, hegemonism, and colonialism were the reasons of China’s 
insecurity and the world’s instability whereas an alliance with the socialist countries and 
“third-world” countries could defend their security through the construction of a “united 
front.” With “standing with the developing countries” becoming the starting point of 
610Zedong (毛泽东) Mao, Selected Works of Mao Zedong: Volume Eight (毛泽东文集: 第八卷)(Beijing: 
Central Documentation Press (中央文献出版社), 1999). 
611Chen, "An Analysis of China's Policy toward the International Nuclear Nonproliferation: Historical 
Evolution and the Future (分析中国对国际核不扩散机制的政策: 演变与未来)." 
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China’s foreign policy, China saw the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a hegemonic 
treaty and refused to join, even though the treaty recognizes China’s status as an official 
nuclear weapons state.612 
These traditional views dominated Chinese official thinking about nuclear proliferation 
for decades. Even in the 1980s and early 1990s, some of China’s top leaders were still 
highly skeptical about nonproliferation policies of the West and viewed them as 
inherently discriminatory and as a means for the “superpowers” to contain China’s 
development and to constrain China’s foreign policy goals.613 In general, the Chinese 
leadership’s view was closer to that of the proliferation optimists in the United States 
than that of the proliferation pessimists. Proliferation optimists believed nuclear weapons 
constituted a credible deterrence against the use of nuclear weapons and that nuclear 
deterrence stabilizes interstate relations and prevents wars from breaking out.614 However, 
the Chinese leaders were not completely proliferation optimists. Proliferation optimists 
believe the chances of nuclear wars ever breaking out are very low because “nuclear 
weapons are a superb deterrent.”615 By contrast, Chinese leadership believed nuclear 
wars were unlikely to take place because nuclear weapons were essentially “unusable”—
something Western scholars later summarized as the “nuclear taboo.”616 They 
612Baogen (周宝根） Zhou and Bin (李彬) Li, "Non-Military Factors in Arms Control (军备控制中的非军事
因素)," International Economic Review (国际经济评论) 5(2002). 
613Medeiros, Chasing the Dragon: Assessing China's System of Export Controls for Wmd-Related Goods and 
Technologies. 
614Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict."; Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the 
Cold War."; Peter R Lavoy, "Civil-Military Relations, Strategic Conduct, and the Stability of Nuclear 
Deterrence in South Asia," Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, 
Stanford, CA (1994). 
615Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War."; "Case for a Ukrainian 
Nuclear Deterrent, The," Foreign Aff. 72(1992). 
616Liu and Liu, "Mao Zedong's Nuclear Ethical Thought and Its Epochal Value (论毛泽东核伦理思想及其
时代价值)."; Nina Tannenwald, "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of 
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emphasized that nuclear weapons in the hands of “peace-loving countries” would 
contribute to peace and stability. The stabilizing effect of nuclear proliferation came from 
the breakdown of nuclear monopoly by the superpowers.617 
Perception Change from the Bottom Up 
The gradual change of Chinese perception toward nuclear nonproliferation took place 
largely from the bottom level. Since the 1980s, the United States has put a high priority 
on nuclear nonproliferation during operational-level engagement with China and 
extensive discussions on nuclear nonproliferation took place during these exchanges and 
dialogues. These engagement programs helped to change the perception of the Chinese 
nuclear community on nuclear nonproliferation in at least three ways. 
First, operational-level engagement helped the Chinese nuclear community recognize the 
dangers of nuclear proliferation. Through U.S.-Chinese exchange programs and dialogues, 
many American experts became very well known to the Chinese nuclear community. 
Frank Von Hipple and Richard Garwin are two examples. Frank Von Hipple is nuclear 
physicist and a former assistant director for national security in the White House Office 
of Science and Technology and a professor at Princeton University. Richard Garwin is 
also a physicist and has worked at IBM, Harvard University, and the Council on Foreign 
Relations. Both of them were very proactive in organizing and participating in nuclear 
dialogues and exchanges with China and had a very significant influence within the 
Chinese nuclear community. Their work was widely read and highly regarded and their 
Nuclear Non-Use " International Organization 53, no. 3 (1999); "Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the 
Nuclear Taboo," International Security 29, no. 4 (Spring 2005). 




                                                                                                                                                                                 
research was closely followed and often cited by Chinese nuclear experts.618 During 
dialogues and exchanges, Chinese experts learned from their American colleagues what 
the United States had experienced during nuclear crises with the Soviet Union including 
the Cuban Missile Crisis, Berlin Crises, and the Arab-Israeli wars. They also learned the 
dreadful accidents during the Cold War when false alarms nearly caused the United 
States and the Soviet Union to launch their nuclear weapons by mistake.619 During such 
engagement, American arguments about the dangers of nuclear proliferation apparently 
had a big influence on their Chinese colleagues and prompted them to develop a more 
comprehensive understanding about nuclear nonproliferation.620 
Many Chinese experts, although some still insisted that hegemonism was the ultimate 
source of war and international conflict, began to point to nuclear proliferation as another 
contributing factor to international instability. For example, ZouYunhua, a frequent 
participant of U.S.-Chinese nuclear dialogues, was one of the first Chinese experts who 
openly admitted the dangers of nuclear proliferation and advocated for measures against 
nuclear proliferation: “Some countries are trying to master the technology of producing 
nuclear explosive materials. Therefore, when we make efforts to resolve regional 
conflicts, we should also prevent nuclear proliferation from taking place.”621 Other 
Chinese experts also sounded alarm about dangers of nuclear proliferation: “Some 
countries that pursue regional hegemony or have hidden intentions are also making 
618Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans, "China's Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions," in 
Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, ed. Robert S Ross and Alastair Iain 
Johnston(New York: Routledge, 2006). 
619 Such as the Able Archer 83 exercise in 1983 when the Soviets wrongly believed that the NATO was 
using the exercise as a disguise for a surprise attack. 
620Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China's Nonproliferation Policies and Practices, 1980-
2004. 




                                                            
efforts to obtain nuclear weapons, in order to achieve their illegitimate objectives… 
Nuclear nonproliferation has to be the guiding principle of international cooperation over 
the peaceful use of nuclear energy.”622 
This perception change of the Chinese expert community seemed to have affected the 
Chinese government’s attitudes toward NPT. After an open discussion by Chinese 
experts in favor of partially embracing the principle of nuclear nonproliferation, in 
August 1990, a Chinese delegation attended the Fourth NPT Review Conference as 
observers. It submitted a “Document on Basic Positions” to the conference and admitted 
for the first time that “the NPT has played a certain positive role in the prevention of 
nuclear proliferation and the maintenance of world peace and stability.”623 
Second, operational-level engagement helped the Chinese nuclear community start to 
reassess and redefine its national interests. The Chinese nuclear community was the first 
to realize in the 1980s that readjusting China’s nuclear nonproliferation policy would be 
economically beneficial for China. Through engagement programs such as those between 
the DOE and CIAE, Chinese nuclear experts came to the understanding that U.S. nuclear 
energy technology would be very helpful for the development of China’s own civilian 
nuclear energy programs and China needed to get access to the U.S. nuclear energy 
market. Because of the high priority that the United States had attached to the issue of 
nuclear nonproliferation, China would benefit greatly from aligning its nuclear 
622Zhiyong (于智勇) Yu, "Rethinking Some of the Issues Related to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (关
于《核不扩散条约》若干问题的再认识)," World Economics and Politics (世界经济与政治), no. 06 
(1988). 
623"Must Comprehensively Prohibit and Completely Eliminate Nuclear Weapons (必须全面禁止和彻底销
毁核武器)," The People's Daily (人民日报), September 13 1990. 
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nonproliferation policy with that of the United States in order to remove the obstacles 
between U.S.-Chinese civilian nuclear energy cooperation.624 
Chinese experts also noted the security benefits that nuclear nonproliferation had brought 
China.625 For instance, Taiwan’s nuclear proliferation efforts were terminated as a result 
of the U.S. nonproliferation measures. Taiwan had started its nuclear weapons program in 
the 1960s, but because of the safeguard measures taken by the United States and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, its program was not going very well. In the 1970s, 
the United States intervened repeatedly to disrupt Taiwan’s suspicious nuclear 
research.626 In 1988, the United States visited the Institute for Nuclear Energy Research 
(INER) and forced Taiwan to dismantle the hot cell facility and shut down the Taiwan 
Research Reactor. This essentially terminated Taiwan’s secret nuclear weapons 
program.627 Chinese experts also recognized the role of the international nonproliferation 
regime in preventing the nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and in delaying the Iraqi 
nuclear weapons program in the early 1990s.628 Unlike China’s top leadership, the 
624Jianwei (刘建伟) Liu, "China's Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy and Behavioral Change: A Normative and 
Legal Perspective (中国核不扩散政策和行为变化——一种规范合法性的解读)," Contemporary Asia-
pacific Studies (当代亚太), no. 4 (2011). 
625Personal correspondence with Chinese experts and former Chinese diplomats, 2009. 
626Chongyan (张崇岩) Zhang, "Israel, South Africa, and Taiwan Are Possibly Collaborating on Nuclear 
Weapons Development (以色列、南非、台湾可能在共同研究核武器)," Global Nuclear News (国外核
新闻), no. 10 (1981); Sheng (苗生) Miao, "The inside Story of Taiwan's Nuclear Weapons Development (台
湾研制核武器内幕)," Technology Tide (科技潮), no. 06 (1996). 
627Shixin (焦世新） Jiao, "A Balance of Interests: The Role of the United States in China's Participation in 
International Institutions (利益的权衡: 美国在中国加入国际机制中的作用)" (Fudan University (复旦大
学), 2007). 
628Yuan (吕原) Lv, "Iraq Pursues Nuclear Weapons (伊拉克谋求核武器)," Global Nuclear News (国外核新
闻), no. 05 (1990); Liang (微亮) Wei, "The U.N. Inspection Team States That Iraq Could Restart Its Nuclear 
Weapons Program at Any Time (联合国检查组说伊拉克随时可能重建其核武器计划)," Global Nuclear 
News (国外核新闻), no. 12 (1991); Ji (家骥) Jia and Hua (邵华) Shao, "Iraq's Secret Nuclear Weapons 
Program (伊拉克的秘密核武器计划)," World Science and Technology Research and Development (世界
科技研究与发展) 6(1992); Jinzhou (郭金周) Guo, "The United States Government Suspects North Korea 
Was Going to Develop Nuclear Weapons (美国政府猜测朝鲜要发展核武器)," Global Nuclear News (国外
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Chinese nuclear community was much more sensitive to the new trend of proliferation in 
regions close to China and across the world and was more appreciative of the importance 
of the international nonproliferation system in containing the emergence of new 
proliferating countries. They argued that there was little cost for China to join the 
international nonproliferation regime because China’s nuclear status was already 
recognized by the regime and that it was in China’s interests to prevent further 
proliferation of nuclear weapons.629 
Third, operational-level engagement helped the Chinese nuclear community to advocate 
for a more pragmatic nuclear policy. For a very long time, China’s nuclear policy was 
very much principle-oriented: China did not develop sophisticated positions or policy 
proposals on specific nuclear issues except a very limited number of nuclear principles 
that were adopted by Mao, Deng, and other Chinese top leaders. Some of the most well 
known principles include the No First Use policy, the negative security assurance, and 
the “support for comprehensive prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear 
weapons.”630 China saw the ultimate solution for eliminating the risk of nuclear wars was 
for everyone to completely eliminate nuclear weapons.631 Any policy discussions that fell 
short of seeking to achieve the end goal of “the comprehensive prohibition and complete 
核新闻), no. 02 (1990); Yujie (程玉洁) Cheng, "The Nuclear Issue on the Korean Peninsula (朝鲜半岛的核
问题)," Contemporary International Relations (现代国际关系) 9(1993). 
629Yu, "Rethinking Some of the Issues Related to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (关于《核不扩散条
约》若干问题的再认识)."; Zou, "Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons - an Observation on the Eve of 
the Fourth Npt Reveiw Conference (不扩散核武器——写在《不扩散核武器条约》缔约国第四次审议
会议之前)."; Jinkun (石锦坤) Shi, "This Year's Disarmament Conference in Geneva Brings New Hope (今年
日内瓦裁军会议带来新的希望)," World Affairs (世界知识), no. 24 (1986). 
630"Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China on Comprehensively, Completely, 
Unumbigiously, and Resolutely Prohibiting and Eliminating Nuclear Weapons and Calling for the 
Convening of an International Summit (中国政府主张全面、彻底、干净、坚决地禁止和销毁核武器、
倡议召开世界各国政府首脑会议的声明)," ibid., no. 15 (July 13 1963). 
631Longbo (冉隆勃) Ran, "Current Peace Movement in the World (当前的世界和平运动)," ibid.14(1985). 
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elimination of nuclear weapons” were not paid much attention by China. This was 
especially true for the issue of nuclear nonproliferation. China saw nuclear 
nonproliferation as only contributing to the nuclear monopoly of very few countries but 
was not helpful for bringing about complete nuclear disarmament. Nuclear 
nonproliferation could not be pursed as a goal in itself.632 
Such a view had effectively prevented China from participating in international nuclear 
nonproliferation discussions and was first challenged by experts from the Chinese nuclear 
community. During the 1980s, voices in the Chinese nuclear community stated that 
China’s attitudes toward nuclear nonproliferation were too rigid and argued for a 
rethinking of China’s existing policy. They pointed out that China’s nuclear policy was 
“constrained by a limited number of fundamental principles, and lacks initiative and 
flexibility.”633 
More importantly, nuclear experts such as Liu Huaqiu pointed out that nuclear 
nonproliferation was “a step toward the comprehensive prohibition and complete 
elimination of nuclear weapons” and therefore was worth pursuing.634 He argued against 
the simplistic policy of only focusing on the end goal and losing sight of the importance 
of taking intermediate steps that could directly or indirectly contribute to the end goal. 
These voices pressed the government to take a more pragmatic approach in making its 
nuclear policy. By the early 1990s, the Chinese government had embraced a more 
632Jin (田进) Tian, China in the United Nations (中国在联合国)(Beijing: World Knowledge Publishing 
House (世界知识出版社), 1999); Zhu, "The Evolution of China's Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy." 
633Shuzhong (王书中) Wang, "Disarmament Struggle and a Few Perceptual Issues (裁军斗争与几个认识
问题)," in International Disarmament Struggle and China: A Collection of Research Papers (国际裁军斗争
与中国: 论文集)(China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (现代国际关系研究所): 
Current Affairs Press (时事出版社), 1987). 
634Liu, "Analysis of China's Nuclear Arms Control Policy (中国核军控政策评析)." 
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practical attitude toward nonproliferation. It began to acknowledge the positive effect of 
nuclear nonproliferation efforts and no longer denied the value of the basic ideas behind 
the international nonproliferation regime.635 It continued to express dissatisfaction about 
some of the institutional design of the regime, which it thought, was unfair, but it began 
to seriously consider nuclear nonproliferation as a worthy goal to pursue in itself.636 
NPT Membership and the Top Leadership’s Endorsement 
Following the advocates from the nuclear community, China began to gradually embrace 
nuclear nonproliferation as a government policy. Compared to its previous general 
opposition against nonproliferation, the government shifted toward a less confrontational 
position in the 1980s and began to limit the subject of its opposition to a selected few. 
China “emphatically opposed to any production of nuclear weapons by racists and 
expansionists such as South Africa and Israel.”637 
The selective opposition to proliferation subsequently changed into a general opposition 
against all nuclear proliferation. In a 1991meeting with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency director general Hans Blix, Premier Li Peng stated, “China’s position is clear-cut, 
that is, China won’t practice nuclear proliferation. Meanwhile, we are against the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons by any other country.”638 In the same year, the vice 
635Jieyi (刘结一) Liu, "Speech of Director General Liu Jieyi at the Dinner of the International Arms Control 
Annual Convention of the U.S. Sandia National Laboratory (刘结一司长在美国桑迪亚国家实验室国际军
控年会晚宴上的讲话),"(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002). 
636Yan Zhang, "Looking Beyond the 2005 Npt Review Conference, Statement by H.E. Ambassador Zhang 
Yan, Director-General,Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
China,"(UN Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, December 1 2005). 
637Xinhua, "Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping to Indian Journalists, Chinese Statements on Proliferation Issues: 
1979-1991," FBIS-SM-91-10007. 
638"Premier Li Peng in a Meeting with Director General Hans Blix of the Iaea, Chinese Statements on 
Proliferation Issues: 1979-1991," FBIS-SM-91-10007. 
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foreign minister Liu Huaqiu admitted that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was a 
universal international agreement and had played an important role in preventing nuclear 
proliferation. He reaffirmed that the treaty “had a positive impact.”639 Regarding its own 
engagement in nuclear proliferation, starting from the late 1980s, China began to openly 
embrace the policy of renouncing the “encouragement of nuclear proliferation” by China. 
China’s foreign minister Wu Xueqian stated, “We don’t stand for, encourage, or engage 
in nuclear proliferation.”640 This “three nots” policy indicated China’s first open 
commitment to not contributing to nuclear proliferation by itself. This gradual change of 
policy finally led to the signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1992. During 
this process, China’s nuclear community, particularly the nuclear defense industry 
(IAPCM, CAEP, and COSTIND), which had been a major participant in U.S.-Chinese 
nuclear exchanges, played an important role in supporting China’s membership in the 
NPT.641 The Chinese government’s stated reasons for its embracement of the NPT were 
exactly along the same line of argument made by the nuclear defense industry and the 
civilian energy industry. The Government Work Report of the State Council released at 
the First Plenary Meeting of the Seventh National People's Congress acknowledged that 
nuclear nonproliferation has certain positive effect because nuclear proliferation does not 
fully fall in line with China’s national interests.642 Chinese senior diplomats also 
639Jun (王君) Wang, "The Change of China's Nonproliferation Policy after the Cold War and Its Causes (冷
战后中国不扩散政策的转变及其原因分析)," Pacific Journal (太平洋学报), no. 4 (2002). 
640International Situation Yearbook: 1985 (国际形势年鉴 1985), (Shanghai: Shanghai Institute of 
International Studies (上海国际问题研究所), Shanghai Branch of Chinese Encyclopedia Press (中国大百
科全书出版社上海分社), 1988). 
641Zhang, China's Changing Nuclear Posture: Reactions to the South Asian Nuclear Tests; Johnston and 
Evans, "China's Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions." 
642Peng (李鹏) Li, "Government Work Report of the State Council (国务院政府工作报告),"(Beijing: First 
Plenary Meeting of the Seventh National People's Congress (第七届全国人民代表大会第一次会议上), 
March 25 1988). 
274 
 
                                                            
expressed the view that “a strong international nuclear nonproliferation regime” serves 
their national interests. They warned against the potential consequences of nuclear 
proliferation, which “might ultimately hurt one’s own national interests.”643 
The signing of the NPT, however, did not mean that all the ideas and concepts of nuclear 
nonproliferation as embodied in the NPT had been completely accepted by the Chinese 
top leadership. It took another few years for China to officially show strong support for 
NPT. In China’s 1995 White Paper on Arms Control and Disarmament, China still 
expressed a number of reservations regarding the existing nonproliferation regime. It 
emphasized the view that nonproliferation is not a goal in itself and held a very critical 
view against the “double standard” and those nonproliferation actions that undermined 
the rights of developing countries on peaceful nuclear energy.644 By the late 1990s, 
China’s defense white papers began to express much stronger support for the NPT regime. 
The 1998 Defense White Paper, for example, claims, “China vigorously supports and 
participates in the international nonnuclear proliferation efforts.” It expresses a pressing 
need for “the international community to strengthen non-proliferation mechanisms” and 
expresses support for the IAEA’s Program for Strengthening the Effectiveness and 
Promoting the Efficiency of the Safeguard System (93 + 2 program). It also pledges to 
negotiate and conclude with the IAEA a legally binding document and to adopt measures 
corresponding to the obligations of the first article of the NPT.645 This indicates that 
senior officials, especially officials from the military and the foreign ministry, reached a 
643"Collection of Speeches Delivered by the Chinese Delegation to the United Nations (中国代表团出席联
合国有关会议发言汇编)," (United Nations Association of China (中国联合国协会), World Knowledge 
Publishing House (世界知识出版社), 1999). 
644"China's Arms Control and Disarmament (中国的军备控制与裁军)." 
645"China's National Security White Paper: 1998 (1998 年中国的国防)," (Beijing: State Council 
Information Office (国务院新闻办公室), 1998). 
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general consensus that “it serves China’s national interests to participate in the 
international nonproliferation regime” and that they were willing to see China play an 
active role in IAEA and other nonproliferation institutions.646 
Chinese top leaders’ first direct and explicit endorsement of nuclear nonproliferation 
came in 1999. On March 26, 1999, President Jiang Zemin delivered a speech at the 
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. For the first time, he mentioned that “[t]he 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is the foundation of the international nuclear 
nonproliferation system, and the precondition for achieving progress on nuclear 
disarmament. This treaty must be thoroughly and comprehensively implemented; 
otherwise international efforts for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation will be 
severely undermined. Countries that have not joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
should join as soon as possible, in order for the treaty to be truly universal.” Jiang also 
departed from the traditional emphasis on nuclear disarmament over nonproliferation and 
pointed out that “for present and for the long-term future, preventing nuclear proliferation 
and promoting nuclear disarmament are going to be important tasks facing the 
international community.” For the first time, he argued that “nuclear nonproliferation and 
comprehensive and complete nuclear disarmament—these two things are complementary 
to each other. Comprehensive and complete nuclear disarmament is the goal that we 
646Wenhui (王文辉) Wang, "Analysis of China's Participation in International Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Regime (中国参与国际核不扩散机制分析)" (Chinese University of Foreign Affairs (外交学院), 2011). 
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strive for; nuclear nonproliferation is an effective means and a necessary step to achieve 
this goal.”647 
Strategic Trust 
Operational-level engagement played an important role in helping the United Stated and 
China find common interests. Bilateral dialogues and exchanges helped change China’s 
traditional opposition against nonproliferation by introducing to the Chinese nuclear 
community the dangers of nuclear proliferation and convincing them about the negative 
impact that proliferation would have on China’s national security. These exchanges 
prompted the Chinese nuclear community to reassess its national security interests, which 
resulted in a departure from China’s simplistic understanding about nonproliferation and 
motivated the Chinese nuclear community to advocate for a more pragmatic approach 
toward nuclear nonproliferation issues. The Chinese nuclear community challenged the 
view that “nuclear weapons in the hands of peace-loving countries” would always 
contribute to stability.648It recognized that nuclear nonproliferation efforts by the United 
States and other countries benefited China’s national interests and pointed out that 
China’s interests would be undermined if further proliferation took place.649 Operational-
level engagement with China’s nuclear community also convinced them about the 
potential economic and technology benefits that China could receive if it responded more 
647Zemin (江泽民) Jiang, "Promoting Disarmament and Maintaining International Peace: A Speech at the 
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (推动裁军进程, 维护国际安全——在日内瓦裁军谈判会议上的
讲话)," The People's Daily 1999. 
648Xia, "An Preliminary Analysis on Contemporary Nuclear Proliferation in the Asian-Pacific Region (浅析当
前亚太地区的核扩散)." 
649Guo, "International Institution Integration and National Interests: A Historical Analysis of China's 
Foreign Policy (国际制度的融入与国家利益——中国外交的一种历史分析)."; Pan, Xia, and Wang, 
International Disarmament and Arms Control (国际裁军与军备控制). 
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positively to the U.S. nonproliferation requirements. This gradual change of perception at 
the operational level apparently influenced China’s official policy and the thinking of top 
leadership. The Chinese government began to admit the importance of nuclear 
nonproliferation to the security of China and the international community. It also 
increasingly expressed the common goals and interests that China and the United States 
share in nuclear nonproliferation.650 As some senior Chinese officials noted, the United 
States and China share “vast common interests” and “we do feel that in bilateral relations 
nonproliferation should be a positive aspect.”651 They believed that, after September 11, 
the international security environment is even more uncertain and unpredictable. In such 
a situation, the United States and China possess even greater incentives to maintain 
common security through nonproliferation cooperation.652 
China’s nonproliferation policy toward the North Korea is another case in which Chinese 
strategic trust toward the United States increases as a result of recognizing more common 
interests. Facing increasing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, the Chinese top leadership 
was more inclined to “stabilize the situation” through small and precautionary steps that 
did not challenge either the United States or North Korean positions. Such steps included 
calling for both North and South Korea to increase communication and dialogue, 
emphasizing the importance of the United States having a “constructive and equal” 
650Song Li, "Statement by Mr. Li Song Deputy Director-General of the Department of Arms Control and 
Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China,"(Warsaw: Annual NATO Conference on Arms Control, 
Disarmament and Nonproliferation, December 10, 2009); Yan Zhang, "Statement by H.E. Amb. Zhang Yan 
Director-General of the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the People's Republic of China at the Thematic Debate of the First Committee of the 60th Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation,"(New York: Permanent 
Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Unions Office at Geneva and Other International 
Organizations in Switzerland, October 10 2005). 
651Medeiros and Saunders, "Fourth U.S.-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and 




                                                            
dialogue directly with the North Korea, and working toward maintaining a multilateral 
consultation framework to reduce tensions.653 The Chinese nuclear community, on the 
other hand, was more alarmed and concerned about potential security threats posed by 
North Korean nuclear tests and possession of nuclear weapons capability to China’s 
interests. They emphasized that “the continuous escalation of the Korean nuclear crisis is 
bringing about serious negative impact on the Peninsula… the possibility of misfiring or 
military conflict breaking out between North Korea and the United States, Japan, and 
South Korea is quickly increasing… In the mid- to long-term, if North Korea becomes a 
de facto nuclear state, the military confrontation between North Korea and the United 
States, Japan, and South Korea would be far more serious; the Peninsula would be much 
farther away from peace and stability.”654 They even claimed, “China is the immediate 
victim of North Korea’s nuclear test[s], which put[s] Chinese citizens at risk given the 
test location’s proximity to the border; North Korea ignores Chinese national interests 
and complains about China despite receiving its aid, thus becoming a strategic and 
economic liability for Beijing.”655 Therefore, they called for more forceful and proactive 
measures from China. Zhang Liangui, China’s prominent Korean expert, argued, “China 
should use its influence to change North Korea’s policy.”656 Xu Jin, an expert from the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, claimed,“[I]t is necessary for China’s North Korea 
653Jiaxuan (唐家璇) Tang and Igor Ivanov, "Joint Press Release of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 
People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the Situation on the Korean Peninsula (中华人
民共和国与俄罗斯联邦外交部长关于朝鲜半岛局势的联合新闻公报）,"(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
February 27 2003). 
654Tuosheng (张沱生) Zhang, "North Korean Nuclear Issue and China's Policy (朝核问题与中国的政策)," 
International Security Studies (国际安全研究), no. 5 (2013). 
655Quanmin (赵全敏) Zhao, "U.S. Presses China to Lead Sanctions against North Korea. Chinese Expert 
Says China Should Use Its Influence (美压中国挑头制裁朝鲜专家称中国应动用影响力)," World News 
(世界新闻报) June 26 2009. 
656"Shades of Red: China's Debate over North Korea," (International Crisis Group, November 2 2009). 
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policy to be somewhat adjusted. (China) needs to transit[ion] from a neutral and 
indifferent mediator to a non-neutral and forceful intervener.”657 Many of them shared 
the view that China’s interests were aligned with those of the United States and other 
countries instead of those of North Korea and wanted China to work with “the other four 
parties in order to exert influence over North Korea.”658 This instigated an unprecedented 
domestic debate on this very sensitive issue—China’s North Korea policy. These debates 
were prominently featured in policy journals such as China and World Affairs (《中国与
世界观察》), which published a special issue on this debate in 2009.659 After this 
domestic debate, Chinese officials became more open to talking about “common interests” 
between the United States and China on nuclear nonproliferation on the Korean 
Peninsula.660 
Moreover, bilateral engagement not only helped to recognize common interests but also 
helped China build the technical capacity to actually achieve such common interests. 
During engagement, the U.S. experts came to the conclusion that China’s lack of 
technical capacity had significantly undermined its capability to effectively set up and 
implement export control systems.661 As a result, training programs became a significant 
657Jin (徐进) Xu, "North Korean Nuclear Issue: Should China Forcefully Intervene or Take a Neutral Stand 
of a Mediator (朝鲜核问题: 中国应强力介入还是中立斡旋?)," International Economic Review (国际经
济评论) 6(2011). 
658"Shades of Red: China's Debate over North Korea." 
659"China and International Affairs (中国与世界观察)," (Issue 2, 2009). 
660Zhang, "Statement by H.E. Amb. Zhang Yan Director-General of the Department of Arms Control and 
Disarmament of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China at the Thematic Debate 
of the First Committee of the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Nuclear 
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation."; Medeiros and Saunders, "Fourth U.S.-China Conference on Arms 
Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation: "Building a Global Strategic Framework for the 21st 
Century.”" 
661Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China's Nonproliferation Policies and Practices, 1980-
2004; Yuan, "The Evolution of China's Nonproliferation Policy since the 1990s: Progress, Problems, and 
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component of U.S.-Chinese nuclear exchanges. A number of U.S. national laboratories, 
research institutes, and educational organizations initiated and organized various training 
and exchange programs that were targeted at growing Chinese nonproliferation 
specialists in a wide range of government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, the 
nuclear defense establishment, research institutes, and universities. They also reached out 
to the nuclear industry and conducted in-depth interaction with major companies and 
enterprises through joint training and co-development of export control tools and 
mechanisms. 
In addition, operational-level engagement helped China to transition from a system of 
administrative control to a system of legally based control. Bilateral dialogues helped the 
Chinese nuclear community to recognize the inherent problems with their traditional 
emphasis on administrative control of nuclear and dual-use exports. With the help of 
American experts, China learned and gradually introduced the control lists from 
international nonproliferation regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and built its 
own legally based nuclear and dual-use export control system. Table 16 summarizes the 
laws and regulations established by China on nuclear-related or dual-use export controls. 
  
Prospects."; Medeiros, Chasing the Dragon: Assessing China's System of Export Controls for Wmd-Related 
Goods and Technologies. 
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Table 16 Laws and Regulations Established by China on Nuclear Related or Dual-Use 
Export Controls 
 
Laws and Regulations Year 
Foreign Trade Law 1994 
Regulations on Nuclear Export 
Control of PRC 
September 1997 
Regulations on Export Control of 
Dual-Use Nuclear Goods and 
Related Technologies of PRC 
June 1998; Revised in January 
2008 
The Procedures for the 
Management of Restricted 
Technology Export 
November 1998 
Regulations on Nuclear Export 
Control of PRC 
2001 Revision 
Provisional Measures on the 
Administration of the Export 
License on Sensitive Items and 
Technologies 
January 2004 
Regulations on Export Control of 
Dual-Use Nuclear Goods and 




Chinese Understanding of U.S. Norm Compliance 
Despite numerous dialogues and exchanges, the Chinese nuclear community’s 
understanding of U.S. compliance with international nuclear nonproliferation norms is 
still very cynical and negative. The majority of China’s nuclear community still believes 
that the United States uses nonproliferation to achieve its own “absolute security” and to 
282 
 
maintain “military superiority.”662 There are exceptions, however. For instance, Yao 
Yunzhu, a frequent participant in U.S.-Chinese nuclear dialogues and a major general in 
the Academy of Military Science, actually believes that under the Obama administration, 
the United States has begun to change from seeking “absolute security” to “cooperative 
security” (合作安全).663 She notes that the Obama administration has departed from the 
Bush administration’s strategy of “preemption” and “full-spectrum dominance” and has 
proposed a new foreign policy direction that emphasizes the role of “smart power,” 
international coordination, and great power cooperation in addressing the threat of 
nuclear weapons.664 Such a voice, however, is very rarely heard. Looking at the overall 
thinking within the Chinese nuclear community, the absolute majority still holds the 
traditional view.665This view is largely derived from the interpretations of two types of 
U.S. nonproliferation behaviors. 
Firstly, the Chinese nuclear community is generally skeptical that international norms on 
nuclear nonproliferation are a guiding principle for U.S. policy-making. From their 
662 See, for example, Medeiros, "3rd Us-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and 
Nonproliferation, Us-China Arms Control and Nonproliferation Cooperation: Progress and Prospects."; 
Cossa, Glosserman, and Santoro, "Progress Continues, but Disagreements Remain: The Seventh China-Us 
Strategic Dialogue on Strategic Nuclear Dynamics & the Inaugural China-Us Dialogue on Space Security."; 
Medeiros and Saunders, "Fourth U.S.-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and 
Nonproliferation: "Building a Global Strategic Framework for the 21st Century.”"; Liu, "An Analysis of the 
Nonproliferation Policy Shift under the Obama Administration (试析奥巴马政府防扩散政策的调整)."; Lu, 
"U.S.-China Arms Control Interaction and Its Theoretical Analysis (中美在军控领域的交流及其理论分
析)."; Jing (卢静) Lu, "The Characteristics and Trend of Major Power Security Relations after the Cold War 
(冷战后大国安全关系的特征与走向)," Teaching and Research (教学与研究) 4(2012). 
663Guang (孔光) Kong and Yunzhu (姚云竹) Yao, "An Analysis of the "Nuclear Free World" Movement 
(“无核武器世界”运动评析)," World Economics and Politics (世界经济与政治), no. 9 (2009). 
664Ibid. 
665Wang, "On the United States' Political Theology of "Absolute Security" and Obam's "Nuclear-Free 
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perspective, the U.S. nonproliferation policy does not focus on “what” the proliferant 
country does but “who” the proliferant country is.666 
The Chinese nuclear community has been highly critical of the consistent U.S. “double 
standard” toward its allies and friends. The U.S. tolerance of Israeli nuclear weapons 
capability is seen as the fundamental source of the proliferation dynamics in the Middle 
East.667 The United States raises little question about the virtual nuclear capability of 
Japan but adopts extremely tough measures against the same capability pursued by 
Iran.668 The U.S. attitudes toward Japan’s military nuclear potential have particularly 
alerted the Chinese nuclear community’s concern that the United States explicitly pursues 
a “double standard” nuclear nonproliferation policy since Japan possesses all sensitive 
nuclear-related capabilities: uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing, and weapon 
delivery technology.669 The little attention that the United States pays to the nuclear 
potential of countries like Brazil and Germany contributes to this perception.670 
666Nan (陈楠) Chen, "Counterproliferation Versus Nonproliferation: Current Debates in International 
Nuclear Nonproliferation (反扩散与不扩散: 当前国际防止核武器扩散中的争论)" (Fudan University (复
旦大学), 2008). 
667Xiancai (陈先才) Chen, "The International Nuclear Proliferation Crisis: Status Quo, Root Causes, and 
Countermeasures (全球核扩散危机: 现状, 根源及对策)," Journal of Shanxi Normal University: Social 
Science Edition (山西师大学报: 社会科学版) 33, no. 4 (2006); Ping (臧平) Zang and Jike (赵继珂) Zhao, 
"A Preliminary Analysis of the Kennedy Administration's Policy toward the Israeli Development of Nuclear 
Weapons (肯尼迪政府对以色列开发核武器的政策初探)," Journal of Northeast Normal University: 
Philosophy and Social Sciences (东北师大学报: 哲学社会科学版), no. 5 (2011). 
668Chunling (李春玲) Li, "International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime and the Issue of Japan's "Nuclear 
Militarization (国际核不扩散机制与日本的“核武装”问题)," World Economics and Politics Forum (世
界经济与政治论坛), no. 4 (2005). 
669Wansheng (徐万胜) Xu and Zhengnan (付征南) Fu, "The Tendency of Japan's Nuclear Policy (日本核政
策动向)," Contemporary International Relations (现代国际关系) 4(2008); Kesheng (吴克生) Wu and 
Desheng (文德盛) Wen, "The Direction of Japan's Nuclear Weapons Policy (日本核武器政策取向)," 
Contemporary World (当代世界), no. 7 (2004). 
670Mengjun (张孟军) Zhang, "The Double Standard of Nuclear Big Powers: Increasing the Danger of 
Nuclear Proliferation (核武器大国的双重标准：将使核扩散的危险日益增加)," Science and Technology 
Daily (科技日报), August 1 2005. 
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The U.S. handling of its nuclear energy cooperation with India convinced the Chinese 
that the United States is willing to change rules of nonproliferation when doing so serves 
its geostrategic interests. The United States imposed sanctions on India after its 1998 
nuclear tests, but these sanctions were lifted later. In less than two years after the tests, 
President Clinton visited India, and the U.S.-Indian relationship continued to improve 
very quickly during the Bush administration, which promised “to help India become a 
major world power in the 21st century.”671 This dramatic change of policy was 
interpreted by the Chinese nuclear community as driven by a U.S. geostrategic 
calculation to work with India for the purpose of balancing against a rising China.672 In 
2006, President Bush signed the 123 Agreement between the United States and India into 
law as the U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement 
Act, under which India was going to receive civilian nuclear technology and nuclear fuel 
from the United States. This U.S.-India agreement was unprecedented in the sense that 
the two sides made it possible by making changes to a number of existing laws and 
agreements including amending the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, creating a civil-
military nuclear separation plan in India, an India-IAEA safeguards agreement, and 
making exemption for India by the Nuclear Suppliers Group—a nuclear export control 
group that had been formed mainly in response to India’s 1974 “peaceful nuclear 
explosion.” This deal also made it possible for India to keep and reprocess the spent 
671Brahma Chellany, "India Can Be America's Best Friend," International Herald Tribune 1(2005). 
672Shuiming (时水明) Shi, "The Dilemma Facing the International Nuclear Nonroliferation Regime and 
Korean Nuclear Issue (国际核不扩散体制的困境与朝核问题)," Peace and Development (和平与发展) 
3(2010); Li (张力) Zhang, "Understanding Indian-U.S. Strategic Relationship from the "Nuclear Agreement" 
(从“核协议”解读印美战略关系)," South Asian Studies Quarterly (南亚研究季刊), no. 3 (2006). 
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nuclear fuel from U.S.-originated nuclear fuel. Chinese nuclear experts saw this as an 
implicit acknowledgement of India’s de facto status as a nuclear weapons state.673 
One of the most recent U.S. policies that further reinforced Chinese perceptions about the 
U.S. nonproliferation “double standard” is the United States signing a nuclear 
cooperation agreement with Vietnam without a legally binding commitment by Vietnam 
to renounce uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.674 This agreement was 
signed by both countries in May 2014 and does not have the same gold standard that was 
in 123 Agreements with United Arab Emirates and Taiwan. As the agreement was 
initiated in 2010, the Vietnamese-Chinese relationship was turning bad because of their 
maritime territorial dispute in the South China Sea. By the time the treaty was signed, 
their relationship had become so bad that people were worrying about a possible military 
conflict between the two.675 This agreement was widely seen by the Chinese nuclear 
community as one more bit of evidence of U.S. employment of nonproliferation double 
standard driven by a geostrategic motivation to contain China’s influence in the region.676 
In general, the consensus view is that preserving and strengthening the international 
nuclear nonproliferation norm is not the top priority of the United States. The United 
673Chunmei (康春梅) Kang, "The Impact of the U.S.-Indian Nuclear Agreement on India's Nuclear 
Capability (美印核协议对印度核能力的影响)," China Academy of Engineering Physics Science and 
Technology Annual Report (中国工程物理研究院科技年报), no. 1 (2008); Shi, "The Dilemma Facing the 
International Nuclear Nonroliferation Regime and Korean Nuclear Issue (国际核不扩散体制的困境与朝
核问题)." 
674Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Mark Holt, and Mark E. Manyin, "U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: 
Issues for Congress,"(Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, R43433, May 13, 2014). 
675Zoe Li, "China, Vietnam, Philippines Collide Amid Escalating South China Sea Tensions," CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/08/world/asia/south-china-sea-drilling/. 
676Wen (辛文) Xin, "The United States Is Suspected of Abandoning Its Bottom Line over U.S.-Vietnamese 
Nuclear Cooperation (美国政府在美越核合作方面被疑放弃防扩散底线)," Global Nuclear News (国外核
新闻), no. 008 (2010); Weiwei (李魏巍) Li, "An Analysis of U.S.-Vietnam Relationship against the Rise of 
China (中国崛起下的美越外交分析)," Journal of Harbin University (哈尔滨学院学报) 34, no. 10 (2013). 
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States uses nonproliferation as a tool to serve its geostrategic objectives and is willing to 
selectively implement nuclear nonproliferation standards. As one Chinese expert puts it, 
“The United States treats proliferant countries differently, according to its own global 
strategy… This selective nonproliferation policy of the United States seriously 
undermines the sanctity and authority of the international nonproliferation regime.”677 
Second, the Chinese nuclear community believes the United States uses coercive 
measures to impose its own nonproliferation agendas, which are counterproductive to 
international nuclear nonproliferation efforts. According to Chinese interpretation of U.S. 
policy, the United States has pursued a “counter-proliferation” policy since the end of the 
Cold War. The core of this policy is to use coercive measures to preemptively prevent the 
development of nuclear programs.678 
The Chinese nuclear community is generally skeptical about the legitimacy of the U.S. 
counter-proliferation policy.679 From its perspective, the international nuclear 
nonproliferation regime became an independent international institution after it was 
established. This regime, however, does not fully serve American security interests and is 
not completely in line with American policy objectives. As a result, the United States has 
always wanted to impose its own rules over the existing international nonproliferation 
677Binwei (杜彬伟) Du, "A Commentary About the Nuclear Nonproliferation System and Solutions (防止核
武器扩散机制的评析及其出路)," Socialism Studies (社会主义研究) 2(2010). 
678Chen, "Counterproliferation Versus Nonproliferation: Current Debates in International Nuclear 
Nonproliferation (反扩散与不扩散: 当前国际防止核武器扩散中的争论)." 
679Wei (李伟) Li, "Analyzing the Strenghening of American Counter-Proliferation Policy and Its Internal 
Dilemma after the Cold War (析冷战后美国反扩散政策的强化及内在矛盾)," International Forum (国际
论坛) 3(2005); Yeliang (张业亮) Zhang, "On the United States' "Counter-Proliferation Strategy" (试论美国
的“反扩散战略”)," America Studies (美国研究) 4(1996). 
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institution by emphasizing its counter-proliferation strategy. Such U.S. policy is 
perceived as challenging the existing international nuclear nonproliferation regime.680 
The U.S. launch of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in 2003 is seen as an 
example of the U.S. self-proclaimed role of “legislator” of the international nuclear 
nonproliferation regime and its overlooking of existing norms of international law.681 
Most Chinese experts have been very critical of PSI and have concerns about its 
legitimacy and effectiveness. Some have pointed out that PSI would help the formation of 
a “coalition of the willing,” reduce the restraints of the international legal framework, and 
split the international nonproliferation community before there is a consensus.682 The 
Chinese government seems to share this view. It has emphasized the importance of 
resolving the issue of WMD proliferation through political and diplomatic means and 
within the framework of the United Nations and international law. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs claims to “understand the concern of the Proliferation Security Initiative 
members about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery 
vehicles. But the international community has many concerns about the legitimacy, 
effectiveness, and potential consequences of the interception measures under PSI. The 
PSI members should take this into serious consideration.”683 
680Chen, "Counterproliferation Versus Nonproliferation: Current Debates in International Nuclear 
Nonproliferation (反扩散与不扩散: 当前国际防止核武器扩散中的争论)." 
681Mingjie (杨明杰) Yang et al., "Assessing the "Proliferation Security Initiative" (“扩散安全倡议”评
估)," Contemporary International Relations (现代国际关系) 10(2003). 
682Jiazhu (石家铸) Shi, "American Nonproliferation Security Initiative and Its Progress (美国防扩散安全倡
议及其进展)," International Forum (国际论坛) 6, no. 6 (2005); Qinghai (赵青海) Zhao, "Evaluating the 
"Nonproliferation Security Initiative" (“防扩散安全倡议”评析)," International Studies (国际问题研究), 
no. 6 (2005). 
683Jianchao (刘建超) Liu, "Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Answered Questions at the 
Press Conference on December 4, 2003 (2003 年 12 月 4 日外交部发言人在记者招待会上答记者
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The Chinese nuclear community holds the same view about U.S. efforts to impose 
missile technology control regulations over other countries. Starting in the late 1980s, the 
United States was concerned that the nuclear nonproliferation regime was not enough to 
address the increasing threat of weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, it wanted to set 
up a ballistic missile technology control regime to prevent the proliferation of ballistic 
missiles that could be used as WMD delivery vehicles. The Chinese nuclear community 
was not enthusiastic about this idea and pointed out that this would not address many 
alternative means of delivering nuclear weapons, such as cruise missiles, airplanes, etc.684 
They were also concerned that this would unfairly deprive the right of countries to 
develop conventional missiles that they perceived as a legitimate need for national 
defense.685 
The Chinese nuclear community was even more critical about how the United States 
implements its missile nonproliferation policy. The United States initiated the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1987, together with six other countries—the 
United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Germany, Italy, and France.686 By 2014, the MTCR has 
a total of 34 partner countries (including the United States), and most of the partner 
countries have already possessed some level of technical capacity on missile 
问),"(Beijing: The State Council Information Office of The People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国国
务院新闻办公室), December 4 2003). 
684Xiaojun (李小军) Li, "Institutional Foundation, Institutional Shortcomings, and Institutional Renovation: 
A Theoretical Reflection on the Missile Technology Control Regime (制度根基, 制度缺陷和制度修复——
对“导弹及其技术控制制度”的理论思考)," International Forum (国际论坛) 7, no. 1 (2005); Liping (夏
立平) Xia, "Ballistic Missile, Proliferation of the Technology, and Its Control in Asia Pacific Region (亚太地
区弹道导弹及其技术的扩散和控制)," International Review (国际观察) 1(2001); Yuanzhe (任远喆) Ren, 
"China and Missile Technology Control Regime: Progress and Prospects (中国与“导弹及其技术控制制
度”: 进程与前景)," International Forum (国际论坛), no. 2 (2012); Yuan, "The Evolution of China's 
Nonproliferation Policy since the 1990s: Progress, Problems, and Prospects." 
685Xiaojun (李小军) Li, "Missile Proliferation and Its Control Regime (导弹扩散及其控制制度)" (Fudan 
University (复旦大学), 2006). 
686"Missile Technology Control Regime,"  http://www.mtcr.info/english/index.html. 
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development. The objective of the MTCR is to prevent the transfer of ballistic missiles 
and related technology with the capability to deliver a payload of more than 500 
kilograms to a distance of more than 300 kilometers. The U.S. implementation of this 
missile nonproliferation regulation, however, has been heavily criticized by the Chinese 
nuclear community. 
The guidelines of the MTCR explicitly prohibit the transfer of any Category I items, 
regardless of whether the intended recipient country of the technology is an MTCR 
partner or not.687 The United States has imposed severe sanctions on North Korea for 
developing rockets that can be adapted and used for weapon delivery vehicles but has no 
problem with countries such as Japan and South Korea developing the same 
technology.688 More importantly, since 1989, the United States has been conducting 
extensive bilateral cooperation with Japan on the development of Standard Missile 3 
(SM-3)—an advanced ballistic missile interceptor. According to the Chinese nuclear 
community, this SM-3 interceptor, although to be used as a missile interceptor, is 
essentially itself a ballistic missile that has an inherent delivery capability that exceeds 
the 500 kilogram/300 kilometer criterion set up by the MTCR. Based on MTCR 
stipulation, the SM-3 is a Category I item and its technology sharing should be strictly 
prohibited. U.S. cooperation with Japan on developing this antimissile interceptor is a 
clear violation of MTCR.689 In the eyes of the Chinese nuclear community, the United 
687The MTCR defines Category I items as missiles that can flight over a distance of more than 300 
kilometers with a payload of more than 500 kilograms. Other less capable missiles and related technology 
are defined as Category II items and receive less strict controls. 
688Shi, "The Dilemma Facing the International Nuclear Nonroliferation Regime and Korean Nuclear Issue 
(国际核不扩散体制的困境与朝核问题)." 
689Xuetong (阎学通) Yan, "Theater Missile Defense System and Northeastern Asian Security (战区导弹防
御系统与东北亚安全)," International Economic Review (国际经济评论) 4(2000); Tong (赵通) Zhao and 
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States is willing to sacrifice MTCR rules because it needs to use these cooperation 
programs to incorporate and keep important regional actors in its security alliance 
network, which is critical to overall U.S. geostrategic interests.690 Similarly, the Arrow-3 
interceptor that the United States has been jointly developing with Israel falls into the 
Category I definition of the MTCR. The SM-2 interceptors that the United States has 
exported to a number of countries and regions, including the Netherlands, Australia, 
South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, are MTCR Category II items. The export of the 
interceptors by the United States to allies and friends is also viewed as a violation of this 
regime.691 
U.S. policy regarding MTCR implementation is particularly revealing to the Chinese 
nuclear community because the MTCR is a U.S.-led nonproliferation regime (rather than 
an internationally accepted nonproliferation regime such as the NPT), and the United 
States frequently uses the MTCR to impose sanctions over countries that violate MTCR 
regulations. Nonetheless, the United States does not want to comply with the MTCR 
rules themselves and makes frequent exceptions for its allies and friends. This has 
contributed to the Chinese perception that the United States is not sincere in holding up 
existing international nonproliferation norms and is willing to impose its own rules when 
necessary. When the norms and rules run counter to its geostrategic interests, the United 
Bin (李彬) Li, "Is the United States Complying with Mtcr Rules? (美国遵守 Mtcr 规定吗?)," Quarterly 
Journal of International Politics (国际政治科学) 2(2007). 
690Haining (倪海宁) Ni and Mengjie (李孟洁) Li, "Overview of the "Missile Defense System" Issues in Asia 
Pacific (亚太地区“导弹防御系统”问题综述)," International data and information (国际资料信息), no. 
5 (2009). 
691Zhao and Li, "Is the United States Complying with Mtcr Rules? (美国遵守 Mtcr 规定吗?)." 
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States is ready to ignore them.692 For this reason, the Chinese nuclear community prefers 
that the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency play a bigger and 
more authoritative role in managing the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.693 
In summary, from the perspective of the Chinese nuclear community, the United States 
purses its own counter-proliferation policy, which is different from nonproliferation. The 
counter-proliferation policy relies more on unilateral and coercive means rather than 
international institutions and multilateralism. The ultimate objective is to assure the U.S. 
“absolute security,” national interests, and technological monopoly, rather than to 
ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons and maintain global and regional stability, and it 
has much less legitimacy in terms of international norms and international law.694 
Norms and China’s Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy 
Normative Consideration in China’s Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy 
From the perspective of the Chinese nuclear community, normative consideration has 
been part of China’s thinking on its nuclear nonproliferation policy. In Chinese internal 
deliberation, the normative demand from developing countries has very much driven 
China’s adjustment of its nuclear nonproliferation policy. For instance, China’s decision 
to join the NPT was significantly influenced by the growing acceptance of NPT by 
692Ruyi (康和意) Kang, "Analyzing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy of the George W. Bush 
Administration (试论美国小布什政府的防核扩散政策)" (Foreign Affaris University (外交学院), 2009). 
693Chen, "The International Nuclear Proliferation Crisis: Status Quo, Root Causes, and Countermeasures 
(全球核扩散危机: 现状, 根源及对策)." 
694Chen, "Counterproliferation Versus Nonproliferation: Current Debates in International Nuclear 
Nonproliferation (反扩散与不扩散: 当前国际防止核武器扩散中的争论)."; Yuan, "The Evolution of 
China's Nonproliferation Policy since the 1990s: Progress, Problems, and Prospects."; Deyi (温德义) Wen, 
"Shield and Sword: The Acceleration of Japan's Building of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Its Impact 
(盾与刀——日本加速建立弹道导弹防御系统及影响)," Modern Weaponry (现代兵器) 1(2006). 
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developing countries. During the 1980s, a large number of developing countries began to 
accept the grand bargain inherent in the NPT and started to join the treaty. The Chinese 
nuclear community recognized this new trend and argued that China should respect the 
will of “the majority of nonnuclear countries” and be more proactive in joining the treaty. 
ZouYunhua, for example, stressed in 1990 that the NPT “has become one of the arms 
control treaties in the world that [has the] most participating countries. The establishment 
of the Treaty and the wide participation of countries in the Treaty [are] a reflection of the 
demand of the international community for achieving nuclear disarmament, eliminating 
nuclear threat, and maintaining international peace. The Treaty also conveys the hope of 
the majority of the nonnuclear weapons states to give up their right of obtaining nuclear 
weapons in order to promote nuclear disarmament … in exchange for assistance with 
civilian use of nuclear energy.”695 China’s support for the unconditional and infinite 
extension of the NPT at the 1995 NPT Review Conference was also very much a direct 
response to the demand of the developing countries.696 
From the realist perspective, as an officially recognized nuclear weapons state under NPT, 
China should have more common interests with other nuclear weapons states on 
nonproliferation issues. But China has traditionally identified itself with the developing 
countries and has been much more willing to respond to the appeals of developing 
countries on nonproliferation issues. Even after China joined the NPT, China has still 
been very critical about the unfairness of the NPT and the imbalance between 
nonproliferation obligations and the legitimate needs of developing countries for nuclear 
695Zou, "Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons - an Observation on the Eve of the Fourth Npt Reveiw 
Conference (不扩散核武器——写在《不扩散核武器条约》缔约国第四次审议会议之前)." 
696Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000. 
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energy development assistance and technology transfer.697 It has been one of the most 
vocal defenders of the right of developing countries to peaceful use of nuclear energy and 
argues that countries with advanced nuclear energy technology should collaborate with 
developing countries in nuclear energy development in order to help developing countries 
to achieve the economic benefits of nuclear energy.698 
China’s resistance to join supply-side nuclear control international organizations is also 
directly linked to its tendency to defend the right of developing countries of peaceful use 
of nuclear energy. For a long time, China did not submit an application to join the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group, even though China met all the requirements of joining NSG. 
This was primarily out of the concern that hindering the transfer of nuclear goods and 
technology for peaceful purposes is unfair and discriminatory. Its view was that 
nonproliferation should not be pursued at the cost of the developing countries’ peaceful 
use of nuclear energy.699 
In contrary to the argument that U.S. pressure is the primary driving force behind China’s 
nuclear nonproliferation policy, China has become more willing to play a positive role in 
nuclear nonproliferation issues, which it believes represents an “international consensus” 
(国际共识). For example, the U.S.-Sino relationship was at a very low point in 2000 as a 
697Yuan, "The Evolution of China's Nonproliferation Policy since the 1990s: Progress, Problems, and 
Prospects." 
698"Statement of the Chinese Delegation About Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy at the Third Preparatory 
Meeting of the Eighth Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (中国代表团在《不扩
散核武器条约》第八次审议大会第三次筹备会上关于和平利用核能问题的发言)," (New YorkMay 
2009); Jinzhang (李金章) Li, "Speech of Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Li Jinzhang at the Opening 
Ceremony of the Seventh U.S.-China Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Workshop 李金章
副部长在第七次中美军控、裁军与防扩散研讨会开幕式上的讲话),"(Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of The People's Republic of China, December 16 2009). 
699Jiao, "A Balance of Interests: The Role of the United States in China's Participation in International 
Institutions (利益的权衡: 美国在中国加入国际机制中的作用)."; Weixing Hu, "China's Nuclear Export 
Controls: Policy and Regulations," The Nonproliferation Review 1, no. 2 (1994). 
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result of the 1999 embassy bombing. The U.S. Senate’s rejection of the CTBT also 
greatly disappointed China. The United States was very concerned that China might not 
be very cooperative at the 2000 NPT Review Conference as a result. However, China 
turned out to play a very positive role at the review conference and this trend has 
continued. China also actively supported and participated in nuclear nonproliferation 
initiatives within the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation.700 
Chinese resistance to using economic sanctions as a nonproliferation tool also reflects an 
element of normative consideration. China has a long-held view that economic sanctions 
employed by “hegemonic powers” are coercive and discriminatory. Its own experience of 
undergoing serious economic sanctions imposed by the United States, the Soviet Union, 
and other Western countries reinforces its perception about the negative humanitarian 
consequences of economic sanctions.701 China has been particularly opposed to strategic 
economic sanctions—those that use large-scale and highly intensive sanctions to target 
and undermine key economic infrastructure of the target country in order to delegitimize, 
contain, undermine, or even topple the regime of the target state.702 As a result, China has 
always resisted any efforts to impose strategic economic sanctions over Iran, North Korea, 
or other countries even though China shares the same objective with the United States 
700Medeiros, Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China's Nonproliferation Policies and Practices, 1980-
2004. 
701Gang (肖刚) Xiao and Guohua (黄国华) Huang, "Unilateral Economic Sanctions in America's Economic 
Diplomay after the Cold War (冷战后美国经济外交中的单边经济制裁)," International Economics and 
Trade Research (国际经贸探索) 22, no. 3 (2006). 
702Liang (阎梁) Yan, "China's Economic Sanctions: Objectives and Policy Issues (中国对外经济制裁: 目标
与政策议题)," Foreign Affairs Review (外交评论) (2012); Yongsheng (周永生) Zhou and Lin (李琳) Li, 
"Political and Economic Objectives of Economic Sanctions and Assessment (经济制裁的政治经济目的及
其评价)," Guihai Tribune (桂海论丛) 20, no. 1 (2004). 
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and other countries on nuclear nonproliferation in these regions. China also has always 
insisted that any economic sanctions should be sponsored by the United Nations. It 
opposes unilateral sanctions without the authorization of the U.N. Security Council. Its 
own limited economic sanctions in recent years against North Korea were also only 
carried out strictly according to U.N. mandates and within the U.N. framework.703 
Nonproliferation Norms and Increasing Chinese Pragmatism 
Believing that the United States wants to impose its own rules beyond the internationally 
accepted nonproliferation norms and regulations, China responds in a similarly 
realpolitik manner. China does not see the U.S.-driven missile nonproliferation as part of 
the legitimate international nuclear nonproliferation regime and therefore chooses to 
cooperate only when it serves its geostrategic interests. One of the tactics that China 
employs is to use issue linkage as leverage. It makes a connection between China’s 
cooperation on missile nonproliferation and the U.S. arms sale to Taiwan, especially the 
U.S. sale of missile defense systems to Taiwan and the incorporation of Taiwan into the 
U.S. regional missile defense network.704 On a few occasions, China has reduced its 
cooperation on missile nonproliferation in the form of deliberate lapse in export control 
enforcement in order to put pressure on the United States against its arms sale to Taiwan. 
This has happened repeatedly since the 1992 U.S. sale of 150 F-16 fighter aircrafts till the 
703Meihua (金美花) Jin, "Crisis Escalation on the Korean Peninsula and China's Role (朝鲜半岛危机升级与
中国的作用)," World Affairs (世界知识), no. 8 (2013). 
704704Jishe (樊吉社) Fan, "U.S. And Chinese Arms Control: Cooperation, Divergence, Motivations, and 
Future Trend (中美军控: 合作与分歧, 动因与走势)," International Economic Review (国际经济评论), no. 
5 (2001); Henry Sokolski, "Us Satellites to China: Unseen Proliferation Concerns," International Defense 
Review 27(1994); Yuan, "The Evolution of China's Nonproliferation Policy since the 1990s: Progress, 
Problems, and Prospects." 
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2000s. The Chinese nuclear community believes that such issue linkage has helped 
reduce the frequency and quantity of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.705 
Although China does not accept the U.S.-led nonproliferation rules as legitimate, it has 
become more pragmatic in implementing its nonproliferation policy. The Chinese nuclear 
community has always been critical about the United States using domestic laws such as 
the Iran Nonproliferation Act and the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act 
to discipline the export of Chinese companies and see this as evidence of U.S. 
“hegemonism” and “unprincipled power politics.”706 But the Chinese nuclear community 
has realized, over extensive communications, that it serves Chinese economic interests to 
make practical concessions to the U.S. requirement. Many Chinese companies have set 
up internal sensitive countries export control lists that essentially put countries such as 
Iran, Syria, Iraq, and others on a blacklist. They have voluntarily abstained from 
exporting certain goods to these countries or have put much stricter export restrictions on 
these countries in order to meet the requirements of the United States and to avoid U.S. 
sanctions. The Chinese government also seems to have been increasingly receptive to 
such de facto discriminatory export control policies against countries that are targeted by 
the United States. 
705Jiao, "A Balance of Interests: The Role of the United States in China's Participation in International 
Institutions (利益的权衡: 美国在中国加入国际机制中的作用)." 
706Jianping (胡剑萍) Hu and Jianping (阮建平) Ruan, "The U.S. Overseas Economic Sanctions and Conflict 
Analysis (美国域外经济制裁及其冲突探析)," World Economics and Politics (世界经济与政治), no. 5 
(2006); Penghong (蔡鹏鸿) Cai, "The U.S. Sanctions on Iran and Its Impact on China (美国制裁伊朗及其
对中国的影响)," Contemporary International Relations (现代国际关系) 4(2012); Jianying (颜剑英) Yan 
and Jinxiu (罗锦秀) Luo, "New Development of U.S. Economic Sanctions after the End of the Cold War (冷
战结束后美国对外经济制裁的新发展)," Theory Guide (理论导刊), no. 2 (2005); Daofu (鲁道夫) Lu, 
Jianzhong (黄建中) Huang, and Qi (宫齐) Gong, "Unprincipled Powe: Ethical Issues Related to 
International Economic Sanctions (无原则的强权--国际经济制裁的伦理问题)," Digest of Modern 
Foreign Philosophy and Social Sciences (现代外国哲学社会科学文摘) 5(1999). 
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There are other signs that the Chinese nuclear nonproliferation policy is becoming more 
pragmatic and less norm-oriented over the last decade. The Chinese nuclear community 
has played an important role in making this happen. On the issues of using economic 
sanctions as a nonproliferation tool, the Chinese nuclear community studied the 
experience of the United States and other countries in employing various types of 
economic sanctions and systematically explored the legal, ethical, political, and financial 
implications of economic sanctions.707 They challenged the traditional Chinese view that 
economic sanctions are unconditionally immoral, illegal, and unjust708 and admitted that 
economic sanctions “ha[ve] been widely accepted as part of international law, and ha[ve] 
played a positive role in maintaining international peace.”709 Compared to the Chinese 
traditional opposition to economic sanctions, the nuclear community has been pushing for 
a greater acceptance of using economic sanctions. They promoted the view that economic 
sanctions should be a tool in the toolbox, although China needs to be “careful on 
sanctions.”710 On North Korea, they argued that “as one of the tools for addressing 
international relation issues, sanctions should also be used in the practice of resolving the 
707See, for example, Yan, "China's Economic Sanctions: Objectives and Policy Issues (中国对外经济制裁: 
目标与政策议题)."; Liang (阎梁) Yan and Jinwen (何劲汶) He, "European and American Economic 
Sanctions against Iran: Policy Divergence and Convergence (欧盟, 美国对伊朗的经济制裁: 政策分歧及
其弥合)," European Studies (欧洲研究), no. 3 (2012); Shuguang (张曙光) Zhang, "U.S. Strategic Thinking 
on Economic Sanctions and Its Decision-Making on Embargo against China, 1949-1953 (美国关于经济制
裁的战略思考与对华禁运决策 (1949-1953))," International Politics (国际政治研究), no. 3 (2008); Yong 
(刘勇) Liu, "An Legal Analysis of U.S. Economic Sanctions (美国经济制裁的法律分析)" (Suzhou University 
(苏州大学), 2009). 
708Bin (石斌) Shi, "Effective Sanctions and "Just Sanctions": On the Political Motivation and Ethical 
Dimensions of International Economic Sanctions (有效制裁与“正义制裁”——论国际经济制裁的政治
动因与伦理维度)," World Economics and Politics (世界经济与政治), no. 8 (2010); Xianyu (余先予) Yu, 
"The Coordination of International Law and Domestic Law (论国际法与国内法的协调)," Journal of 
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics (上海财经大学学报) 2, no. 2 (2000). 
709Lirong (杜栎荣) Du, "The Impact of International Sanctions on Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Issue 
(国际制裁对解决朝核问题的影响)" (Yanbian University (延边大学), 2012). 
710Hong Li, "Chinese Nonproliferation Policy and Export Control Practice,"(China Arms Control & 
Disarmament Association (CACDA), August 28, 2013). 
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Korean nuclear issue.”711 This has started internal discussions about the feasibility of 
employing economic sanctions. The Chinese government’s recent small-scale sanctions 
against North Korea after its nuclear and rocket/missile tests seemed to be indicators of 
the influence of this “rethink” on its position on economic sanctions.712 
Since early 2013, China has adopted a series of economic measures against North Korea. 
Some of these measures were even considered more restrictive than the stipulations of 
recent U.N. Security Council resolutions on North Korea. Table 17 provides a summary 
of economic measures taken by China after the third nuclear test. In the financial sector, 
four of China’s major commercial banks closed some North Korean accounts that had 
suspected links with WMD programs in May 2013. In September, China released a list of 
export control items that could be used by North Korea in its nuclear and missile 
programs. China also cut off oil supply to North Korea for six months starting in 
February, which was once widely seen as an indicator of “real” punishment from 
China.713 
  
711Du, "The Impact of International Sanctions on Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Issue (国际制裁对解
决朝核问题的影响)." 
712Jin, "Crisis Escalation on the Korean Peninsula and China's Role (朝鲜半岛危机升级与中国的作用)."; 
Liangui (张琏瑰) Zhang, "2013: The "Decisive Battle" of the North Korean Nuclear Issue (2013 年: 朝鲜核
问题“收官之战”)," Theoretical Trends (理论动态), no. 7 (2013). 
713"China for the First Time Cut Off Oil Supply to North Korea for Three Consecutive Months (中国首次连
续 3 个月断供朝鲜石油)," Yonhap News Agency April 25 2013. 
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2013 (Mar) Representative offices of some North 
Korean banks closed 
2013 (Apr) Minister of Transportation mandated 
strict implementation of UNSCR 2087  
2013 (May) Suspicious North Korean accounts 
closed by four major banks 
2013 (May) Heightened customs inspection of 
goods bound for DPRK 
2013 (Feb-Jul) Oil supply cut-off for six months 
2013 (Sep) Release of list of prohibited dual use 
export 
 
In general, normative consideration has been a part of China’s nuclear nonproliferation 
policy-making. But China’s understanding of nonproliferation norms is much more in 
line with that of the developing countries than with that of the United States. Moreover, 
long-term operational-level engagement has not changed the Chinese nuclear 
community’s view that the U.S. nonproliferation policy is more geostrategic-interest 
oriented than norm-compliance oriented. As a result, the Chinese nuclear community has 
increasingly focused on the calculation of geostrategic interests in policy analysis and 
discussions. Normative consideration is becoming less important in China’s 
nonproliferation thinking. This has actually undermined the foundation of moralistic trust, 
which is based on the appreciation of the importance of norms and the recognition of 







Summary of Findings 
The most important finding of this research is that operational-level engagement between 
the United States and China on nuclear issues is very effective in increasing Chinese 
strategic trust toward the United States but is not very helpful in increasing moralistic 
trust. This conclusion is reached by examining the proposed hypotheses in chapter one. 
In terms of strategic trust, there are three specific hypotheses, and the three case studies 
provide strong empirical evidence to accept these hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1A: Operational-level engagement promotes the growth and expansion of a 
Chinese nuclear community that shares a common vocabulary with the U.S. nuclear 
community and understands important concepts used by the U.S. nuclear community. 
U.S.-Chinese engagement on CTBT was the first systematic and intensive operational-
level engagement on nuclear issues. Many Chinese nuclear scientists, policy practitioners, 
and analysts started their first interaction with American colleagues as a result of CTBT-
related engagement programs. They were introduced to this new policy research subject 
and came to the recognition that they could play as important a role in influencing 
Chinese nuclear policy-making as their American colleagues did in the United States. 
Operational-level engagement directly led to the emergence of China’s own nuclear 
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community. After the CTBT negotiations finished, U.S.-Chinese engagement continued 
to drive the growth and expansion of the Chinese nuclear community. Such bilateral 
engagement on a range of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation issues attracted more 
and more Chinese professionals from an increasing number of governmental and 
nongovernmental agencies to get interested in and become part of the Chinese nuclear 
community. During this process, the Chinese and American participants in these 
dialogues and exchanges felt the need to clarify the terms and language they were using 
and therefore cooperated to develop a common vocabulary. All these proved the causal 
connection between operational-level engagement and the growth of the Chinese nuclear 
community. 
Hypothesis 1B: Operational-level engagement helps the Chinese nuclear community to 
recognize new areas of common interest with the United States and to become more 
motivated in pursuing cooperation with the United States to achieve these newly 
recognized common interests. 
Operational-level engagement helps the Chinese nuclear community to recognize new 
areas of common interest with the United States in a few ways. First of all, technical 
exchanges changed China’s calculation of interests. In the case of CTBT engagement, 
Chinese nuclear scientists were very much interested in exploring the perceived benefits 
of peaceful nuclear explosion for large-scale civil construction projects, but their lack of 
research and empirical experience in this area made them unlikely to understand the 
potential costs and obstacles. Their American colleagues, however, had extensive 
experience in this area and had conducted a relatively large number of nuclear explosions 
to test their potential civilian utility. Based on their real-world experience, American 
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scientists had a more comprehensive understanding of the benefits and the serious 
problems with peaceful nuclear explosion. Their engagement with Chinese nuclear 
scientists provided an opportunity for them to share their experience, which partly 
contributed to the change of Chinese calculation of interests on this subject.714 
Operational-level engagement changed the Chinese nuclear community’s simplistic 
understanding on a range of important issues such as nuclear nonproliferation. As the 
case on nuclear nonproliferation shows, the Chinese nuclear community used to subscribe 
to the traditional Chinese view that breaking the nuclear monopoly and making nuclear 
weapons available to more countries contributed to international peace and stability and 
therefore did not cause nuclear proliferation to have a negative impact on China’s 
security interests. It was their engagement with American colleagues that prompted them 
to develop a much more sophisticated understanding of the potential consequences of 
nuclear proliferation and the problem of simply dividing countries into evil superpowers 
and peace-loving countries. After the Chinese nuclear community began to embrace a 
more nuanced understanding of nuclear nonproliferation, it realized that instead of having 
conflicting interests, it actually shared a lot of common interests with the United States. 
This became the starting point of China’s policy change on nonproliferation. 
From their American colleagues, the Chinese nuclear community learned Western arms 
control theories and accepted the general analytical framework. As Chinese nuclear 
analysts began to look at nuclear policies through the same theoretical lenses as the 
Americans, their understanding of nuclear deterrence, stability, and arms control in 




                                                            
general began to converge. This also changed China’s overall understanding of its 
security interests and in many cases helped the Chinese realize that they shared common 
interests with the United States. 
Moreover, operational-level engagement helps build the Chinese nuclear community’s 
technical and practical capacity to achieve newly recognized common interests. 
American and Chinese nuclear scientists cooperated to develop new arms control 
verification instruments and technologies that strengthened China’s confidence in CTBT 
and other international arms control regimes. Bilateral training programs helped China 
bring up a new generation of export control experts across relevant government agencies 
and the defense industry. These experts learned best practices from the United States 
about export control implementation methods. Based on the U.S. model of strategic good 
management, China changed its export control system from one based on administrative 
control to one based on laws and legal regulations. All these have helped China to move 
forward in areas in which it perceives as sharing increasing common interests with the 
United States. 
Hypothesis 1C: The Chinese nuclear community is able to convince the top leadership 
that these new areas of common interest are real and worth pursuing in cooperation with 
the United States. 
In all three cases, operational-level engagement helps bring about a better internal 
interagency coordination mechanism in China on nuclear policies. The growth and 
expansion of the Chinese nuclear community gradually broke the bureaucratic boundaries 
between traditionally stovepipe governmental organizations. Many U.S.-Chinese 
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dialogues and exchange programs themselves served as unprecedented opportunities for 
Chinese experts from different sectors and organizations to meet and communicate with 
each other. Inspired by their American colleagues, members of the Chinese nuclear 
community from different government agencies actively sought to establish cross-agency 
communication channels. Such interagency communication and coordination 
mechanisms help the Chinese nuclear community to speak with the same voice and 
promote the same policy agendas. 
Under such a coordinated effort, the Chinese nuclear community initiated domestic 
discussions to rethink China’s policies such as the nuclear test ban, missile defense, and 
nuclear nonproliferation, which ultimately resulted in significant policy change at the 
official level. Using internal, bottom-up communication channels and open publication 
and advocacy, the Chinese nuclear community was able to convince the Chinese top 
leadership that it was in China’s interest to prepare for a comprehensive test ban, to 
pursue a nuclear strategy that contributes to stability, and to counter nuclear proliferation.  
As for moralistic trust, there are three specific hypotheses to be examined. The first 
hypothesis (Hypothesis 2A) is the same as Hypothesis 1A, which is already accepted 
based on empirical evidence. 
Hypothesis 2B: Operational-level engagement helps the Chinese nuclear community to 
recognize and/or accept more common moral/normative principles with the United States 
on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation issues. 
China’s domestic discussions reveal that normative consideration indeed affects the 
Chinese nuclear community’s thinking and policy deliberation. However, their 
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understanding of international norms is more in line with that of the developing countries 
than with that of the United States. They are more willing to respond to normative 
demands from nonaligned countries than the United States. Operational-level engagement 
does not seem to have changed this. 
Operational-level engagement provides the Chinese nuclear community with the 
opportunity to closely monitor domestic policy debates in the United States and to 
develop a deeper understanding about U.S. nuclear policy-making. However, this does 
not seem to have led the Chinese nuclear community to develop a more favorable 
understanding of the moral/normative principles behind the U.S. nuclear policy. After 
decades of engagement, the Chinese nuclear community still believes that U.S. nuclear 
policy-making is primarily guided by the following principles: pursuit of “absolute 
security,” technology supremacy, and peace through strength. It believes that the United 
States is more than willing to sacrifice or circumvent internationally accepted norms such 
as nuclear nonproliferation in order to achieve its geostrategic objectives. This has, in fact, 
encouraged the Chinese nuclear community to focus increasingly on calculations of 
geostrategic interests in their policy discussions. Normative consideration is receiving 
less attention and is becoming less important. The lesson that the Chinese nuclear 
community draws from observing U.S. nuclear policy-making is that China’s security 
depends on its strength and material capability as the most important source of leverage 
in international negotiations. Chinese nuclear thinking has become more realpolitik rather 
than less. This contradicts the hypothesis that operational-level engagement helps the 
Chinese nuclear community to recognize and/or accept more common moral/normative 
principles with the United States. Therefore, Hypothesis 2B has to be rejected. 
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Hypothesis 2C: The Chinese nuclear community is able to convince the top leadership 
that the United States and China share important moral/normative principles in their 
respective nuclear policy thinking. 
Since Hypothesis 2B is rejected, Hypothesis 2C cannot be accepted. In fact, as discussed 
in chapter four, the Chinese nuclear community shares the same view with the Chinese 
top leadership on moral/normative considerations of China’s nuclear policy. There is 
sufficient bottom-up communication and no significant perception gap between the 
nuclear community and the top leadership. In summary, operational-level engagement 
between the United States and China on nuclear issues increases China’s strategic trust 
toward the United States but does not increase China’s moralistic trust toward the United 
States. 
Theoretical Contribution 
Existing literature in IR does not answer the following questions: (a)whether trust-
building is possible in an anarchic international system,715(b)whether engagement is able 
to build trust,716 and (c) how effective are different approaches of engagement (bottom-
up engagement vs. top-down engagement) in building trust.717 These are critical 
questions that have important implications for deepening our understanding of IR 
theories. For the first and second questions, this research shows that whether trust-
building is possible in an anarchic system and whether engagement is able to build trust 
715Xuetong Yan, "The Instability of China–Us Relations," The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 
3 (2010); Zhang, China in International Society since 1949: Alienation and Beyond. 
716Kenneth Lieberthal, "A New China Strategy," Foreign Affairs (1995); Economy and Oksenberg, China 
Joins the World: Progress and Prospects. 
717Sun, "Building a Security Community in the Asia-Pacific Region: Dilemmas and Prospects."; Wheeler, 
"The Challenges to Trust-Building in Nuclear Worlds Project Practitioners Meeting Report." 
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depend on what trust means. Based on the existing literature on trust, this research 
proposes that a better way to understand trust is to distinguish “strategic trust” from 
“moralistic trust.” Empirical study in this research has proved that such categorization 
highlights the fundamental differences between the two types of trust and is very helpful 
for understanding the specific trust-building mechanisms.  
This research uses the most conservative cases for understanding trust. It finds that it is 
possible to build strategic trust even on highly sensitive national security issues such as 
nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. It challenges the realist theories, which 
completely dismiss the issue of trust in IR in general, let alone in the issue area of arms 
control and international security.718 The most important challenge that this research 
poses to rationalist theories in general is that it rejects the rationalist assumption that a 
state’s interests are predetermined and clearly understood. Rationalists believe a state’s 
interests are determined by the structure of the international system, the state’s position in 
the system and its security environment, among other things, and can be objectively 
evaluated.719 This research finds that a state’s preferences are more determined by its 
perception of its interests rather than its “real” interests understood in an objective matter. 
In fact, whether the assumed objective and “real” interests exist is questionable. In any 
case, a state’s perception of its own interests determines its preferences and objectives. 
One’s perception of interests constantly changes and is subject to influence. In this regard, 
the process of building strategic trust is a process in which one’s perception of interests 
718Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions."; "Back to the Future: Instability in 
Europe after the Cold War." 
719Buzan, Jones, and Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism; Lynch, "Why Engage? 




                                                            
gets influenced and changed and in which one comes to the recognition that it shares 
more common interests with the other than it originally thought. 
This research points out that a state does not always understand there are common 
interests at the inception of its interaction with the others. It traces an incremental process 
of convergence toward common interests among states that at first do not conceive of 
such common interests. This goes beyond the traditional rationalist approach, which 
tends to focus on interests at separated single points of time or in separate single 
occasions. 
The third question is which engagement approach (bottom-up vs. top-down) is more 
effective in building trust. Some scholars have argued that the top-down approach is more 
effective because there are few actors at the top level, which makes it easier to reach 
agreement without too much public pressure. For example, Tony Armstrong 
states,“[N]egotiations that successfully lead to a rapprochement are conducted at a high 
level, are nonpublic, and involve the fewest possible participants.”720 These scholars 
provide a few reasons to support their argument. They believe high-level talks are free 
from public attention and public pressure. Public attention can make the decision makers 
less likely to openly express their interests or to make necessary compromises.721 Public 
deliberation can make decision makers more interested in “playing to the passions of 
their audience than reaching rational consensus.”722 Therefore, secrecy at the high level 
720Tony Armstrong, Breaking the Ice: Rapprochement between East and West Germany, the United States 
and China, and Israel and Egypt(United States Institute of Peace Press Washington, DC, 1993). 
721Jon Elster, "Strategic Uses of Argument," in Barriers to Conflict Resolution, ed. Kenneth Joseph 
Arrow(WW Norton & Company, 1995); Deliberative Democracy, vol. 1(Cambridge University Press, 1998); 
Lynch, "Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement." 
722Michael N Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order(Columbia University Press, 
1998); Lynch, "Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement." 
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“allows flexibility by excluding rigid bureaucracies and interest group pressure, 
facilitates a focus on shared strategic interests rather than on contentious political issues 
and builds trust between top officials prior to bringing the new relationship into the 
open.”723 
The findings of this research show that the Chinese top leadership at the beginning 
embraced distinctively different perceptions from their American colleagues on 
fundamental issues including what is the role of strategic weapons, what contributes to or 
undermines stability, and what are each other’s interests. It is difficult to imagine that 
high-level talks would have been able to change their perceptions. Instead, as this 
research shows, such perception change mostly takes place at the operational level as a 
result of extensive engagement. This perception change at the operational level then 
gradually influenced the perception of the leadership at the top. Operational-level 
engagement does involve a much larger number of players, but it does not necessarily 
bring more public pressure. If conducted in a semi-closed environment, as most of U.S.-
Chinese nuclear engagement programs were, operational-level engagement is effective in 
promoting open discussions. 
This research shows operational-level engagement contributes to the growth of strategic 
trust through the building and growing of an epistemic community. Engagement brings 
about better internal interagency coordination within this community and facilitates 
bottom-up communication and influence between the community and the top leadership. 
This research confirms the effect of “argumentation” raised by some scholars. Checkel 
and Risse believe that if players are placed in an environment that is relatively insulated 
723"Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement." 
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from political pressure, they may be able to open themselves to persuasion by good 
arguments.724 This “act of argumentation” actually takes place at the operational level. 
U.S.-Chinese high-level official dialogue on nuclear issues, which started in the mid-
2000s, usually took place in a politically charged environment and on a far less regular 
basis than operational-level engagement. This makes the “act of argumentation” less 
likely to take place during high-level official dialogues. In contrast, there is very visible 
evidence for “persuasion by good arguments” that took place during operational-level 
engagement. The Chinese nuclear community learned and accepted Western arms control 
theories and used them to guide China’s own nuclear policy. They also gradually 
embraced Western concepts and changed their perceptions on a range of key issues such 
as deterrence, strategic stability, nonproliferation, etc., which are now very much in line 
with mainstream Western understanding. This perception change at the operational level 
leads to the Chinese nuclear community’s reassessment of their national interests. 
There is a general belief that operational-level engagement can reduce or resolve deeper 
disagreements, such as disagreements about identity, ideological beliefs, and moral 
principles and therefore increase trust.725 People who make arguments along this line 
believe that growth of this deeper type of trust requires broad participation by a large 
number of civil society members through some sort of people-to-people exchange, which 
can lead to fundamental change in interstate relations.726 U.S.-Chinese nuclear 
724Jeffrey T Checkel, "Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change," International 
organization 55, no. 03 (2001); Thomas Risse, "“Let's Argue!”: Communicative Action in World Politics," 
ibid.54, no. 01 (2000); Lynch, "Why Engage? China and the Logic of Communicative Engagement." 
725Lee Teng-hui, "Understanding Taiwan-Bridging the Perception Gap," Foreign Affaires 78(1999); Baogang 
He, "The Role of Civil Society in Defining the Boundary of a Political Community: The Cases of South Korea 
and Taiwan," Asian Studies Review 23, no. 1 (1999). 
726Constantin Holzer and Haibin Zhang, "The Potentials and Limits of China–Eu Cooperation on Climate 
Change and Energy Security," Asia Europe Journal 6, no. 2 (2008); Lena C Endresen and Signe Gilen, 
311 
 
                                                            
engagement resembles this type of broad engagement among all relevant players at the 
operational level. However, moralistic trust does not increase as a result.  
Growth of moralistic trust depends on convergence of moral/normative principles held by 
the respective nuclear communities. This research shows that operational-level 
engagement does not necessarily have a positive impact in this regard. Chinese 
perceptions that the United States follows realpolitik rules rather than international norms 
and moral principles gets reinforced after decades of engagement. This has encouraged 
the Chinese nuclear community to attach less importance to moral/normative 
considerations in its policy deliberation. Instead of converging moral/normative 
principles, there is less common ground for shared moral/normative principles. The 
argument that broad-based engagement increases moralistic trust is problematic. 
Policy Implications 
As China’s economic and military capability continues to increase, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to implement a containment strategy. Most strategists argue that the 
United States should continue engaging China in order to influence China’s policies in a 
direction that does not contradict U.S. objectives and interests.727 The issue is, what is the 
most effective way to engage China? As mentioned above, some scholars argue that 
"Consultations and Consensus: Implementing the Israeli-Palestinian People-to-People Programme for 
Development," Development 43, no. 3 (2000); Pavlos E Michaelides, "Interfaith Dialogue in Global 
Perspective and the Necessity of Youth Involvement," Asia Europe Journal 7, no. 3-4 (2009); Yale 
Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain(Penn State Press, 2010). 
727William H Perry, "Us Strategy: Engage China, Not Contain It," remarks delivered to the Washington State 
China Relations Council (1995); R Bradford Leininger, "China 2015: Us National Strategic Policy Now and 
Then,"(DTIC Document, 1996); Thomas J Christensen, "Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise 
of China and Us Policy toward East Asia," International security 31, no. 1 (2006). 
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engagement should focus on Chinese senior officials.728The Chinese themselves also 
hold the view that trust-building should start at the top level.729 In practice, however, in 
the field of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation, high-level official dialogues have 
shown limitations in building trust. Nuclear arms control and nonproliferation are not as 
important issues to Chinese top leaders as to U.S. leaders. Chinese top leaders (except 
Mao and Deng) are not particularly interested in spending time and energy on nuclear 
policy. This lack of high-level attention from the Chinese side explains the relatively rare 
high-level official dialogues between the United States and China. Nuclear issues did not 
receive significant attention in previous high-level dialogues, and most of the nuclear-
related discussion was repetition of official lines without much substance.730 
The operational-level engagement, therefore, offers the best hope for narrowing the gap 
between the two countries on nuclear policy. However, some analysts are too optimistic 
about the impact of operational-level engagement and believe that such engagement can 
in the long run fundamentally change the nature of the relationship.731 This research 
shows that operational-level engagement has not increased moralistic trust over the past 
three decades and probably is not going to do so in the near future. After the Chinese 
728Armstrong, Breaking the Ice: Rapprochement between East and West Germany, the United States and 
China, and Israel and Egypt. 
729Qianyi (舒前毅) Duan, "Sino-American Mutual Trust Building in the 21 Century (21 世纪中美建立互信
研究))" (Central China Normal University (华中师范大学), 2008); Yongjie (倪永杰) Ni, "Enhance Political 
Trust, Deepen Peaceful Development (增进政治互信，深化和平发展),"(Shanghai: Shanghai Taiwan 
Research Institute (上海台湾研究所), 2013). 
730Lu, "U.S.-China Arms Control Interaction and Its Theoretical Analysis (中美在军控领域的交流及其理论
分析)."; "The United States and China Held Strategic Security, Multilateral Arms Control, and 
Nonproliferation Dialogue (中美举行战略安全、多边军控和防扩散磋商)"; "Background Information: 
U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue (背景资料：中美战略对话).” 
731Yandong (刘延东) Liu, "Deepening Sino-American People-to-People Exchange and Building a New Type 
of Great Powers Relationship: Speech at the Third Round of Sino-U.S. People-to-People Exchange High-
Level Consultation Meeting (深化中美人文交流，构建新型大国关系——在第三轮中美人文交流高层
磋商会议上的讲话),"(Beijing: Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China, May 4 2012). 
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nuclear community develops a more sophisticated understanding of U.S. nuclear policy-
making, its view that the United States pursues realpolitik and does not value 
moral/normative principles actually gets reinforced. As a result, decision makers should 
be realistic about what can be achieved through operational-level engagement. 
On the issue of deep nuclear reduction, for instance, Chinese analysts agree that President 
Obama is more active in promoting nuclear arms control but believe that his initiative is 
primarily driven by calculations of interests.732 As one puts it, “Obama’s ‘nuclear free 
world’ proposal, although objectively speaking has positive and progressive implications, 
is essentially a continuation of America’s political philosophy which pursues ‘absolute 
security’; it is due to Obama administration’s reassessment of the features of the security 
threats faced by the United States, and of America’ ability to protect its security; it is an 
important strategic measure to employ ‘smart power’ to pursue America’s ‘absolute 
security.’”733 Even for the Obama administration, which has taken very active steps to 
pursue deep nuclear reductions, it is difficult to convince China that the United States 
intends to break away from realpolitik thinking and to bring about substantial 
transformation of its nuclear relationship with China and other countries. If the United 
States indeed seeks to fundamentally change China’s perception on these issues, this 
might not be a goal that is achievable. At least operational-level engagement does not 
seem to be able to contribute. 
732Sun, "New Challenges and New Agenda for China's Arms Control (中国军控的新挑战与新议程)."; Lu, 
"U.S.-China Arms Control Interaction and Its Theoretical Analysis (中美在军控领域的交流及其理论分
析)." 




                                                            
With that said, there is strong evidence that operational-level engagement increases 
strategic trust. Both types of operational-level engagement—concentrated engagement 
and long-term engagement—help the two countries find new common interests and 
become more motivated to achieve these newly recognized common interests. Therefore, 
future engagement programs with China should focus more on promoting interest-based 
cooperation. More importantly, policy makers should not assume that common interests 
are something obvious. Various factors such as history, culture, bureaucratic habits, and 
lack of first-hand experience can all undermine the partner’s ability to recognize the 
existence of common interests. Future dialogues and exchanges can focus more on 
addressing these potential obstacles. 
According to the findings of this research, the increase of strategic trust is a direct result 
of the growth and expansion of the Chinese nuclear community. Policy makers who are 
responsible for managing operational-level engagement should recognize that helping 
China’s nuclear community to grow and expand is an important and worthy goal in and 
of itself, even if the engagement programs do not generate immediate progress in the 
short term. Some U.S. participants of existing dialogues complain that when the Chinese 
delegation has new members on its team, these new Chinese participants tend to repeat 
the same arguments and views that had already been expressed in previous meetings.734 
From the perspective of building China’s nuclear community, it is actually beneficial to 
the United States for China to broaden the base of its participants in these dialogues. As 
more Chinese experts come to participate in these programs and start to engage with 
American colleagues, China’s nuclear community grows. Policy makers should 
734Personal correspondence with American participants of these programs, 2011, 2012. 
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encourage rotational participation in these dialogues and actively seek to bring new 
experts into these programs. In this regard, more Chinese military personnel should be 
encouraged to participate, because the number of Chinese participants from the PLA has 
so far been relatively small. Both countries should work together to reduce bureaucratic 
barriers for bringing additional Chinese military participants into the engagement 
programs. 
Last but not least, the establishment of an appropriate risk-management mechanism in 
these exchange programs is important. Nuclear scientists are frequent participants of 
these programs and have greatly contributed to narrowing the gap between the two 
countries on important issues including CTBT, FMCT, and nuclear security. A certain 
level of information sharing has been proven necessary and very helpful for constructive 
dialogues. However, conservative politicians are always suspicious about such exchanges 
that involve technical experts and are extremely concerned about any potential release of 
sensitive information. In the case of the U.S.-China Arms Control Technical Exchange 
Program (also known as the U.S.-China Lab-to-Lab Technical Exchange Program), the 
United States set up an interagency oversight group consisting of officials from the State 
Department, DOD, DOE, National Security Council, Office of Science and Technology 
Policy, and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to ensure that American scientists’ 
interactions with their Chinese colleagues are carefully coordinated and do not reveal 
sensitive information.735 Even so, some U.S. Congressmen attacked this interaction for 
releasing sensitive information to the Chinese. Much to the opposition of many U.S. 
nuclear policy officials and nuclear scientists, the publication of the Cox Committee 
735Prindle, "U.S.-China Lab-to-Lab Technical Exchange Program." 
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Report in 1999 essentially terminated the U.S.-China Arms Control Technical Exchange 
Program, and it has never resumed.736The loss of potential opportunities as a result of the 
termination of this program cannot be fully evaluated. It serves as a reminder that 
technical exchange is an important part of U.S.-Chinese nuclear engagement, but security 
measures and oversight mechanisms should be emphasized to ensure that operational-
level engagement can be effectively and continuously conducted without significant 
interruption in the future. 
  
736Capua, "The Cox Report and the Us-China Arms Control Technical Exchange Program." 
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